*1 SHAW, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, MARK S. v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE OF STATE NEW (FICTITIOUS JERSEY; JOHN A DOE NAME FOR THE DRIV- VEHICLE), ER JEEP OF THE CHEROKEE MOTOR ELIOPOU- KONSTANTI; (FICTITIOUS LOS JOHN B DOE NAME FOR VEHICLE); THE DRIVER OF THE HONDA MOTOR MICHELE CASCETTA; RANDALL, ELIZABETH E. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE ON BEHALF THE OF UNSATISFIED CLAIM (FICTI- AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD AND JOHN DOE C-Z NAMES), DEFENDANTS, TIOUS AND NEW JERSEY MANU- COMPANY, FACTURERS INSURANCE DEFENDANT-RE- SPONDENT. COMPANY, NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, SHAW, v. MARK S. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. September
Argued 2002 Decided December 2002. *2 (Blume E. John Molinari appellant Gold- argued the cause for Forte, Donnelly Berkouritz Fried & attorneys). faden (Mortemon Pomeroy argued Daniel J. respondent the cause for Heller, Pomeroy, attorneys; Pomeroy Mr. E. and Karen brief). opinion The Court delivered ZAZZALI, J. appeal we this must decide whether a tortfeasor’s intentional *3 may meaning
act constitute an “accident” within the of New statute, N.J.S.A 17:28-1.1. The courts Jersey’s uninsured motorist Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. below relied on this dictum in Court’s (1994), 138 to hold that N.J.S.A. coverage injured by not 17:28-1.1 does extend to an a insured conclude, however, party’s third intentional conduct. We consis Legislature’s enacting tent with the in intent the uninsured motor statute, insured, expectations ist as well as the reasonable may qualify that an an intentional act as an “accident” under N.J.S.A 17:28-1.1. We reverse.
I in evening plaintiff, One March of police undercover City Nazario, agent Jersey City, partner, the and his Edwin parked police Jersey sat in an unmarked van on a side off street Avenue. was the Plaintiff on lookout for stolen cars that automo- frequently stripped Shortly bile thieves the at Avenue’s dead end. plaintiff midnight, traveling after observed two automobiles south- of, Jersey bound down in the Avenue direction the dead end. return, plaintiff When those failed to the to a vehicles drove van approximately halfway plain- location between the dead end and vantage point. parked tiffs earlier Plaintiff there and exited the displayed badge van. He then approached his and the two closer, vehicles, vehicles foot. As he drew Jeep, one a began plaintiff to drive high speed. toward at a rate of Plaintiff gun pointed drew his and it at the vehicle’s windshield. Plaintiff at testified trial that when he Jeep realized that the going stop, left, was not jumped to he while the driver of Jeep in opposite swerved direction. Officer Nazario’s however, report, accident stated that the Jeep driver of the “with disregard to deliberately human life steered for and struck” plaintiff. undisputed Jeep It is plaintiff, breaking hit his places. ankle three The driver fled and apprehended. was not insured, Although Jeep its coverage insurer declined because it had been stolen. Plaintiff had uninsured motorist personal under policy Jersey his with New Manufactur- (NJM) Company ers $35,000, Insurance in the amount of and was $15,000 also entitled from the City.
Plaintiff complaint seeking filed a City, recover from the NJM, the owners of the stolen vehicle and the Unsatisfied Claim (UCJF) Judgment Fund Board. against Plaintiff’s claims City and NJM asserted that because he was struck a stolen operated by vehicle person an unknown he was unin- entitled to sured responded by filing NJM declaratory judgment complaint seeking a determination that it was not required provide coverage plaintiffs personal under automobile policy. insurance
The trial court consolidated those actions and conducted a bench trial. Prior City to the trial elected not to contest availability of its The court also plaintiffs against dismissed claims the vehicle’s owners and the UCJF. The trial court then addressed NJM’s denial of uninsured motorist coverage plaintiffs under personal policy. policy required part
Plaintiffs in that NJM
571 damages legally which an insured is to pay entitled recover from the compensatory owner of an motor or or uninsured vehicle underinsured motor vehicle operator because of: injury accident____ 1. sustained an insured and an Bodily caused by hearing plaintiffs testimony, After the trial court that held plaintiff was not entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits Regarding from NJM. itself bound this Court’s dictum Lindstrom, 249-50, 1272, supra, 138 at N.J. 649 A .2d the trial court found that the intentional conduct of the uninsured tortfea plaintiffs injury sor caused and therefore ruled no accident plaintiffs policy provided occurred. NJM Because accident, only event the trial court judgment for entered NJM. Appellate
The Division affirmed the trial court’s Shaw decision. (2002). 219, City Jersey City, N.J.Super. 346 “[ujnlike panel against UCJF, The held that the claims claims coverage applies arising for which UM are limited to those 226, damage.” accidental Id. at A.2d The 787 268. Lindstrom, panel 249, supra, relied 138 at also on N.J. 649 A.2d 1272, rule “the term ‘accident’ must be viewed from the tortfeasor, insured,” perspective of the not the and therefore “does Shaw, not supra, include conduct.” intentional 346 at 227, 787 A.2d268. 177, granted
We 172 certification. N.J. II statute, 17:28-1.1, The uninsured motorist N.J.SA serves purposes. designed two “provide It maximum remedial motorists,” protection financially irresponsible to the innocent victims of Prop. cio v. Prudential Ins. & Cas. Ric (1987), 531 A.2d and “reduce the drain the financial ly-troubled 503-04, Judgment Fund.” Unsatisfied Claim Id. at 717. A.2d statute, to passage “[statutory
Prior reliance for the placed direct relief of victims of uninsured motorists at first *5 572 Fund____”
solely Judgment on the Unsatisfied Claim and Motor 271, 284, Phillips, Club Am. Ins. v.Co. of (1974). law, -91, The UCJF “provide[s] N.J.S.A. 39:6-61 to persons measure of relief for who sustain losses or inflicted by financially irresponsible operators or unidentified owners or of vehicles, persons motor where such would otherwise be remedi Gassert, Corrigan less.” 27 142 A.2d 209 1968, Legislature passed statute, the uninsured motorist which offering liability mandated insurers automobile insur protection. ance also offer uninsured motorist N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1. That same act also stated that carrying insureds uninsured motor coverage “qualified ist persons” were not pursue able to a claim against the Legislature UCJF. N.J.S.A. 39:6-62. The intended give Fund, which, this scheme “to relief to the at that time, approaching insolvency growing gap because of the between its income and the volume of upon claims it.” Motor Club, 284, supra, 66 N.J. at 330A .2d360. scheme, statutory
Under the current uninsured motorist cover- age governed 17:28-1.1, by is requires N.J.S.A which motor liability policies vehicle provide coverage up mini- certain mums for legally all or the sums which
payment part the insured ... shall be entitled to damages recover as from the or owner of an motor operator vehicle, hit and run motor vehicle, [N.J.S.A. 39:6-78] as defined ... because of bodily injury ... arising sustained by insured, caused accident and out of the vehicle____ maintenance or use such uninsured or hit ownership, and run motor added).] (emphasis [N.J.S.A. 17:28-l.la past Over the two decades the courts of this State have disa greed meaning about the of the uninsured motorist statute’s requirement injured that the harm to the insured be “caused accident.” In Sciascia v. Am. Ins. N.J.Super. 183 443 (Law Div.1982), o.b., A.2d 1118 459 A.2d aff'd (App.Div.1983), the court extended uninsured motorist cover age to an by gunshots insured killed moving fired from a automo bile. It ruled that far as “[s]o concerned, question of whether there was an ‘accident’ must *6 Id. at viewpoint 356, of be evaluated the the insured.” 443 distinguished A.2d 1118. The court liability between traditional insurance, wrong “an under which intentional is not considered to accident,” an coverage, be and uninsured motorist under which the 355-56, Id. at purpose tortfeasor’s “intent or is immaterial.” 443 A. 2d 1118. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
This Court first in addressed these issues Malec, (1986). Malee, 104 In we character 1, “eminently ized as Appellate opinion sound” an Division that held “for purposes that of PIP benefits the word ‘accident’ did not occurrences, ‘except exclude intentional where the conduct of the ” injured 10, Id. at person implicated.’ (quoting A.2d 514 832 Pennsylvania Miller, Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate 185 of N.J.Super. (App.Div.1982)). observed We coverage that both uninsured motorist and PIP benefits constitute “first-party coverage designed compensate injured party.” [an] Ibid, Sciascia, supra, 357, N.J.Super. (citing 183 at 443 A.2d 1118). Although in Malec we not explicitly did hold that the may intentional acts of a qualify tortfeasor as accidents under an policy, comparison uninsured motorist our PIP of and uninsured coverage suggested motorist that conclusion. Lindstrom, supra, however, approach this Court revised the it endorsed Malec and distin coverage
to uninsured motorist
guished
coverage
PIP
dictum between
and uninsured motorist
249,
138 N.J. at
In Abraham v. United Circuit, applying the Third New Appeals States Court law, Jersey question of unin called into Lindstrom’s discussion applied perspective of the sured and instead motorist injured may qualify an whether occurrence as insured to decide plaintiff’s cover triggers “accident” that age. The observed that uninsured Id. at 296-97. Abraham court “protects an insured from harm caused other acts, equally surprised people’s and an insured is blameless regardless inten negligently of whether tortfeasor acted tionally.” “[covering Id. at 298. It further reasoned that *7 the a insured a harm has resulted from intentional act of [where third-party encourage the not insured to commit tortfeasor] does intentional, unexpect wrongful protects acts and the insured from agree the are ed losses.” Ibid. We with Third Circuit because we persuaded objectives now that both of the uninsured motorist by including conduct of a statute are served the intentional within the ambit of uninsured motorist We tortfeasor consequently contradictory set aside the dictum Lindstrom.
Ill
A
noted,
objectives
As we have
one of
of uninsured
provide
protection to
is to
“maximum remedial
financially irresponsible
the innocent victims of
motorists.” Ric
cio,
supra,
liability victim, but, rather, an accident as benefits as to a and, such, policy, provides first-party opposed which benefits. liability policy pays third-party ed.1997).] (3d § [9 Couch Ins. 122:5 Thus, intentionally whether the uninsured tortfeasor acted does availability coverage, which not control the of uninsured motorist pays directly injured benefits insured. The intentional acts only justify third-party a denial of the tortfeasor are relevant liability coverage under an intentional acts exclusion or clause of liability import policy applicable similar in a to the “uninsured It motor vehicle.” matters not to the definition of “uninsured all, motor vehicle” whether the tortfeasor has no insurance at coverage pursuant exclusionary insurer denies to an tortfeasor’s policy, clause the tortfeasor’s insurer is insolvent and 17:28-l.le(2). pay. unable N.J.S.A. third-party liability coverage an insurer denies for what-
When reason, “precisely ... if no ever the same situation exists as Appelman, supra, carried all.” at insurance had been at 8C scenario, third-party coverage unavailing § 5076.15. either injured first-party and an victim must resort to available reme- *8 dies, including coverage, Although motorist for relief. uninsured may third-party deny an a insurer intentional tort cause injured coverage party, to the detriment of an that denial also availability injured party’s first-party cannot limit the of the coverage. Extending coverage irrespective of uninsured motorist - by act whether insured’s was caused intentional scope protection maximizes the available under N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1, thereby giving legislative effect to its intent.
576
B
noted,
Legislature
As
also intended that uninsured motorist
coverage
financially-troubled
“reduce the drain on the
Unsatisfied
Riccio,
503-04,
Judgment
supra,
Fund.”
Because uninsured motorist
UCJF,
vide relief to the
to construe the term “accident” more
restrictively under the uninsured motorist statute than under the
Legislature’s
Kenny
would defeat the
intent.
v.
UCJF
See
Co.,
408,
403,
N.J.Super.
(App.Div.
Ins.
328
Because the and of the uninsured interpretation motorist statute favor an that extends the same protections under uninsured motorist insurance as are available UCJF, may under the and because claimants recover from the acts, injuries resulting for intentional hold UCJF from we that the requirement set forth in 17:28-1.1 that an N.J.S.A. insured’s injured preclude be “caused accident” does not seeking first-party policy insured relief under his her own of uninsured motorist insurance for the inten- parties. holding today tional acts of third furthers Our legislative design by requiring of N.J.S.A 17:28-1.1 that courts persons carrying statutorily-required treat coverage at least as as who lack and well those such consequently compensation. must resort to the UCJF
C
unique
Aside from those considerations
to N.J.S.A 17:28-
1.1, general principles of
also dictate
result.
insurance law
our
adhesion,
typically
prepared
Insurance contracts
are contracts of
Co.,
unilaterally by
Sparks
the insurer.
v. St. Paul Ins.
100 N.J.
(1985).
325, 335,
Members protection necessary to fulfill are entitled to “broad measure of expectations.” Loyal Protective their reasonable Kievit v. Life Ins. To the extent that the term “accident” in the context of uninsured motorist ambiguous, construing it to include intentional acts committed *10 against expecta- an innocent insured satisfies those reasonable agree Supreme tions. We with Montana Court’s observation that, reasonably average expects long that “the so as an insured insured, by injury-causing unprovoked event is unforeseen and injuries by by caused motorists be covered uninsured will UM coverage regardless they negligently of whether were caused intentionally.” v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Wendell Nothing language 974 P.2d in the of Mont. plaintiffs policy suggests policy pur- to “bodily injury by that for a chaser sustained an insured by contingent and caused an accident” is on the of state mind of a party. plaintiff paid premium third The insured has a and is protected entitled to be to the extent of his reasonable under- standing policy. of the terms of his insurance This result majority jurisdictions consistent with a that have addressed may qualify issue of whether an intentional act as an “accident” purposes (citing for of uninsured motorist Id. at 629-30 jurisdictions adopted majority approach). that have
IV Applying holding our that uninsured motorist tortfeasor, by extends the intentional acts of a plaintiff Jeep we conclude when was struck the stolen an meaning “accident” occurred within the of his uninsured motorist policy. This result legislative design is consistent with both expectations plaintiff. the reasonable recognize appropriate that in coverage may We circumstances be withheld when to the insured results from his or her own negligent record, however, intentional or actions. On this there is nothing suggest plaintiff materially contributed to the injury. infliction of his We therefore reverse and remand to the entry judgment plaintiff trial court for an in accordance with opinion. this
VERNIERO, J., dissenting. car
This case is not about an uninsured motorist whose acciden- Rather, tally unsuspecting pedestrian. as the collided with an found, escaped explicitly perpetrator it is about a who trial court injure police by using an automobile as ah instrument to arrest The trial acting pursuit perpetrator himself. officer finding investigative report an filed court’s was consistent with eyewitness report the incident. That partner, the officer’s disregard ... to human life indicates that driver with “[t]he him deliberately sending [the officer] steered for and struck attempted cover.” ground as he to seek facts, trial court erred in those I do not believe that the On in Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. following this Court’s dictum *11 (UM) coverage the from that courts must view uninsured-motorist 242, 249, 649 perspective of the uninsured tortfeasor. 138 N.J. however, moment, that it did. A.2d 1272 Assume for the ruling, trial considered portion In an alternate of its the court also officer, injured plaintiff. perspective the the events from explained: The trial court taking in of into account the narrative of the event From the Shaw and testimony (J3EYD), I as a fact that the as is contained in the find question police reports causing injury within the of
incident Shaw’s was not an “accident” contemplation (P2EVD) would entitle him to recover the law or the NJM such as applicable policy I Moreover, UM benefits. even considered perspective plaintiff, find if injury intentional conduct the uninsured that Shaw’s was caused the clearly by Accordingly, it is run down as to arrest. who tried to Shaw so escape tortfeasor is to recover UM benefits from determination that Shaw not entitled my plaintiff involving injury not sustain an caused an “accident” by NJM because Shaw did according language, for such vehicle, which is the policy predicate, recovery. added).] (Emphasis [ Thus, plaintiffs assailant explicitly trial court found that injuries. intentionally plaintiffs Adopting either the mo- no perspective, or the trial court was satisfied that torist’s victim’s (I majority’s acknowledge accident had occurred. that under conduct are of no approach aspects the intentional of a tortfeasor’s Lindstrom, Because I would adhere moment to a victim. findings regard my trial court’s in that are still relevant analysis.) below,
Writing panel Judge correctly for the unanimous Lintner review], “Applying principles appellate stated: ... we are [of satisfied from our review of the [the evidence that trial court’s] finding, plaintiffs injuries that were caused intentional conduct when an uninsured hit-and-run driver run him tried to down in escape, order to effectuate City his is unassailable.” v. Shaw Jersey 219, 232-33, City, (App.Div. 2002). require I would follow those basic that tenets us these accept circumstances to the trial court’s determination. See State Locurto, (1999) (observing appellate court cannot finding disturb lower court's that “could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence record”) (internal present in the quotation marks and citation omitted). analogy
The Judgment to the Unsatisfied Claim and Fund (UCJF Fund) and, imperfect view, my unpersuasive. merely procedural “Accident” under the UCJF denotes a term or mechanism, timing e.g., that a claim under the Fund must be filed days “within 90 after the accident.” N.J.S.A 39:6-65. The provision all, Fund’s substantive does not refer to “accident” at requiring only ownership, “arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor N.J.S.A vehicle[.]” 39:6-78. contrast, requires UM statute as a claim element that a claimant’s be “caused aecident[.]” N.J.S.A 17:28.1.1a. They Those textual legislative distinctions are critical. evince *12 intent, fully more in Appellate described Lindstrom and the case, Division in recovery this to exclude intentionally-inflicted for injuries in the UM context.
Although agree I majority with the Legislature that the de- signed UCJF, the UM endorsement to unburden the I remain unconvinced that provide lawmakers intended to type the of remedy sought here. Courts have declined to read “accident” into provision, the UCJF’s substantive allowing recovery instead
581 Elder, 466, 476, Proskurnja v. intentional torts. (Law Div.1962) impose (refusing to Fund restrictions statute). Declining in to draw a restric expressly contained not context, however, the in is not same as tive inference the UCJF limitation, as the one declining plainly-written a such to enforce language in between The differences evident in the UM statute. to warrant our affirm provisions Fund are sufficient the UM and ing judgments below. duty injured in line of is question, police a officer
Without regard, plaintiff In that compensation and relief. entitled injuries. arising from his compensation award received workers’ (1986) Malec, Allstate Ins. Co. v. See insurance is denied (observing that when automobile recovery, claimant, of such system provides often “other sources benefits”). compensation Absent a clearer state as ... workers’ engraft present Legislature, I would not onto the ment statute when the system ability to recover under UM unquestionably intentional nature. underlying conduct majority holding, the cites for the Court’s As an alternate basis Generally, expectations. that doctrine the doctrine of reasonable ambiguous policy contains relevant when an insured’s becomes 590, 595, 775 Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. language. See (2001) rely expectations (stating that courts A.2d 1262 contract”). “[wjhen ambiguity in an insurance there is insured “accident” is Briefly put, I not invoke the doctrine because would ordinary that term in the sense of unambiguous when considered Ibid, (observing simple sense. through prism common instance, policy are to of an insurance that the first the words “[i]n meaning”). ordinary given plain, be their the incident from way dispute this is to view to resolve One above, rather, suggested perspective, as party’s but neither commonly- it was an “accident” within consider whether Supreme meaning The Court of Wash understood term. Stonewall, essentially adopted approach Roller ington stated, loss “[a] The court h .2d 801 P.2d 115 Was *13 intent, is accidental when it occurs design, without or obvious (citation omitted). motivation.” Id. at 210 quotation marks It “Thus, perspective added: opposed insured as tortfeasor inquiry. is not a relevant Either an incident is accident or not.” Ibid. today’s holding declaring
After
perpetrator’s attempt
that a
police
run down a
officer constituted an “accident” under the UM
law,
difficulty
I
discerning any
pattern
have
future fact
that would
subject
not be
to the same determination. This Court once
warned,
personal injury
albeit within the
protection
context of
(PIP),
statute],
“that section four
the PIP
[of
however broad its
protection
injuries
substantially related to the use of an
automobile,
designed
general
not
to function as
crime insur
Lindstrom,
ance.”
supra,
253,
One New has high with the See, costs of automobile insurance e.g., is no secret. In re Am. Co., Reliance Ins. (App. Div.1991) (tracing history of this State’s “intractable” insurance problems), denied, 556, 127 N.J. Given certif. reality, I would exercise overruling restraint before portion of Lindstrom that has been on nearly the books for objection decade without Legislature. from the I adhere to a prior Legislature sentiment: “The spoken again has time and the issue of insurance Perhaps look; reform. it is time for another so, lawmakers, if judges, any not must drive effort to revise the Aponte-Correa statute.” 318, Allstate Ins. (2000) (Verniero, J., 744A.2d 175 dissenting).
To summarize: In a noble
interpret
effort to
the term “acci
dent” with all
insured,
favorable inferences to the
the Court
effectively has written that term out of the UM statute.
I would
dictum, carefiilly
Lindstrom,
affirm the
expressed in
supra, that
UM
does
apply
not
“to
an act that is
an accident from the
perspective
victim’s
but that is intended
the actor.”
For YERNIERO —1. affirmance —Justice PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, JERSEY,
STATE OF NEW FRISBY, L. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. MONICA 2002. Argued 2002 Decided December October