629 N.E.2d 483 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1993
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff-appellant, Janet Shaffer ("appellant"), administrator of the estate of Tony H. Shaffer ("Shaffer"), and defendant-appellant, Kristi N. Fite, appeal a decision of the Brown County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Marshall Hardyman, in a wrongful death action. The action was brought against Fite and Hardyman by appellant *375 and arose out of a January 17, 1991 vehicular collision on State Route 62 in Brown County.
The record shows that at approximately 10:00 a.m. on January 16, 1991, Shaffer borrowed Hardyman's 1942 Ford Ferguson farm tractor in order to perform work at the farm of Harold Bowman. It is not disputed that when Hardyman loaned Shaffer the tractor, the vehicle lacked both a slow-moving-vehicle ("SMV") emblem and taillights. Upon receiving the tractor, Shaffer informed Hardyman he would return the tractor at 12:00 noon that same day.
Shaffer failed to return the tractor on January 16, 1991 as promised, prompting Hardyman to visit Shaffer at Bowman's farm at 9:00 a.m. the following morning. At that time, Shaffer told Hardyman he would return the tractor "in a little bit." Nine hours later, while driving the tractor in the darkness south on State Route 62 toward Hardyman's residence, Shaffer was struck in the rear by an automobile operated by Fite. Shaffer died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.
Appellant thereafter initiated the instant action. In response, Fite filed a cross-claim against Hardyman. On October 29, 1992, Hardyman filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to both appellant's complaint and Fite's cross-claim. In an amended entry issued February 26, 1993, the court awarded Hardyman summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact for trial. This appeal followed.
In their only assignment of error, appellant and Fite argue that the court erred in granting Hardyman's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we agree and reverse the trial court's ruling.
It is well established in Ohio that summary judgment may only be granted when the following three factors have been established:
"`* * * (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.'"Bostic v. Connor (1988),
The burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact falls upon the party moving for summary judgment.Toledo's Great Eastern Shoppers City, Inc. v. Abde's Black AngusSteak House (1986),
The complaint filed by appellant sounds in negligence. To recover in a negligence action, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show (1) that the defendant had a duty, recognized by law, requiring him to conform his conduct to that standard; (2) that the defendant failed to conform his conduct to that standard; and (3) that the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff to sustain a loss or injury. Brauning v. CincinnatiGas Elec. Co. (1989),
Our analysis begins with the recognition that R.C.
Appellant and Fite contend that Hardyman breached the duty set forth by R.C.
"(A) All vehicles * * * including [agricultural tractors] * * * shall, at the times specified in section
"* * *
"(B) All * * * farm machinery * * * upon a street or highway * * *, which is designed for operation at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour or less * * * shall display a triangular slow-moving vehicle emblem (SMV). The emblem shall be mounted so as to be visible from a distance of not less than five hundred feet to the rear. * * *"
As a general rule, the violation of a statute passed for the protection of the public is negligence per se. Roszman v.Sammett (1971),
We disagree with Fite and appellant's assertion that the failure of Hardyman to equip the tractor with taillights was violative of R.C.
Herein, it is not disputed that Shaffer borrowed the tractor during the daylight hours on January 16, 1991 and that he notified Hardyman he would return the tractor during the daytime that same day. Similarly, when Hardyman visited Shaffer the following morning, Shaffer again assured Hardyman that the tractor would be returned during the day. Given these circumstances, it is clear that Shaffer gave Hardyman the impression that if the tractor were to be operated on a highway, it would only be during those hours that taillights were not statutorily required. In fact, Hardyman testified at his deposition that he informed Shaffer not to operate the tractor at night because the vehicle was not equipped with taillights. In light of such evidence, we fail to detect a violation of R.C.
However, construing the evidence most strongly in appellant and Fite's favor, we find that reasonable minds could disagree on whether Hardyman knowingly permitted Shaffer to operate an unsafe tractor because the tractor lacked the SMV emblem. According to R.C.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Hardyman loaned Shaffer farm machinery that did not display the SMV emblem. Unlike taillights, which are only necessary when certain atmospheric and lighting conditions are present, the SMV emblem is required at all times for farm machinery designed for operation at a speed of twenty-five m.p.h. or less, travelling within the highway. Thus, while it may have been safe for the tractor to be operated within the highway during the daylight hours without taillights, reasonable minds could come to different conclusions concerning the SMV emblem as to whether Hardyman knowingly permitted Shaffer to drive the tractor, within a highway, to Bowman's *378
farm without the emblem. Reference by R.C.
Accordingly, it is our belief that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of whether Hardyman breached his duty under R.C.
On the basis of the aforementioned, this court finds that the lower court improperly awarded Hardyman summary judgment. Consequently, the single assignment of error set forth by appellant and Fite is well taken and the judgment of the lower court is reversed.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
WILLIAM W. YOUNG, J., concurs separately.
JONES, P.J., dissents.
Concurrence Opinion
Our dissenting colleague, "Friendly Farmer Jones," has missed the point.
By our decision today, we are merely holding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a duty had been breached. We have not declared that you may not permit your neighbor to borrow your field tractor without incurring liability.
It is fundamental law that summary judgment may be granted only where there are no genuine issues of material fact. Evidently, this proposition may be overlooked when relying on emotion rather than the law.
Dissenting Opinion
Farmers beware! The majority has declared that you cannot permit your neighbor to borrow your field tractor unless you first equip it with a slow-moving-vehicle ("SMV") sign and make certain that the taillights are working. It matters not that you are doing a favor to a friend of twenty years who needs a tractor at his place down the road. How do you refuse him? If the neighbor operates the tractor on the public road without the SMV mentioned in R.C.
When Hardyman loaned (not rented) his 1942 tractor to Shaffer, he didn't violate R.C.
The concept of liability on the owner of a tractor trying to be a good neighbor is shocking. Obviously, the same rationale would apply if your friend borrowed your car and only one taillight was working. If he were injured, he could sue you and collect damages.
The majority cites no authority for this bizarre proposition of law. I could certainly understand the majority's holding if a farmer loaned a tractor to another, knowing it had bad brakes, and if the borrower struck and injured a third person because of the brake failure. Logically, the injured party could conceivably have a cause of action against the lender of the tractor.
This case, however, does not involve an innocent third party. The borrower himself was fatally injured. I am disturbed by the majority's unusual holding that one who borrows a tractor, without consideration, can recover from the owner when struck by a third party.
Hardyman did not breach a duty to Shaffer under R.C.
