51 U.S. 56 | SCOTUS | 1850
ISAAC SHELBY, COMPLAINANT,
v.
JOHN BACON, ALEXANDER SYMINGTON, THOMAS ROBINS, JAMES ROBERTSON, RICHARD H. BAYARD, JAMES S. NEWBOLD, HERMAN COPE, THOMAS S. TAYLOR, AND GEORGE BEACH.
Supreme Court of United States.
*60 The case was argued by Mr. Clay, for the complainant, and by Mr. Wm. A. Porter and Mr. George M. Wharton, for the defendants.
*67 Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes before us from the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges.
The complainant, who is a citizen of Kentucky, filed his bill against John Bacon and others, assignees of the late Bank of the United States under the charter from the State of Pennsylvania. The bank, being in a failing condition, executed assignments of its assets for the benefit of its creditors, and of certain creditors of the Bank of the United States chartered by Congress.
The complainant represents himself to be a creditor of the late bank, to a large amount, which is shown by judgments recovered in the "District Court" for the city and county of Philadelphia; and in the Commercial Court of New Orleans. That, on application to the trustees aforesaid, they refused to pay the said judgments or any part of them, although they have funds in their hands or under their control, to pay the debts of the bank, &c.
*68 The defendants pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court. They admit the trust as alleged, and aver that the assignments were recorded as required by the acts of Pennsylvania; and they aver that the Court of Common Pleas of the city and county of Philadelphia has ample power to enforce the trust, in regard to the rights of all parties claiming an interest therein. That the defendants under those laws, at different periods down to the 1st of January, 1847, filed their accounts, duly verified, "of their receipts and disbursements, with the prothonotary of the said court," which were sanctioned by the court. That under its direction they have vested large sums of money to await the result of pending litigations. And they submit to the court whether they ought to be compelled to answer.
On the hearing the judges were opposed in opinion on the following points:
1. Whether the facts stated in the plea to the amended bill filed by John Bacon, Alexander Symington, and Thomas Robins, deprive the court of jurisdiction of the case; and whether the plea to the plaintiff's bill is sufficient and ought to be allowed.
2. Whether the facts stated in the plea to the amended bill filed by the defendants James Robertson, Richard H. Bayard, James S. Newbold, Herman Cope, and Thomas S. Taylor, deprive the court of jurisdiction of the case, and whether the said plea is a sufficient plea to the plaintiff's bill, and ought to be allowed.
There is no principle better settled, than that, where two or more tribunals have a concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject-matter and the parties, a suit commenced in any one of them may be pleaded in abatement to an action for the same cause in any other. And the question we are now to consider is, whether the procedure in the Court of Common Pleas, above stated, under the special acts of Pennsylvania, abates the suit of the plaintiff.
Can the proceeding stated in the plea be considered a suit? The revised act of Pennsylvania, of the 14th of June, 1836, entitled, "An Act relating to assignees for the benefit of creditors and other trustees," requires in the first six sections the assignment to be recorded in thirty days, and the assignment being voluntary, "the assignees shall file an inventory or schedule of the estate or effects so assigned, which shall be sworn to"; on which it is made the duty of the court to appoint appraisers, who shall return an inventory and appraisement; on the return of which the assignees are required to give bond "to the Commonwealth, that they will in all things comply with the provisions of the act of Assembly, and shall faithfully execute the *69 trust confided to them," &c. The defendants aver, "that having in part executed the trust so as above committed to them, they did, on the 7th of January, 1843, file in the office of the prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas aforesaid an account, duly verified, of their receipts and disbursements," &c. And several other and similar returns are averred to have been made.
By the seventh section of the act, the court are authorized, on the application of any person interested, to issue a citation to any assignee or trustee for the benefit of creditors, whether appointed by a voluntary assignment or in pursuance of the laws relating to insolvent debtors, &c., requiring him "to appear and exhibit, under oath or affirmation, the accounts of the trust in the said court," &c. The ninth section authorizes the court to give notice, by publication, when the accounts will be acted on, that objections to them may be made. And by the eleventh section, where a trustee has neglected or refused, when required by law, to file a true and complete inventory, or to give bond with surety, when so required by law, or to file the accounts of his trust, "it shall be lawful for the court". (of Common Pleas) "to issue a citation, &c., to show cause why he should not be dismissed."
Now it does not appear from the plea that the assignees ever filed the inventory of the assets in their hands with the prothonotary of the court, as required by the first section, and it would seem that not only the inventory must be filed, where the assignment is voluntary, to give jurisdiction to the court, but also that it must be sworn to, an appraisement of the trust property made and returned, and bond given by the assignees. This is a proceeding under a statute, and to bring the case within the statute, every material requirement of the act must be complied with. And if the above requisites have not been observed, it is not perceived how the court could take jurisdiction of the case.
In the plea it is stated that accounts have been filed by the assignees at different times, and moneys distributed among the creditors. But how can this give jurisdiction? The court has no evidence of the extent and value of the trust, and no bond of the assignees faithfully to account. If these important steps have been taken, they should have been stated in the plea; as it must show, to be effectual, that the court had jurisdiction of the whole matter. The plea is defective in not setting out the above requirements.
But if the plea had been perfect in this respect, it would not follow that the complainant could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. He being a non-resident has his option *70 to bring his suit in that court, unless he has submitted, or is made a party, in some form, to the special jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas.
It appears from the bill, that the assignees have refused to allow the claim of the plaintiff, or any part of it. To establish this claim as against the assignees, the complainant has a right to sue in the Circuit Court, which was established chiefly for the benefit of non-residents. Not that the claim should thus be established by any novel principle of law or equity, but that his rights might be investigated free from any supposed local prejudice or unconstitutional legislation. On the most liberal construction favorable to the exercise of the special jurisdiction, the rights of the plaintiff, in this respect, could not, against his consent, be drawn into it.
It is difficult to define the character of this procedure under the Pennsylvania law. There being no court of chancery in that State, statutory provision was made for the execution of trusts. The statutes adopt some of the principles of chancery, but do not invest the court with the powers of a court of equity which are necessarily exercised in administering trusts.
It is not strictly a proceeding in rem. The proceeding is intended to adjust the rights of debtors and creditors of the bank, beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Pennsylvania. Citizens residing, perhaps, in a majority of the States of the Union, are debtors or creditors of the bank. It is difficult to perceive by what mode of procedure the State of Pennsylvania can obtain and exercise an exclusive jurisdiction over the rights of persons thus situated. From the plea, it does not appear that any notices have been given, or citations issued, as authorized by the statute. Nothing more seems to have been done by the assignees than to file their accounts, have them referred to auditors, and finally sanctioned by the court. Whether this procedure is evidence of a faithful discharge of the trust so far as the accounts have been so adjusted, it is not necessary to inquire. We suppose that it could not be contended, that fraud or collusion might not be shown to avoid the proceeding before any tribunal having jurisdiction.
No suit seems to be pending in the Common Pleas. The action of the assignees appears to be voluntary, for their own justification, and not in obedience to the order of the court. By the statute, any person interested may, on application to the court, obtain a citation to the assignees to appear and answer. But this is nothing more than the ordinary exercise of a chancery power to compel them to account. And it is only an exercise of jurisdiction over them from the time the bill is filed and a notice served, or the application for a citation is made *71 on due notice. If no such proceeding is had, the assignees, it would appear, file their accounts or omit to do so at their pleasure.
This is not in the nature of a bankrupt or insolvent procedure. Neither the person nor the property of the assignor is entitled to exemption, under the statute, from the claims of creditors. But in such a proceeding, notice to the creditors and a schedule of debts, as well as assets, are required by law.
Under the laws of Pennsylvania a debtor may assign his property for the benefit of his creditors, giving a preference to some of them over others. This may be done by the common law. The assignment made by the late Bank of the United States specifies different classes of creditors, but none are excluded from the benefits of the assignment.
The assignees admit, in their plea, that they have vested a large amount of assets to await the determination of certain suits still pending. Suppose they had reduced to possession the whole amount of the assets of the bank, and held them ready for distribution; could it be doubted that the complainant would have a right to file his bill in the Circuit Court, not only to establish his claim against them, but also for a proportionate share of the assets. The Circuit Court could not enjoin the Court of Common Pleas, nor revise its proceedings, as on a writ of error; but it could act on the assignees, and enforce the rights of the plaintiff against them. The debts due by the bank being ascertained, and the amount of its assets, after the payment of all costs, the equitable distribution would not be difficult.
Not doubting that the complainant may file his bill in the Circuit Court for the purposes stated, against the defendants, we deem it unnecessary at this time to consider questions which may arise in the exercise of the jurisdiction. The questions certified by the Circuit Court are both answered in the negative.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and on the points and questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, 1st. That the facts stated in the amended plea to the amended bill filed by John Bacon, Alexander Symington, and Thomas Robins, do not deprive *72 the said Circuit Court of jurisdiction of this case; 2d. That the facts stated in the plea to the amended bill filed by the defendants James Robertson, Richard H. Bayard, James S. Newbold, Herman Cope, and Thomas S. Taylor, do not deprive the said Circuit Court of jurisdiction of this case; and that this opinion renders it unnecessary for this court to answer the remainder of the questions certified. Whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.
