Janette E. Shaw (Wife) and William D. Shaw (Husband) were married on June 28, 1968, and lived together until their separation on or about August 25, 2007. A divorce action was filed on March 3, 2009, and, pursuant to the terms of a pretrial order, the only issue for resolution was the equitable distribution of certain property, including unimproved real property in Marion County, Florida, that was received from a trust created by Husband’s mother, two Morgan Stanley accounts established by Husband with inherited funds, and two deeded interests of 6.67% in an apartment complex that is currently involved in litigation. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court issued a final divorce judgment and decree that divided the Florida property and the two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in the apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own 6.67% interest. Husband applied for discretionary appeal, and this Court granted the application pursuant to the Pilot Project then in effect in domestic relations cases. For current procedure see Supreme Court Rule 34 (4).
1. Husband contends that the trial court erroneously characterized the two Morgan Stanley accounts as marital property.
“In general, the question of whether ‘a particular item of property actually is a marital or non-marital asset may be a question of fact for the trier of fact.’ (Cit.) Furthermore, ‘(t)he standard by which findings of fact are reviewed is the “any evidence” rule, under which a finding by the trial court supported by any evidence must be upheld.’ (Cit.)” [Cit.]
Miller v. Miller,
Husband opened the two Morgan Stanley accounts for the purpose of receiving the assets he had just inherited from his mother, and he established both accounts, from the outset, in the name of him and his wife,
to be held as [joint tenants] with right of survivorship. In so doing, Husband manifested an intent to transform his own separate property into marital property. [Cits.] Because both Husband and Wife then owned an undivided one-half interest in the property, the [accounts were correctly] treated as marital property.
Lerch v. Lerch, supra. Husband contends that this principle should not apply in the present case since Wife never contributed to
2. Husband also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the real property located in Florida was marital property. To support this contention, Husband again argues that he inherited the property from his mother, that Wife has not contributed to the property’s value, and that the property has not been commingled with other marital assets. However, when the property was inherited, Husband directed that it be deeded to him and Wife as tenants in common, thereby giving each party an undivided one-half interest in the property. As discussed above, such action by Husband constitutes some evidence that the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset. Therefore, this enumeration also is without merit.
3. Husband claims that the trial court erred by not giving him all of the couple’s interest in an apartment complex. According to the record, Husband, Wife and Husband’s brother bought a 20% interest in the property that was divided into three equal shares amounting to approximately 6.7% each. Therefore, with the purchase of the property, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband’s. Moreover, “ ‘property acquired as a direct result of the labor and investments of the parties during the marriage is’ ” marital property. Crowder v. Crowder,
Husband, however, contends that he should be granted Wife’s separate interest in the property since he, with his brother, instigated a legal action to enforce their interests in the property and has paid $20,000 in legal fees. Regardless of whether Husband’s allegation would otherwise be sufficient to strip Wife of her ownership in the property, it is undisputed that Wife has been added as a third-party defendant and is represented by her own attorney in the litigation. Moreover, in the present case, the trial court, sitting as the factfinder, has broad discretion in determining the equitable division of the marital assets. See Stanley v. Stanley,
4. Finally, Husband claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence. Husband points to the following language spoken by the court after the conclusion of Wife’s case-in-chief but before Husband’s presentation of evidence:
I don’t see why it shouldn’t be divided 50-50. I mean nothing I’ve heard yet has convinced me otherwise. . . . I’ve not heard all the evidence. ... I know you haven’t had [Husband] on direct examination. But I’ve got a very good feel from this case. . . .
However, a comprehensive review of the hearing transcript shows that before the trial court made these statements, Husband testified extensively in Wife’s case-in-chief as an adverse witness, and Husband’s counsel thoroughly questioned Wife on cross-examination, and thus the trial court hardly could be accused of basing his statements on evidence presented only by Wife. Moreover, after reading the entire conversation between the trial court and Husband’s counsel during which the statements above were made, it becomes apparent that the trial judge was
Furthermore, the prohibition against judges commenting on witness testimony is meant to apply to comments made by a judge in front of a jury, not to comments made by a judge in a bench trial, since the purpose behind the prohibition “is to prevent the jury from being influenced.” [Cits.]
In the Interest of C. S., supra at 566 (2). Since the trial court sat as the factfinder in the present case, it was not erroneous or improper for the judge to express aloud his opinions on the evidence as the trial progressed. The only person that the trial court could improperly influence with his comments was himself, and it would be inane to rule that the trial judge acted improperly by expressing aloud these opinions rather than keeping them secret. Thus, this enumeration also is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.