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Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage
4 P.3d 336
Alaska Ct. App.
2000
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*1 allege financial or commercial infury chil- sure does not to their thereby personal caused subject is not misrepresentations advance and so purport do not The Greens dren. 09.50.250(8). According misrepresen- of for the tort dismissal under AS separate claim superior ly, court's sum tation. we REVERSE REMAND for mary judgment orders and Su- the California In Johnson v. proceedings.41 further noted that preme Court lends itself potentially "misrepresentation" EASTAUGH, Justice, participating. elusive inter extremely expansive and automobile who pretations. A of an driver misleading signal, for exam turn

makes in "misrepresented" literally

ple, has of conduct. subsequent course

tentions and hold the state it would be senseless

Yet any failed to make employee if

liable its "nonrepresentation," but arguably a signal, affirmatively if he opposite result

reach the intentions.[39] SHEARER, Appellant, Daniel P. "misrepresented" here to hold Similarly, it be senseless would gather failing to liable for the state ANCHORAGE, MUNICIPALITY OF potential fos- relevant information disclose Appellee. immunity for parents, providing ter Billy's affirmatively misrepresenting suitabil- No. A-7467.

ity placement. for foster Appeals of Alaska. Court agree California thus with the " 'misrepresen Supreme view that Court's 23, 2000. June general tation, from the as a tort distinct wrongs, intentional negligent milieu financial and

applies to interferences with interests." We conclude commercial 09.50.250(3) only exempts the state from

AS misrepresentation claim. Be type of against DFYS does the Greens' claim

cause from an invasion of financial

not arise 09.50.250(8) interests, does

commercial AS superior court's apply. We reverse summary

grant judgment based on this

provision.

IV. CONCLUSION duty care to disclose

DFYS owes a of due prospective foster

relevant information here,

parents. taken The evidence Greens, would

light favorable to the most jury

permit a to find DFYS duty its breach caused and that

breached injuries. foreseeable

the Greens to suffer negligent claim for nondisclo-

The Greens' 782, 240, unnecessary to consider Cal.Rptr. 41. Our reversal makes Cal.2d - challenge superior court's (1968). Greens' prevailing party awarding attor- order the state ney's award must be vacated because fees. The Cal.Rptr. 447 P.2d at 365. Id. 73 - longer prevailing party. the state is no *2 20, 1999, just January

On midnight, after Anchorage Anthony Police Officer driving toward the northbound Glenn Highway exit on Muldoon Road when he Jeep pull observed black Cherokee out of a strip partially mall and obstruct the oncom- ing lane of traffic. Provost attempt did not Jeep already because he was Highway. committed to the Glenn just finished way his shift and was on his Eagle home to River. He was unmarked Ford Aerostar van. right

Provost was hand lane Highway on the Glenn when he noticed a Jeep vehicle similar to the he had seen pass him in "high the left lane at a rate of speed." Jeep Provost then observed the speed per slow down to a of 55 miles hour as approached Jeep two other vehicles. The pulled right over passed hand lane and those vehicles. Provost testified that he Jeep watched the move back and forth be- lanes, generally tween signaling without first (although at signal times the driver would lane). after he entered a point, new At one Jeep Provost observed the . move into the Cole,Anchorage, R. Appellant. Brent for right signal lane with its left on. ClarkWeeks, Carmen E. Assistant Munici- Provost testified training; that based on his Prosecutor, pal Mary Hughes, and K. Munic- officer, years his 20 of experience as a ipal Attorney, Anchorage, Appellee. for "speeding, slowing, passing, and changes, the lane the movement ... from COATS, Judge, Before Chief STEWART, Judges. signal one lane to another and MANNHEIMER and then lane," comes on and then back into the first impression was that the driver of the P I N I N O Jeep was intoxicated. Provost characterized COATS, Judge. Chief Jeep's "gross weaving" movement as Highway. over several lanes of the Glenn charged Daniel Shearer was with one minutes, observing Jeep After for several (DWI).1 count of while intoxicated telephoned Anchorage Police De- suppress Shearer moved to on the evidence (APD) partment dispatch and advised them grounds off-duty police that an officer's en suspected Jeep that the driver of the driveway counter with consti was intoxicated. Provost asked APD to run investigatory stop. tuted invalid After Jeep's plates check on license Judge Sigurd Murphy District Court E. de f eventually for called assistance. motion, to, nied pled no contest of, guilty ap According found DWI.2 Shearer Jeep took the peals, claiming Judge Murphy Highland erred in Road exit and traveled at an exces- denying suppress the motion to speed proceeded ewdence sive rate of as it down the We affirm. Loop Eagle Road toward River. Provost AMC 9.28.020. of whether the district court erred in denying suppress his motion to evidence. preserved appeal, pursuant 2. Shearer Co (Alaska 1974), oksey v. 524 P.2d 1251 Jeep moved from level. subsequently charged report that the

noted DWI, in violation of AMC 9.28.020. into with then back left lane and right into the suppress the evidence ob- post- moved to traveling than the faster right lane Provost. initial contact with As the after his Loop Road. tained limit down the speed ed evidentiary hearing, *3 Provost) Following an (and Kantishna approached Jeep subse- the motion. Shearer Road, dispatch reported Murphy denied Loop on the Drive pled no contest to DWI. quently the vehicle to which the address to Provost dispatch Provost advised registered. was question us is whether before that headed to appeared to be driver that the an in suspicion standard the reasonable Kantishna Jeep turned left on address. by adopted supreme the vestigatory stop, out, degrees. turning 270 spun and Drive State,3 in was in v. satisfied Coleman turn and continued corrected the The driver Coleman, investigatory this case. Under to his residence. only in where the permitted situations Jeep used Although the driver of suspicionthat "a reasonable policeofficer has door, garage he open the control to remote danger serious exists or imminent driveway. Provost Jeep in his parked the recently property has persons to harm of the he contacted driver testified 4 "argu admits that he occurred." Shearer Shearer) (Daniel stepped out of as he Jeep public danger" when ably posed an as a identified himself Provost the vehicle. Nevertheless, driving home. Shearer to APD and asked Shearer with the detective Jeep in his parked that because claims Provost con- away the vehicle. step from and was headed driveway, exited the vehicle obtained and pat a down search ducted Provost contacted home when towards his testified identification. Shearer's - reasonably him, to sus Provost had no basis of alcoholic bever- the odor that he detected pose to an immi continued pect that Shearer asked person. ages on Shearer's Judge motoring public. danger to the nent alphabet and to balance Shearer Murphy disagreed. and sobriety The alcohol odor field tests. addressing of reasonable In difficulty performing the field Shearer's Judge Murphy found that suspicion, im- initial confirmed Provost's information, on his obser- enough based intoxicated. pression that Shearer reasonably driving, to vations of Shearer's ini- of his a different account Shearer had intoxi- while Shearer driveway. with Provost tial contact what Judge Murphy next addressed cated. got of his car that he out testified Shearer and arrived home happened once Shearer driveway to enter his up the and walked nothing prevent found garage. He had through the basement home into his vehicle getting back from he heard garage, when entered Thus, Judge night. driving again that and "hey buddy." someone call out continued Murphy concluded that Shearer man in civilian and saw a turned around driv- pose potential him. testified signaling at clothes car though parked he had ing public, even in trouble and thought the man was that he driveway. garage help, he walked out of needed so got approached the man. When Shearer Murphy's findings are consis Judge driveway, the man identi- of the to the end of this court and prior decisions tent police officer. fied himself as a applied the Cole that have supreme court stops. As transported to man standard was arrested concedes, In- for an Eagle River substation it is well established poses a breath toximeter test. Shearer submitted the crime the public.5 In addi dangers to significant aleohol resulting .172 blood sample, with a (Alaska 1976). P.2d 701 (Alaska 577 5. See Ebona 553 P.2d 1978); Moran, State v. at 46. Id. tion, place."1 suspect a DWI upheld We actually does not have to judge's trial finding be pose vehicle in order to immi that the defendant would have resumed driv ing at point public.6 a later nent Nevertheless, and that the officer was Judge Shearer claims Murphy's finding not unreasonable in believing change that the posed drivers did not that he continuing danger eliminate the need to make investigatory stop.14 motoring public supported is not by the rec ord because there is no evidence that he Similarly,in this case Murphy found again would have driven night. that Provost had suspicion, based rejected arguments similar in Larson v. on his observations of driving, v. Anchorage.8 State7 and Romo posed an imminent danger safety. Judge Murphy recognized Larson, that the officer observed *4 stopped defendant's car danger the element of middle of did a terminate when road, dirt exited his Although vehicle. the defendant Shear- behind the wheel. The er claims he was home officerwatched as the defendant night, for the Murphy found that nothing was pulled up next to pedestrians, two talked to prevent Shearer going from them inside and then drove his north on wrong the side coming out, back and driving again. We of the road.9 The officer decided to follow agree that the danger the defendant and subsequently witnessed posed to the driving public did not several cease suspicious instances of driving by the simply pulled because Shearer into his drive- Finally, defendant. the officer saw the de way and exited his vehicle. Our conclusion pull fendant over next pedestrians. two supported by our decision in Romo. got One of them into the driver's seat and the defendant slid into Romo, passenger In seat.10 officer decided to follow The proceeded new driver the defendant after recognizing prostitute to drive down the road stopped by the officer. The in the front seat of his vehicle. The officer officer immediately went passenger saw no indication from defendant's side, contacted the defendant and arrested that he was intoxicated. The defendant him for DWI.11 pulled into a parking lot. The officer fol lowed, but did not activate lights.15 his primary appeal issue on in Larson defendant voluntarily got out ofhis vehicle was whether the officer made a valid investi approached officer, who then noticed gatory stop. agreed We with the trial the odor of alcohol on the defendant. finding court's the officer had reason response questioning officer, from the (based suspicion able on his observations of defendant admitted that he had been drink driving) defendant's that the defendant's ing. The officer then asked the defendant to driving posed an public tests, sobriety field which he failed.16 safety and that stop justified.12 But, we also addressed the argument defendant's facts, Based on the above we found that "requisite element of termi officer had "sufficient reasonable nated when [the defendant] ap allowed an suspicion" that the defendant in Romo was parent stranger to drive the car his while intoxicated. We thus conclud- (Alas- 6. See Jacobson v. State, 10. Id. at 1336. 935, 551 P.2d 938 1976) ("An ka seated behind steering wheel of a motor vehicle [that is not 11. Id. moving] is a safety threat and welfare of (citations omitted). public) State, See also 12. Id. Department Safety Conley, Public 754 P.2d (Alaska 1988); 236 Lathan v. 707 P.2d 13. Id. at 1337. (Alaska App.1985). 14. Id. (Alaska

7. App.1983). 697 P.2d at 1067. 8. 697 P.2d 9. 669 P.2d at 1335. Id. by distinguish Romo attempts to performing justified in the officer ed in Romo did that the encounter arguing to administer in order investigatory rejected the after the stop until investigatory alsoWe sobriety tests.17 become field stopped perform field that since the defendant contention officer asked defendant's case, lot parking in this apartment and that car stop as soon investigatory not reason was an car, could encounter

exited Coleman, with Shearer. contact by made believe, required as ably as any longer danger" existed immaterial. public this distinction "imminent case-whether driving: in this issue from The ultimate that "immi reasonably believe no Provost could case, made Judge Finn In the instant after to exist danger" continued nent to the likelihood finding as specific affir answered his vehicle-is exited reasonable or the driving again argues also matively by immi Romo.20 belief Plummer's ness of Officer know the defen didn't in Romo as are satisfied the officer danger. We nent complex next to apartment lived dant that an law matter of lot, start the defendant nor did parking The fact in this case. proper However, his house. walking to his encoun towards driving just prior Romo that, like change the fact does not distinction demonstrated Plummer with Officer ter Romo, *5 still Shearer in his current to drive the defendant willingness encounter, the encounter time of at the to his car time of access At the condition. just Further, had Shearer his car Provost. possession of with Romo retained drive while willingness to him to for his immediately accessible demonstrated remained reasonably Thus, could there Provost circumstances intoxicated. these drive. Under public of imminent risk of a sufficient risk was a sufficient that there believe investigatory justify an stop.18 to investigatory public an warrant danger to stop .21 reasoning in Romo is our that We Provost's obser case. to this applicable also above, we discussed the reasons For suspicious of miles several of

vations denied properly Murphy Judge clude particular a him with provided by Shearer The suppress evidence. motion Shearer's suspect objective basis ized and AF- is the district judgment intoxicated. driving while FIRMED. the fact Murphy found head his vehicle exited had dissenting. MANNHEIMER, Judge, not eliminate home did his towards ed law, who has police officer a Alaska vehi Under get back would that Shearer risk is a reason driving. do not believe We and resume cle stop the motorist can intoxicated The while clearly erroneous. finding is this State1, su In Ebona investigate. Jeep prior drove fact that Shearer this held that preme court demonstrated with his encounter person who a justified because Fur intoxicated. while drive willingness to pub "imminent an presents encounter ther, at the time case is in this question danger". The lic possession retained justi stop remains an "immediately whether accessi it remained vehicle and car, parks the motorist that, after fied even conclude him to drive. ble" away, with no engine, and walks off the turns risk of Romo, a sufficient there under re intends to motorist indication to war case this that, such under driving. I conclude stop.19 sume rant Id. 21. at 1069. 17. Id. Id. at 1069-1070.

18. 1978). 698, 700-701 P.2d Id. Id. cireumstances, arrest. Municipality The is no imminent further concedes danger, and so an stop is not that Provost coerced perform Shearer to allowed. field sobriety through tests display of au- thority. part, For his that, Shearer concedes

Underlying facts by the end of tests, the field sobriety Anthony Police enough Officer obtained Provost saw Daniel information about Shearer's level of justify driving erratically just intoxication to after mid night January is, on arrest. by 1999. Shearer That con the end of the field cedes that his driving gave sobriety erratic probable Provost a Provost had cause to suspect reasonable basis to that Shearer was believe that Shearer was under the influence. driving while intoxicated. Because problem The is the manner in which Provost suspicion, Provost would have obtained this information. justified been in stopping Shearer's vehicle to voluntarily walked down the drive- investigate potential crime.2 But way speak to Provost. Had Provost mere- traffic would have been difficultbecause ly engaged in Shearer, conversation with off-duty: Provost was he was dressed in officer conceivably gleaned could have suffi- clothes, civilian and he was driving private cient information from speech, de- vehicle emergency lights without or a siren. meanor, and balance to probable establish So performing instead of stop, traffic Pro cause to make an arrest. But Provost imme- vost followed Shearer. He called for a back diately displayed badge and directed up officer, and he also asked dispatch field tests. to run a check on registra Shearer's vehicle These actions constituted an investigative tion. stop-a seizure for Fourth pur- Amendment dispatcher told poses. is whether this seizure lived on Kantishna Eagle Drive in River. legal. *6 him, With Provost behind Shearer drove to parked his own vehicle on the street. As the Kantishna Drive driveway, and parked address, his car. turned into the Provost 7,eg requirement "imminent public dan- watched, Provost Shearer used a remote con- Coleman v. State Supreme the Alaska open trol garage to his door. He Court then was asked to decide whether the Alas walked toward the preparing to enter ka permits police Constitution officer to through garage. the investigative conduct an stop based on rea (i.e., suspicion sonable probable less than point, At this Provost called out to cause). The court ruled that investigative and asked him to come back down the drive- stops based on suspicion per are way. Shearer did not know that Provost was mitted in two instances: when the officer has officer; he assumed that Provost was reason to believe that public "imminent dan a motorist who was either having lost or was ger exists", or when the officer has reason to car trouble. But as soon as Shearer walked believe that persons "serious harm to or up to displayed badge. property recently has occurred".4 He directed Shearer to field sobri- ety tests. performance, Based on Shearer's points Shearer's case out a erucial distinc- Provost arrested him for while intoxi- tion between categories. these two If an cated. investigative justified stop is because there is The Municipality Anchorage concedes reason to believe that "serious harm ... has that, before performed the recently occurred", field so- it does not matter wheth- briety only Provost had a reasonable er the continuing crime is or has been com- suspicion that Shearer was under the pleted. case, influ- In either Coleman authorizes ence probable rather than cause to make investigative the stop. investiga- But if the Ebona, 2. See 577 P.2d at 700-701. Id. at 46. (Alaska 1976). 553 P.2d 40 Rather, the this issue. not decide court did reason there is justified because stop is tive investigative stop danger ex- district the public ruled that "imminent court that

to believe category first Coleman's justified establish under must government ists", then the Moreover, the ongoing (imminent danger). or public is crime that the reason that in its in motion this issue raise Municipality set events did not has the crime Instead, Municipality the crime is this court. the public-unless brief to endanger will interrupted. during oral events time or the the first revealed this issue raised circumstances, these argument. Given court nor this court supreme Neither its contention waived Municipality has driv crime of whether ever decided has categor second falls within Coleman's DWI Coleman's falls within intoxicated ing while y. persons to harm category of "serious second 6, the v. State in Ebona But property".5 remaining contention is Municipality's who a motorist held supreme court stopped driv- had that, though Shearer even an "immi constitutes drives pose a ing, he continued Thus, when danger". public nent investi- upheld the The district public. driving a motor vehicle sees a officer ruled The court on this basis. gative stop has reason and the parked his car had that, though Shearer even authorized intoxicated, the officer driver house, it at way into on his investigate.7 stop and a traffic conduct shortly might re- possible least is different: But Shearer's case again. begin and turn to his car vehicle when driving a motor longer no stop. performed Municipality I conclude Why residence, had he reached suspicion a reasonable to establish engine, and off car and turned parked his failed dan- an imminent posed house. Shearer entering his he was ger when Coleman violated that Provost tends foot stop at the performed the justify government's burden It is the because, by time driveway An seizure. any warrantless long- no stop, Shearer conducted suspi- on reasonable stop must be based posed an er which, articulable facts clon-"specific points out safety or welfare. inferences rationale together [the] taken over, argues act of *7 int facts, reasonably warrant from those he no reason there was prong first Because Coleman's rusion."9 near future. driving in the resume would danger, we imminent proof of requires Anchorage offers two Municipality of The question: Offi following When must ask the answers to Shearer's argument. performed cer Provost First, Municipality he driveway, was the foot asserts at see- within Coleman's falls while intoxicated indicat facts specific and articulable aware constitutes offense category-that ond posed an ing that Shearer If property". or persons harm to "serious Or, rephrase public? to the justified in been so, would have then of this particular facts reference with though stop even performing specific and articula- have Did Provost case: ' was over. offense believing would reasons ble driving before resume raise this leave his house did But Municipality sobriety? regained court, district and the trial argument 406, 803 P.2d Co., Ins. Mutual v. n. 8. Petersen 1065, 1070 Anchorage, 697 P.2d Romo v. Life 5. See 1990) (issues (Alaska are not briefed 8 411 n. 2 waived). 700-701. P.2d at Ohio, Coleman, Terry (quoting 45 P.2d at 1880, 1868, 21, 20 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 392 U.S. (1968)). Ebona, at 701. majority possibility ble that the motorist will resume believes that the answer is supplied by Romo, Romo v. Anchorage.10 In driving. This stretching Romo too far. pick followedthe defendant's Romo, the officer reasonably could up truck recognized because he the woman clude that Romo merely interrupted his passenger prostitute. as a known Romo driving in order to talk with the officer. pulled into parking apartment lot of his stopped Romo his vehicle and walked over to building stopped his truck. The officer car, patrol officer's gave but he no indica- stopped patrol forty car some fifty feet tion that he had reached his final destination away, but he did attempt to make contact or that he intended to driving. As this moments, Romo.11After a few got Romo stressed, "Romo possession retained out of his truck and walked back to the his car and it immediately remained accessi- patrol car engage in conversation with the ble for him to drive." officer. During conversation, the officer smelled alcoholic beverages on Romo's majority concedes that Shearer's case breath, and Romo admitted that he had been is different. parked his car in his drinking. When Romo failed various field driveway, he turned engine, off the and he sobriety tests, the officer arrested him for was proceeding into his house when Officer driving while intoxicated.12 Provost called him back. The hour was mid- night-a time people One of when arguments ordinarily Romo's appeal return on that, home for night. Nevertheless, even after the officer signs observed the ma- jority concludes Officer intoxication, had a officer had no authority specific, ask Romo to the field articulable believing basis for continued to pose dan- any tests to take other action amounting ger to safety. to an stop. Romo contended that, stopped because he his truck in the judge The district upheld who the investi- parking apartment lot of his building, and gative stop reasoned that might got because he out of his car to talk to the conceivably going been home to re- have officer, there was no longer an "imminent trieve more beverages alcoholic and then re- public danger" required as by Coleman. driving. sume imagine One can also other rejected This court argument: Romo's scenarios in which might resume We are satisfied as a matter of law that an though initially even intended to investigatory stop proper in this case. remain at example, home-for if his children The fact that driving just Romo was prior demanded that he take them out for a mid- to his encounter with Officer Plummer night snack, or if Shearer's wife threw him demonstrated willingness to drive out of forcing him to seek new in his [intoxicated] condition. At the time lodgings. encounter, of the posses- Romo retained (and other) These speculative possibilities sion of his car and it remained immediately can not be ruled out. But Coleman and *8 accessible for him to drive. Under these Terry require v. Ohio speculative more than cireumstances{,] there was a sufficient risk possibilities. justify To investigative sei- public danger to warrant an case, zure in government this point must investigative stop. specific and articulable facts that would Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069-1070. lead a reasonable to believe that My colleagues interpret Romo to mean intended to return to his car and that, even after a suspected intoxicated driv- resume while he was still intoxicated. stops driving, er always will In the absence of an affirmative reason to be authorized to investigative conduct an suspect that Shearer would driving, resume stop because always there is some conceiva- illegal. is P.2d 1065 12. Seeid. 11. Seeid. to be- intoxicated, no reason would be there law. rule of alter does Romo an "imminent presented lieve that applica- rests on in Romo Rather, the result a Coleman and so danger", facts of particular rule to

tion of permitted. not be stop would if we clearer becomes This case. facts of the slight variation consider actual facts Concededly, the case. Shearer's lack of clearly prove Shearer's so do not case But driving. to resume unsure of intent that Officer Suppose speculative negate all burden simply watched Shearer's proceed, how to might to leave decide that he possibility into his walked garage, entered Rather, it is driving again. begin behind house and garage door and closed to come Municipality's burden minutes waiting forward several After him. - that affirma- facts articulable specific, re-emerge, Officer might resume for advice. and asks that Shearer supervisor tively indicate tacts a on in this case. to knock facts are no such driving. tells There supervisor will if and see door front Shearer's stop of Accordingly, Provost's now, twenty min- By talk. come outside unlawful, ob- evidence and the house by, gone and Shearer's have utes should during that tained minutes. several knocks for dark. reverse I would suppressed. have been He is the door. answers length, Shearer At conviction. barefoot, and he pajamas, he is dressed He is obvious- hand. a toothbrush has

ly preparing for bed. facts, is no there hypothetical these

Under to believe reason articulable

specific, Thus, if even driving. would resume was reason

Case Details

Case Name: Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Alaska
Date Published: Jun 23, 2000
Citation: 4 P.3d 336
Docket Number: A-7467
Court Abbreviation: Alaska Ct. App.
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