Appellant Theodore Fred Sharpe was convicted of malice murder in connection with the deaths of Herman “Rusty” Cadle and Stillson “Larry” Lawrence and was sentenced to two consecutive life terms.
1. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Cadle and Lawrence died in a fire that swept through their residence while they slept on the night of June 9, 2008. Appellant, who lived with the victims, and Celisa Hamilton were seen arguing at the residence immediately before the fire. A witness heard Hamilton yell that she was going to kill somebody and saw appellant exit through the front door with a flashlight and walk over to an area on the side of the residence where law enforcement later discovered multiple gas cans. Appellant reentered the residence with something in his hand and then stood in the front doorway with Hamilton. The witness observed them “throw something” followed by the eruption of flames in the front portion of the house at which time appellant and Hamilton fled. Appellant later returned to the scene of the fire as firefighters were trying to revive one of the victims and commented that he was glad one of the victims was dead. A crime scene investigator and an arson investigation expert both concluded that an accelerant had been used, and the arson expert determined that the fire was intentionally set.
Appellant contends that the actual cause of the arson was never determined and all of the evidence against him was circumstantial. Contrary to appellant’s assertions, however, there was substantial evidence linking him to the murders, and we conclude the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to characterize the manner of death for the two victims as homicides.
Generally, witnesses are prohibited from expressing opinions on an ultimate issue where jurors can come to their own conclusion from
Finally, we conclude that even had the trial court erred in permitting this testimony, such error was harmless where the plain and overwhelming inference to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial was that the fire was intentionally set and there was no evidence presented to the contrary. See Suits v. State,
3. Appellant additionally complains that the trial court erroneously excluded exculpatory evidence when it refused to admit a recording of a 911 call appellant made to report the fire. However, appellant chose not to testify at trial and was not subject to cross-examination, thus the trial court did not err in holding that the 911 call was a self-serving declaration and inadmissible hearsay. Parker v. State,
4. Appellant also argues that the trial court improperly charged the jury on the offense of arson in the first degree by charging
Where the indictment charges a defendant committed an offense by one method, it is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that the offense could be committed by other statutory methods with no limiting instruction. [Cit.] The defect is cured, however, where... the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]
Mikell v. State,
Nor does this claim survive a plain error analysis. State v. Kelly,
5. Finally, we reject appellant’s claim that the trial court’s charge to the jury failed to inform the jurors that the “not guilty” option could operate as a general acquittal of the murder charges. Not only were the trial court’s instructions not deficient in the manner urged by appellant, see Jones v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes occurred on June 9, 2008. A Richmond County grand jury returned an indictment charging appellant and Celisa Heard Hamilton with two counts of malice murder and two counts of felony murder while in the commission of arson. Appellant filed a motion to sever and was tried separately from Hamilton on October 27,2008. On October 29,2008, a jury found appellant guilty as charged. He was sentenced on November 12,2008 to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment for malice murder and the remaining counts of felony murder were vacated under Malcolm v. State,
The medical examiner testified that both victims died as the result of smoke, soot, and super heated gas inhalation and further opined that both died as a result of a homicide. He explained, “[Tjhere are five manners of death. There’s homicide, suicide, accident, undetermined and natural death. What I do is I try to determine which of those classifies for each death, in other words, cause of death and manner of death.... When I use manner of death ... I use that in the medical sense for an autopsy report.” Further clarifying, he stated, “I don’t decide whether or not it’s justifiable or not, hut it’s still a homicide.”
OCGA § 16-7-60 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of arson in the first degree when, by means of fire or explosive, he or she knowingly damages or knowingly causes, aids, abets, advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to damage:
(1) Any dwelling house of another without his or her consent or in which another has a security interest, including but not limited to a mortgage, a lien, or a conveyance to secure debt, without the consent of both, whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant;
(5) Any building, vehicle, railroad car, watercraft, aircraft, or other structure under such circumstances that it is reasonably foreseeable that human life might be endangered.