76 Iowa 459 | Iowa | 1889
— I. The petition alleges that plaintiff is the widow of Robert Shane, who in his life-time, and while plaintiff was his wife, was seized of certain lands, which he afterwards conveyed to defendant’s grantor. Plaintiff did not relinquish her dower interest in the land by joining in the deed. She seeks in this action to have her dower in the land assigned and set apart to her. The answer of defendants, as defense to the action, sets up these facts : Prior to the execution of the deed by plaintiff’s husband to defendants’ grantors under which they claim, he and plaintiff made an “exchange” or division of their interests in the lands of the husband ; he conveying to her certain lands described in the petition, and she relinquishing to him all her interests in
III. It is first insisted that plaintiff ratified the transaction by recognizing the division of the property of her husband as it was done by the deeds between him and her, and by holding possession of the land ; thus electing to take under the deeds. This ratification, it is insisted, made valid the deed executed by the husband to plaintiff. If this be so, the ratification must have been of the deed by the husband to plaintiff. It was void under the statute and decisions above quoted. It is contended that this invalidity is removed by the acts of plaintiff, which amount to a ratification of the transaction. Of course, if the alleged ratification did not
Por another reason we think it cannot be held that the acts and conduct of plaintiff operated as a ratification. Under the statute and decisions just cited, it was not competent for the parties to make an arrangement of the character attempted. Their agreement and deeds made pursuant thereto are forbidden by the law. They are in conflict with the policy of the state as disclosed by the statute and decisions just cited. Now, it cannot be claimed that the parties may disregard the policy of the state, and violate its laws, by ratifying acts which the law forbids. It cannot be insisted that their acts and conduct will nullify the prohibitions of the law, and require us to hold their deeds valid, when these deeds are declared by the law to be of no validity. It will be
IV. Defendants insist that the acts and conduct of plaintiff, before stated, operate as an estoppel, forbidding plaintiff to deny the validity of the title conveyed by her husband to the grantors of the defendants. We cannot discover elements of estoppel in this case. It is not alleged, shown or claimed that the defendants or their grantors purchased the land relying upon the acts of plaintiff as confirming to them a title or equity in the deed. Indeed, there ' could have been no such reliance on the part of these persons. It will be remembered that the claim of estoppel is based upon acts and conduct which in effect recognize the validity of the husband’s deed ; and it is plain that this recognition, to constitute due estoppel, must have been made after the plaintiff could have ratified the transaction. It must have been after her inchoate dower interest became actual and fixed by the death of the husband. It cannot be claimed that any act done before the husband’s death would operate as an estoppel. Any such claim would be as unreasonable as the claim that a minor may ratify his contracts during his ' minority, or a married woman may ratify her contracts while her coverture actually exists. It follows from these arguments that plaintiff is not estopped to set up her claim of dower in the land in question.
YI. Plaintiff ’ s husband acquired title to the land as an heir. .Defendants now insist that plaintiff cannot recover, under the evidence in the record, for the reason that she fails to show that her husband acquired such interest in the land as entitled her to dower. i But the defendants claim under plaintiff’s husband, who conveyed to their grantor an absolute title to the land. Plaintiff and defendants trace their title to a common source. Defendants cannot, after setting up in their pleadings title derived from plaintiff’s husband, now insist that they derive title under him, but plaintiff must fail, for the reason that she does not show she had the title. Defendants must be regarded as admitting in this action that they held the title.
We have disposed of all points which.demand consideration, and reach the conclusion that the decree of the district court, in every particular, ought to be
Affirmed.