256 Pa. 172 | Pa. | 1917
Opinion by
Nothing is to be found in the elaborate argument of learned counsel for appellant justifying a distinction between this case and Palmer v. Protected Home Circle, 252 Pa. 201. There the stipulation of the beneficiary was that compliance on his part with all the laws, rules, regulations and requirements of the association then in force, or that might thereafter be enacted by it, was the express condition upon which he was to be entitled to participate in the beneficiary fund. The stipulation of this beneficiary with the same association is identical in its terms, but it is contended that a provision in the certificate issued to him distinguishes his case from Palmer’s. That provision is as follows: “It is further agreed, that in case the said Lewis Sheetz, shall live to the age of physical disability according to the American experience table of mortality, in this case seventy (70) years or shall be proven to be totally and permanently physically disabled previous to that time, from any cause except intemperance or immoral conduct on his own part, as per article 8, sec. 9, of the constitution, from following his own or any other remunerative occupation whereby he can earn a livelihood; which proof must be certified to by the president, secretary and medical ex
It is further urged that judgment ought not to have been entered against the appellant in view of the following averment in its affidavit of defense: “The deponent avers that the plaintiff in this case, by and through the
Another contention of the appellant is the following, set up in the 27th paragraph of its affidavit of defense: “The defendant avers that as the charter, or fundamental laAV by which the defendant association or society was created or incorporated neither contemplates, nor in any manner refers to, the payment at the age of expectancy of any part of the amount named in the benefit certificates issued to members, the embodying or inclusion of such a provision in the benefit certificate in suit is ultra vires and void, as being an act beyond the scope of the powers of the defendant association as defined by its charter.” The purpose for Avhich the defendant association was incorporated, as declared in its charter, is to promote the welfare of its living members and render them “assistance of a moral, social, intellectual and pecuniary nature.” Among its funds there is one for the payment of certain sums to members Avho have reached the age of permanent physical disability. It thus promotes their welfare and renders them assistance of a “pecuniary nature,” and, in so doing, is-acting within its clear corporate poAver. ' It has received the dues
Judgment affirmed.