75 Pa. Commw. 118 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1983
Opinion by
This is an appeal from an opinion and order of the Department of General Services (Department) which found that the Bureau of Risk and Insurance Management properly denied the payment of a death benefit to the petitioner, Marie L. Seybold.
Marie L. • Seybold (Petitioner) is the widow of Charles H. Seybold, a former fireman for the City of Pittsburgh. Her claim is for the $25,000 death benefit provided for firefighters “killed in the performance of [their] duties” by Section 1 of Act of June 26, 1976 (Act), P.L. 424, as amended, 53 P.S. §891.
On February 1, 1976, Mr. Seybold was on duty when an alarm was sounded. Mr. Seybold donned boots, heavy protective clothing and a helmet and drove a pumper truck approximately one mile to the Carlton House where the alarm had been triggered. Mr. Seybold then carried about 47 pounds of equipment to an elevator, rode it to the ninth floor and proceeded at a “fast walk” up the stairs to the tenth floor with the equipment. There was then some smoke on the tenth floor, described by one witness “as cook
Therefore, the Hearing Examiner finds that the decedent was not “killed” as that term is defined in 4 Pa. Code §89.1 and that the claim was properly denied by the Bureau of Bisk and Insurance Management.
The word “killed” is defined in regulations of the Bureau of Bisk and Insurance (4 Pa. Code §89.1) as follows:
Death as the direct and proximate result of a wound or other condition of the body caused by external force, including injuries by bullets; explosives; sharp instruments, blunt objects or other physical blows; chemicals; electricity; climatic conditions, including gases, heat, and lack of air; infectious diseases; radiation; and bacteria; but excluding stress and strain and diseases which arise merely out of the general performance of duty. (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner urges that the regulation be disregarded “as being violative of the legislative intent as expressed in Act 101 of 1976.” Bespondent relies heavily upon the requirement in the regulation that death must result from “external force” and upon the exclusion of death from “stress and strain and diseases which arise merely out of the general performance of duty.”
While we may not question the fact-finding prerogatives of the hearing examiner, Boughter v. Department of Public Welfare, 55 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 521, 423 A.2d 806 (1980), it is our duty and responsibility to examine the legal basis on which his findings were predicated. This brings us to the Bureau’s Begulation 89.1 defining the word “killed.”
Considering the meaning of the word “killed” as it must have been intended by the legislature, it must be remembered that this statute, like other social legislation, such as workmen’s compensation laws, must be construed liberally in order to effectuate its beneficent purposes. Bee LeGare v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 498 Pa. 72, 444 A.2d 1151 (1982); Commonwealth v. College, 497 Pa. 71, 439 A.2d 107 (1981); Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 497 Pa. 115, 439 A.2d 627 (1981); Kremer v. State Ethics Commission, 56 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 160, 424 A.2d 968 (1981).
Our. research has yielded but two cases in which the word “killed” has been interpreted. In one of these, the case of Vernon v. Firemen’s Pension Fund, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 617, 52 A.2d 199 (1947), the fireman’s widow claimed pension benefits, provided under the pension fund’s by-laws for a member (fireman) “who may be killed or die of injuries received whilst in the discharge of . . . duty.” The Court held
This appeal resolves itself into a determination of whether under the evidence Yernon was “killed” within the meaning of the word as used in the charter and by-laws of the defendant association. The charter and by-laws should be construed most strongly against the association and in favor of the plaintiffs (Cerelli v. Order of Brotherly Love, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 319, 44 A.2d 774), and there is no intention shown in either to limit “killed” to death resulting solely from the application of external violent physical force to the body. On the contrary, it appears to have been used to denote a sudden accidental death while discharging the duties of the member’s employment, as distinguished from death resulting either after a substantial loss of time from injuries sustained or from disease. This is the meaning that would be ascribed to it in common parlance and no reason appears why the ordinary meaning should yield to a more technical construction. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 623, 52 A.2d at 202.
The Court also stated:
In our opinion, this section of the by-laws does not apply to a member of the defendant association who was killed while in the discharge of his duty. If he was killed, it would appear to be of no moment that, at the time he was killed, he had an abnormal condition of his*124 body or was suffering from some disease. (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 622, 52 A.2d at 201.
Recently, in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Nik in Appeal of Stanton, Pa. , 452 A.2d 496 (1982),
Also, while the language of the 1981 amendment to the Act may not have been intended to supplant
As Judge Craig stated, in writing for a panel of this Court, in the case of Fields v. Department of Public Welfare, 47 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 172, 407 A.2d 155 (1979): “If the statute confers eligibility, a regulation with - contrary effect would not be controlling.” Id. at 174, 407 A.2d at 156. See also Sciulli v. Pennsylvania Crime Victim’s Compensation Board, 74 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 36, A.2d (1983).
We recognize that we are not free to pass upon the ■ wisdom of a factual determination by the hearing examiner when supported by substantial evidence, yet we cannot disregard the apparent influence that the restrictive language in Regulation 89.1 may have had on the ultimate factual and legal conclusions which he reached in this case.
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Order
And Now, this 17th day of June, 1983, the adjudication of the Department of General Services, dated
The case is not on point, since it deals with a pension claim for a fireman’s death which was admittedly “not job-related.”
See also Foster v. State College Borough, 124 Pa. Superior Ct. 492, 189 A. 786 (1937), where the breadth of -the accidental injury concept as applied to firemen is expounded at length, especially' at 499-500.