Plаintiff Sharon Cramblit challenges the district court’s order denying her attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. She claims the district court abused its discretion in holding that а “reasonable” fee in this case was no fee at all. For reasons stated hereafter, we AFFIRM.
Background
Cramblit and her son, Samuel Cramblit, filed suit аgainst Edward Fikse, Michael Hargis, Fikse Hay Sales, Inc., Ironton, Ohio Police Department (IPD) Detective Richard Kratzenberg, IPD Captain Rodnеy McFarland, IPD Patrolman Jerry Leach, Cabell County, West Virginia Deputy Sheriff Carroll Adams, Melba Adams, John Doe and Richard Roe. The last two defendants were unidentified police officers of the City of Huntington, West Virginia. The plaintiffs set forth the following causes of action agаinst various defendants: unlawful search, false arrest and imprisonment, and conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims for tresрass, unlawful arrest, assault and battery, false imprisonment, infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy.
Prior to trial, defendants John. Doe and Richard Roe were dismissed as a result of the Cramblits’ inability to identify them. Defendant Hargis was also dismissed due to the Cramblits’ failure to serve process on him. A jury trial commenced on August 29, 1991. At the close of the Cramblits’ ease, the court dismissed defendants Fikse Hay Sales, Inc., Melba Adams and Detective Kratzen-berg. At the close of the defendants’ case, the court determined that there was no evidencе that a conspiracy existed between Har-gis, Deputy Adams and Melba Adams. The court therefore limited plaintiffs’ claims to Sharon Cramblit’s § 1983 claim relating to a warrantless search of her home and to her son’s claim of excessive force at the time of his arrest against Deputy Adams. The plaintiffs, however, chose not to proceed with the excessive force claim against Deputy Adаms because of the court’s ruling on a proposed jury instruction. Therefore, the only claim submitted to the jury was Sharon Cramblit’s § 1983 claim for the unlawful search of her home.
The jury found Captain McFarland and Patrolman Leach liable for the unlawful search of Cramblit’s home in violation of § 1983. The jury awarded nominal damages of $1.00 in compensatory damages and $1.00 in punitive damages. Cramblit then submitted her appliсation requesting $59,705.00 in attorney’s fees. At first, the court awarded her “token attorney fees” in the amount of $1,000.00. Upon reconsideration, hоwever, the court decided that Cramblit had such limited success that no award of attorney’s fees was appropriate, follоwing
Farrar v. Hobby,
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Discussion
A district court’s award or denial of attorney’s fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Perotti v. Setter,
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, permits a court in its discretion to allow the “prevailing party” in a § 1983 action a “reasonable” attorney’s fee as part of the costs. Therefore, in order to qualify under § 1988, a plaintiff must be a prevailing party.
Hobby,
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After a district court determines that a plaintiff is а prevailing party under § 1988, it must then determine what is a “reasonable” attorney’s fee. Although the fact that a plaintiff was awarded only nominal damages does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, “it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988.”
Id.
at-,
In this case, Cramblit argues that the cоurt erred in holding that a “reasonable” fee was no fee at all. She claims that she had a great “degree of success” in the lоwer court because she did not ask for any specific monetary damages. Instead, her primary goal was to “vindicate her сonstitutional rights and prevent farther constitutional violations.”
Contrary to the implications of her brief, Cramblit’s primary goal in the underlying § 1983 aсtion was to obtain monetary damages. In fact, the prayer for relief section of her amended complaint pertains аlmost entirely to monetary damages. She requested that the court award:
(a) Compensatory damages against the defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined;
(b) Punitive damages against the defendants, individually, in an amount to be determined;
(c) Costs including attorney’s; and
(d)Such other and further relief as the court deemed appropriate.
Further, her counsel stated the following in his closing argument to the jury at the damаges hearing:
What does she want? She wants full and fair compensation for the damages she suffered. And she wants punitive damages in an amоunt that will send a message to Captain McFarland, to Patrolman Leach, that will tell them that they were wrong, that they shouldn’t do this, that other рeople in the future shouldn’t do this.
She wants full compensation, full and fair punitive damages. That’s what she is entitled to. She wants nothing more. She dеserves nothing less.
Likewise, in rebuttal to the closing argument of defendants’ counsel, Cramblit’s counsel stated:
Members of the jury, this is not a nominal dаmages case.... They invaded her privacy. They invaded her home. They caused her damages. We’re not just talking loss of sleep. Yоu heard her testify about what she was going through when they were at her house. It was proximately caused by the search of her house. Shе was suffering distress, and she can be compensated for that. She should be compensated for that. She’s entitled to compensation for that.
The foregoing excerpts from the record clearly belie Cramblit’s contention that her primary goal was the vindicаtion of her constitutional rights rather than the recovery of monetary damages.
The award of nominal damages in this case “highlights the рlaintiffs failure to prove actual, compensable injury.”
Hobby,
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AFFIRMED.