192 Iowa 1288 | Iowa | 1921
J. G. Heitzman had no money, — was insolvent. Upon the expectation of Mabel Heitzman to receive money from her mother’s estate and from her grandmother, which she did after-wards receive, negotiations were begun with H. J. Kennedy, appellee, for the purchase of the property to be occupied by them as a homestead, which they did purchase for $2,500. A contract of purchase of the property was made and signed, from Kennedy to J. G. Heitzman, or Jerome Heitzman, the same person. The contract was prepared by Kennedy’s lawyer. It was signed by both Jerome and Mabel Heitzman, at a bank where Kennedy was cashier. When they were returning home from signing the contract, Mabel said to Jerome, “Why is that contract not made in my name?” Jerome said, “It is only a contract, and as soon
This action was begun May 29, 1918, about two months after the assignment of the contract and the quitclaim deed were made by J. G. Heitzman to Mabel Heitzman. In the original petition, appellant alleged that appellee J. G. Heitzman had purchased from H. J. Kennedy, who held the legal title, the premises 'in controversy, and was the owner of an equity and interest in the property; that Kennedy held the property, subject to the payment by J. G. Heitzman of the -remainder of the purchase price;'that the interest of J. G. Heitzman'in and to the property had been acquired subsequent to the recovery of the judgments of the plaintiff; and that the equity and interest in the realty of J. G. Heitzman was liable, in equity, for the payment and satisfaction of the judgments. Appellant prayed for judgment and decree establishing the judgments as liens against the interest of J. G. Heitzman in and to the property; that the balance due Kennedy, holder of the legal title, be ascertained; and that the property be sold, and out of the proceeds of the sale the balance of the purchase price due Kennedy be first paid; and that the remainder of the proceeds be applied in satisfaction of plaintiff’s judgements.
In an amended petition, plaintiff alleged, on information, not having access to the contract, that the contract provided that
Appellees answered separately, but their answers were substantially alike. They admitted rendition of the judgments, but denied that J. G. Heitzman, appellee, was tbe owner of an equitable or any other interest in tbe property in controversy; denied that be ever bad any interest in the property, equitable or otherwise. Appellees averred that, about May 20, 1916, J. G. Heitzman negotiated for and on behalf of Mabel Heitzman, his wife, to purchase the real estate in controversy as a homestead for said Mabel Heitzman and himself and their family; that a contract was made and entered into on May 20, 1916, between Kennedy, appellee, and Mabel Heitzman, appellee; that, by inadvertence or mistake, the contract was written in form only as though J. G. Heitzman, appellee, was the party in interest; but that, in fact and in deed, the said Mabel Heitzman was to furnish the consideration for the purchase of said real estate, and did furnish the consideration thus far paid towards the purchase of said real estate; and that Mabel Heitzman was, at the time, the real purchaser; that J. G. Heitzman, in effect, had and has no interest in the property other than as the husband of Mabel Heitzman; that, in pursuance of the purchase of the property as a homestead, J. G. Heitzman and Mabel Heitzman, with their family, constituted of four children, ranging from two and one-half to eleven years .of age, began to occupy the premises as a homestead in October, 1916, and have ever since so occupied it; that, under the law, the property was exempt from execution; that Mabel Heitzman had paid from her personal resources all the money which had been paid on the contract; that, on March 19, 1918, J. G. Heitzman, appellee, assigned, conveyed, and transferred to Mabel Heitzman, appellee, his apparent right, title, and interest in the contract, and made
Copies of the contract, with indorsement of payments thereon, and of the quitclaim deed, were annexed to the answers.
Appellees further allege that the judgments against J. G. Heitzman, appellee, had been recovered more than ten years prior to May 16, 1916, the date of the contract; and that the judgments were not and never had been liens on the real estate in controversy; and that the property was notssubject to the satisfaction of the judgments.
After appellees’ answers were filed, plaintiff amended its petition, alleging that the assignment of the contract and the execution of the deed from -J. G. Heitzman to Mabel Heitzman, appellee, were for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of appellee J. G. Heitzman, and to prevent the subjection of the realty in controversy to the satisfaction of the judgments due the plaintiff, and that appellee J. G. Heitz-man was insolvent at the time of the execution and delivery of the contract and deed, and that they were executed without sufficient consideration, and were of no effect in equity; and prayed that the assignment of the contract and the deed be. set aside.
In reply to the separate answers of appellees, plaintiff averred that appellees J. G. Heitzman and Mabel Heitzman were estopped by the terms of the contract from claiming and as
There was no dispute in the evidence. The only testimony offered by appellant was formal entries of the judgments which had been admitted by defendant, and the original contract, with payments indorsed thereon, which was furnished by defendant. Appellant offered no oral testimony. The only witnesses were the appellees.
If Mabel Heitzman, appellee, wife of J. G-. Heitzman, ap-pellee, in fact furnished from her own resources all of the money paid on the contract, — all of the purchase money which had been paid for the property in controversy, — that would seem to be determinative of this case, in favor of appellees and against appellant. The evidence, without dispute, shows that she did furnish the money to pay every cent that was paid on the purchase price of the property. True, J. G. Heitzman, appellee, paid the installments, most of them, on the contract to Kennedy, but it is not shown that he used one cent of his own money in making such payments. But on the contrary, it is clearly and conclusively proven that all of the payments were made with the individual money of Mabel Heitzman. J. G. Heitzman was insolvent, was a clerk in a store, and it is not shown that he ever had any money of his own with which to make payments. It does appear without contradiction that Mabel Heitzman re
Appellant claims that fraud was intended and committed by transferring the contract and executing the quitclaim deed. Appellant asserts that J. G. Heitzman transferred the property to Mabel Heitzman for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The evidence does not prove these claims, but positively disproves them. It is not shown that any money of J. G. Heitz-man’s went into the purchase of the premises, but it conclusively appears from the evidence that Mabel Heitzman furnished from her own individual means all the money which was paid on the property. J. G. Heitzman did not pay anything towards the purchase price nor towards the improvements on the homestead. There could be no fraud on the part of Mabel Heitzmán, for she did not know of the existence of plaintiff’s judgments until the commencement of this action. All of the appellees, who were all the persons having personal knowledge of the transaction, say that the property was purchased by Mabel Heitzman, but, by inadvertence or mistake, the contract of purchase ran to J. G. Heitzman.
The record shows that the transaction was free from fraud, and, although not done in as strictly a businesslike manner as is usual with strangers, was carried out more strictly than is usual between husband and wife. The court was correct in finding the equities with appellees and in dismissing the petition.
Decree and judgment must be and are affirmed. — Affirmed.