106 Kan. 220 | Kan. | 1920
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $1,336.09, with interest, for cattle purchased by one Corder, who was by the plaintiff claimed to be the agent of Paugh and Company, a partnership composed of the defendants and engaged in buying live stock at Wichita. The defendants appeal, and assign as error the refusal of the court to sustain their demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence, the refusal to sustain the motion for judgment on the special findings and the motion for á new trial, the admission and rejection of certain testimony, the giving and refusing of certain instructions, and the allowing of prejudicial statements by the plaintiff’s attorney.
The whole contention hinges on the alleged agency of Corder, which was denied by the defendants, who claim there was
Mr. Lehrling, one of the 'defendants, testified that they never employed Corder to buy cattle for the company; that he and Mr. Paugh were active members of the firm, and Mr. Kanavel was the silent member.
We fail to find any evidence to show that Corder was the defendants’ agent. The company seems to have staked him in buying cattle, and to have collected the ordinary commission
“We will pay Corder’s draft drawn on us when the drafts are received by you.”
One was to Corder asking him how many cattle he had bought and what he had paid for them. Also one to him—
“Notify Ray when you will get there can sell some cows there.”
It is argued that because Corder showed some of this telegraphic correspondence to the plaintiff and talked with him to the effect that Paugh and Company intended to furnish the money, the plaintiff had a right to so conclude, and it is said:
“If appellants are not liable for appellee’s cattle then appellants will be relieved of a liability which they had intended to incur, and release from which is not due to any change of conditions or circumstances which should affect their obligation in this case.”
It is quite common for a commission firm to furnish a cattle buyer money with which to operate, and not be liable for his debts to the person from whom he buys, and we find no evidence here to indicate any difference with reference to this case.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendants.