21 F. Cas. 1183 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1878
Contracts of insurance are completed when the proposals of the one party have been accepted by the other by some appropriate act signifying such an acceptance, and it follows from that rule that the place or seat of the contract is the place where it was accepted. Consequently if an agent appointed in a state other than that which chartered the company, and in which the company has its home office, forwards the requisite papers to that office, and a policy is thereupon executed there, and mailed directly to the applicant, the contract is a contract made in the state where the •home office is situated; and since the acceptance of the proposals is the test of completion, it follows that a transmission of the policy by mail to the agent, to be delivered ;by him to the applicant, if the policy conforms in all respects to the proposals, would have the like effect, unless by the terms of the policy it was not to be binding until it was countersigned by the agent who forwarded the proposals. May, Ins. § 66; Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y. 266; Huntley v. Merrill, 32 Barb. 626; Western v. Genesee Mut. Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 263.
Agents are appointed by the defendant corporation for certain specific purposes, but the agreed facts show that they are not authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts,' or to waive forfeitures. Policies are issued by the company in consideration, among other things, of the payment by the assured of the ■first and each succeeding premium, at its office in New York, where the policy in this case was issued, and where the loss, if any, is payable. For the convenience of ’such of the assured as transmit their premiums to the home office, the company appoints agents who are authorized to receive such premiums, but only on the production of the company’s receipt, duly signed by the president, vice-preSident, secretary, assistant secretary, or cashier thereof. These agents are only authorized to receive applications from persons desiring insurance and to forward the same to the home office of the corporation, where, if the application is accepted, a policy is issued and sent by mail to the agent in the state in which the application is made,'to be there delivered by said agent to the insured upon payment by the insured, to the agent, of the first premium. Applications of the kind, however, are not forwarded by the agents to the home office of the company until the applicants have been examined by physicians appointed by the company in the state in which the applicants reside, and have been recommended by said physicians as suitable
On the 22d of November, 1869, the policy in this case, on the life of the plaintiff’s intestate, was issued at the home office, in New York, by the defendant corporation, in "the sum of $1,000, a copy of which is annexed to the agreed statement. Before that date, the company had complied with the requirements of the General Statutes of Massachusetts in respect to the appointment of an agent in the state, upon whom all lawful processes against the company might be served. Gen. St. c. 58, §§ 68, 69. Said policy was sent by mail to the agent of the company, and was by him delivered to the insured, and the agreed facts show that the insured died November 8, 1875, and that due notice and proof of his death was given by the plaintiff to the defendant corporation. It is admitted by the counsel of the plaintiff, in his argument, that proposals for insurance were made by the decedent in due form, and that they were properly forwarded by the agent of the company to the home office of the defendant corporation; and that the defendant corporation, at then-home office, accepted the proposals, and there issued the requested policy, and sent the same by mail to the agent who forwarded the proposals, to be delivered by said agent to the insured upon payment by the insured, to the ¿igent, of the first premium. Beyond all question the admissions of the plaintiff to that extent conform in every particular with the agreed facts, and the plaintiff also admits that the contract in such a case is complete when the proposals of one party have been accepted by the other by some appropriate act signifying the acceptance, and that the place of the acceptance is the ■ place of the contract
Suppose that is so, of which there can be no reasonable doubt, the court is then of the opinion that the proposals of the decedent were accepted by the defendant corporation, at their home office, within the plaintiff’s own rule of law; that the defendant corporation, in issuing the policy in exact accordance with the terms of the proposals, and in sending it by mail to the agent who forwarded the proposals of the applicant, to be delivered there, by said agent, to the insured upon payment by the insured to the agent of the first premium, did signify the acceptance of the proposals by an appropriate act, if not by the only act adapted to make known their intention to insure the life of the applicant. What the plaintiff contends is. that before the premium was paid, the applicant had not assented to the policy and that he had not complied with the conditions upon which the policy was issued; but the agreed facts show that the premiums .were paid by the insured and were received by the defendant corporation up to and including May 22, 1874, four ' years and a half from the date of the policy, since which time no money was paid on account of premiums. Nor can the proposition submitted by the plaintiff be sustained, for three reasons: (1) Because the proposals were submitted by the decedent. (2) Because the contract became complete when the proposals were accepted by the defendant corporation. (3) Because acceptance of the proposals without variation was made known to the applicant in the usual and accustomed mode.
Attempt is made to support the theory off the plaintiff by reference to the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 23 Wall. [90 U. S.] 85, in which the opinion was given by Mr. Justice Swayne, but it is obvious that tbe-case affords no support whatever to the theory, for reasons which pervade the whole-opinion: (1) Because the acceptance was a qualified one. (2) Because new terms were added to the proposals. (3) Because the proposals contained conditions. (4) Because the-delivery was conditional. (5) Because the policy did not conform to the proposals.
Much discussion of the other points in the I case is unnecessary, as they are the same as ; those decided in the preceding case, to which i reference is made for the reasons which in- - duce the court to hold that the home office off the defendant corporation is the place of the contract, and that the Massachusetts statute referred to is not applicable in such a case. Pursuant to the agreed facts the defendants-nre entitled to judgment.
Judgment for defendants.
