103 Mo. App. 515 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1903
(after stating the facts-as above). — 1. An objection was made to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that th¿ petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The argument advanced by appellant’s counsel in support of the objection is that, as the petition alleged the motion of the car was imperceptible when Mrs. Shareman started to get off, and alleged that she was thrown or fell from the car on account of its imperceptible motion, the conductor, if the motion was imperceptible, could not be aware of it and, therefore, was not negligent. When this objection was preferred plaintiff’s counsel asked leave to amend so that the averment would read “imperceptible to her;” that is, to plaintiff’s wife; and the amendment was allowed over the defendant’s objection. As will be seen from the statement of the case given above, this averment of the imperceptible motion of the car was abandoned by plaintiff’s counsel during the trial. In his opening statement to the jury, said counsel informed them that the evidence would prove the car stopped and that while Mrs. Shareman was on its steps and in the act of stepping off, it started and threw her. This theory was adopted in the instructions submitted, and at plaintiff’s request one instruction was given which told the jury there was no evidence in the case that when plaintiff’s wife was proceeding to alight from the car it was moving, but so slowly that its motion was imperceptible to her. The court properly permitted the amendment; which, however; from the course the evidence took, proved to be immaterial. There were certainly sufficient facts stated in the petition to let in evidence. There was an averment that the car stopped, or slowed down until its motion was imperceptible to Mrs. Shareman, and when she was in the act of stepping off, its motion threw her and hurt her. Of course, if the car stopped still, as the petition alleged, it must have started again while she was alighting, for its motion to throw her down; and, as stated, the case was tried for the
The other theory of the case arises on the testimony ■' >r the defendant. It is that after the car had stopped a sufficient interval for all passengers to alight who desired to do so, and had then started again,plaintiff’s wife suddenly arose from her seat, walked to the middle door
This car had already made a customary and reasonable pause to discharge passengers and had started onward, if the testimony for the defendant is true; as, for the purpose of this hypothesis we assume it to be. There was, therefore, no invitation, express or implied, to Mrs. Shareman to alight, nor any constraint on her to do so. If she attempted to alight while the car was moving away from its usual stopping place, the act was purely voluntary and she must abide the consequences.
In Neville v. Railroad, 158 Mo. 293, it was said that if the plaintiff’s-son was killed while getting off a moving train, without direction or invitation of the defendant railway company, or its servants, plaintiff had no case, as the deceased took the risk incident to such an act.
In Mason v. Railway, 75 Mo. App. 1, which was an •action for damages based on the ground that a railway train was not held long enough at a station to permit the plaintiff to alight safely, the plaintiff testified that he
In Jackson v. Railroad, 118 Mo. 199, plaintiff, a woman, had been injured in leaving a street car and sued for damages. Her testimony, like that for the present plaintiff, was that while she was stepping from a still car it was started and threw her off. The testi-. mony for the company was that she stepped from the ear while it was moving and after it had left its stopping-place. This instruction was given in behalf of the defendant :
“If the plaintiff undertook to alight from the defendant’s car while it was moving, then defendant could not have been guilty of any negligence charged and your verdict must be for the defendant.”
The negligence charged in the petition was that the car started while she was in the act of getting off. Said instruction was attacked as erroneous, but was approved by the Supreme Court. That case throws much light on the true issues of the present case and should be carefully studied. The instructions given by the trial court were held to embody the only theories which properly arose on the evidence therein, namely; whether the car stopped and was suddenly started while Mrs. Jackson was alighting, or whether she attempted to alight while it was in motion. It will be seen by reading the opinion that the Supreme Court insisted on holding the plaintiff fully accountable for her voluntary acts,instead of attaching blame to the conductor if he failed to intercept her though he could have done so; which the in
It is not necessarily a negligent act to leave a moving ear; but a qestion of fact arises for the jury as to whether the act was negligent; and if it was and proximately contributed to an injury received by the passenger, he has no case for damages.
The facts shown by the record did not call for an application of the last chance rule; but the court applied it by the clause attached to an instruction requested by the defendant. Said instruction,, as requested, was that if the ear stopped to let off passengers and started forward, and after it had started and was moving away, plaintiff’s wife.attempted to alight and was thrown down and injured, he could not recover. That charge was precisely, like one approved in the Jackson case, supra. The qualification added by the (court, was in effect, that plaintiff could not recover unless the jury found from the evidence the conductor, by the exercise of a high degree of care, could have prevented plaintiff’s wife from leaving the car. The last chance rule, so far as we know, has never been held to make a defendant liable unless he could have avoided injuring a negligent plaintiff after he knew, or might have known, the plaintiff was in danger from what he (the defendant) was doing — has never been applied to make a passive defendant liable because he could have prevented a plaintiff, of' full capacity, from injuring himself. But this was what the instructions in this case did. Granting that the conductor could have hindered her from getting off (and the evidence to maintain that premise is weak) she herself, by the hypothesis of the requested instruction and by the testimony for the defendant,- was- a voluntary and active agent in bringing
Whatever force may be allowed to the city ordinance in question, it can not abrogate the rule of law that when the negligence of a party proximately and directly causes or contributes toward causing injury to him, he has no just claim for damages from another individual whose negligence also played some part in the affair. Moore v. Railroad, 75 S. W. (Mo.) 672; Hudson v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 13; Cocoran v. Railroad, 105. Id. 399; Weller v. Railroad, 120 Mo. 635; Duncan v. Railroad, 46 Mo. App. 198. The scope of the last chance doctrine is to be found'in the adjudicated precedents, which have already encroached on the doctrine of contributory negligence to the extent of constituting an exception to that doctrine as applied in some cases.
The judgment is reversed and -the cause remanded.