57 Pa. Super. 48 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1914
Opinion by
John U. Hartzig, age seventy-six, on December 30, 1911, brought suit to recover from Julius Bahr, the defendant, the sum of $1,000, with interest, which he claimed to have loaned Bahr on December 8, 1910, for a period of one year. Bahr, the defendant, denied that any money had been loaned to him and averred that
The plaintiff’s statement declared on a loan made on December 8 “for a period of one year” and to support the allegations as to the time of payment the plaintiff testified as follows: “Q. For how long a time did you loan this money? A. He said for a year, but when necessary, that I must use that money, for me to have that money, I was to have it before. I was awful sick. Always have been more or less sick. When it was necessary, and I must use that money before, of course I was to have it. This is the only thing I must make my living from.” The defendant complains that this was such a variance between the proof and the plaintiff’s statement as would be fatal to the plaintiff’s cause of action and devoted much of his time to the argument of this phase of his ease. The defendant permitted this evidence to go in without objection. He made no motion to strike out the objectionable parts. He made no request for the withdrawal of a juror and a continuance of the case. A motion was made for a compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court overruled; no point was presented setting forth any supposed variance between the plaintiff’s statement and his proof, or asking for binding instructions; nor was a judgment on the whole record asked for; and finally, no assignment of error is presented raising the question of a variance. It is too late at this time for the appellant to complain of any injury done to him by reason of this variance: Oehmler v. Pittsburg Railways Co., 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 617; Kroegher v. The McConway, etc., Co., 149 Pa. 444; Walter v. Transue, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 617; Elder Township District v. Penna. R. R. Co., 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 112.
This suit was instituted more than one year after
To corroborate the case of the defendant (that the plaintiff made a gift of this money to the defendant’s wife) the defendant offered to prove that he borrowed $800 of this same money from his wife on December 17, 1910, nine days after it was given to her; and gave a judgment note for the money, which note was immediately entered. The trial court rejected this evidence and plaintiff makes such rejection his first and second assignments of error. This offer falls within the familiar rule of evidence that no person is allowed to make evidence for himself. Its weakness comes from its many possibilities for fraud and fabrication. The plaintiff knew nothing of this transaction and these acts would not aid in determining whether the money was a gift to the wife or a loan to the defendant. It was a collateral matter to the issue on trial: Reddelien v. Atkinson, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 159; Tisch v. Utz et al., 142 Pa. 186. These two assignments of error are dismissed.
In part of the charge of the court, here the third assignment of error, the court said: “If, however, ....
The defendant’s third point, the fourth assignment of error, asked the court to charge as a matter of law that the lending of money without taking a note was contrary to the common experience of men in business dealings. The court refused to affirm this point and left it to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff’s transaction was unusual. In this there was no error.
In the defendant’s fourth point, the fifth assignment of error, the court was asked to declare the effect of certain of the defendant’s evidence which was disputed in the case. The court refused to do this and submitted all the evidence as to the question of gift or loan to the jury. This assignment is dismissed.
The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth assignments of error complain of the conduct of certain of the jurors and of the plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel with these jurors. It is charged, first, that one of the jurors boarded at the same house as the plaintiff and conversed with him on different topics during the trial of the case; second, that two of the jurors were seen in consultation with the plaintiff in the case during the trial; and third, that the plaintiff’s counsel treated the jurors to intoxicating liquors and cigars after the verdict. As to the first and second of these charges, the trial court found as a fact that the jurors did not have any conversation with the plaintiff during the trial of this case at the