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Sheets v. Graco, Inc.
292 N.W.2d 63
N.D.
1980
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*1 Judgment or order.— “14-17—14. SHEETS, Appellant, Plaintiff and

Leona the amount to be determining “5. of the support parent paid GRACO, INC., Corporation; a Minnesota during which the and the child Exchange, n Farmers Unio Central owed, court enforc- support is duty of association; cooperative Minnesota support shall con- obligation of ing the Company of Powers Farmers Oil Union facts, including: all relevant sider Lake, Dakota, North Dakota North child; The needs of the a. association, cooperative Defendants living circum- The standard of b. Appellees. parents; stances Civ. No.. means of the The relative financial c. parents; Dakota. Supreme Court of North earning ability parents; The d. child capacity e. The need April education, higher educa- including tion; child; age

f. resources and

g. financial child;

earning ability of the parents responsibility

h. others; and support The value of services contributed

i. parent.

the custodial factors foregoing

It is our view considered the court

should be matters of child

proceeding to determine proceeding not such

support, whether or Parentage under the Uniform

commenced

Act. The trial court’s determination parent for the paid by to be

amount

support of the child should be based factors, not limit- including, but

all relevant to, 14-17- set forth in §

ed those factors Unterseher,

14(5), N.D.C.C. State factors, Those ability, financial

addition to the father’s to consider

important criteria for the court obligation, if determining support Krueger.

any, impose upon pro- remand for further

We reverse and opinion.

ceedings consistent with this PEDERSON,

ERICKSTAD, J., and C. SAND, JJ., concur.

VANDE WALLE and

Letnes, Fiedler, Forks, Marshall & Grand plaintiff appellant; argued F. Marshall, John Forks. Grand McGee, Hankla, Wheeler, Backes & Mi- Graco, not, Inc., appellee, for defendant and corporation; argued by a Minnesota Orlin Backes, W. Minot. Wahl, Neff, Williston,

Bjella, Rathert & appellee, for defendant and Farmers Union Exchange, cooperative Central Minnesota association; Jacobson, argued by Paul W. Williston. .Minot,

Pringle Herigstad, defend- appellee, ant and Farmers Union Oil Com- Lake, Dakota, pany of Powers North association; cooperative Dakota North ar- gued Mahoney, Mitchell Minot. Brantner, Vogel Vogel, Kelly, Mart R. Knutson, Bye, Fargo, Weir & amicus curiae support appellant. plaintiff ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. summary appeal judg- This is granted ment in favor the defendants on ground plaintiff’s claim is barred affirm. the statute of limitations. We brought A death action was Sheets, plaintiff,. surviving Leona wife of T. the late Harold Sheets. The incident which resulted in Harold’s death 2, 1975, August he occurred on while spray painting building a farm near Stan- paint North ley, applying Dakota. While barn, alleged paint sprayer it is thereof, injecting paint into Harold’s recover discharged respect who, mishap, this he died and in As a result of case body. which, corporation or company September have been liable if had not action, Graco, Inc., in this The defendants damages, shall be liable to an action for Exchange, Union Central Farmers notwithstanding the death of the *3 Company of Powers Union Oil Farmers tort-feasor, or of the and al- Lake, referred Dakota North [hereinafter though the death been caused shall have corporations collectively Graco], such in circumstances as- amount and sale of the engaged in the manufacture felony.” law to paint spraying equipment by used paint and right At common law was no of re occurred in Harold at the time accident wrongful covery negligent injury August of 1975. of another caused his death. Harsh by action present was commenced Co., Ry. man v. Pac. 14 N.D. Northern July on complaint service of a summons and wrong Although 103 N.W. 412 nearly years Harold’s four after pecuniary another loss ful death of involves sought damages pecuni- death. Leona person seeking compensation, of her ary loss she suffered as a result right bring purely such an is stat death, including property, loss of husband’s utory, statutory provisions and loss Her support, loss of and of consortium. wrongful be main which a death action can against corporations each of the Chapter are contained 32-21 of tained as defendants in this lawsuit is named the North Dakota Arm Century Code. lia- negligence, based claims of strict Miller, N.W.2d, (N.D. strong v. expressed bility, implied and breach and 1972). warranties. wrongful death statute “is not a summary dis- judgment Motions for statute to increase the survival intended complaint by missal of the were filed each deceased, purpose estate of the but its corporations August three of the protection give per a measure of to those and the motions were consolidated hear- degree relationship within a fixed sons ground ing. The for each of the motions dependency on because of the deceased was that death action by them reason by actual sustained barred statute of limita- wrongful killing of the deceased tions as set forth in Minneapolis, Satterberg . .” St. Dakota A hear- Century the North Code. 38, 41, Ry. M. P. S. S. 19 N.D. ing summary judgment on the motions for 32-21-03, (1909); see N.W. 2,1979, Burke was held on October Coun- N.D.C.C. Court, ty Judicial Dis- District Northwest to the ex- The amount recovered inures trict. The trial court determined heirs, clusive benefit deceased’s limita- action was barred the statute of the debts amount shall not be liable for said tions, summary judgment was entered 32-21-04, of the deceased. Section N.D. appeals to this October Leona C.C. judgment. court from There has never been a self-contained 32-21-01 of the Dakota North of limitations within the Century is our death statute Code provisions Chapter provides follows: N.D.C.C., However, pro- “32-21-01. When action for death pertinent part: vides in wrongful act —Whenever maintainable having two-year “28-01-18. Actions person the death of a shall be caused following limitations—‘The actions must act, default, neglect, and the years commenced within two act, neglect, or default is such as of action has accrued: injured, have entitled the if death party had not ensued, to maintain an action # [*] [*] [*] # [*] injuries for “an action done to the tions injuries done An action for another, ensues from death ensues when death injuries, injuries the cause . . . The enactment of such response have accrued Wrongful Death Act was a shall deemed provide of the death law to at the time the failure common Wrongful injured.” remedy for compensates the survivors for Death Act Leona contends that Section by reason of the they have sustained losses N.D.C.C., case bar applicable killing the deceased. Arm- of that pertinent provisions because Miller, strong v. 200 N.W.2d injuries “for only refer to actions subsection distinguished from survival This is to be another, when death person of action, and distinct separate which is a . . .” . She ensues from for an action action. The basis cause of is one for argues that *4 wrongful provisions the our death under damages as a she has suffered pecuniary of an the deceased. A injury existence to death, wrongful her result of husband’s action, survival wrongful like a ac- death Wrongful brought pursuant the Death to tion, sus- dependent upon of the North Act under Section 32-21-01 deceased, from the by the and ensues tained Code, Century that Section 32- Dakota death. injuries which caused his no express 21-01 contains brought pursu- of commencement an provides that further Section is that the thereto. Leona’s contention ant of action “the cause [referred therein] against upon action is claims present based accrued at be deemed shall negligence, liability, and of strict Graco injured.” It is of the death therefore, and, warranty, breach of wrongful necessary distinguish between express of absence actions better death actions survival Act, Wrongful applica- Death pertinent of this importance understand years. six See statute of limitations is ble provision. argues 28-01-16(2), N.D.C.C.1 She Conceptually, survival actions are that, was because the filed wrongful death ac quite different death, years four Harold’s sum- within of provides separate and Each a dis tions. judgment improperly granted. mary of remedy for kind loss. tinct a different Generally, statutory are where there intended Wrongful death are actions special provisions provide for a stat the deceased compensate survivors of wrongful death ute of limitations in as they the losses have sustained a of regardless such a limitation controls Dependent killing. wrongful result of a contract, tort, warranty of as breach language, specific statutory losses case. Kline pects Rogers v. Smith recoverable survivors Laboratories, Ariz.App. 429 French 5 loss prospective often include Am.Jur.2d, (1967); 22 Death 35§ P.2d contribution; prospective earnings and ex 53(a) (1966). (1965); 25A C.J.S. Death § services; companion penses; loss of loss problem case is in the instant comfort, consortium; ship, and mental is no self-contained statute limita grief. Speiser, anguish and 1 S. Recov See tions within the 2d, Wrongful Ch. ery for Death Chapter N.D.C.C. hand, statutes, on the other are Survival nature, intended to Literally, remedial in and are N.D. C.C., recovery by representatives provides permit limita- six-year upon liability having 2. An action stat- 1. “28-01-16. limita- Actions forfeiture, ute, following tions —The actions must com- other than a years expressly provided.” within six not otherwise 28-01- 16(2), action has accrued: N.D.C.C. and continue the cause of action his shoes the deceased deceased for he deceased’s See have recovered had lived. Section on behalf estate. could N.D.C.C.;2 28-01-26, 28-01- O’Callaghan, see Section Marsden merely 26.1, actually N.D.C.C. A survival A ac- survival injured person’s and, in existence injury, continues if the crues at time of estate, an asset of his dies, after death as claim person injured later the action is con- entirely action is an while a representatives in tinued his the form those for the benefit of cause of action new action, action. A survival relationship close persons who bear a however, indepen- is an new entirely suffered and who have deceased only can accrue at dent cause of action that Satterberg v. of his death. result death, the wrongful the time of based M. Minneapolis, Ry. P. & S. St. S. itself. actions are intended the death Such (1909); Speiser, N.D. 121 N.W. 70 S. compensate of the deceased the survivors 14:1 Recovery Wrongful 2d § they losses have sustained as 32-21-03, (1975); see result of damages recoverable “The elements of generally under survival statutes recognize We that words suffering; pain and follows: conscious to be construed phrases in a statute are expenses; funeral burial ex- medical gram and rules of according context earnings, usually penses; and loss of usage language. approved mar and the injury to time of from the time of N.D.C.C.; Falk v. Frand *5 jurisdictions, punitive some sen, (N.D.1965). N.W.2d Considera 137 228 outrage anguish, damages, mental given ordinary sense in must be to the tion may feelings injured person, to the used, in the context which the words are added.) (Emphasis 2 be recovered.” background the they placed, Speiser, Recovery Wrongful S. as can be enactment as far that 2d 14:6 Harding act. v. from the whole ascertained Dickinson, N.W.2d 76 N.D. 33 City of alone, we that Standing believe (1948); see 626 Section injuries done the words action “[a]n word, Meaning given should be another, when ensues person of the clause, in the Brenna and sentence statute. injuries,” as found in Section from (N.D.1968). The reasonably interpret Hjelle, N.W.2d 28-01-18(4), could give effect to the object is to ascertain and apply How solely ed to to survival actions. the State v. Unter ever, Legislature. one that cause of intent of considers the seher, at “shall to have accrued 289 N.W.2d action be deemed injured,” party the time clauses, words, We believe that 28-01-18(4), clear becomes 28-01-18(4), when sentences two-year provision is limitation whole, two- indicate that the as a viewed rea wrongful death actions. The apply to ap period contained therein year limitation accrue, or come son is that survival actions Wrongful death actions. plies to right, legally into existence as a enforceable done actions are actions at the time the death of the from which death another the deceased party, but the time ac death actions established, has injured. previously first As the death of the at the crue merely of a survival action is a continuation Therefore, within injured. such actions fall enti the deceased would have been claim provision of Section repre two-year bring not died. The had he tled 28-01-18(4). that this step into We further believe merely sentatives the deceased survives, may his be commenced an action in case of death —If 2. “28-01-26. Limitation expiration representatives bring of that time after the an dies before entitled to ” year . . expiration one from his death. . com- and within time limited for the 28-01-26, N.D.C.C. of action mencement thereof and would 28-01-26 legislative tion 65] gives [C.Civ.P. effect construction actions,' reach a con- language of the for to by the survival as disclosed cover intent by delving into enactment, one-year unveiled render the would trary conclusion controlling statutes. history of superfluous period under Section sup- nothing. In further applicable death was of action for A cause construction, and indicative port of this by statute in first created intent, that both recovery under is the fact right legislative was no such 5974.3 two-year R. C. common law. Act and the Wrongful Death statute has language of found in period Sec- of limitations statute unchanged since virtually remained the same were enacted tion enactment, never and, there has its since year, 1895. limitations statute of been a self-contained Power Com- Tail In Van Ornum Otter provisions. within its (N.D.1973), we held pany, 210 N.W.2d in Legislature Also enacted brought by per- a survival '5203(4),4 our which is was Section the deceased to re- representative sonal found two-year statute of suffering, pain and for the deceased’s cover language of which subject to damages, was punitive as well unchanged since virtually has also remained of limitations statute 28-01-18(4), N.D.C.C. set forth pertain- We note that under our or not we 210. Whether Id. at for survival ing to limitations “[i]f the issue raised opinion were adhere to bring an action dies person entitled to not, future, light whether or the time limited for expiration before by this research necessitated study the cause of the commencement thereof and that such a survival opinion, we would hold survives, com- one-year limita- subject to the action was ex- representatives after the his 28-01-26, N.D. for in Section provided tion yean time and one piration of that within C.C., today. Had Sec- we need not decide added.) (Emphasis his death.” Sec- 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., *6 applied been in tion tion N.D.C.C. Section Ornum, changed that would not Van 1877,5 one-year peri- and the was enacted in whether or not The issue of the result. at that od referred to therein was 28-01-18(4) wrong- applied Section Apparently Legislature intended time. we have defined such ful death actions as predecessor of Section this court in today was not before 5203(4)] C. 1895 would cover § [R. Van Ornum. predecessor while the Sec- ríes; of action shall be deemed maintainable. and the cause 3. 5974. When action for “§ person be caused at the time of the death the death of a shall have accrued party injured.” Whenever by act, 1895, 5203(4). neglect or default and the § R. C. would, act, neglect if default is such as or bring person ensued, If a entitled to 65. 5. “§ Death.] had not have entitled expiration of the time an action die before the in maintain an action and recover to respect person thereof, thereof, and the limited for the commencement and in such case the survive, may who, company corporation be com an action or the have been liable if death had cause of action which, expira representatives, after his time, year liable to an action for dam- from his shall be and within one tion of that ages, notwithstanding person against the death an action If whom death. may injured, although expiration have been brought the death shall die before the thereof, circumstances as amount caused under such law to the commencement time limited for 1895, felony.” survive, 5974. R. C. an action and the cause of action against his executors or admin be commenced 5203(4) Proce- of the Code of Civil time, expiration of that and tes istrators after the dure, 1895, provides statute of year issuing of letters within one tamentary commencement of: limitations for the administration.” C.Civ.P. or of An action for “4. § inju- when death ensues Railway N.D. Pacific 103 N.W. never been confronted court has This bar, presented (1905). in the case at it is respect the issue In this an action with applica e., limitations is which statute of (2) i. meets the of subsection Da actions in North ble 28-01-16, NDCC, resting as an action of § however, intimated, have, or in We kota. liability by statute. created said, appropriate period is dictum NDCC, made its 28- two-year limitation appearance first in the Civil Code of Libi, 01-18(4), See Hubbard provided: It § 54. (N.D.1975); Sprecher 229 N.W.2d liability “An action upon a (N.D.1973); Van Magstadt, 213 N.W.2d statute, other than or forfei- Company, 210 v. Otter Tail Power Ornum ture.” Code, 5201, shows that an leg- The 1895 might the future The solution for limi- was incorporating specific amendment made section islative statute, wrongful death comma, tation within the changing period to a and add- Chapter N.D.C.C.6 ing expressly provid- “when not otherwise ed;”. give The 1895 does not Code foregoing, view of we conclude to a comma changing source for 28-01-18(4), N.D.C.C., is di- that Section adding language “when not other- death actions. Summa- rected expressly provided.” The North Dako- wise granted, we properly ry judgment was Century “Derivation” states ta Code under accordingly affirm. (N.Y.) from Wait’s obtained WALLE, VANDE PEDERSON 91;1 Practice, Code, (Cal,) and Harston’s PAULSON, JJ., concur. 337.2 SAND, (special Justice concurrence appeared in the 28-01-18 first dissent). 1877 in but it Code Procedure of Civil (1) only subsections law consisted principles

I concur in most (3) malpractice came opinion relating to stated in Chief Justice Erickstad’s Subsection to, respect- case law referred but I being Chapter and the of the 1893 through into employed rationale fully dissent from the (4) first made its Laws. Subsection Session con- reaching the conclusion and from the Code of appearance the Revised clusion itself. gave no but the source indication being into to when came did not

An being. provided It it came into manner purely law and is exist under common follows; Harshman v. Northern creature statute. *7 conversation, thirty-four or 5. An action for criminal research has revealed that 6. Our rights any of of or or self-contained statutes for other states built-in contract, respec- another, provisions arising not limitation within the of their not on enumerated; wrongful Speiser, acts. 2 S. Recov- tive death hereinafter 2d, Appendix ery Wrongful ground A for on of An action for relief 6. fraud, solely heretofore were cases which (Am’d 1849) 1.“§ 91. chancery; cognizable of by the court years: six of such cases not “Within action in contract, obligation, accrued, discovery upon a 1. An action until the deemed to have liability, implied; excepting express (cid:127)by aggrieved party or or constitut- of facts ninety; ing those mentioned in section fraud.” by upon liability An a created 2. action forfeiture; statute, penalty years: “337. Within four other than a or prop- trespass upon An real action contract, obligation any or “An action for erty; any liability, upon in writ- found instrument injur- taking, detaining or 4. An action for ing State.” executed in this chattels, including ing any goods or specific recovery personal proper- of ty; 70 of subdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code

“An action for special a ensues Civil Procedure. That section is person of when death which controlling of statute the time within injuries; and the cause ac- any covering injury may deemed to have accrued at action tion shall be commenced, injured.” prevails gen- over the the time of death applicable eral statute actions based was removed later semicolon Sometime by Code Civ. ‘liability created statute’. put place. and a comma was in its 338, 1.” Proc. sec. subd. states it came derivation Code court was reasoning California 93;3 (N.Y.) Code, from Har- Wait’s Klingebiel followed in Lockheed Aircraft Practice, (Cal.) ston’s 340.4 (1971) Corporation, F.Supp. U.S. A review of the statutes of the states California, District Court North District of adopted law was not very from which our which was affirmed 494 F.2d helpful provisions because consid- (9th 1947). any Cir. I did make elabo not part eration were not of the law of the has effort find out if other state rate states which our statutes were mod- question. addressed to the same itself eled. is a review the New York Neither stat- wrongful North Dakota death very helpful statutes because New York ute, does contain a limita- ultimately provided death must be tion of time in which action statute contained own statute which its commenced, go we theil therefore must limitations, and, matter, for that Califor- statute in Ch. 28- of limitations found nia’s also contains death statute NDCC, period to determine its own limitations. applies death However, the courts in two instances left herein, As out pointed action. earlier impression pertain- action is one created ing liability action based on a an created statute and as such meets the apply statute would were it not for the provides: which fact the California n “The following actions must be com- statute, (3) subdivision Code years menced within six the cause Procedure, special of Civil was a statute of action has accrued: and contained its own of limitation upon liability 2. An created controlled, general which rather than a than for- penalty statute other or statute, (1) subdivision Code of feiture, expressly when not otherwise Procedure, setting Civil forth the time limi- provided.” statutory tation of actions based on a liabil- ity. Casualty Surety Co. Aetna liability liability A statute is Pacific & Electric 41 Cal.2d Gas the stat- except which would not exist (1953), 264 P.2d the court said: Phrases, page ute. See 25 Words Vol. party plain- seq., part.

“No who et pocket matter be the A tiff, [wrongful the cause of action within this action is one falls express is one within the terms of definition. action] 3. “§ 93. 2. An undertaking in a criminal for a forfei- years: “Within two State; people libel, slander, assault, ture this 1. An *8 libel, assault, slander, imprisonment; 3. An for battery, or false seduction; statute, battery, imprisonment false or An action a for a forfei- against penalty people 4. An a other ture to the sheriff or or of this State.” escape prisoner officer for the of a arrested year:

4. “340. Within one imprisoned process; or on civil 1. An against municipal corpora- 5. An forfeiture, given or the to action is damages injuries property tion for or to individual, State, or to an the individual and by caused a mob or riot.” except pre- imposing when the statute limitation; scribes a different 28-01-18(4) injuries relates the provision have some to sus § other which The the died person who from such found in tained application § is injuries of and that the cause action sur NDCC: injured person vives and that the the having two-year limitations “Actions to at of action is deemed have accrued following must be com- actions —The person time death of the rather of years after the cause within two than at time the infliction accrued: action has injuries. concept, Under this the action to injuries done An action 28-01-18(4) separate is and dis § when death ensues person tinct the action for action from injuries, the cause of and 32-21. As in Chief death under Ch. stated to have accrued be deemed action shall opinion, Justice Erickstad’-s the death of the time of s compensates act the survivor for injured.” [Emphasis added.] they have sustained reason of the losses interesting question: This raises wrongful killing the deceased. Arm applies statutory Which Miller, v: strong N.W.2d prin- death? The to an action for clearly supports This the conclusion that the ciple relating interpretation law. 28-01-18(4) provisions merely provide of § of statutes that construction injuries done that the cause of action for clause, word, given and sentence must be injuries person who died from such applies here. With that consideration at the deemed to have accrued time mind, is exam- principle § If had death. not ined. governed by the ordi limitations would First, applies noted that it must be injuries. nary statute of limitations injuries person done to the such injuries generally covered would be “injuries” here does not another. term pain suffering, expenses, medical concept of term embrace the broad but injured; earnings loss to the individual injuries which caused the is limited to the death statute ad whereas language This evidenced from the itself losses sustained the ben dresses injuries”. ensues from such “when death eficiaries, pain does not include term, injuries injuries,” refers to “such expenses, etc. suffering, medical essence, person another. agree I cannot that this court intimated (4) 28-01-18 refers to ac subsection of § peri appropriate or said that the in dictum injuries the death which result in tions two-year limitation under 28-01- od is a § person injured. comparing After Libi, 18(4) v. 229 N.W.2d 82 in Hubbard 32-21, NDCC, this with Ch. provision (N.D.1975), Magstadt, v. Sprecher Act, By Wrongful it must be noted (N.D.1973), or Van Ornum v. N.W.2d 881 32-21, more damages authorized under Ch. (N.D. 210 N.W.2d 207 Otter Tail Power 32-21-02, specifically § 1973). damages to the numerous items that relate Considering again 28- might beneficiary reasonably have ex 01-16(2) it be noted that with refer- should services, pected, including earning value of statute, we liability ence to a See, ability, and other such related items. providing provision expressly have no other Darrow, Stejskal 55 N.D. 215 N.W. otherwise, already pointed as has been (1927); Umphrey Deery, 78 N.D. out, 28-01-18(4) pertains injuries done From this it should injuries who dies from such recognized that immediately wrong itself to an action for and does address merely ful death statute is not limited to under Ch. NDCC. died, who done beneficiaries, gen employed' rationale is but No matter what minimum a doubt upon, very at the erally outlined in sus relied argument tained. A valid can be made that exists. *9 herein, ute for the reasons set out earlier I Magstadt, v. 213 N.W.2d 881 Sprecher should

(N.D.1973), quoted Legislature the court from also believe the remove Adams Association, making appropri- Missouri Minerals all Little doubts (N.D.1966), wherein said: prac- N.W.2d amendment for the benefit ate ticing exists as to substantial doubt bar. “Where appli- two statutes

which of limitation

cable, longer period applied.” will be be- was not mere dictum

This comment syllabus, appeared in the which required pursuant to the Constitu-

was still concept that time. Under this

tion at NDCC,

rationale, applies 28-01-16(2), § wrongful death statute. BECKER, behalf of herself Elizabeth 28-01-18(4) that argument if did § children, Becker and and her James pertain to not Becker, Appellee, Darlene Plaintiff been no need for its enactment would have same matter would be subject because the convincing in 28-01-26 is neither covered § Doubek, Esther Walter DOUBEK and repeatedly seen persuasive. nor We have Appellants. Defendants and Legislature provided has where Civ. No. 9709. pro- general way in a and then something similar or related matter vided for a North Dakota. Supreme Court of manner, gave of course specific more specific pre- April that rise to the rule the more general, event there vails over the argument were valid conflict. If the need for

there would been no

enactment of because the §

subject already was covered matter However, is, 28-01-26. as it .§ types

pertains only to all relating to an which caused

those

death, 28-01-18(4) is limited whereas

injuries from which death ensues.

Furthermore, it would seem reasonable logical Legislature if were provide special

truly concerned to wrong- applied to

statute of limitations that was

ful death actions the time it enacted Legislature provided would have within Teevens, Minot, Montgomery, Johnson & than enact is now 28-01- act rather argued by plaintiff appellee; Bruce NDCC, 18(4), which makes no mention of Montgomery, Minot. applied death act and can be Anderson, Dobrovolny, Minot, Tossett & only by straining, death act argued by appellants; for defendants and where the especially Dobrovolny, Collin Minot. 28- already covered in what is now §

01-16(2), NDCC. SAND, Justice. though

Even I am 28- convinced NDCC, appeal County the Pierce 01-16(2), This is rather than § NDCC, denying defendants- applies death stat- District Court’s order

Case Details

Case Name: Sheets v. Graco, Inc.
Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 21, 1980
Citation: 292 N.W.2d 63
Docket Number: Civ. No.. 9706
Court Abbreviation: N.D.
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