95 Mo. 373 | Mo. | 1888
James M. and James W. Anderson brought suit by attachment against' William J. and Thomas D. Sexton and James W. Kanatzar, partners doing business under the name of Sexton Brothers & Company. The writ was levied upon a stock of merchandise on the twenty-second of December, 1883. Other creditors attached about the same time, and the property was sold by order of the court. Elisha Sexton interpleaded, claiming the property and the proceeds arising from the sale thereof, amounting to forty-five hundred and thirty-two dollars, by virtue of a sale to him and M. S. Bush. Issues were made on this inter-plea, in which the attaching cr editors take the ground that the sale to Elisha Sexton and Bush was fraudulent as to them. The court, sitting as a jury, found the issues for the interpleader.
The evidence discloses these facts: On the eighteenth of December, 1883, Sexton Brothers & Company made an instrument in writing, in the form of a warranty deed, whereby they sold their entire stock of merchandise and store fixtures to Elisha Sexton and M. S. Bush for the recited consideration • of sixty-eight hundred and fifty-five dollars. At the same time and as a part of the same transaction, Elisha Sexton signed
The bill of sale was acknowledged, and was recorded on the twenty-second of December, 1883, just anterior to the levy of the attachment by Anderson & Company. The other document was withheld by the parties thereto, and not made known until it appeared in evidence in the trial of this cause. An issue was made on the trial as to' whether Elisha Sexton and Bush had possession of the goods at the date of the attachment, but that issue was found for the interpleader on favorable instructions for the attaching creditors. It is shown that Elisha Sexton and Bush took possession of the property on the eighteenth of December, and sold from the stock until the twenty-second. Bush then brought an attachment suit, and hence does not join in the interplea.
. The evidence for the interpleader is, that the debts mentioned in the agreement were tona fide, his own being for money loaned the firm ; that Sexton Brothers
1. Generally, a sale of property with the intent on-the part of the seller to thereby hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, and knowledge of such intent on the part of the purchaser, renders the sale void, though the purchaser pay a valuable consideration .for the property, because the purchase of the property under such circumstances amounts to a participation in the intended fraud. Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 529; Frederick v. Allgaier, 88 Mo. 601. But a debtor, though unable to pay all of his creditors, may pay one or more to the exclusion of others, either in money or the transfer of property; and the favored creditor or creditors may accept such preference. If the preferred creditor, in such cases, acts in-good faith and takes the money or the property for the sole purpose of saving a bona-fide debt, mere knowledge that the debtor intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors does not render the transaction void as against the creditor taking the preference ; for simple knowledge under such circumstances, it is held, does not amount to a participation in the intended fraud. Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74; Albert v. Besel, 88 Mo. 150; Frederick v. Allgaier, supra.
In the present case the court was asked, but refused, to declare the law to be, that knowledge, notice, or information on the part of Elisha Sexton, that Sexton Brothers & Company intended, by the deed in evidence,.
2. One of the debts mentioned in the contract to be paid from the transferred property is a debt of one thous- and dollars due by Kanatzar individually to the estate of Emmett Sexton. This note was given for an interest in •the partnership property. In respect of this, the court was asked to instruct that if it was the intention of Sexton Brothers & Company and the interpleader to pay or secure an individual debt of either member of the firm, as that was the effect and operation of the deed read in evidence, then such preferment was a fraud on the firm creditors and as to them made the deed void. This instruction does not state a correct proposition of law, and was properly refused. It is to be observed it •does not even require the court to find that the firm was
With us each partner is liable for all the partnership debts. The partners may, so long as the firm exists, do with their property as they see fit. The firm creditors have no lien on the partnership property for the payment of their debts, while the firm continues to exist. Partners have a right to 'have the partnership-property applied to partnership purposes, but this is a right or lien which they may waive. Hence the great majority of adjudicated cases are to this effect, that all the partners may, by their joint act, dispose of partnership property in liquidation and payment of a debt owing by an individual member of the firm. .The qualification is, that the transaction must be in good
faith, and not for fraudulent purposes. Rogers v. Batchelor, 12 Pet. 221, 232; City v. Willey, 35 Iowa, 323; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 124; Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 Miss. 597 ; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 530. The cases of Flanagan v. Alexander, 50 Mo. 50; Ackley v. Staehlin, 56 Mo. 558; Price v. Hunt, 59 Mo. 258; and Forney v. Adams, 74 Mo. 138, are all in accord with what has been said. These cases recognize the right-of one partner to apply partnership property, with the consent of the other partners, to the payment of his
3. It is suggested, probably for the first time in this court, that the two documents, when taken and read together as they must be, resolve the whole transaction into a voluntary assignment. There is a vast deal to be said in favor of this proposition. But it does not follow from being an assignment, that the transaction is fraudulent or void. Our present law in respect of a voluntary assignment, made by a debtor to any person in trust for his creditors, shall be for the benefit of all the creditors in proportion to their respective claims. 'The fact that the deed of assignment does not name all the creditors does not render it void. Though part only of the creditors are named, the assignment will enure for the benefit of all. Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 437. Conceding, too, that the debt of Kanatzar was improperly included with the firm debts, that could not invalidate the assignment. Pinneo v. Hart, 33 Mo. 561. If an assignment, the creditors should proceed to -compel the trustees to give bond and administer the property under the assignment law. It is suggested that they did not have any information of the agreement, converting the bill of sale into an assignment, until the trial of this cause. That may be a very good reason why they should not, be precluded from proving up their demands. Their attachments ought not to prejudice their claims under these circumstances. But .the attitude > of .the .attaching creditors in this case is,
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.