Shaktman v. StateShaktman v. State
These are consolidated appeals by sixteen appellants from orders of the trial court denying their pretrial consolidated motions to suppress evidence derived from electronic surveillance and to dismiss the informations filed against them. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the trial court‘s ordеrs denying the motions to suppress and the motions to dismiss the informations.
The appellants were charged with various offenses including violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute [RICO],
The appellants filed consolidated motions to suppress all evidence gathered from the pen registers and the wiretaps. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and, in a written order, denied the motions. The trial court specifically found that sufficient probable cause had been demonstrated by the Mart and DeBlasio affidavits. The appellants then moved to dismiss the informations based upon a claim that the statute under which they were charged,
The appellants subsequently reached plea agreements with the State. Pursuant to the agreements, the appellants entered pleas of nolo contendere to reduced charges, reserving thеir right to appeal the trial court‘s orders denying their motions to suppress and to dismiss. The State and the appellants stipulated that the outcome of these appeals would be dispositive of the cause, i.e., that a favorable ruling for the appellants on either the motions to suppress or the motions to dismiss would terminate this prosecution.
The trial court held individual plea colloquies. Of the sixteen appellants in this consolidated appeal, only five — Alfred Mart, Reuben Goldstein, Stuart Levanthal, Bernard Shaktman, and John DeBlasio — entered nolo contendere pleas to felony charges pursuant to
I. CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
A. Pen Registers.
The appellants argue that the electronic surveillance evidence should have been suppressed as the product of an illegal warrantless search because the wiretaps of both the Mart and DeBlasio telephone lines were based primarily on pen register information obtained in violation of their rights to privacy as guaranteed by
1. Article I, Section 12.
The appellants concede that the use of pen registers does not abridge the
While other states have concluded that the use of a pen register without a warrant impermissibly intrudes into the privacy of individuals in violation of state constitutional provisions, e.g., People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App.3d 487, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982);3 Commonwealth v. Beauford, 327 Pa.Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 319, 496 A.2d 1143 (1985); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (en banc), Florida courts have explicitly repudiated such a conclusion.4 See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dep‘t of Business Regulation, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1985) (following United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), in holding that the subpoena by a state agency of a Florida citizen‘s bank records without notice does not offend privacy rights guaranteed by the Florida Constitution); Yarbrough v. State, 473 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (use of a pen register does not cоnstitute a search or require a warrant under
2. Article I, Section 23.
The appellants’ alternative argument is that the right of privacy expressed in
The section 23 privacy provision has been held operative in such disparate contexts as the denial of an AIDS victim‘s discovery request for the names and addresses of blood donors after he contracted AIDS following blood transfusions, Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987), and the right of an incompetent patient to have a feeding tube removed so as not to maintain life artificially, Corbett v. D‘Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). Conversely, the courts have failed to extend the constitutional right of privacy guarantee of section 23 to an individual‘s bank records subpoenaed by a state agency, Winfield, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1985), a bar application‘s requirement for disclosure of psychological and medical treatment, Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re: Applicant, 443 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1983), and to the criminalization of private possession of cannabis, Maisler v. State, 425 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev. denied, 434 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1983).
We find that the appellants’ interests in the numbers dialed from the Mart telephones fall within the zone of privacy protected by section 23. Our reading of Rasmussen, 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987), buttresses our determination that the warrantless use of pen registers in an ongoing criminal investigation involves the privacy safeguards ensured by section 23. In Rasmussen, the court observed:
The proceedings of the Constitution Revision Commission reveal that the right to informational privacy was a major concern of the amendment‘s drafters... . [A] principal aim of the constitutional provision is to afford individuals some protection against the increasing collection, retention, and use of information relating to all facets of an individual‘s life.
Id. at 536. Moreover, “[t]he drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the words `unreasonable’ or `unwarranted’ before the phrase `governmental intrusion’ in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible.” Winfield, 477 So.2d at 548. “The citizens of Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion when they approved article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution.” Id. See also Riley v. State, 511 So.2d 282, 288 (Fla. 1987) (“Our own right to privacy amendment, article I, section 23, Florida Constitution, was meant to protect against governmental encroachments on privacy made possible by increasingly sophisticated investigative techniques.“), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1011, 98 L.Ed.2d 977 (1988). The gathering of telephone numbers through the use of a pen register is, in our view, one of the sophisticated investigative techniques for collecting information which the drafters of the right of privacy amendment contemplated. In a noncriminal context, the use of a pen register on his telephone is precisely the type of activity which a private citizen would not expect from his government. We, therefore, conclude that section 23 clearly applies to the facts of the instant case.
Having determined that section 23 is appliсable to these facts, we must, of necessity, address the interrelationship between section 12, the search and seizure provision, and section 23, the right of privacy provision. Both constitutional provisions may be implicated by a governmental intrusion
Because section 23 is involved when government agents obtain telephone numbers through the use of a pen register, we must gauge any claimed infringement according to the standard espoused by the Florida supreme court. Section 23 “was not intended to provide an absolute guarantee against all governmental intrusion into the private life of an individual.” Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 443 So.2d at 74. We believe that the correct standard for assessing a claim of unconstitutional government intrusion under section 23 is the compelling state interest test established in Winfield, 477 So.2d at 548. According to Winfield, the test “shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy.” Id. If the state can demonstrate that the challеnged government intrusion serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the least intrusive means, then the state has met its burden and the right of privacy will yield. Id. In the instant case, the state has satisfied this standard. The state has a compelling interest in investigating and apprehending the principals of large-scale bookmaking operations. A pen register is one of the least intrusive methods
It is a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.
49 Fla.Jur.2d, Statutes § 126. See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976); Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation Div. of Workers’ Compensation, 408 So.2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Biddle v. State Beverage Dept., 187 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dismissed, 194 So.2d 623 (Fla. 1966). We deem it significant that the ABA committee formulating the standards for electronic surveillance considered the issue and similarly rejected the inclusion of pen registers in the security of communications category.10
Our reading of the record in this case indicates that both Metro-Dade and Miami Beach fulfill the definition of “criminal justice agency” established by
Because the interrelationship between section 23 and the warrantless use of pen registers appears, as previously noted, to
(1) WHETHER ARTICLE I, SECTION 23, OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION IS IMPLICATED WHEN A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INSTALLS A PEN REGISTER DEVICE ON THE TELEPHONE OF AN INDIVIDUAL?
(2) IF THE ANSWER TO (1) IS YES, THEN IS THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST SATISFIED IF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INVOLVED IN THE INSTALLATION HAS FOUNDED SUSPICION AND MEETS THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY SECTIONS 119.011(3)(a), (b), (c) AND 119.011(4)?
B. Probable Cause
The appellants allege that the Mart wiretap application was erroneously approved because the supporting affidavits failed to establish probable cause that actual betting activity was occurring over the telephones. In support of their argument, the appellants rely upon Murphy v. State, 402 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). In Murphy, this court held that the affidavit filed in support of a wiretap application failed to establish probable cause that the defendant was using his telephone for a gambling operation where the information contained in the affidavit amounted only to a mere suspicion of gambling activity. Unlike the deficient affidavit in Murphy, the affidavits for thе Mart wiretap meticulously detailed abundant evidence of illegal gambling activity. The Mart affidavits contained a description of the results of the police surveillance of Mart and his associates. A pattern of conduct consistent with bookmaking was manifested by Mart‘s routine in leaving his office during common bookmaking hours for the apartment where the telephones were located. Mart was observed exchanging manila envelopes with his associates.13 The pen registers recorded the vast majority of incoming calls while Mart and Sam Levanthal were in the apartment. The pen registers also revealed that outgoing calls were made to known gamblers and bookmakers as well as to sports betting lines. The pen registers disclosed an impressive volume of telephone activity shortly before the start of major sрorting events. The Mart affidavits further described numerous calls from the Mart lines to DeBlasio. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Mart affidavits clearly established probable cause that the Mart telephones were being utilized for illegal bookmaking.
The appellants argue that the Mart wiretap was premature since the DeBlasio wiretap application by Metro-Dade had been approved on January 13, 1984, prior to the Mart wiretap application by Miami
We reject DeBlasio‘s separate challenge to the wiretap of his telephone on the same basis. DeBlasio contends that the information obtained from the Elias wiretap constituted sufficient evidence to arrest him, thereby eliminating any need to wiretap his telephone. DeBlasio cites no authority for the proposition that the police are precluded from seeking a wiretap of a suspect‘s telephone merely because they already have grounds for his arrest.
Electronic surveillance is commonly used not only to gather evidence for prosecution, but also to determine the scope of a criminal organization, the extent and nature of its activities, and the identities of its participants. Surveillance of a backroom bookmaker, though it may obtain evidence against him, seeks principally to gain information about the overall operation‘s financiers and underwriters, who otherwise would remain undetected.
J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 1.2(b) (2d ed. 1987). “[E]lectronic surveillance is most useful when directed at large criminal conspiracies that both rely on oral communication and are vulnerable to being overheard by electronic surveillance.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 2-1.1 commentary 2d ed. (1982). The evidence set forth in the Mart wiretap application pointed to the existence of a large-scale bookmaking operation emanating from Mart‘s telephones. The evidence available indicated that DeBlasio did not occupy a key role in this enterprise. The wiretap of only DeBlasio‘s telephone would not have revealed the extent of the operation or the identities of all the participants. Moreover, where the tap is authorized “because of probable cause to believe that a gambling conspiracy exists, and a major purpose is to uncover as many of those involved as possible, it would seem just and necessary to be more liberal in terms of coverage and content of the calls and persons making them.” State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 291 A.2d 825, 835, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090, 93 S.Ct. 699, 34 L.Ed.2d 675 (1972), modified on other grounds, State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 427 A.2d 537 (1981). We conclude that the wiretap applications contained the requisite information to provide probable cause for electronic surveillance of the Mart аnd DeBlasio telephones.
C. Staleness
The appellants also allege that the affidavits for the Mart wiretap lacked probable cause because of staleness. The affidavits for the Mart wiretap chronicled activities occurring over a period of four months. In view of the length of time covered in the affidavits, the appellants claim that the affidavits failed to demonstrate evidence of current criminal activity, i.e., that the suspected bookmaking offenses were being committed or were about to be committed, and that the telephones were being used or were about to be used in connection with these offenses as required by
Moreover, where the evidence clearly shows a longstanding, ongoing pattern of criminal activity, it is more likely that the passage of time will not dissipate probable cause. “In such circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that the activity has continued beyond the last dates mentioned in the affidavit, and may still be continuing... . Therefore, when police describe telephone activity occurring over an extended period of time, the stale information issue should be construed less rigorously.” United States v. Domme, 753 F.2d 950, 953 (11th Cir.1985), modified, United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1973, 95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987). Accord United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1345 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Hobson v. United States, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985); Hudson, 368 So.2d at 902. See also Rodriguez v. State, 297 So.2d 15, 18 (Fla. 1974) (although thirty days from date of observation of alleged offense to date of affidavit was “rule of thumb” in evaluating staleness, nature of the illegal activity was also factor to be considered in assessing timeliness of affidavit). We conclude that the affidavits presented sufficient, current information for the issuing court to believe that the Mart and DeBlasio telephones were being used for illegal gambling at the time the wiretap applications were approved, and, therefore, that the affidavits were not stale.
D. Necessity
The appellants additionally allege that the affidavits in support of the Mart wiretap application were fatally defective because they failed to meet the “necessity” requirement of
The record in this case shows that the police officers who executed the Mart affidavits already had exhausted the avenues of physical surveillance and pen registers. The record further shows that alternate investigative methods would not have yielded additional evidence. “[T]he pursuit of gambling crime involves the absence or quick disappearance of records of gambling establishments, and the usually undecipherable or difficult-to-comprehend argot which is employed for concealment of the true nature of the activity.” United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff‘d, 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.1977). As the affidavits for the Mart wiretap explained, a searсh warrant would have uncovered gambling paraphernalia, but not the identities of the conspirators or the extent of the operation because such information was generally reduced to codes. Undercover infiltration was impractical because Mart and his associates would not be eager to divulge the secrets of their enterprise to an outsider. Subpoenas and interviews only would have alerted the suspects to the existence of the police investigation.
In short, courts will not invalidate a wiretap order simply because defense lawyers are able to suggest post factum some investigative technique that might have been used and was not. It is enough if the affidavit explains the prospective or retrospective failure of several investigative techniques that reasonably suggest themselves.
United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir.1978). But cf. United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.1975) (error to dеny appellants’ motion to suppress electronic surveillance evidence where wiretap application failed to show why traditional investigative techniques were not viable alternatives).16 We find that the affidavits fulfilled the necessity requirement of
We find no merit in any of the challenges raised by the appellants to the trial court‘s denial of their consolidated motions to suppress the evidence obtained by electronic surveillance and, therefore, affirm the trial court‘s order.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO SECTION 849.25, FLORIDA STATUTES (1983).
The appellants were charged by informations with the felony offense of bookmaking pursuant to
III. EFFECT ON PLEAS AND SENTENCES
The validity of the nolo contendere pleas entered by eleven of the appellants18 to the reduced misdemeanor charge of gambling in violation of
Because
Finally, we affirm the judgments and sentences of Alfred Mart and Bernard Shaktman who pled nolo contendere to violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statute [RICO],
Affirmed; questions certified; remanded for conviction or sentencing in accordance with this opinion.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED
PER CURIAM.
The appellee state has directed our attention to an error in our opinion of March 29, 1988, regarding the validity of the sentence of Sam Levanthal. Our disposition of Lеvanthal‘s conviction and sentence was predicated on the written order of judgment which reflected that Levanthal had entered a nolo contendere plea to gambling, a second degree misdemeanor. As the state has noted, the sentencing guidelines scoresheet and the record of the plea colloquy reveal that the nolo plea actually entered by Levanthal was to bookmaking, a third degree felony. The sentence imposed was therefore appropriate to the charge to which the plea was entered. We, therefore, correct that portion of our opinion which had directed the trial court to resentence Levanthal pursuant to the gambling charge. We affirm Levanthal‘s judgment and sentence and remand to the trial court with directions to conform the written judgmеnt to the trial court‘s oral pronouncements which reflect Levanthal‘s nolo plea to bookmaking in accordance with the plea colloquy and the guidelines scoresheet. See Roberts v. State, 512 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Notes
Article I, section 12, reads as follows:
SECTION 12. Searches and seizures. — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Article I, section 23, provides:
SECTION 23. Right of privacy. — Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public‘s right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.
It should be noted that the pace of technological change enhances the importance of privacy and legal mechanisms to protect it, whether it be through a freestanding privacy section such as article I, section 23, or through an unreasonable seаrch, seizure, and interception provision such as section 12... . To be sure, the standards for sections 12 and 23 are very different, and the “reasonableness” criterion for section 12 is considerably less stringent than the compelling state interest test for section 23. But the common feature of the two is that both may impose, at some point, substantive limitations on the power of government to intrude on privacy.
Cope at 769.
Significantly, Justice Barkett concluded in her dissent in State v. Hume, 512 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1987), that both sections 12 and 23 of article I were implicated. According to Justice Barkett:
There is no bright line between the privacy protections afforded under article I, section 12, and the privacy interests protected by article I, section 23. Section 23 comes into play in cases involving electronic surveillance because this aspect of governmental activity infringing on privacy is one that section 23 was particularly designed to check.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Elеctronic Surveillance, Introduction (2d ed. 1982).
Sections 119.011(3)(b) and (4) read as follows:
119.011 Definitions. — For the purpose of this chapter:
* * * * * *
(3)(b) “Criminal investigative information” means information with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission, including, but not limited to, information derived from laboratory tests, reports of investigators or informants, or any type of surveillance.
* * * * * *
(4) “Criminal justice agency” means any law enforcement agency, court, or prosecutor. The term also includes any other agency charged by law with criminal law enforcement duties, or any agency having custody of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information for the purpose of assisting such law enforcement agencies in the conduct of active criminal investigation or prosecution or for the purpose of litigating civil actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, during the time that such agencies are in possession of criminal intelligence information or criminal investigative information pursuant to their criminal law enforcement duties.
Section 934.09, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in relevant part:
(3) Upon such application, the judge may enter an ex parte order ... authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications ... if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that:
(a) There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in s. 934.07.
The necessity requirement of section 934.09 is set forth as follows:
934.09 Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications. —
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing... . Each application shall include the following information:
* * * * * *
(c) A full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.
The due process clause of the Florida Constitution is set forth in section 9:
SECTION 9. Due process. — No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself.