SHANE M. GATES v. RODNEY JACK STRAIN, Sheriff, in his official and individual capacity; WALTER P. REED, District Attorney, in his official capacity; CHARLES M. HUGHES, JR., Attorney; NATHAN MILLER, Sheriff Deputy; ROGER GOTTARDI, Sheriff Deputy; BRIAN WILLIAMS, Sheriff Deputy; PHILIP DUIETT, Lacombe Nurse; RICHARD SWARTZ, Judge; NICHOLAS F. NORIEA, JR., Assistant District Attorney; MARIE-ELISE PRIETO, Clerk of Court - St. Tammany; JEFF LANDRY, Louisiana Attorney General; RONALD GRACIANETTE, Assistant District Attorney; KATHY SHERWOOD, Captain; KATHRYN LANDRY; ST. PAUL FIRE ; MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY
No. 17-30519
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
March 22, 2018
Summary Calendar
SHANE M. GATES,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
RODNEY JACK STRAIN, Sheriff, in his official and individual capacity; WALTER P. REED, District Attorney, in his official capacity; CHARLES M. HUGHES, JR., Attorney; NATHAN MILLER, Sheriff Deputy; ROGER GOTTARDI, Sheriff Deputy; BRIAN WILLIAMS, Sheriff Deputy; PHILIP DUIETT, Lacombe Nurse,
Defendants - Appellees
SHANE M. GATES,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
RICHARD SWARTZ, Judge; NICHOLAS F. NORIEA, JR., Assistant District Attorney; MARIE-ELISE PRIETO, Clerk of Court - St. Tammany; JEFF LANDRY, Louisiana Attorney General; RONALD GRACIANETTE, Assistant District Attorney; KATHY SHERWOOD, Captain; KATHRYN LANDRY; RODNEY STRAIN, St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Office Sheriff, also known as Jack Strain; ST. PAUL FIRE ; MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY; WALTER P. REED,
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC Nos. 2:07-CV-6983; 2:13-CV-6425
Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
Shane Gates was arrested by the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff‘s Office in 2006. In 2007, he filed this action under
I.
On November 16, 2006, plaintiff-appellant Shane Gates was pulled over and arrested by deputies of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff‘s Office. According to the police report, Deputy
Gates‘s arrest report cites the following offenses: driving while intoxicated, reckless operation of a motor vehicle, open container in a motor vehicle, aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce, and resisting an officer. He was later also charged with aggravated flight from a police officer. In 2007, Gates filed in federal district court a § 1983 suit alleging that the deputies used excessive force in arresting him and that he was being prosecuted in bad faith in state court. He sought damages and an injunction preventing his prosecution in state court.1 That action was stayed in 2008, pending resolution of the underlying criminal charges against Gates. The action was reopened in 2012 after a state-court jury found Gates not guilty of aggravated flight, but then stayed again after the district court became aware
of still-pending misdemeanor charges including driving while intoxicated and resisting an officer. The misdemeanor charges were originally set for trial on August 31, 2012, but the trial was continued due to Hurricane Isaac. Gates was then ordered to appear on November 22, 2013, to be served with a new trial date. When he failed to appear, an attachment was issued for his arrest. He has failed to appear before the state court since, and his whereabouts are unknown, even to his counsel.
On October 20, 2016, defendants filed a motion in the district court requesting that the stay be lifted for the limited purpose of allowing Gates to appear for service for his misdemeanor trial and that, should he fail to appear, his § 1983 action should be dismissed under
II.
Gates first contends that the district court erred by not enjoining the state from prosecuting him for the pending misdemeanor charges. We review both the denial of a motion for a permanent injunction and an abstention ruling for abuse of discretion. Tex. Ass‘n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) (abstention ruling); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 332 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 2003) (denial of motion for permanent injunction). However, we review de novo both a district court‘s legal determination regarding the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, United States v. Billingsley, 615 F.3d 404, 409–10 (5th Cir. 2010), and “whether the requirements of a particular abstention doctrine are satisfied,” Tex. Ass‘n of Bus., 388 F.3d at 518 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 283 F.3d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Where those three criteria are satisfied, a federal court may enjoin a pending state-court criminal proceeding only if: (1) the state-court proceeding was brought in bad faith or to harass the federal plaintiff; (2) the federal plaintiff seeks to challenge a state statute that is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it,” or (3) where other “extraordinary circumstances” threaten “irreparable loss [that] is both great and immediate.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 53–54; accord Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1979).2
Here, the district court correctly determined that the three criteria that generally require Younger abstention are satisfied. First, Gates requested that the district court enjoin his pending state-court criminal proceeding. The federal proceeding would therefore clearly interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Second, the underlying state proceeding concerns the enforcement of state criminal laws, something in which the state has a strong interest. Third, Gates can raise his challenges to the state criminal proceedings in state court. To the extent that Gates argues that he has been unsuccessful or is likely to be unsuccessful in raising his constitutional claims in state court that is irrelevant. The relevant question is whether the would-be federal plaintiff has the opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 425 (“[T]he federal court should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs ‘had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.‘” (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977))); id. at 425–26 (“Certainly, abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.“). Gates does not contend that he cannot raise his constitutional claims in the state court. Accordingly, Younger abstention precludes an injunction here unless
Gates contends that the state prosecution has been taken in bad faith or that other extraordinary circumstances warrant enjoining the state criminal proceedings. Specifically, he argues that: (1) his prosecution for resisting an officer was instigated by the parish‘s insurer, St. Paul-Travelers (whom former district attorney Walter Reed privately represented and from whom he derived personal financial benefits, which Gates argues amounted to a Hobbs Act violation), in order to preclude § 1983 liability for excessive force; (2) prosecution for the pending misdemeanor offenses would constitute double jeopardy; and (3) prosecution would violate state and federal speedy-trial laws. We agree with the district court that Gates‘s asserted grounds for an injunction neither fit within the narrow bad-faith exception nor present the kind of extraordinary circumstances that justify departure from the general rule of non-interference.
To the first point, there is no evidence of bad faith. A prosecution is taken in bad faith if state officials proceed “without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); accord Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5th Cir. 1988). “[T]he ‘bad faith’ exception is narrow and should be granted parsimoniously.” Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1985). It is Gates‘s burden to establish actual proof of bad faith. Hensler v. Dist. Four Grievance Comm. of State Bar of Tex., 790 F.2d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, Gates does not dispute that he was cited for resisting an officer on the day of his arrest. While he was not charged with resisting an officer in the original bill of information, two counts of resisting an officer (one with respect to Deputy Miller and one with respect to Deputy Gottardi) were added on September 10, 2007, after the district attorney received a statement from Deputy Miller expressing his belief that Gates should be charged with resisting an officer. While Gates contends that the Miller statement was forged, he has not proved that the state‘s prosecution for resisting arrest was initiated without hope of obtaining a valid conviction.3 Furthermore, while Gates makes much of his belief that the relationship between District Attorney Reed and St. Paul-Travelers amounted to a violation of the Hobbs Act, he does nothing to connect that alleged violation to Younger‘s bad-faith exception. He appears to argue that Reed acted in bad faith by attempting to use the resisting-arrest charge to negotiate a release of Gates‘s § 1983 claims, but that argument fails. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393–98 (1987) (upholding enforcement of release-dismissal agreement dismissing criminal charges in exchange for waver of right to sue under § 1983).
Gates next contends that his prosecution for the misdemeanor offenses
reasonable doubt of aggravated flight, the state cannot now use any of the same evidence to convince a jury that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving while intoxicated or resisting an officer. See id. at 348–49 (explaining that double jeopardy does not preclude introducing evidence to establish a fact a jury previously failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt were, at the subsequent trial, the jury was only required to find that same fact by a lower evidentiary standard). But Gates misses Dowling‘s broader point. As the Supreme Court explained, the collateral-estoppel element of double jeopardy prevents relitigating “an issue of ultimate fact that has already been determined by a valid and final judgment.” Id. at 347–48. But where, as here, a “prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case,” double-jeopardy concerns are not implicated. Id. at 348. Gates has not “demonstrate[d] that his acquittal in his first trial represented a jury determination that he was not” driving while intoxicated or that he did not resist an officer.4 See id. at 350. Accordingly, his prosecution for the pending misdemeanors would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and an injunction is not warranted on this basis.
Finally, Gates argues that an injunction is warranted because his prosecution for the pending misdemeanors would violate state and federal speedy-trial laws. However, the alleged denial of a speedy trial is not itself a legitimate basis on which to enjoin a state criminal proceeding. See Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 902–03 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal courts may not enjoin state criminal prosecution on basis of alleged speedy-trial violation absent an independent showing of bad faith or other extraordinary
circumstances); Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1282–83 (5th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that, in the context of a pre-trial habeas petition, a federal court may not normally enjoin state prosecution based on alleged speedy-trial violation); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 1975) (“[F]ederal courts should not permit the claimed denial of a speedy trial, presented in a pre-trial application for habeas, to result in the ‘derailment of a pending state proceeding.” (quoting Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973))). Accordingly, this, too, fails to warrant the extraordinary remedy of enjoining a state criminal proceeding.
III.
Gates also appeals the district court‘s dismissal, with prejudice, of his claims pursuant to
District courts have the authority, pursuant to both their own “inherent power’ . . . to manage their own affairs” and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss cases with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); accord Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1984). However, because of the severity of the sanction, “we have stated that it is a drastic remedy to be used only in those situations where a lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice.” Morris, 730 F.2d at 251 (quoting Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1981)). We review a district court‘s dismissal with prejudice for abuse of discretion. Id.
Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only where there is “a showing of (a) a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and (b) where lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” Id. at 252. Furthermore, we affirm dismissals with prejudice generally only where those prerequisites are accompanied by “certain ‘aggravating factors,’ such as (1) the extent to which the plaintiff, as distinguished from his counsel, was personally responsible for the delay, (2) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant, and (3) whether the delay was the result of intentional conduct.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982)).
Here, there is a clear record of delay and contumacious conduct attributable to Gates himself. This matter was stayed in the district court for nearly ten years pending the resolution of Gates‘s underlying criminal charges. For over five years, that stay has been the result of Gates‘s failure to appear before the state to stand trial for his pending misdemeanor charges. We have previously instructed that, following Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), district courts should stay § 1983 cases that may implicate the validity of pending criminal proceedings until those underlying proceedings have run their course. See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The court may—indeed should—stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the two.“). Gates‘s intentional flight has prevented resolution of his pending misdemeanor charges and, pursuant to Mackey and Heck, has accordingly prevented him from prosecuting his § 1983 claims. Furthermore, Gates was warned, both in the district court‘s order and at a motions hearing, that failure to appear in state court or establish the inapplicability of Younger could result in dismissal with prejudice. Under the circumstances, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that lesser sanctions would be insufficient and dismissing Gates‘s suit with prejudice. See Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff had received prior warning).
IV.
Gates also argues that the district erred by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing and by making factual findings not supported by the record. Where the application of Younger does not turn on disputed facts, no evidentiary
Gates also contends that the district court made “numerous” erroneous factual findings. The only alleged error he actually identifies, however, is an allegedly unsupported statement regarding a blood-alcohol test performed at the hospital shortly after Gates‘s arrest. He argues that there is no competent evidence of that blood test that would be admissible at trial. However, whether the evidence of the blood-alcohol test would be admissible at trial is irrelevant here. The district court did not rely on that evidence in concluding that Younger abstention applied and that dismissal with prejudice was warranted.
V.
Finally, Gates appears to contend that the district court erred by denying his Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. While not explicitly challenging the denial of the motion, he argues that the district court erred by finding his motion untimely. But the district court did not deny the motion as untimely. Rather, the district court analyzed the motion under the rubric of
(”This Court has held that [a Rule 59(e)] motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.