20 F. 1 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1884
(orally.) This is a suit in equity to declare null and void, and to cancel, an instrument which is claimed to be a contract of marriage between William Sharon, complainant, and Sarah Althea Hill, defendant. The point of the demurrer interposed is that the bill does not present a case for equitable relief. We have examined the question fully, and we are satisfied, upon the principles established by the various authorities cited by complainant’s counsel, that it is a proper case for equitable jurisdiction. The bill presents a case of forgery and fraud. The contract purports to have been drawn and executed in pursuance of the provisions of section 75 of the Civil Code of California. The Code of California makes a marriage contract purely a civil contract for all legal purposes, like any other civil contract. This supposed contract is alleged to be a forgery, and to be fraudulent. It purports to be in writing, and to be signed by the parties; and the defendant claims, by virtue of it, to be the wife of complainant, and to have an interest in his property, which is alleged to be of the value of several millions of dollars. There is no adequate remedy at law for complainant against the claim set up under the alleged contract, and no means at law to annul it at the suit of complainant. The defendant can choose her own time for enforcing her claim under the alleged contract, even after the death of the other party. Fraud has always been one of the principal heads of equity , jurisdiction.
The instrument in question is alleged to be a forgery and a fraud. If it is a forgery, it is of course a fraud also. The only parties who appear to have any personal knowledge of the facts, so far as indicated,' —who, personally, know anything about this transaction, — are the two parties to the alleged fraudulent contract. One is alleged to be many years older than the other; the complainant being alleged to be 60, and defendant 27, years old. The elder, in the ordinary course of nature, is more liable to die, and the contract, in such an event, would be in control of defendant, without any testimony to defeat the
We think this case is within the rule that is often laid down on this subject. Story, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, § 700, after speaking of various instruments that may be used for fraudulent or improper purposes, and which may be canceled by a court of equity on the ground of fraud, says:
“If it is a mere written agreement, solemn or otherwise, still, whilo-it exists, it is always liable to be applied to improper purposes, and it may be litigated at a distance of time when the proper evidence to repel the claim may be lost or obscured, or when the other party may bo disabled from contesting its validity with as much ability and force as he can contest it at the present time. ”
Story says further, in section 701:
“The whole doctrine of courts of equity on this subject is referable to the general jurisdiction which it exercises in favor of a party quia timel. It is not confined to cases where the instrument, having been executed, is void upon grounds of law and equity, but it is applied, even in cases of forged instruments which may be decreed to be given up without any prior trial at law, on the point of forgery.”
If this instrument is not void upon its face, then its validity depends upon testimony aliunde, and testi nony which rests wholly in parol, which is liable at any time to be wholly lost, or placed beyond tbe reach of the parties injured by the fraud. In case of the death of complainant, the contract, and the means of enforcing it, honest or otherwise, would be wholly in the control of the alleged forger and fraudulent claimant. She would be mistress of the situation, and the heirs of a large estate might be wholly at her mercy. There is a charge'of forgery and fraud; and we think the instrument, if a forgery and fraud, ought to be canceled. If there be no remedy in equity for such a wrong as is charged, then the law is, indeed, impotent to protect the community against frauds of the most far-reaching and astounding character. If there is no precedent for a case upon the exact slate of facts disclosed by the bill, it must be because no instance exactly like it lias ever before arisen. The principle, however, is established, and the occasion has arisen for making a precedent, if none over existed before.
The demurrer is therefore overruled, with leave to answer on or before the next rule-day, on payment of the usual costs.
