On Sеptember 5, 1981, Louise Sheerin was brutally stabbed to death at the Holiday Inn restaurant where she worked as a waitress in Bettendorf, Iowa. Bernard Hickman, a cook at the restaurant, was later convicted of first-degree murder in her death, and this conviction was affirmed on appeal.
See State v. Hickman,
On August 2, 1983, Ann Sheerin, Louise’s mother and the administrator of her estate, brought this wrongful death action against the State and several other defendants. The essence of Sheerin’s numerous allegations against the State was that the State negligently (1) granted Hickman parole, (2) failed to adequately supervise his parole, and (3) failed to warn his employer, persons who would come in contact with him, or the public generally of his proclivity to commit assaults and violence. This appeal is brought by Sheerin from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, whiсh relied on
Anthony v. State,
I. The Parole Decision. In Anthony, we held that the decision by state officials to adopt particular terms for a prisoner’s work-release plan was immunized from liability by thе discretionary function exception of Iowa Code section 25A.14(1). Id. at 666. This exception to suits permitted by chapter 25A, the Iowa Tort Claims Act, prоvides:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply with respect to any claim against the state, to:
1. Any claim ... based upon the exercise оr performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state agency or an еmployee of the state, whether or not the discretion be abused.
Iowa Code § 25A.14(1). In this case, Shee-rin contends the decision to have a pаrole program is a discretionary function, but that the application of the program’s guidelines to an individual inmate is an operational functiоn, for which the State may be held liable if negligently undertaken.
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To determine whether a state official s decision constitutes a discretionary function, we have recognized a distinction between decisions made at the planning level and those made at the operational level. Planning level decisions require state officials to weigh competing interests, assess the practicality or monetary feasibility of a proposed cоurse of action, or evaluate how the public interest will be best served.
Butler v. State,
The implementation of decisions made at the planning level is opеrational....
The distinction between the two levels is best illustrated in terms of judicial review. Policy decisions, such as when and where to construct a freeway, involve the weighing of the merits of social, political and economic factors traditionally held to be within the purview of the legislature. Judicial review of such decisions would be an apparent violation of the separation of powers principle.... Decisions made at the oрerational level, however, do not involve the same overriding policy determinations and can readily be reviewed under judicially manageаble tort standards of due care and reasonableness.
Anthony,
We have previously observed the legislature has a correctional philosophy of attempting to integrate convicted persons into the community, even though it involves some risk to the public. Id. This philosophy, of which work-releases and paroles are merely components, involves rehabilitative and practical considerations. Some of these considerations include weighing the risk a particular inmate poses to society against the rehabilitative opportunities afforded by work-releasе or parole and against the alternative risk posed by another inmate who might otherwise be paroled in order to avoid prison overcrowding. These assessments, made by executive branch officials vested with the responsibility, cannot properly be considered the mere implementation of general parole guidelines; they clearly involve the type of policy determinations required to make planning level decisions. The district court was correct to so hold.
II.
Supervision.
Sheerin’s petition also alleged the State was negligent by “failing to adequately supervise, or provide for continuing treatment and evaluation of Hickman following his release from prison and the Davenport Halfway House.” The gist of this allegation is that the Stаte failed to sufficiently tailor Hickman’s parole to account for the threat he posed to the community.
Cf. Anthony,
III. Duty to Warn. Sheerin’s final contention is that the State had a duty to warn persons who would come in contact with Hickman, including Louise and her employer, and the public generally of the danger posed by him. In order to show the existence of a duty to warn, Sheerin alleged only that the county attorney who prosecuted Hickman fоr assault in 1975 had written a letter for Hickman’s permanent file stating he believed Hickman should serve the maximum sentence allowed by law, and that Hickman would be a model prisoner but would kill someone upon release from prison. Tragically, this letter proved prescient. It did not, however, suggest Hickman had made a threat to Louise or to a person who could have been readily identified as Louise.
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In the work-release setting of
Anthony,
we held “the duty to warn depends upon and arises frоm the existence of a prior threat to a specific identifiable victim,” explicitly adopting the standard enunciated in
Thompson v. County of Alameda,
Applying the Thompson standard here, we conclude summary judgment for the State was appropriate. The State did not have a duty to warn Louise, her employer, or the general public.
AFFIRMED.