Sexton v. ConleySexton v. Conley
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} Linda Sue Sexton and Tierra Dawn Sexton (the Sextons) appeal the Scioto County Common Pleas Court‘s order that granted Francis Jefferson “Jeff” Conley‘s motion for summary judgment and denied their request for retroactive child support. First, the Sextons contend motions for summary judgment are inappropriate in paternity actions. To the contrary, motions for summary judgment are appropriate in paternity actions because R.C.
{¶ 2} Linda Sue Sexton gave birth to Tierra Sexton on August 14, 1973. On August 9, 1996, when Tierra Sexton was five days short of her twenty-third birthday, the Sextons filed a timely paternity action against Jeff Conley.2 As part of this paternity action, the Sextons joined the Ohio Department of Human Services, n.k.a. the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS), the Scioto County Child Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) and the Pike County Department of Human Services (DHS). In their complaint, the Sextons alleged Conley was liable for the support, maintenance and necessities expended on behalf of Tierra Sexton during her minority.
{¶ 3} The court ordered Conley and Tierra to submit to genetic testing. The test results established a 99.84% probability that Conley was Tierra‘s father. Conley then stipulated that he was Tierra‘s father and filed a motion for summary judgment.3 In the entry granting Conley‘s motion for summary judgment, the trial court accepted Conley‘s stipulation to paternity and ordered a corresponding change to Tierra‘s birth certificate. Moreover, at ODJFS, DHS and CSEA‘s request, the court dismissed them as parties because they stipulated that they had no cognizable claim at issue. Finally, the court stated, “no authority exists in this instance which allows an award of retroactive support to either the mother, or the emancipated child in this matter, for a claim presented after the child attained the age of majority.” Therefore, the court found that as a matter of law, the Sextons could not recover retroactive child support. The Sextons appeal and assign the following errors. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR — The trial court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiffs-appellants, and denied the plaintiffs-appellants equal protection of the laws, in overruling the objections of plaintiffs-appellants to the magistrate‘s decisions filed on October 15, 1998, and on October 26, 2001, respectively, and in confirming said magistrate‘s decisions, which decisions granted defendant, Francis Jefferson Conley‘s, motion for summary judgment.SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR — The trial court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiffs-appellants in overruling the objections of the plaintiffs-appellants to the magistrate‘s decision filed on October 26, 2001, and in confirming said magistrate‘s decision, which decision denied the plaintiffs-appellants motion to reconsider and amended motion to reconsider. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR — The trial court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiffs-appellants, and abused its discretion, and denied the plaintiffs-appellants equal protection of the laws, in overruling the objections of the plaintiffs-appellants to the magistrate‘s decision filed on October 26, 2001, and in confirming said magistrate‘s decision, which decision denied the plaintiffs-appellants request for attorney fees and costs.
{¶ 4} In their first assignment of error, the Sextons make three arguments; first, they argue motions for summary judgment do not lie in paternity actions. Next, they contend the civil rules required Conley to obtain leave of court before the court could entertain his motion. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in granting Conley‘s motion for summary judgment because, once paternity is established, R.C.
{¶ 5} The Sextons rely on DeSalvo v. Sukalski (1983),8 Ohio App.3d 337, 457 N.E.2d 349, for the proposition that motions for summary judgment do not lie in paternity actions. However, DeSalvo involved a paternity action brought under the bastardy proceedings of former R.C. Chapter 3111. DeSalvo, supra; State ex rel. Drews v. Ambrosi (Sept. 3, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 73761. The current version of R.C. Chapter 3111 includes R.C.
{¶ 6} The Sextons also claim that summary judgment was inappropriate because Conley did not obtain leave of the court.
{¶ 7} Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of the case. We review a trial court‘s decision to grant summary judgment on a de novo basis.Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 1996-Ohio-336, 671 N.E.2d 241. We apply the same standard as the trial court, which is the standard contained in
{¶ 8} Conley argues that Snider v. Lillie (1997),131 Ohio App.3d 444, 722 N.E.2d 1036, should control the outcome here. Snider also involved a mother and an adult emancipated child‘s claim for retroactive child support following a determination of paternity under R.C. Chapter 3111. In Snider, the First District stated, “[f]iling a timely action to determine the existence of a father-child relationship, as was clearly done in this case by both mother and daughter, will not and cannot preserve an untimely claim for support.” Id. at 447. TheSnider Court stressed that a parent‘s duty to support children terminates when the child attains the age of majority. Id. at 448. Therefore, it reasoned that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award child support to an adult, emancipated child. Id. Further, theSnider Court stated, “the right to find out who one‘s father is (or is not) is separate and distinct from the right to support from one‘s father.” Id. at 447. The court went on to state that there are other reasons, apart from seeking support, for establishing paternity, including issues of inheritance and death benefits. Id. Moreover, the court stressed that an eighteen-year-old may not be ready to make a decision regarding establishing paternity and that “five extra years seem a reasonable accommodation to emotional realities.” Id. We agree that paternity may be established and/or requested for a variety of reasons, including support. See Hall v. Lalli (Ariz. 1999), 977 P.2d 776, ¶ 13 (stating that a child‘s interest in establishing paternity include claims to inheritance, medical support, workers’ compensation dependent‘s allowance, veteran‘s educational benefits, interest in accurate family medical history, establishing familial bonds and learning cultural history, as well as intangible psychological and emotional benefits.).
{¶ 9} However, we choose to not follow our learned colleagues logic in Snider for several reasons. First, R.C. Chapter 3111 clearly indicates that trial courts have the authority to award child support following a determination of paternity. Park v. Ambrose (1993),85 Ohio App.3d 179, 183, 619 N.E.2d 469. R.C.
{¶ 10} Under R.C. Chapter 3111, so long as the child commences the paternity action prior to the twenty-third birthday, a court may award retroactive child support, or any other applicable remedy under R.C.
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, an award of child support, or any other available remedy, is not mandatory. Rather, the determination of what relief is appropriate, if any, is within the court‘s discretionary and equitable powers. See State ex rel. Scioto Cty. Child Support EnforcementAgency v. Gardner (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 46, 56, 680 N.E.2d 221, n. 4;Spires v. Moore (Nov. 24, 1999), Muskingum App. No. CT98-0040; Stricklerv. Carver (Mar. 23, 1992), Washington App. No. 91CA7; Hugershoff v.Loecy (Geauga C.P. Sept. 28, 1999), 103 Ohio Misc.2d 58, 62, 725 N.E.2d 378. R.C.
{¶ 12} Moreover, equitable defenses such as laches, res judicata and estoppel apply in paternity actions. See Wright v. Oliver (1988),35 Ohio St.3d 10, 517 N.E.2d 883, syllabus; Park v. Ambrose (1993),85 Ohio App.3d 179, 184, 619 N.E.2d 469. Since we have already held that support awards incident to paternity actions are not separate and distinct actions, equitable defenses are applicable in the support context. In order to alleviate any possible confusion in our earlier decision in Park, supra, we must clarify a point. In Park, we held that the doctrine of laches barred the mother‘s claim for retroactive child support but that the mother‘s laches could not bar the daughter‘s claim. We did not hold that laches was inapplicable to a child‘s claim for retroactive support. The doctrine of laches may bar a child‘s claim for retroactive support if the child, by her own inaction, has materially prejudiced the rights of the father. Thus, a court may establish paternity but still refuse to award support when it finds that an equitable defense applies or if it finds that a deviation from the guidelines is necessary.
{¶ 13} We acknowledge that, generally, a parent‘s duty to support their children terminates on the child‘s eighteenth birthday. R.C.
{¶ 14} We reverse the court‘s finding that R.C. Chapter 3111 does not authorize an award of retroactive child support to an adult emancipated child if the claim is made prior to the age of twenty-three. After a court establishes paternity under R.C. Chapter 3111 it may, but is not required to, award support to an adult emancipated child.
{¶ 15} The Sextons’ second and third assignments of error are rendered moot because of our resolution of their first assignment of error.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED and that Appellants recover of Appellees costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Kline, J. Evans, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.