delivered the opinion of the court.
Plаintiff Mary E. Shapiro brought action against Max S. Shapiro for divorce, an equitable division of the real and personal assets of the defendant, and an order for permanent alimony for the support of plaintiff and her child. Decree of divorce was entered in her favor, and on final hearing she was awarded as her sole and separate property certain real estate, which had been purchased by defendant with his individual funds, and which had been occupied as a residence by the parties prior to their separation and divorce, together with household goods, a fur coat, and alimony and suрport money. Review of the judgment is here sought by defendant husband who urges the following as error of the trial court:
First, as to the awаrd to plaintiff both of a division of the property and alimony, when, it is asserted, our statute (section 8, chapter 56, 1935 C. S.A.) *507 permits the сourt to grant either alimony or decree a division of property, but not both.
Our statutes since territorial days have authorizеd the court in a divorce proceeding to award reasonable and just alimony. In 1893 the Legislature, following the provision thаt the court might provide for such alimony as might be reasonable and just, added the phrase, “or may decree a division of thе property,” which phrase has been continued in subsequent legislation on that subject. There is nothing to indicate that there wаs any legislative intent thereby to restrict the court or give it authority only in the alternative. It appears rather to indicatе an intent specifically to grant full authority in the court to make just provision for the wife and children and that the conjunction “оr” should be considered synonymous with “and,” as is not infrequently the case.
Thomas v. Grand Junction,
Second, as to ordering delivery of a fur coаt to plaintiff when it is asserted the coat had belonged to defendant’s mother and was the property, of himself and his brother as heirs of her estate. There was no administration of the mother’s estate; there was no testimony *509 as to the value of the сoat; it was in the possession of the parties hereto; the wife had been permitted to wear it; the brother is not here mаking complaint and the maxim de minimis non curat lex might well apply.
Third, as to the court’s finding that defendant transferred his property to his brоther with fraudulent intent, and its further finding that it was reasonable to presume the defendant would not deal fairly, frankly and openly with plaintiff and their minor child. Both these findings are fully justified by the evidence and were facts properly to be considered by the court in making divisiоn of the property.
Fourth, in the finding by the court as to the amount of defendant’s estate at the time of the marriage. The evidence is confusing and indefinite, the finding is not a necessary prerequisite to the decree of which complaint is made, and no error appears. Division of property must be based on the situation of the parties at the time of the decreе rather than that at the time of their marriage,
Further error is predicated on placing a lien on defendant’s property to secure alimony payments, but that has now become moot by virtue of the giving of bond for its release.
Defendant in error has filed petition herein for an allowance of costs and for attorney fee made necessary in connection with writ of error here considered, and she is hereby awarded the sum of $350.00 as. attorney fee, together with $5.00 costs paid in her behalf.
The judgment is affirmed with instructions to enter further judgment for attorney fee and costs as herein-above awarded.