OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Eddie Shaw of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen and assessed punishment at life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Appellant challenges his conviction in six issues. He argues that the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony about the complainant’s conduct after the abuse, permitting the complainant’s school principal to testify as an outcry witness, admitting DNA evidence without the necessary proof of the chain of custody, and allowing an expert to testify about the DNA evidence in this case. Finally, he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient. We affirm.
Background
*649 When Jane 1 was seven or eight years old, appellant moved in to the townhouse where Jane lived with her mother and two-year-old sister. Soon thereafter, appellant sexually assaulted Jane, who testified at trial about the details of the assault. Jane testified that when her mother was taking a bath one night, appellant took Jane into a laundry room, unzipped his pants, and showed her his penis. He then pulled down Jane’s pants, brought her into the foyer area of the house, and got on top of her. He put his penis inside her vagina. Jane said that it hurt, and she tried to scream, but he told her to stop. Appellant said he would kill her mother and sister if she ever told anyone what happened. Jane remembered that semen came out of his penis when he was putting his pants back on. She was bleeding from her vagina, so she threw away her underwear that night.
The next day, Jane told her mother that appellant touched her and did things he should not have done. Her mother did nothing, and appellant continued to have vaginal or oral sex with Jane nearly every day until she was about ten or eleven years old. When Jane was eleven years old, her mother took her to a doctor and discovered that Jane was six-and-a-half months pregnant. Jane told her mother, “[Appellant] is the one that got me pregnant,” but no report was made to authorities.
Jane gave birth to a baby boy when she was eleven years old, and she retained custody of her son. Jane’s mother told Jane to tell the doctors that a boy named John at her elementary school impregnated her. About eighteen months after Jane’s son was born, appellant resumed sexually assaulting her. By this time, Jane’s mother had also given birth to at least one of appellant’s four biological daughters, and the family was living in and out of various hotel rooms. Appellant would have vaginal and oral sex with Jane while her mother would take baths and the other children were present in the hotel room. This routine continued for about another year. Jane testified that, in total, appellant had sex with her hundreds and possibly a thousand times.
Shortly after her fourteenth birthday, Jane and her son moved in with her maternal grandmother. Jane began attending school and was enrolled in a teen parenting program. One day she was in a fight at school and was sent to an assistant principal’s office. Shannon Fisch, the assistant principal, testified at trial as an outcry witness. Fisch said Jane told her that Jane had been raped by her mother’s boyfriend, and her son was the offspring of that assault. That night, Jane also told her grandmother about the assault and that appellant was the father of her child. Her grandmother took her to a police station, and they made a report.
The State presented testimony from various persons involved in the investigation. Officer Heidi Ruiz worked at the Houston Police Department (HPD) Children’s Assessment Center, and she investigated this case. She testified generally about how children disclose to adults that they have been sexually abused, and she said that children often “cry out” to multiple adults because they are not ready to disclose every detail of the abuse the first time they tell someone. Over appellant’s objection, Ruiz was permitted to testify that Jane’s “actions were appropriate in this case.” Ruiz based her conclusion on *650 her experience working with children for ten years and her observation of how children disclose these types of offenses.
Ruiz further testified that she collected buccal swabs of DNA from Jane and Jane’s son. She brought the swabs to an HPD property room. Officer Carlos Val-era similarly testified that he collected buccal swabs from appellant and delivered them to an HPD property room. Cassandra Pope, an employee at an HPD crime lab, testified that she received the buccal swabs from the property room and transported them to the lab. Karen Gincoo, an employee at the crime lab, testified that she inventoried some of the buccal swabs and sent them via FedEx to Orchid Cell-mark, a forensic DNA testing laboratory in Tennessee, because the HPD crime lab did riot perform paternity testing.
Tabitha Bullock, a DNA analyst at Orchid Cellmark, also testified at trial. After a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court found her qualified to testify as an expert. The State introduced the actual DNA samples taken from appellant, Jane, and Jane’s son, and appellant’s counsel objected because the State had failed to establish the chain of custody. The court overruled the objection and admitted the DNA samples. Bullock prepared a report based on her testing of the DNA samples, which showed that there was a 99.99% probability that appellant was the father of Jane’s child.
The jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. This appeal followed.
Analysis
A. Officer Ruiz’s Testimony Regarding Jane’s Outcry Actions
Appellant argues in his first issue that Ruiz’s testimony about Jane’s outcry actions being “appropriate” was irrelevant and did not assist the trier of fact because it improperly bolstered Jane’s testimony as “a direct opinion on the truthfulness of a child.”
Yount v. State,
*651
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only when the court’s decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Burton v. State,
Here, evidence at trial showed that Jane cried out to multiple persons, including her mother, her grandmother, and a school principal. Based on her experience, Ruiz explained that sexually abused children often cry out to multiple persons, and thus, Jane’s actions were “appropriate.” This evidence enhances an inference drawn from the fact that Jane cried out to multiple adults, and therefore, makes it more probable that Jane was sexually assaulted. Ruiz’s testimony was about the behavior of a child sex abuse victim; she did not provide a direct opinion on whether Jane was telling the truth or was a credible witness. 3 *652 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ruiz’s testimony — it was relevant and assisted the trier of fact. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
B. Admission of Fisch’s Outcry Testimony
Appellant argues in his second issue that the trial court erred in designating Fisch, the assistant principal, as an outcry witness under article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In a case alleging aggravated sexual assault of a child, a witness’s hearsay testimony about a child’s statement is admissible if the following requirements are met: (1) the statement describes the alleged offense; (2) the statement was made by the child against whom the offense was allegedly committed; (3) the witness is the first person, eighteen years of age or older, other than the defendant, to whom the child made the statement; (4) the party intending to offer the statement provides notice at least fourteen days before the proceeding begins, and the notice includes the name of the witness and a summary of the statement; (5) the trial court finds, in a hearing outside the jury’s presence, that the statement is reliable based on the time, content, and circumstances of the statement; and (6) the child testifies or is available to testify at the proceeding. Tex. Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 38.072, § 2 (West Supp.2009). If, as here, a defendant objects based on hearsay, the State bears the burden of proving each element of the statute.
Zarco v. State,
The only argument appellant makes on appeal regarding the court’s admission of Fisch’s outcry testimony is that appellant’s mother, rather than Fisch, was the first person, eighteen years of age or older, to whom Jane made a statement describing the offense.
4
It is undisputed that Jane first told her mother about the abuse, but the State argues that Jane did not disclose sufficient details to her mother to describe the alleged offense.
See Garcia v. State,
A child’s description of the alleged offense “must be more than words which give a general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was going on.”
Garcia,
Nonetheless, any error in admitting Fisch’s statement would be harmless in this case. The admission of inadmissible hearsay testimony under article 38.072 is nonconstitutional error, and we will consider it harmless if we are reasonably assured that the error did not influence the verdict or had only a' slight effect.
See Nino,
C. Chain of Custody of DNA Evidence
In appellant’s third issue, he argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the DNA evidence because the State failed to establish a complete and proper chain of custody. Specifically, he argues that a number of unnamed witnesses “who may have had contact with the DNA samples” did not testify, one named witness who handled the evidence did not testify, and there was insufficient evidence “tracing the delivery and receipt of the FedEx packages” from HPD to Orchid Cellmark.
Appellant has not shown any evidence of tampering or impropriety, and “[without evidence of tampering, most questions concerning care and custody of a substance go to the weight attached, not the admissibility, of the evidence.”
Lagrone v. State,
Here, there was testimony about the beginning of the chain: Officers Ruiz and Valera said they collected the buccal swabs and delivered them to the HPD property room. There was also testimony from the middle of the chain: Pope said she brought the swabs to the crime lab, and Gincoo said she sent swabs to Orchid Cellmark in Tennessee via FedEx. Finally, there was testimony about the end of the chain: Bullock said that Orchid received the FedEx package, and she analyzed the DNA on the swabs. Further, the various packages and envelopes containing the swabs included the initials of people who handled the swabs. Although appellant suggested to the jury that the swabs may have been handled in a way that could degrade the DNA, he has provided no argument that there was any tampering or impropriety. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
D. Bullock’s Expert Testimony Regarding Paternity Testing
Appellant argues in his fourth issue that the trial court erred in allowing Bullock to testify as an expert. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Bullock’s testimony without first making a finding that the testimony was reliable. Because appellant did not request that such a finding be made, object to the trial court’s failure to do so, or object to the testimony on the basis that it was not reliable, we hold that this issue was not preserved.
To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that the party made a specific objection on the record and received an adverse ruling on that objection.
See
Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a);
Turner v. State,
A party may challenge expert testimony on at least three specific grounds. First, a party may allege that the witness does not qualify as an expert because the witness lacks the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in the subject matter of the expert’s testimony.
Vela v. State,
In addition to challenging an expert on the three grounds discussed above, a party in a criminal case has a procedural right to voir dire an expert under Rule 705(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Under this rule, a trial court must grant a party’s “request to conduct a voir dire examination directed to the underlying facts or data upon which .the opinion is based,” and this examination is conducted outside the presence of the jury. Tex.R. Evid. 705(b). The purpose of this examination is twofold: (1) it allows the defendant to determine the foundation of the expert’s opinion without the fear of eliciting inadmissible evidence in the jury’s presence, and (2) it may supply the defendant with “sufficient ammunition to make a timely objection to the expert’s testimony on the ground that it lacks a sufficient basis for admissibility.”
Goss v. State,
A party’s argument that the trial court failed to conduct a properly requested Rule 705(b) hearing is a distinct argument from one challenging the qualifications of an expert.
See Jenkins v. State,
Here, appellant filed a pretrial “request for a Rule 705(b) hearing,” in which he requested “before the State puts on any witness from which it expects to solicit [expert] testimony ..., a hearing be held outside the hearing of the jury pursuant to Tex.R. Evid. 705(b) to determine the admissibility of that testimony.” There was no pretrial ruling on this motion. When the State called Bullock to testify at trial, appellant again requested a “705 hearing.” There was a discussion off the record, and then the court retired the jury and allowed counsel for both parties to ask Bullock questions. The court never denied appellant’s request for a Rule 705(b) hearing on the record, nor did the court limit the scope of this hearing. During the hearing, both parties asked Bullock questions primarily about her qualifications, rather than anything about the data underlying her conclusions or the reliability of her paternity testing. Appellant asked two questions — one about Bullock’s continuing education and another about her publications. When appellant’s counsel said, “I have no further questions,” the court said, ‘Tour objection is overruled. She is qualified to testify.”
Nowhere in the record do we see an objection to the reliability or relevance of Bullock’s testimony, and the context provided by the hearing outside the jury’s presence does not suggest that appellant objected on either of these grounds. Although there was no objection on the record to Bullock’s qualifications, it may be apparent from the context that appellant objected on this ground because those were the type of questions both parties asked Bullock and the court specifically overruled an “objection” and said Bullock was “qualified” to testify.
See Martin v. State,
But appellant does not argue on appeal that Bullock was unqualified. Rather, he argues that the court erred when it held an “abbreviated” and “truncated” Rule 705 hearing “restricted to the qualifications of the witness without requiring the State of Texas to establish” the reliability of Bullock’s testimony. The record does not show, however, that the trial court denied appellant’s request for a Rule 705 hearing. In fact, it held a hearing outside the jury’s presence. If the court impermissibly limited this hearing in scope, it was appellant’s duty to bring this issue to the trial court’s attention and show error in the record.
See Ortiz v. State,
Accordingly, because appellant’s fourth issue was not preserved, it is overruled.
E. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his fifth and sixth issues, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. While this appeal was pending, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that only one standard should be used to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case: legal sufficiency.
Brooks v. State,
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
at 898. This court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Id.
at 901. We defer to the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence unless the resolution is not rational.
Brooks,
Appellant was charged with the aggravated sexual assault of a child by intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of Jane’s sexual organ.
See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(l)(B)(i). Jane testified in detail how appellant penetrated her sexual organ. She said that she was seven or eight years old “when he put his penis inside of my vagina.” Appellant notes the contradictory statement Jane made when she identified the father of her baby as an elementary school student named “John.” Appellant further notes that Jane’s outcry to her principal was made only when Jane faced discipline for getting into a fight. But these arguments primarily concern Jane’s credibility as a witness, not the sufficiency of the evidence. The jury was free to weigh this evidence, and we will not disturb the jury’s credibility determinations on appeal.
See Brooks,
Appellant also argues that the paternity testing evidence does not satisfy the legal sufficiency standard because it rested on several assumptions to reach the 99.99% probability of paternity. We need not decide whether a 99.99% probability of paternity alone is sufficient to convict appellant because Jane’s testimony by itself was legally sufficient evidence.
See Bargas v. State,
Having overruled all of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. To protect the privacy of the child complainant, we refer to the child by a pseudonym.
. For purposes of this appeal, we presume without deciding that an objection to "relevance” preserves the alleged error that testimony does not “assist the trier of fact.” Initially, the Court of Criminal Appeals suggested that relevancy under Rule 401 was a different inquiry from assist the trier of fact under Rule 702.
See Morales v. State,
. Prior to Ruiz testifying about how children cry out to multiple adults, Ruiz testified about questions that can be asked of a child to help determine if the child is telling the truth. Appellant now argues that "[t]he juxtaposition of the questions asking Officer Ruiz if there were safeguards/questions that could determine the truthfulness of the child, with the officer’s responses that the complainant's actions in this case were appropriate, constitute *652 the 'functional equivalent' of opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of the child complainant's allegations.” But appellant did not object to the “truthfulness” testimony, and Ruiz never testified that anyone asked Jane these questions. The testimony immediately before the objected-to question was about the action of a child telling multiple adults about abuse. Further, Ruiz testified about several different topics between the initial “truthfulness” testimony and the statement that Jane's actions were appropriate. Appellant did not preserve any error regarding the earlier testimony about how to determine if a child is telling the truth.
. Accordingly, we do not address the other statutory requirements, including the issue of whether Jane’s statement to Fisch described the offense with sufficient detail.
See, e.g., Hayden
v.
State,