Shawn G. Willet, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2699
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
July 31, 2020
Robb, Judge.
APPELLANT PRO SE: Shawn G. Willet, New Castle, Indiana; ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, David A. Arthur, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana; Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 20D03-0801-FB-2
[1] Shawn Willet, pro se, appeals from the denial of his Motion to Dismiss Sentence Time Served alleging he has served his entire sentence and was being unlawfully detained by the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC“). Willet raises one issue for our review, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Willet‘s motion. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The State charged Willet with six counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, all Class B felonies, and he was arrested on January 22, 2008. In 2010, Willet was convicted of three of the counts and, on March 25, 2010, the trial court sentenced Willet to fifteen years on each count to be served concurrently in the DOC. Willet was awarded 791 days credit for time spent in custody while awaiting disposition.
[3] On January 23, 2015, Willet was released to parole. Willet was on parole for two years, ten months, and twenty days before his parole was revoked. Willet was returned to prison on December 12, 2017. On September 16, 2019, Willet filed his Motion to Dismiss Sentence Time Served, arguing he was entitled to be released because he “actively served seven (7) years of his prison term and received six (6) months[‘] time cuts for education classes that he took while incarcerated. Thus he
[4] On October 11, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Willet‘s motion on the basis that it “does not have purview of any good time credit awarded by the [DOC], which is granted that authority by Indiana Law.” Id. at 16. Willet now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] We initially note that Willet is proceeding pro se. Pro se litigants are held to the same legal standard as licensed attorneys and are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[6] As a threshold matter, we address the State‘s argument that Willet has waived appellate review of his claim for failure to make a cogent argument. See Brief of Appellee at 9. The State contends Willet‘s brief “is a rambling, conclusory, unsupported assertion that somehow he was deprived of good time [credit] as well as educational credit” and although Willet cites to several statutes, he fails to explain how they support his claims. Id.
[7]
[8] Willet filed a Motion to Dismiss Sentence Time Served, but the State argues that “[a] better reading of the motion is that it is a petition for post-conviction relief [pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a)(5) (2015)1] alleging that Willet‘s sentence has expired so revocation of his parole was unlawful.” Br. of Appellee at 7. Although the State makes a compelling argument, we disagree and construe Willet‘s motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.2
[10] Here, Willet does not challenge the validity of his convictions or his fifteen-year sentence. Instead, he alleges he is entitled to immediate discharge because he has fully served his sentence. See Brief of the Appellant at 5-6. Therefore, we treat his motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and evaluate it as such.3
[11] A trial court‘s habeas corpus decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Benford v. Marvel, 842 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We do not reweigh the evidence and consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to determine whether sufficient evidence sustains that decision. Id. We may affirm a trial court‘s judgment on any basis sustainable by the record, even though not on a theory used by the trial court. Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind. 1994).
[12] A trial court lacks the “jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of
[13] The crux of Willet‘s argument is that, with his executed time and earned credit time, he has served over twenty years on a fifteen-year sentence. See Br. of the Appellant at 5 (statement of the facts). And therefore, he contends he is entitled to be released immediately. We disagree.
[14] Once incarcerated, prisoners begin accumulating additional credits which shorten the length of time they will be incarcerated. Miller v. Walker, 655 N.E.2d 47, 48 (Ind. 1995); see also
[15] When a person imprisoned for a felony completes his fixed term of imprisonment, less the credit time he has earned with respect to that term, he shall be released on parole for no more than twenty-four months.
[16] Applying the above here, the record shows that on March 25, 2010, Willet was sentenced to serve fifteen years, with 791 days of jail time credit. Thus, Willet effectively began his sentence on January 23, 2008; fifteen years from that date is January 23, 2023. Again, credit time simply shortens a fixed executed sentence for release to parole, it does not reduce Willet‘s fifteen-year sentence itself, which does not end until January 23, 2023. See Miller, 655 N.E.2d at 48 n.3. The record reveals on its face that Willet was not entitled to immediate release because his sentence has not expired. Therefore, the trial court properly denied his petition summarily.4
[17] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Willet‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus because his sentence has not expired. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[18] Affirmed.
May, J., concurs.
Vaidik, J., concurs in result with opinion.
Shawn G. Willet, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2699
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Vaidik, Judge, concurring in result.
[19] I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that Willet‘s motion should be treated as an application for a writ of habeas corpus rather than as a petition for post-conviction relief. An inmate who believes their sentence has expired has two options. First, they can file a petition for post-conviction relief in the county where they were convicted and sentenced. See
[20] The majority suggests that I believe Willet‘s motion should be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief “based on where he filed it rather than the substance of the allegations therein[.]” Slip op. n.3. Not true. The substance of the motion is just as important as the location of filing. And the substance of Willet‘s motion is a claim that his sentence has expired—a claim that is explicitly authorized by the post-conviction rules. Again, Post-Conviction Rule
[21] The majority also states, “Construing Willet‘s motion as a petition for post-conviction relief is problematic because the proper procedure in post-conviction proceedings was not followed in this case.”
Notes
Laboa v. State, 131 N.E.3d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In this case, the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or order the case to be submitted on affidavit and neither party moved for summary disposition. And, as we discuss below, Willet does not challenge his conviction or sentence. He only argues that he has served his entire sentence and is entitled to be released immediately. Therefore, given the relief sought and the procedural posture of this case, we conclude that construing Willet‘s motion as a petition for post-conviction relief is not appropriate.hold a full evidentiary hearing, P-C.R. 1(5); deny the petition if the pleadings show no merit, P-C.R.1(4)(f); decide the petition on the basis of the pleadings and other evidence submitted if either party moves for summary disposition and there is no genuine issue of material fact to be considered at a hearing, P-C.R. 1(4)(g); or, if the petitioner is pro se, order the case submitted on affidavit, P-C.R. 1(9).