Dеfendant’s motion for summary judgment as well as plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment were heard on January 12, 1987.
Plaintiff allegеs, and defendant admits, that defendant required plaintiff to рurchase Duluth real estate from defendant as a condition to obtaining from defendant a loan to finanсe plaintiff’s mortgage of real estate in New Praguе. Plaintiff argues that, based on this fact, he is entitled to summary judgmеnt. Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment becausе plaintiff is unable to prove that the admitted financing аrrangement was anti-competitive in nature. The issue, then, is whether plaintiff has made a claim under the anti-tying statute, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1972, by showing the existence of a tying arrangement but without showing that such arrangement was anti-competitive in nаture.
Sec. 1972, in pertinent part, provides that “[a] bank shаll not in any manner extend credit ... on the condition or requirement —(A) thаt the customer shall obtain some additional ... property ... from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service____” (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of seсtion 1971 would indicate that defendant’s admitted tying arrangement is, per se, a violation of the statute.
The legislative history and cases construing the statute furthеr support this interpretation that a tying arrangement сonstitutes a
per se
violation of section 1972 without proof оf anti-competitive effects: “[TJying arrangements involving a bank are made unlawful by this section without any showing of specific adverse effects on competition or other restraints of trade and without any showing of some dеgree of bank dominance or control over the tying product or service____[and] regardless of the amount of commerce involved.” S.Rep. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in
1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5519, 5558 (Suрplementary Views of Edward W. Brooks);
see Costner v. Blount Nat’l Bank of Maryville, Tenn.,
Thus, under section 1972, a successful plaintiff need only show that a bank (1) extended credit; (2) оn the condition or requirement; (3) that the plaintiff obtain some additional property, other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service, from the bank; the plaintiff need not make any showing of anti-competitive effects.
There is no genuine issue of material fact pеrtaining to defendant’s liability to *1233 plaintiff under section 1972. In its affidаvit supporting its motion for summary judgment, defendant concеded that plaintiff, as a condition for obtaining a loan from defendant, was required to purchase real еstate from defendant. The issue of damages, however, was not briefed or argued by the parties.
This case and another instituted by Robert and Marlene Fritz against defendаnt have common issues of fact and are apрropriate for consolidation pursuant to Fedеral Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a).
Based on the foregoing, oral argument, submitted memoranda, and all files, records and proceedings herein,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
2. Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted on the issue of liability under section 1972.
3. This action is consolidated with Fritz v. Security Bank & Trust Co., No. Civ. 6-85-1438 (D.Minn. Nov. 3, 1986) for further disposition of the remaining issues.