170 Ga. 578 | Ga. | 1930
This ease is in equity. The facts strongly call for the interposition of the powers of a court of equity. The contract between Sheftall, holder of the legal title to the property, and the Eealty Company contemplated a sale of the property by the Eealty Company. It made express provision for such sale. That was the obvious purpose moving the Eealty Company to execute the contract with Sheftall. The contract did not require that purchasers from the Eealty Company should pay the full purchase-price in cash. The contract did not expressly provide that purchasers from the Realty Company were obligated to see that the Eealty Company paid over to Sheftall the money paid to the Eealty Companj'v The Eealty Company sold designated lots to Johnson, and Johnson has paid the contract price for his lots in full, to wit: $1050. According to the contract between Sheftall and the Eealty Company, Sheftall was obligated to execute a deed to the Eealty Company when eighty per cent, of this $1050 was paid to Sheftall. Eighty per cent, would be $840. The petition alleges that the Eealty Company paid to Sheftall $474.53 out of the $1050 paid by Johnson; also that the Eealty Company made “anticipated payments” as provided in section 4 of the contract amounting to $300, which, added to the $474.53 amounts to $774.53. The paragraph of the contract mentioned provides that the Eealty Company shall have the right “to anticipate in payment any and all amounts due under this agreement, and shall be entitled to obtain conveyance from the said Solomon Sheftall as herein set forth, either upon the payment of the amounts at the dates herein specified or when the pajnnent of such amounts is anticipated.” The Eealty Company agreed to pay all taxes. The petition alleges that the company did pay taxes to the amount of $198.04.
’ We are dealing with the sufficiency of the petition as against the demurrer. We proceed, therefore, on the theory that Sheftall has actually received $474.53 in cash on the particular payments