152 Mich. 463 | Mich. | 1908
(after stating the facts). Under the above statement, it is clear that there was evidence that Mr. Shall was' working between the two cars and could not be seen by either Grisdale or any of the crew on the train. Some one owed a duty to warn him Of the approach of the train, unless (1) he knew or should have known that the train was approaching on account of the noise that it made; or (2) that it was the custom to back trains in without any warning, and that therefore he assumed the risk.
There was evidence that the deceased and Zolweg were engaged in customary and necessary work, and that they expected notice to be given to them of the approach of the train. Zolweg testified that he expected McFarland, a subforeman of the Kilby Manufacturing Company, to give them warning, and that he did.give warning, but too late for Shall to step into a place of safety. It does not appear that McFarland had ever before given warning, or that he had been instructed to give it. He would
One witness testified:
“When I last saw McFarland before the accident he stood with his face about half turned, * * * was looking at his men at the work.”
Another witness on the part of the plaintiff testified that McFarland was part of the time between the cars and part of the time close by directing the work when the accident happened. This witness testified that he was the first that said anything, and that when he saw the train within 25 or 30 feet of the car behind which Shall was, “I hollered, ‘ For God’s sake, boys, get out of there!’ and when I hollered I thought all three were in a bunch, —McFarland, Otto and Aleck.”
There were 100 workmen in the building. Evidently they were making considerable noise. It appears there was nothing to warn Shall and Zolweg of the approach of the train aside from the noise of the train itself. There was evidence that the train was backing in faster than usual, and that it did not stop as was customary just outside the building before backing in. Under these circumstances it cannot be said as a matter of law that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.
Whether Shall assumed the risk depends upon the manner in which trains had been operated for the three
Complaint is made of the introduction of evidence as to the deceased’s habits of industry. It is contended that this had no legitimate bearing upon the question of damages. Among the facts and circumstances laid down by text writers and numerous authorities as proper evidence of damages, are the deceased’s habits of industry, sobriety, etc. 1 Joyce on Damages, § 563; 6 Thompson on Law of Negligence, § 7129; 4 Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.), § 1268; Spaulding v. Railway Co., 98 Iowa, 205; Hunn v. Railroad Co., 78 Mich. 513, 527 (7 L. R. A. 500).
Counsel for the defendant cite and rely upon McQuisten v. Railway Co., 150 Mich. 332. The question there objected to was, “ What do you know, if anything, about his (plaintiff’s) being a-careful, prudent man?” The testimony was evidently introduced for the purpose of affecting the question of contributory negligence. I have examined the briefs and record in that case and find that there is no suggestion in the plaintiff’s brief that the testi
It is urged that the deceased had been informed that the train was approaching. If this was so, then the deceased was clearly guilty of contributory negligence. This claim is based upon the testimony of Mr. Zolweg. His testimony is as follows:
“While I was doing that work, Mr. Shall and me, both of us had been informed that the engine was coming in to take that car out, that loaded car; we knew that in order to take out that loaded car they would have to take out the car that was partly loaded, they would have to take them both out.”
It does not follow from this testimony that Zolweg and deceased understood that the train was then approaching. It is entirely consistent with the idea that they knew it was coming in soon to take out the cars, for whose removal they were making preparations. We cannot on this testimony say that it was conclusively shown that Shall had been informed of the approaching train and the immediate danger consequent thereon.
Counsel for defendant strenuously urge that the Kilby Manufacturing Company is the negligent party if there is any negligence. As above stated, there is evidence of a custom on the part of the defendant to give warning, and that it was not the custom of the Kilby Manufacturing Co. to give warning. The manager of the Kilby
Judgment affirmed.