Proceedings were instituted by the United States in the district court for the district of New Jersey February i, 1900, for the condemnation of about 40 acres of land pf the plaintiff in error, Edward S. Sharpe, situate in Salem county, in the state óf New Jersey, contiguous to a certain reservation of the United States, upon which Ft. Mott had theretofore been built; which land, as stated in the petition filed by the United States, was “needed for military purposes, for the location, construction, and prosecution of works for fortifications and coast defenses.” They were authorized by the provisions of the act of congress of August 18, 1890, and of those of March 7, 1898, and March 3, 1899, making appropriations therefor. The act of August 18, 1890, provided that the proceedings for condemnation should be “prosecuted in accordance with the laws relating to suits for the condemnation of property of the states wherein the proceedings may be instituted.” These proceedings accordingly were begun under the authority of an enabling act of the legislature of the state of- New Jersey, passed in February, 1900, and were prosecuted in accordance with the laws regulating the condemnation of lands in that state at the time this, enabling act w,as passed. Pursuant to the requirements of the laws aforesaid, three commissioners were duly appointed by the judge of the district court for the district of New Jersey to appraise the value of the land in question. The commissioners so appointed made due report of their proceedings to the said district court, which report was filed .July 16, 1900. By it it appears that they fixed the value of the 41.75 acres of' land required to be taken for
“This matter coming on for trial at the January term, 1901, of this court, and being called, and both parties appearing, and the canse being moved by the said appellant, and a jury being impaneled and sworn, and having viewed the premises, and the evidence offered by the parties having been submitted, and the respective parties, by their connsel, being heard, and the judge having charged the jnry, and the jury having retired to consider their verdict, come again into court, and say that they find and assess the value of the said lands and damages sustained at the sum of twelve thousand dollars, to be paid to the said Edward S. Sharpe, by the said appellant, fir the value of said lands and damages sustained. And it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the said assessment by the jury aforesaid he, and the same is hereby, confirmed, and that the said Edward S. Sharpe is entitled to have from the said United States the sum of twelve thousand dollars for his said land and damages. Judgment signed this 11th day of March, A. D. 1901.”
Bills of exception to the rulings of the court in regard to the admission of testimony and to the charge of’the court were duly scaled, and, together with the record of the judgment, have been brought before us by writ of error.
The first point of objection that arises out of the assignments of error is that the court overruled the defendant’s offer to prove the probable use that the government would make of this land, and the further offer to prove that the use of this land for military purposes would injure and depreciate the value of Dr. Sharpe’s remaining and adjoining land. We think the court were right in overruling these offers, on two grounds: First, the record discloses the fact that the land taken by these proceedings constituted one of three several tracts of land, consisting of three adjoining farms, owned by plaintiff in error, and held by different titles, and acquired at different times. The property first acquired was known as the “Dunham Farm,” and was purchased in 1880, for $5,800, by Mrs. Sharpe, wife of the plaintiff in error, and afterwards'transferred to the plaintiff in error. The property in question, the subject of these proceedings, was purchased by plaintiff in error in 1891, and is known as the “Gibbons Tract,” consisting of 41.75 acres and 22
“It is an established rule in law, in proceedings fcr condemnation of land, that the just compensation which the landowner is entitled to receive for his lands and damages thereto must be limited to the tract a portion of which is actually taken. ‘The propriety of this rule' is quite apparent. It is solely by virtue of his ownership of the tract' invaded-that the owner is entitled to incidental damages. His ownership of other lands is without legal significance.”
It is enough to say that, in our opinion, the two other farms or tracts of land owned by plaintiff in error constituted such separate and independent parcels as regards the laud in question that they cannot properly be spoken of as the residue of a tract of land from which the land in question was taken. The court, however, did allow the plaintiff in error to show what damage, if any, had resulted from separating these farms; that is, to show, if he could, that by reason of their severance they were made so small -that it would be unprofitable to work them, and damage resulting from that the jury might so award. This certainly was as far ás the court could be justified in going in favor of the contention of the plaintiff in error. We think the court were right, therefore, for the reasons stated, in refusing to allow the plaintiff in- error to show what damage or inconvenience would probably result to these other tracts (otherwise than what resulted from the mere severance in farming-) from the taking of the Gibbons tract for the military purposes aforesaid.
A second sufficient ground for the court’s action in this respect is that the testimony offered was too vague and speculative in character. It dealt with possibilities more or less remote, and was not founded upon any clear, certain, or avowed' obnoxious uses to which the property in question was to be put. The tract in question nearly surrounds the reservation of the United States, upon which permanent fortifications have already been erected, and emplacements for heavy ordnance already built, with the magazines and other appurtenances for the firing of large guns. These already existed, and there was no suggestion that the additional land embraced within the tract in question was to be used for enlarging these permanent fortifications. No offer was made by the plaintiff 'in error to show for what purpose the land was to be used. “Military purposes” is a general description, and would cover its use as a parade ground, officers’ quarters, barracks, etc. No proof was had showing that batteries were to be erected on this land. The only testimony actually offered by plaintiff in error was as to the batteries, emplacements, and magazines already erected within the permanent fortification, known as “Fort Mott.” The-court were right in refusing the offer to show possibilities or probabilities of damage from the use to which the land in question -might be put. The court ruled that the offer was too broad. Under the-' circumstances of thi's case we are of opinion that it was- right: in so stating.
■ The second point of'objection raised by the assignments of error ■is to llie ruling of the court to the effect that the plaintiff in error could not be allowed to testify to offers of purchase made to -him
The court was very liberal in allowing the .jury to consider the-testimony offered by the plaintiff in error, as to other criterions of value, and allowed testimony to show that the land in question was adapted to other purposes than agricultural purposes; that it was available as a hotel site; that projected trolley lines were likely to run near it, and enhance its value; that a railroad might be built in its neighborhood, which might have a like influence; stating to the jury that, if these or other purposes to which the land could be adapted add to the present value of the land, they might give the pla.intiff in error the benefit of that in estimating the present worth of the property itself. There was considerable testimony of this kind, more or less vague, all of which was admitted for the reasons stated. In so admitting it, we think, the court was quite as favorable as it ought to have been to the plaintiff in error.
The last assignment of error is that the court instructed the jury, as follows:
“The jury must be satisfied as to the value and damage by the testimony which is produced before it, without reference to any testimony which was produced before the commissioners, or influenced by the commissioners’ report.”
We think the court were quite right in this instruction. The case on the appeal from the commissioners’ award was tried before the district court de novo. All the evidence necessary to a finding was produced on both sides, and this only could the jury properly consider, uninfluenced by the action of the commissioners, from which appeal was taken.
Upon a careful consideration of the whole case, we- see no error, either-in the charge of the court to the jury or in its rulings as to the admissibility of evidence, and the judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.