40 Vt. 171 | Vt. | 1868
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The grounds of exception in this cause are, that the county court refused to direct a verdict for the defendant, but directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff.
But there is another view of this case upon the facts. The plaintiff was an inhabitant of the defendant town. He enlisted into the service in August, 1861; re-enlisted about the time of the expiration of his first term of service, and caused himself to be credited to the town, knowing they were paying bounties for such enlistments and Credits, and expecting they would pay him as they paid others for like service. He remained in the field in the performance of his duty until the close of the war, and until honorably discharged. This long period of military service, a portion of which was performed under a re-enlistment thu3 induced, was not only meritorious but beneficial to the town, and constitutes a good and sufficient consideration for an express promise to pay him. In view of the decisions of this court, relating to the general subject, it is quite too late to question, or for the court to doubt, the authority of the town to raise and appropriate money, either by assessment in the usual mode, or upon credit, pursuant to vote, for the purpose of enabling them to furnish their assigned quota of men for the army during the war. The legislature authorized it, not only to enable the towns of this state to discharge a corporate duty under the law, but to relieve the inhabitants in respect to drafts and military service. Any contract or agreement, therefore, express or implied, entered into for this purpose and to this end, is obligatory; and if the facts in this case show what is equivalent to an express promise to pay the plaintiff the amount he claims for his military service, the town can stand upon no different footing than an ordinary party with respect to an ordinary contract. The plaintiff having re-enlisted, and having caused himself credited to the defendant town, as already remarked, he was applicable to the quota of the town under the call of the President of the 19 th of December, 1864. Under these circumstances, having faithfully served until discharged, the defendant town, in March, 1865, voted to, pay him the sum of three hundred dollars (the amount he seeks to recover) at the expiration of his term of service. This.vote we regard as having the effect of an express promise as between ordinary parties. It is á promise made to the
The fact that the promise (vote) was made upon a past consideration does not affect its validity upon the facts. The consideration upon which it was made, moved from the plaintiff, was meritorious and beneficial. Booth v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681. Giving then the vote the effect we do, immediately upon its adoption by the town, the legal rights of the parties as to the claim in controversy, and to which it refers,, became fixed, and these rights, as to the plaintiff, upon the facts in this case, cannot be defeated by the subsequent vote rescinding it. An ordinary party cannot recall an express promise to pay another, based upon sufficient consideration, and thus relieve himself of liability in consequence of it, and we do not see how, upon principle, a town can.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.