116 Ky. 490 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1903
Opinion op the court by
Affirming.
Appellant was auditor’s agent for Harrison county. He was also appointed by the fiscal cofirt of Harrison county in October, 1900, to collect certain back taxes owing the county. The order of appointment contains the contract, defining appellant’s authority, as well as fixing his pay. ■ As to his authority and compensation it stated; “That this order be co-nstrued to include the collection only of such taxes as to which the sheriff has been exonerated, and such taxes as are due the county separately from the State, and as to which taxes he can not recover or collect as said auditor’s agent, and for his services in the collection of said taxes he is to have an amount equal to one-fourth of all sums so collected.” It is the duty of auditor’s agents to cause omitted property to be assessed for taxation, and to collect the taxes due thereon. They aré primarily, assessing officers. They have no authority to collect any taxes except .from such property as may have been omitted from assessment. Inasmuch as the same assessment operates for both State and county purposes, the act of the auditors’ agents in procuring the assessment of omitted properties inures to the benefit of the counties. In the contract involved here the parties have carefully excluded from it any act of appellant as auditor’s agent. What he was employed by this order to do was entirely outside of the range of his official duties.
Acting under the authority of this appointment, as appellant claims, he collected from certain distillery ware-housemen from October 14, 1890, to April 6, 1892, sums aggregating $617.95, as taxes due Harrison county on distilled spirits contained in bonded warehouses. Sections
We are of the opinion that the pleas are not.good. The taxes collected were not of the character covered by the terms of the contract, as the sheriff had not been exonerated from their collection. Consequently appellant .was neither authorized to collect them nor to receive pay for their collection.
It is suggested that appellee can not maintain this action unless it admits appellant's authority to collect the taxes under the contract; for, it is said, if appellant was not so authorized, their payment by the taxpayers was voluntary, and did not operate as a discharge of their obligation. It is claimed that, until the taxes were paid to one authorized to collect them, they were not paid at all in point of law, and are yet owing by the taxpayers to the county. Appellant was, as to the taxpayers, at least a de facto official, acting under claim and color of official authority. His acts are binding on himself, at least, as well as upon the county when ratified by it; he will be required to deliver to the rightful claimant the money he has collected wrongfully in its name, while acting ostensibly within, yet actually beyond his authority.
The action was properly brought in the name of Harrison county, as the money was owing to the county in its cor
The judgment is affirmed, -with damages.