Shealey v. StateShealey v. State
Appellant Dextreion Shealey and his co-defendant Kelvin Hurston were found guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the gang-related shooting death of Daven Tucker. Appellant‘s only contention in this appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence statements that his co-indictee Charles Lovelace made during Lovelace‘s guilty plea hearing. Seeing no error, we affirm.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at Appellant‘s trial showed the following. On the evening of December 17, 2016, Appellant, Hurston, Lovelace, Shawndarious Sands, Coty Green, Natori Lee, Lee‘s brother Kouri, Dantavious Rutledge, Zachary Holloway, Andre Gilliam, and Essence Todd — all of whom were connected to a criminal street gang from West Point called “4way” — attended a memorial celebration for a friend who had died.2 After the memorial, the group and a few other people decided to go to LaGrange. They drove there in a caravan of cars that included among others Appellant‘s Ford
Appellant and a few others in the caravan stopped at a jail in LaGrange to put money in an inmate‘s account and then at a gas station before proceeding to a nearby public housing complex. A surveillance video recording of the complex‘s parking lot showed that Appellant‘s Mustang and the other cars in the caravan were at the complex from 9:53 to 9:59 p.m.
According to Green, there was an ongoing “beef” between 4way and a LaGrange group called “Mob,” and the people in the caravan decided to drive to Granger Park to see if any Mob associates were hanging out there. Surveillance video recordings from the park showed that at 10:03 p.m., Appellant‘s Mustang and the rest of the caravan of cars entered a parking lot where dozens of people had gathered. According to several witnesses who were in the park, gunshots rang out from some of the cars in the caravan. One of those witnesses heard return fire from some of the people in the parking lot; several people in the caravan, however, testified that the people in the parking lot began shooting first. The park surveillance video showed that the caravan left as people in the parking lot ran away. Investigators later found 39 shell casings in the parking lot. Remarkably, no one was injured during the shooting.
The surveillance video from the housing complex showed that at 10:07 p.m., Appellant‘s Mustang and the rest of the caravan returned to the parking lot there. Appellant‘s Mustang had a bullet hole in the passenger door, and according to several members of the caravan, Appellant was angry because his car had been hit.
According to Kouri, he received information that Mob members had shot at the caravan. He relayed that information to the group at the housing complex, and Green said that he knew the location of a house where some Mob members lived. According to Lee, Appellant suggested that they go to the house, which was on Newnan Street, saying that he “wanted some get back.” Green testified that Appellant said, “Somebody‘s got to pay. My car just got shot,” and “What y‘all want to do? Somebody‘s got to get it.” Green explained that he, Appellant, Hurston, Lovelace, Sands, Lee, and Kouri planned to shoot up Daven Tucker‘s house — the house on
Green and Lee testified that on the way to Newnan Street, Green pulled the Accord over so that he could switch from the driver‘s seat to the passenger‘s seat because he “wanted to be a shooter.” According to Green, Appellant also planned to shoot, but while they were in the Accord, Lovelace took a gun that Appellant was holding and said, “No, you‘re going to school. Let me take care of that for you.”4
The Accord and the Sonata were parked near Newnan Street, and Hurston, Green, Lovelace, and Sands got out of the cars. Hurston had a big, black handgun; Green had a .40-caliber gun; Lovelace carried a nine-millimeter gun or a .380 pistol, and Sands carried a nine-millimeter gun. Green testified that he, Hurston, Lovelace, and Sands started shooting toward the house; Green shot once and then got back in the Accord as the three other men continued to shoot. Green and Lee heard return gunfire from the direction of the house.5 Lovelace then got back in the Accord; Hurston and Sands got in the Sonata; and both cars fled.
Tucker, who had been in the front yard of his house, was shot once in his chest. Emergency responders arrived minutes later, around 11:00 p.m., and took Tucker to a hospital, where he soon died
The nine 4way members and associates in the Accord and Sonata all eventually went to a motel in Alabama.6 Green, Lovelace, and Kouri were arrested there the next day, December 18.7 In Green‘s Accord, investigators found Green‘s .40-caliber gun, an empty box for nine-millimeter bullets, a nine-millimeter bullet, and a plastic tray used to hold ammunition.
Appellant and Hurston did not testify at their trial. Appellant‘s theory of defense was that he was merely present in Green‘s Accord when other members of the group shot toward Tucker.
Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court‘s general practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.‘” (citation omitted)).
We note in particular that a person who does not directly commit a crime may nevertheless be convicted as a party to that crime.
2. Appellant‘s only contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence statements Lovelace made during his guilty plea hearing. We disagree.
(a) After the State rested its case-in-chief, the trial court asked Appellant‘s counsel outside the presence of the jury if the defense was going to put on a case. Counsel replied that it depended on whether Lovelace would testify. Lovelace, who had pled guilty but had not yet been sentenced, was then brought into the courtroom, where he told the court that he did not wish to testify and wanted to assert his privilege against self-incrimination under the
Appellant‘s counsel then proffered that during Lovelace‘s guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor asked, “Is it truthful that [Appellant] was present in the car?” and Lovelace testified, “Yes.” Counsel also proffered that during the plea hearing, the prosecutor asked Lovelace, “Is it my understanding that your testimony would be that [Appellant] was there but he wasn‘t shooting a gun at Newnan Street?” Counsel argued that those portions of the plea-hearing transcript would support Appellant‘s “mere presence”
The trial court then ruled that the statements were not admissible under the prior-testimony exception, noting that the purpose of the prosecutor‘s questioning Lovelace at the plea hearing was simply “to get the plea done.” The court also found that the evidence that Appellant‘s counsel was attempting to introduce through Lovelace‘s plea-hearing statements had already been presented to the jury “in other ways.”
(b) Appellant correctly recognizes that the statements Lovelace made during his plea hearing are hearsay. See
(b) The following shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding . . . , if the party against whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. . . .
As both parties acknowledge, Lovelace‘s invocation of his
The prosecutor‘s motive in questioning Lovelace at the plea hearing was to establish that Lovelace‘s guilty pleas were voluntarily entered and that there was a sufficient factual basis for them. See Preciado, 336 F3d at 746 (holding that the government did not have a similar motive to elicit a co-defendant‘s testimony at his plea hearing because “[t]he government‘s motive at [the] hearing
By contrast, if Lovelace had testified for the defense at Appellant‘s trial, the prosecutor‘s motive would have been to test Lovelace‘s credibility. The prosecutor would have been particularly interested in developing testimony about Appellant‘s interactions
Moreover, even if the plea-hearing statements had been admissible, any error in their exclusion was entirely harmless. As the trial court noted, Lovelace‘s proffered statements — that Appellant was present in the car with him at the crime scene but was not a shooter — were cumulative of properly admitted testimony from several witnesses at trial that Appellant was present in the Accord but did not shoot at Tucker. But those statements, like that testimony, did not prove that Appellant was not a party to the crimes. See, e.g., Williams, 307 Ga. at 690-691. Thus, it is highly probable that the exclusion of Lovelace‘s statements did not
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.