1 Shan. Cas. 77 | Tenn. | 1858
delivered, the opinion of the Court:
This was a conviction for grand larceny, and it is contended that there should be a reversal on account of error - in the charge of the Court, upon the rule on the subject of guilty possession of stolen goods. Greenleaf, § 34 states the rule to be, “that the possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission” raises a presumption of guilt — prima facie only, of course. This single fact, if unexplained by direct evidence, the attending circumstances, good character, or otherwise, will he conclusive. Phillips in vol. 1, p. 168-9, without the qualification of “recently” after the crime, or any reference to the nature of the property, states that the inference of guilt arising simply from the possession, will he much •weakened by the lapse of a considerable time, or that the property was of a kind likely to pass in the interval through many hands. In Cowen & Hill’s notes to
Judgment affirmed.
The State v. Adams, 1 Hayw. 463; Hughes v. The State, 8 Humph. 75; Correy v. The State, 7 Humph. 499; Tyner v. The State, 5 Humph. 383; Pensylvania v. Myers, Addison, 320; State v. Jenkins, 2 Tyler Vt. R. 379; East P. C. ch. 16, § 93, p. 656.