1 Hopk. Ch. 436 | New York Court of Chancery | 1825
The master has reported, jhat in his opinion, the complainant can give a good title to the lands which were agreed to be conveyed to Thomas Ellison deceased : and ten exceptions to the report, are taken by the defendants. These exceptions object to opinions of the master, upon particular questions, which arose before him, and also to his conclusion, that the complainants’ title is'valid. The inquiry referred to the master, was, whether the com
The title to the lands now in question, was in Benjamin Smith, in 1782 ; and he then conveyed to Henry E. Lutterloh. A deed from Henry E. Lutterloh to Henry L. Lutterloh, bearing date the sixteenth day of March 1786, is produced ; and one question is, whether this deed is genuine or not. This deed has not been acknowledged or proved; and it is not now proved to have been executed by Henry E. Lutterloh. If. is in evidence, only upon the doctrine, that an ancient deed may be received without proof of its execution, when it is free from suspicion upon its face, and is offered to support a title concurrent with possession. This deed is impeached by four witnesses, John Anderson, Comfort Sands, David Wolfe and James Abeel. They state, that they knew the writing of Henry E. Lutterloh ; and that in their belief, the name subscribed to this deed, is not his handwriting. This testimony of four witnesses concurring in the same opinion, must destroy this deed, or at least, render its genuineness extremely doubtful.
William Seymour deceased was in possession of this land, during a long period ; but the commencement and duration of his possession, do not appear, with any exactness. Isaac Belknap a witness, says, that he thinks, that Seymour was in possession, upwards of thirty years; and that Seymour, before his purchase from Hallett, held possession under Hallett. The land had been for a considerable time, uninclosed; and Seymour’s first occupation was by laying timber on it. The deed from Hallett and his wife to Seymour, bears date the thirty first day of October 1800: and Seymour’s possession prior to that time, seems to have been a very slight and imperfect occupation. The possession of Seymour, must I think, be regarded, as adverse and exclusive, only from the time of his purchase from Hallett; and if so, it was not of sufficient length, to give that species of title, which results from an adverse possession and the limitations of actions.
Henry E. Lutterloh died in 1786. It is suggested, that he was an alien; and this suggestion is founded upon the testimony of Abeel, who says, that he thinks, that Henry E. Lut
There is no proof, that Hallett ever had possession of this land; unless the occupation of Seymour, for some time prior to 1800, is considered as the possession of Hallett. Seymour’s occupation prior to 1800, might have been an adverse possession, if the title of Henry E. Lutterloh had been really conveyed to Hallett. But the only evidence that Henry E. Lutterloh ever conveyed his title, is the deed of the sixteenth day of March 1186, and according to the testimony, he never executed this deed.
In all the circumstances of the case, it is uncertain, whether the title of William Seymour is valid, by the mere force of adverse possession. If it is not good by "adverse possession, it is still more doubtful, whether it is valid, by a regular derivation of right from Henry E. Lutterloh. I am accordingly of opinion, that the title of the complainant, as it has been exhibited before the master, is so far uncertain, that it must receive a farther investigation: and as this uncertainty arises from questions of fact, it is most proper, that they should be tried by a jury. If William Seymour acquired a title by adverse possession, such a title would preclude all other inquiries ; and the inquiry whether his possession was adverse or not, and the length of such a possession, are questions of fact. The inquiry whether the deed from Henry E. Lutterloh, is genuine or not, is purely, a question of fact. These questions are peculiarly proper for the trial by jury, as the best method of ascertaining their truth.
Equity does not compel a conveyance of a doubtful title ; and the defendants contend, that if this title is doubtful, the suit should be dismissed. This title is so uncertain, as to require farther elucidation; but it would be premature and un