21 Conn. 481 | Conn. | 1851
In this case, we think judgment should be rendered for the defendants. In coming to this result, we do not mean to overrule the cases heretofore decided by this court, referred to at the bar; for whatever might be our opinion upon the question of the exemption of property from taxation, were it an open one, it is now too late to contend, that grants, or donations for religious and charitable purposes, made under the statute enacted at some period before 1702,
While, however, we say this much, we would be equally explicit in declaring our intention not further to extend this exemption from taxation. We think the present case is altogether distinguishable from others, and on that ground place our decision. In the cases in our own court, the donor had, by the express terms of the grant, impressed upon the property, a perpetual sequestration for the maintenance of the ministry, &c. He declared what should be the exact and exclusive object of the grant, which we hold to be en
Nothing of this is to be found in the deed of Mrs. Burnham; but, on the other hand, the deed expressly declares the gift is a sure and absolute fee simple, without any manner of condition. Of course, the grantor does not require, that the property should he sequestered or kept or used, for the maintenance of the ministry; nor does she declare any particular intent whatever, unless the general character and corporate powers of the society imply one; which we think, is not the case. Nothing of this can be ascribed to the law. It is enough to allow the grantor to do this, if it is her desire; and if she will not do it, the deed cannot be held to come within the provisions of the statute.
We are unable to distinguish this grant from any absolute purchase made by the society generally, or from any unqualified gift made to it; as a purchase of bank stock, or of a library of books, or of land, or anything else, which it may purchase, or receive by donation. We discover in Mrs. Burnham’s deed nothing but an unqualified transfer of property, which may be used, at the pleasure of the grantees; no restriction, no sequestration for any public object. The society may do with it as they please: they may sell it, or use it, or give it away, without being liable to any one.
But it is said, and with much emphasis, that the character of the grantees, they being a religious body, possessing only attributes to promote religious objects, impresses upon the property, of necessity, the character of a sequestration or perpetual gift for religious purposes, since this is the only use
Since, then, there is, as we believe, a manifest difference between the present case and those referred to; and as we are unwilling to extend the principle there decided, we hold the property in question is liable to be taxed; and therefore, that the plaintiff cannot recover.
Judgment for defendants.