Sheets v. StateSheets v. State
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Daniel T. Van
Assistant County Prosecutor
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
For William Sheets
Stuart H. Lippe
940 Leader Building
526 Superior Ave.
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
For Richard Ogletree
Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Karnell Johnson, pro se
464 Eddy Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44108
Fred Andrew Farley, Jr., pro se
10914 Nelson, Down
Cleveland, Ohio 44103
Otis Lockett, pro se
4681 Country Lane, Apt. 157
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, the appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court‘s judgments granting the petitions contesting the application of Ohio‘s Adam Walsh Act (“AWA“) filed by the appellees, William Sheets, Karnell Johnson, Fred Andrew Farley, Jr., Otis Lockett, and Richard Ogletree, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court convicted Sheets of rape in 1984; Johnson of sexual battery in 1991; Farley of sexual battery in 1996; Lockett of kidnapping with the purpose to engage in sexual activity in 1986; and Ogletree of rape in 1983. At the time of the filing of the petitions in these cases each appellee was residing in Cuyahoga County and registering with the county sheriff pursuant to
{¶ 4} While appellees’ petitions were pending, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, reconsideration denied, 126 Ohio St.3d 1235, 2010-Ohio-3737, 933 N.E.2d 810, in which the Supreme Court held that, ”
{¶ 5} Thereafter, the trial court granted each appellee‘s petition pursuant to Bodyke and in each case stated, “Petitioner is restored to his previous registration status under the terms and conditions of the final decision in his criminal case.” It is from these orders that the state appeals.
{¶ 6} The state first argues that the trial court erred in applying Bodyke to the appellees because they were classified under Megan‘s Law by operation of law rather than by an Ohio court. The state contends that where there is no prior judicial order classifying a sex offender, reclassification by the attorney general under the AWA does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine under Bodyke because it does not require the opening of a final court order or a review by the executive branch of a past decision of the judicial branch. The state argues in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred by applying Bodyke to the appellees because the appellees did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were previously classified by an Ohio court.
{¶ 7} This court recently addressed these precise arguments in Speight v. State of Ohio, 2011-Ohio-2933, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044, 96405 and Hannah v. Ohio, 2011-Ohio-2930, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95883, 95884, 95885, 95886, 95887, 95888, 95889.
{¶ 8} In Hannah we stated, “[w]e recognize that the state raises a conceivably correct interpretation of Bodyke and that the language in Bodyke appears to limit its separation-of-powers holding to judicially classified sex offenders and not those sex offenders classified by operation of law. However, the remedy of Bodyke was complete and included total severance of the provisions providing for the attorney general‘s authority to reclassify sex offenders. The severance makes no distinction between those classified judicially and those classified by operation of law.” We concluded that “offenders whose pre-AWA classification arose purely as a matter of law still must receive the benefit of the Bodyke remedy returning those offenders to their pre-AWA classifications because of Bodyke‘s complete severance of the statutory provisions governing reclassification by the attorney general.” Id.
{¶ 9} Until the Ohio Supreme Court renders a decision expressly limiting the holding in Bodyke, we will continue to apply the precedents made by this court. In further support of this conclusion, we note the Ohio Supreme Court‘s recent decision in State v. Williams, ____ Ohio St.3d ____, 2011-Ohio-3374, wherein the Court held:
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in applying Bodyke and we overrule the State‘s assignments of error.
{¶ 11} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the lower court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR