{¶ 1} In this matter, we address whether the General Assembly’s response to our decision in Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000),
Relevant Background
{¶ 2} Appellee, Debra Shay, was injured seriously in a single-vehicle accident on March 16, 2001. At the time of the accident, Shay was a passenger in a minivan operated by her husband.
{¶ 3} Appellant, Ohio Mutual Insurance Group (“Ohio Mutual”), insured the vehicle through a personal auto policy. Shay and her husband were the named insureds on the policy, which was first issued to them on July 6, 1998. The Shays’ first two-yeаr guarantee period thus ran from July 6,1998, to July 6, 2000. At the conclusion of that period, they entered a second two-year guarantee period, which ran from July 6, 2000, to July 6, 2002.
{¶ 5} In Septеmber 2000, however, S.B. 267 changed the UM/UIM terrain. It removed the provision in R.C. 3937.18(K)(2) allowing insurers to bar a vehicle owned by a named insured from the definition of an uninsured vehicle.
{¶ 6} Shay relied extensively on S.B. 267 in seeking UM/UIM coverage pursuant to the Ohio Mutual policy. She argued that because the policy excluded liability coverage for injuries sustained by a household member (her) of an insured driver (her husband), the liability exclusion effectively rendered her husband an uninsured motorist for purposes of her claims. She further argued that the policy’s UM/UIM household exclusion was eviscerated by S.B. 267, and that S.B. 267 was incorporated into the policy on January 6, 2001, the date the Shays first renewed the policy after S.B. 267 became effective. She conceded that UM/UIM coverage would not have been available to her absent S.B. 267, but concluded that in S.B. 267’s wake, she was entitled to the UM/UIM benefits in the policy.
{¶ 7} Ohio Mutual denied her claim. Citing Wolfe, which held that every automobile liability insurance policy issued in Ohio has a guaranteed two-year period during which the policy cannot be altered without the parties’ agreement, Ohio Mutual asserted that the original terms of its policy, including the UM/UIM exclusion, remained extant through the period from July 2000 until July 2002. Ohio Mutual argued that the Shays’ policy could be modified by the passage of S.B. 267 only at the conclusion of the guarantee period in 2002, not at the interim renewals within that two-year period. Because the guarantee period did not expire until after the accident, Ohio Mutual maintained that the UM/UIM household exclusion remained in force and precluded coverage for Shay’s injuries.
{¶ 8} On cross-motions for summary judgment in the ensuing declaratory-judgment action, the trial court found in favor of Shay. Its cryptic judgment entry simply noted that Shay “asserts the policy language and recent Court decisions
{¶ 9} The court of appeals affirmed in a more thorough decision. Its opinion properly acknowledged that our decision in Wolfe applied, correctly described its holding, and noted the appellate courts’ application of the Wolfe rule of law in subsequent cases:
{¶ 10} “In [Wolfe ], the Ohio Supreme Court considered the effect of R.C. 3937.31(A) * * * [on] an automobile policy [that] was issued in 1983. The insured wаs injured on April 2, 1995, and sought UM coverage under her policy. The insured sought to have Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993),
{¶ 11} “Because the policy in Wolfe had been renewed on December 12, 1994, after the effective date of S.B. 20, the insurer argued that the provisions of S.B. 20 were incorporated into the policy at that time. The court, however, held, ‘Pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A), every automobile liability insurance policy issued in this state must have, at a minimum, a guaranteed two-yeаr policy period during which the policy cannot be altered except by agreement of the parties and in accordance with R.C. 3937.30 to 3937.39.’ Wolfe at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court further held that the guarantee period mandated by R.C. 3937.31(A) is not limited solely to the first two years following the initial institution of coverage, and that the commencement of each policy period mandated by R.C. 3937.31(A) brings into existence a new contract of insurance. Id. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} “By counting successive two-year policy periods from the inception of the policy, the court in Wolfe determined that the last guaranteed policy period prior to the accident would have begun on Deсember 12, 1993. Therefore, even though S.B. 20 became effective on October 20, 1994, and the policy was renewed on December 12, 1994, the terms of the policy could not have been amended by the insurer to lessen the insured’s coverage until the expiration of the two-year guarantee period, i.e., December 12, 1995. Because Savoie,
{¶ 14} “In Young and Slone, the insurance companies sought to incorporate S.B. 267 into their policies upon a renewal date that occurred after the effective date of S.B. 267, but during the two-year guarantee period provided by R.C. 3937.31(A). In each case, application of S.B. 267 would have precluded the insured from receiving UM coverage, whereas without the application of S.B. 267, the insured would have received UM coverage. The courts held that the terms of coverage, which would have allowed the insured to receive UM coverage, were guaranteed for two-year periods of time pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A). Therefore, in each case, the insurance company was prohibited from applying S.B. 267 retroactively to its policy in order to bar the insured’s right to receive UM coverage.” Shay v. Shay,
{¶ 15} Although the court of appeals correctly characterized Wolfe and its progeny, it nevertheless departed from them. It concluded that the Ohio Mutual policy was amended to incorporate the provisions of S.B. 267 at the point of renewal on Januаry 6, 2001, rather than at the beginning of the next two-year guarantee period. In so doing, the appellate court attempted to distinguish the instant case from previous cases:
{¶ 16} “In Wolfe, Young, and Slone, the insurance company sought to lessen an insured’s UM coverage by amending its policy at a time when it was statutorily prohibited from doing so, i.e., during the two-year guarantee period set forth in R.C. 3937.31(A). Obviously, an insurance company is barred from amending its policy language during the two-year guarantee period in a way that would lessen an insured’s coverage, unless agreed to by the insured. See R.C. 3937.31(A) (‘Where renewal is mandatory, “cancellation” * * * includes refusal to renew a policy with at least the coverages, included insureds, and policy limits provided at the end of the next preceding policy рeriod.’ [Emphasis added.]).
{¶ 17} ‘We find, however, that an insurance company is not prevented from increasing the coverage it provides during any two-year period. To the contrary, an insurer has always been allowed to modify a policy so long as it does not ‘effect a withdrawal or reduction in the initial coverage or policy limits.’ R.C. 3937.31(B)(3). Similarly, Wolfe held that a policy is permittеd to be altered ‘by agreement of the parties and in accordance with R.C. 3937.30 to 3937.39’ within the two-year guarantee period. Accordingly, we find that R.C. 3937.31(A) provides a floor for what coverage must be provided, not a ceiling.” (Emphasis
{¶ 18} Having so concluded, the appeals court found that although the household exclusion would have denied coverage to Shаy, it was unenforceable because it was no longer permitted by statute and conflicted with the purposes of R.C 3937.18. Id., ¶24.
{¶ 19} The court of appeals also stated that it was not applying S.B. 267 retroactively. That determination was based on the court’s belief that the policy’s “conformity clause,” which provides that policy terms in conflict with state law are to bе amended to conform to state law, applied at the time of renewal to amend the policy terms to conform with S.B. 267 and eliminate the household exclusion. Id. at ¶ 23. According to the appellate court, because Ohio Mutual agreed to conform its policies to comport with Ohio law and Ohio law forbade the household exclusion at the time of renewal, the incorporation of the provisions of S.B. 267 into the policy did not violate any statute or interfere with any vested rights and thus was not an impermissible retroactive application. Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶ 20} After reaching these conclusions, the court sua sponte found that its decision was in conflict with Flowers v. Ohio Mut. Ins. Group, 3d Dist. No. 13-02-28,
{¶ 21} “Does the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000),
{¶ 22} “Is it an unlawful retroactive application to allow Am.Sub.S.B. No. 267 to apply to the terms of a renewal policy, prior to the expiration of the two-year guarantee period discussed in R.C. 3937.31(A), to increase [UM/UIM] coverage?” Shay v. Shay,
Analysis
{¶ 23} In Wolfe, we acknowledged the General Assembly’s laudatory objectives in ensuring that all motorists maintain some form of liability coverage on their motor vehicles, and we held that “pursuant to R.C. 3937.31(A), every automobile liability insurancе policy issued in this state must have, at a minimum, a guaranteed two-year policy period during which the policy cannot be altered except by agreement of the parties and in accordance with R.C. 3937.30 to 3937.39.”
{¶ 24} Wolfe adhered to our prior holdings that the statutory law to be applied when interpreting a policy for motor-vehicle insurance is the statute in effect when the policy was issued. Id. at 250,
{¶ 25} Wolfe, and the limitation it imposed on Benson, drew a strong dissenting opinion and a response from the legislature. Within six months of our decision, the General Assembly used S.B. 267 to amend R.C. 3937.31 by adding subsection E, which provides: “Nothing in this section prohibits an insurer from incorporating into a policy any changes that are permitted or required by this section or other sections of the Revised Code at the beginning of any policy period within the two-year period set forth in division (A) of this section.” S.B. No. 267, 148 Ohio Laws, Part V, 11385. In amending the statute, the General Assembly enunciated its purpose: “It is the intent of the General Assembly in amending section 3937.31 of the Revised Code to make it clear that an insurer may modify the terms and conditions of any automobile insurance policy to incorporate changes that are permitted or required by that section and other sections of the Revised Code at the beginning of any policy period within the two-year period set forth in division (A) of that section.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 11386.
{¶ 26} In light of that legislative action, three members of this court, Justices Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, and Lanzinger dissented from a decision to dismiss an аppeal of Young v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 8th Dist. No. 82395,
{¶ 27} Despite the dissent in Young questioning the viability of Wolfe in the wake of S.B. 267, there is no showing that the analysis set forth in Wolfe fails our tripartite test for overruling precedent. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis,
{¶ 28} As we stated in Galatis, whenever possible we must maintain and reconcile our prior decisions to foster predictability and continuity, prevent the arbitrary administration of justice, and providе clarity to the citizenry. Galatis,
{¶ 29} Here, there is no showing that the legislative response to our decision in Wolfe, which is found in S.B. 267, required an insurer to incorporate its provisions
{¶ 30} Although we, like the appellate court, are aware of the intent of the statutes at issue here and the important public policies that underlie them, a court can not elevate its interpretation of those policies over the plain wording of the statute and established precedent.
{¶ 31} We thus hold that absent an agreement between the insurer and the insured to amend the policy terms at the six-month renewal point, R.C. 3937.31(A) and our decision in Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000),
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. R.C. 3937.31(A) provides that every automobile insurance policy in Ohio shall be issued for a рeriod of not less than two years or guaranteed renewable for successive policy periods totaling not less than two years.
. According to the statute in effect in July 1998, uninsured and underinsured motor vehicles did not include vehicles “owned by, furnished to, or available for the regular use of a named insured, a spouse, or a resident relative of a named insured.” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 261,147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2372, 2376, eff. Sept. 3, 1997. That portion of the statute remained unaltered on July 6, 2000, the date on which the second two-year guarantee period began.