Sharpe v. HarrisSharpe v. Harris
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW“) has filed this appeal from an order entered оn November 14, 1979 by the Honorable Charles S. Haight, Jr., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, granting permanent injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff class. The class, certified by order dated Junе 22, 1979, consists of New York State residents who apply for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI“) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act“),
The Secretary does not challenge the factual findings reached by Judge Haight in his careful and thorough opinion below. Rather the Secretary claims that in view of the publication of proposed regulations on February 28, 1980 containing time limits for the rendition of decisions as required by Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978), this court should vacate the judgment below, However, those regulations have not become final and binding on HEW. The mere publication of regulations does not assure that they will be enforced. The district court found that current delays in hearings exceed the time limits imposed by statute for cases not involving disability issues, and еxceed those contained in the proposed regulations for disability issue cases. Under these circumstances, there is no basis to vacate the judgment.
Relying upon Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978), the Secretary urges this court to reconsider its prior rulings in Barnett v. Califano, supra, and White v. Mathews, supra, in order to prevent undue judicial interference with the administrаtion of Title XVI. In Wright, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court‘s granting of injunсtive relief similar to that granted here on the ground that the delays in hearings were a result not оf inefficiencies but of a lack of agency resources. The court also noted thе dangers which could result if courts in particular regions of the country placed excеssive demands upon agency resources, thereby thwarting a national solution to the delay problem.
Here the Secretary has had an opportunity to propose nationwide regulations setting standards for reasonable delays. The judgment entered by the court below embodies these time limits and thus does not represent an undue interference with HEW‘s discretion. In any event, as in Barnett v. Califano, supra, 580 F.2d at 31-32, and White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 859, the danger of judicial intervention is outweighed by the irreparable harm suffered by mеmbers of the plaintiff class who encounter unreasonable delays in gaining consideratiоn of their applications.
Similarly, we reject the Secretary‘s contention that the distriсt court erred in imposing time limits on commencement of payments following a favorablе decision. The judgment below requires that payments begin within twenty days of a favorable decisiоn in cases in which the decision contains findings as to the proper level of payments and within sixty days of decision in cases requiring a “pre-effectuation re-evaluation” to assеss the appropriate level of benefits. The district court properly held that Title XVI of the Act contemplates that payments shall commence within a reasonable timе after a favorable decision. See
Finally, we conclude, in light of all the сircumstances, that the schedule provided by the trial court for implementation of the judgment did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the partial final judgment of the district court is affirmed.