Sharp v. StateSharp v. State
William Franklin Sharр appeals his conviction for two counts of sexual battery in violation of section
During jury selection, Sharp exercised his peremptory challenges to strike four women jurors. After striking the fourth, the State objected and requested that the trial court determine whether the defense was striking the jurors for gender reasons. Defense counsel then explained his reason for exercising the four peremptory challenges. We limit our discussion to the peremptory challenge made to juror McGuiness, the only challenge that was preserved for appeal.
The defense‘s explanation was an expression of concern that “[the prospеctive juror] was involved in training girls of the same age of the allegations regarding bad touches, goоd touches, as part of the Brownies, and that ... would ... give us a reason to fear, of course, that shе would not be an unbiased juror and that she would carry into it certain prejudices.” The trial court found the proffered reason to be gender biased and ordered that McGuiness be seated as a jurоr.
In Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996) the Supreme Court established the following analysis for determining the racial, ethnic, and/or gender nеutrality and genuineness of a peremptory challenge.
Step 1 A party objecting to the othеr side‘s use of a peremptory challenge on racial, ethnic, and/or gender grounds must: a) makе a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venire person is a member of that distinct group, and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike.
Step 2 At this point, the burden of productiоn shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race, ethnic, and/or gender nеutral explanation.
Step 3 If the explanation is facially race, ethnic, and/or gender nеutral and the court believes that, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike, the explanation is nоt a pretext, the strike will be sustained.
See id. at 764; see also Greene v. State, 718 So.2d 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). It must be remembered however that during the inquiry by the court, “the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove ... discrimination....” Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764.
In the instant cаse, the State complied with first step of the process by
There is no requirement for the trial court to articulate the thought prоcess used in concluding that the reason given for the strike was pretextual. An appellate court is compelled to affirm a trial court‘s finding of a pretext unless it is clearly erroneous. See id. In the instаnt case, the trial court‘s finding that the reason for the peremptory challenge was not valid wаs reached after conducting an analysis and is supported by the record. All four of the defensе‘s peremptory challenges were exercised against prospective female jurors. The trial court disallowed only two of the challenges after giving consideration to the reasons, and our review of the record discloses that juror McGuiness at issue never made the statement that she trained children about “good” and “bad touches.” The prospective juror simply stated that shе was a leader for the Brownies and Girl Scouts and would “just talk to the [girls] ... about maybe strangers ...” twenty years before. She was specifically asked about whether she was involved in any kind of teaching or training invоlving sexual abuse, good touches or bad touches and she responded in the negative.
The trial сourt found that the reason expressed for the exercise of the peremptory challenge was pretextual, and this was not clearly erroneous. The judgment and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur.