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Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., Defendant-Cross-Appellant
172 F.3d 817
Fed. Cir.
1999
Check Treatment

*3 LOURIE, Circuit Judge. Avionique, S.A. appeals from decision United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor- summary nia Ana- granting judgment that Devices, log literally infringe Inc. did not any patents grant- claim of Sextant’s ing judgment as a matter law that Ana- log infringe did not under the doctrine of equivalents.1 affirm. We

I. BACKGROUND A. Sextant’s “Marcillat” and “Bourn” Patents generally to patents pertain Sextant’s accelerometers, devices which are small acceleration and capable detecting automotive utility find in avionic and pat- applications. of Sextant’s The first Patent ents at issue in U.S. appeal, cross-appeal Analog support 1. also filed of the district Devices affirmance court. However, recognizing that it did during this action. oral Analog cross-appeal withdrew its because cross-appeal its standing have argument. arguments grounds merely alternative were 4,663,972, issued to inventor Gerard The fixed part comprises two “wings” 20 Marcillat March One 1985. embodi- and 21 having edges metallized 22 and 23. ment disclosed in the Marcillat configuration This produces thus two ca- body” shows “test 6 connected to and pacitors, the first by plates formed 19 and supported by two “flexible blades” 4 and 5. 22, the by plates second 18 and with air The flexible blades are anchored at their gaps in the capacitor between plates. This “lower to a ends” “fixed part.” test embodiment is shown in Figure 2 of Mar- body further comprises edges” “lateral cillat: and 17 having metallized edges 18 and 19. *4 The operates accelerometer as follows: Claim Marcillat, 2 of represen- which is when the device subject to an accelera- tative of the issue, reads as fol- tive force (ie., in the “sensitive axis” lows: 2), left to right in Fig. body test sways 2. An accelerometer sensor comprising like a pendulum within part the fixed a flat pendular structure made from thus varies the distance between the ca- one crystalline same wafer, pacitor plates. This corresponds variation said structure having in a same electrically to a change in the capacitance planet a] flat part, fixed paral- two of the capacitors, which can be detected by lel blades flexible in the said plane circuitry residing elsewhere on the fixed and delimiting therebetween part. Specifically, the specification dis- space, each of said blades having a closes that signals can travel from the first end portion fixedly connected metallized edges 18 and 19 of the test body to said part, fixed and a second end circuitry detection by metallizing portion, said structure further com-

the edges flexible blades 4 and 5. prising a flat body test connected to the second portions end The specification said also discloses that the blades so as to be suspended from accelerometer can be manufactured using part fixed and to be able to processing semiconductor techniques. For move in translation in the plane said example, specification discloses that axis, along sensitive said flat test the claimed “pendular structure” can be body extending at least partially “formed by a single piece i[n] micro-ma- into space, said chining a or crystalline quartz silicon wafer which may further serve [a] substrate wherein electrical connections be- for an integrated circuit.” electronic Mar- tween test body and the fixed cillat patent, 3,11. col. 10-13. part pendular structure by metallizations formed on from the suspended

formed flat fixed part flexible the thin faces of said blades. and to be able to move in transla- same plane along a sen- 8, 11. patent, (para- Marcillat col. 33—47 sitive axis under the effect of an ac- added). graphing celeration with a position which second of patents, The Sextant’s U.S. varies in relation with said accelera- 4,711,128, Patent was issued to inventor tion, said flat body test extending André Boura on April 1986. partially at least space, into said Boura patent formally is not related to the not, body wherein said flat comprises Marcillat it test patent; example, at least a first any application edge derived from related to carries a first metallization having Marcillat continuation or division. first and However, opposite Boura’s written second faces description and said flat makes clear part that his invention constituted fixed comprises least a sec- an improvement over Marcillat’s invention. ond and third edge carrying re- fact, the “Field of the Invention” is spectively a second and third me- tallizations, described Boura as “an accelerometer said second and third using aeeelerometric sensor with flat respectively metallizations facing pendular type structure of the described faces, said first and second opposite *5 [ie., 4,663,927 U.S. Pat. Marcillat].” so to form capacitors as whose ca- patent, Boura col. 11.8-10. This state- pacities vary depending po- ment by “Description is followed Boura’s sition of body, said test said first Art,” of the Prior which focuses on Marcil- being brought metallization to a magnetic capa- lat’s disclosure of a circuit V0, first voltage whereas the second returning body ble of the test to a proper and the third metallizations are re- position. rest The “aim” of Boura’s inven- spectively brought to a second and provide is summarized as “to ... an voltages Vj third and which are V2 type aeeelerometric sensor of a similar to capable generating an electro- [ie., the one described above Marcillat’s static return force on the flat test sensor],” 49-50, id. at 11. but which has an body. improved return mechanism. Specifically, Id., added). (paragraphing col. 11.15-42 Boura’s mechanism involved cer- applying optimal mathematically-derived tain vol- B. The Prosecution Histories Marcil- tages to the capacitor plates various of the lat and Boura sensor structure. portions The salient only Claim the in independent claim patent easily of the Marcillat patent, the Boura reads as follows: Original application summarized. claim 7

1. An comprising accelerometer sensor generically “capacitor plates.” claimed pendular rejected flat structure made from This claim was under 35 U.S.C. wafer, § crystalline prior

one and the same 103 over a art issued to having light said structure in a same Rudolf in of other references. Rudolf planet part, a flat fixed at least discloses an accelerometer formed ] parallel processing techniques two blades flexible in the semiconductor (a plane delimiting body pivotable flap) same therebet- which the test monocrystalline ween a each of said blades formed in silicon that has space, portion fixedly doped impurities been with to make it having a first end Similar to the Marcillat dis- part, to said fixed conductive. connected closure, body the test of Rudolf constitutes said structure portion, second end sensor. body capacitor flat test one of the plates further comprising art, Marcillat por- distinguishing second end In over this connected to the claim 26 canceled claim 7 blades so as to be and substituted tions of said place. in its Claim 26 was explicit 4,345,474). more The statement accompanying nature of the capacitor plates, claim- rejection examiner’s read: “Although ing plates as “metallizations.” Marcil- provides Deval a common ground potential lat’s amendment was accompanied by the ..., between fixed plates it would have following Rudolf, statement: “In the flap been an design obvious modification to and attachment means comprise monocrys- provide a ground common potential be- talline heavily doped silicon with boron and tween mobile capacitor plates [the] ... capacitor form a plate without metalliza- vary the voltage to the plates. fixed ” tions .... Joint App. Applica- A2224. Forming [the wafer Deval] microma- tion claim 26 eventually issued as claim 14 chining a monocrystal would have been an in the patent. Mareillat The term “metal- obvious manufacturing expedient.” Id. lization” appears also in other claims of A2302. Mareillat to describe the composition After rejection Boura, was made in structures other capacitor than plates, the examiner of the application Mareillat

such as the electrical connections claimed allowed the Mareillat claims. Accordingly, claim Marcillat’s quoted above. attorney, Sextant’s attorney same who addition to the limitation, “metallization” prosecuting Mareillat application, parties do not dispute that the claim canceled claim in1 Boura and substituted limitations “made one and the same claim 10 in its place, which eventually is- crystalline wafer” and “flat part” fixed sued as claim 1 in the patent, quot- were added to the claims of Mareillat to ed above. Boura stated the following distinguish them over the art. about claim 10: filed,

As originally the Boura application does present [Deval] a flat pendular contained one independent claim, structure but a structure comprising a which read as follows: flat test body hinged for rotation....

In an accelerometer using at least one In contrast with [ the Applicant’s ] sen- accelerometric sensor with a flat pen- sor, capacity [Deval’s] electrodes of the dular structure formed by microma- test body are formed by a thin layer of

chining substrate formed of a fine metal which covers the two sides of this monocrystal wafer and comprising a test body and does not consist in [sic] flat mobile mass suspended from the metallizations formed edge on portions rest of structure by means of two of body. this test addition, [Deval’s] parallel thin strips situated each capacity electrodes of the fixed structure mass, said of said said mobile mass cover the faces of the two side members comprises at least one mobile capaci- which are facing the two sides of the tor plate and the fixed part test body. This is quite different from pendular comprises element at least the Applicant’s sensor in which these two fixed capacitor plates disposed capacity electrodes are formed on the on each side of the plate mobile edge and portions of the fixed part. flat plate mobile is brought to a first An important advantage of the Appli- voltage V0, whereas the fixed plates cant’s that, structure in consists due to are respectively brought to [ ] second the parallel blades, flexible ... ca- and third voltages and pacity Vi V2 electrodes substantially remain are capable of generating an electro- parallel [when the test body moves]. static recall force on the mobile Therefore, FR a high precision can be ob- mass. tained. Id, at 2281. This rejected claim was under [T]he width of the facing metallizations ¶ § U.S.C. 2 for indefiniteness and which form .the capacity electrodes [of under 35 light § U.S.C. prior of a Deval] to the substantially equal art patent (U.S. issued to Deval Patent thickness of consists substrate which deposited doped po- techniques of these and use The surfaces a fine wafer. very lysilicon layer small and for those structures corre- facing metallizations body to the test and blades of the sponding foreseeable that it would it was not Analog summary judg- return moved for a sufficient claims. possible to obtain (which and for construc- proportional noninfringement ment force Fr metallizations). facing disputed certain limitations area of the S.A. v. Avionique, claims. See Sextant Thus, argued Boura Id. at A2310-11. Devices, Inc., Analog No. C-95-2838 SI from Deval distinguishable claim 10 was (N.D.Cal. 1997) (order granting Feb. (1) Deval a flat rotation- because disclosed summary judgment). The construed pendu- to the “flat opposed al structure as limitations, in favor of six four them (2) claim, Deval dis- lar structure” of thereafter Analog’s interpretation,2 and on the sides of forming capacitors closed literal granted summary judgment no body flat fixed instead of part the test Particularly infringement Analog. rele- (3) not disclose “edges,” their Deval did here, vant the court construed the term the ca- permitting flexible blades parallel deposited “metallization” to mean a metal- par- the sensor to remain pacitor plates of material, doing in so noted the lic (4) allel, Deval did not enable the use prosecution history relevance made of a return force. Other statements distinguished which Marcillat his concerning “good results” by Boura doping to achieve over Rudolfs use no that are obtained his structure have conductivity. at 14-15. suitable See id. art distinguishing relation to deposited did not use a Analog Because claim 10 and are therefore not noted layer, doped but instead used a metallic However, at A2311-12. new here. See id. layer, silicon the court held polycrystalline the three limitations claim 10 contained in- literally Analog’s device did to his claims that Marcillat had added patent. claim of the Marcillat fringe any to overcome the Rudolf reference. order successfully later moved for Analog many claim 1 is similar in re- law, judgment arguing as a matter of fact, 2. In spects to Marcillat claim com- history estoppel barred Sex- of Marcillat claim 2 and Boura parison Analog’s devices amendment, asserting tant from that, through claim 1 shows under the doctrine infringed either claims became sub- language of these *7 Concerning the Marcillat equivalents. except for the “where- stantially identical the court concluded that patent, dispute in” Sextant does not clauses. to se- attempt

use of this format was an limi- Marcillat added “metallization” claims, allowance of the Boura quick cure Ru- distinguish to his tations claims had been though even the Marcillat an doing, so he surrendered dolf and Thus, by a different examiner. allowed body the test in which accelerometer “metallization,” through strategy, this means are conductive and attachment crystalline “made from one and same of an additional de- without addition wafer,” limitations part” and “flat fixed layer. The Court further- metal posited of the claims of Boura. part became devices Analog’s more finds that accused of a without the addition are conductive Proceedings C. The District Court fall layer metal and therefore deposited of the “metallization” scope within the infringement, Analog Sextant sued is es- Sextant alia, estoppel. Accordingly, claim inter of claim 2 of Marcillat infringement un- claiming from topped 1 of Boura. Analog’s accused devices as to equivalents the doctrine of der using processing fabricated semiconductor wafer,” paral- “two part," and line "flat fixed 2. The court construed the claim limitations but all structure,” lel blades." The court construed "pendular plane,” same "in a Analog’s favor. "metallization,” two of these limitations in crystal- first "one and the same “metallization” element of the Marcillat terms towas quick secure allowance of patent claims. application Boura and to avoid the objections raised during Avionique, Devices, S.A. v. Marcillat’s Analog Inc., prosecution of his SI, patent. No. Under C-95-2838 these slip op. at 9 (N.D.Cal. circumstances, 1997) (order the Court finds Sept. granting law). should be judgment estopped as a matter of The court assert- ing infringement also under the concluded doctrine that Marcillat’s addition equivalents against Analog “made from one and the as to these crystal- same line wafer” elements[.] Because Sextant “flat fixed part” limitations estopped also from asserting created estoppels infringement precluded under the doctrine of equivalence equivalents Sextant’s theories as to against “metallization,” individual Analog’s accused devices. See id. at “made 9-13. from one and the wafer,” same and “flat The court next addressed the impact of part” fixed limitations of the Boura prosecution history estoppel on the Boura claims, the court judgment GRANTS patent and concluded that the estoppels favor of Analog on Sextant’s doctrine of present in the Marcillat file were equivalents claim regards the Boura applicable to limit the scope of equivalence patent. of the same claim terms in the Boura patent. (brackets explained Id. at quote 14-15 from Pall original).

Analog argues that Boura’s amendments to his claim language in response to the Sextant appealed the noninfringement section [rejection] should create an rulings to this court. We have jurisdiction estoppel. agrees The Court with Analog pursuant 1295(a)(1) § 28 U.S.C. (1994). that under the case, unusual facts prosecution history estoppel applies. II. DISCUSSION See Corp. Pall Separations, Micron A. Standard Inc., Review (Fed.Cir.1995) (“[change made in order to more partic- Judgment as matter of law ularly point out the applicant’s invention (JMOL) is appropriate when party “a not presumed are] to raise an estoppel, been fully heard on issue and there is but is facts, on reviewed its with the legally no sufficient evidentiary basis for a guidance precedent.”) jury reasonable to find for that party on On having his rejected as indefi- issue.” 50(a)(1). Fed.R.Civ.P. We nite Examiner, Boura incorporat- review a district court’s decision a mo ed the claim terms of the Marcillat pat- tion for novo, JMOL de reapplying the ent which recently had been allowed and JMOL standard. See Markman v. West then argued that these claim terms ad- Instruments, Inc., view 967, 975, 52 F.3d dressed the Examiner’s concerns. Of USPQ2d *8 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en 1326 particular importance is banc), the timing of aff'd, 370, 517 U.S. 116 1384, S.Ct. Boura’s amendments. The claims of the 134 USPQ2d (1996). L.Ed.2d 38 1461 Marcillat patent had been allowed on Summary judgment is appropriate when 22,1986 October after Marcillat nar- had there are genuine no issues of material rowed and redrafted his claims to the fact and the moving party is entitled to satisfaction of the Examiner. Boura in- judgment as a matter of law. Fed. corporated the 56(c). terms from the Marcillat R.Civ.P. We similarly review a dis (i.e. patent “metallization,” “made from trict court’s grant of summary judgment one and the same crystalline wafer,” novo, and de reapplying the summary judg “flat fixed part”) into his patent own ment standard. See Conroy v. Reebok application on May 15,1987. Int’l, Ltd., It 14 appears F.3d 1575, USPQ2d 29 that Boura’s intent 1373, 1377 in adding (Fed.Cir.1994). these

825 lic While Sextant was free to act In- material. B. Construction Literal Claim fringement lexicographer as its own and to define its plain term in a manner different from analysis entails infringement “An in a meaning, (“Although see id. words determining is steps. step two The first ordinary generally given claim are their meaning scope patent customary meaning, patentee may step The second infringed. asserted to be lexicographer choose to be his own and use comparing properly is construed terms in a manner different from their infringing.” claims to the device accused ordinary meaning, long special as Markman, 976, USPQ2d 34 at F.3d clearly definition of the term is stated construction, is step, 1326. The first history.”), it patent specification or file law, review de question which we speci- not done so here. The Marcillat Techs., Cybor v. FAS Corp. novo. See only deposition fication discloses Inc., 1448, 1456, USPQ2d 138 F.3d materials, patent, metallic see Marcillat (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc). The (“The 8,11. on the deposited col. 1-8 metal factual. See North Am. step second may gold ... or pendular structure Co., Vaccine, Cyanamid Inc. v. American alloy alloy chromium-gold as a gold such 1571, 1574, USPQ2d However, circuits example. ... these (Fed.Cir.1993). claim, construing a When or alumi- preferably made from silver the evidence principally a court consults ....”) added), and does (emphasis num viz., the claims patent, intrinsic that the term “me- suggest not otherwise themselves, description portion written tallization” can include conductive materi- and the specification, generally als or materials made conductive history. Corp. Concep See Vitronics fact, by doping. specifications tronic, Inc., 1576, 1582-83, 90 F.3d (Fed.Cir.1996). concepts Boura use the 1573, 1576-77 both Marcillat and USPQ2d in re- of “metallization” and “conductors” that the court erred argues Sextant different, contexts, lated, but somewhat four claim limita- its construction of the they do not have identical suggesting it, viz., against tions that were construed See, e.g., patent, Marcillat col. meanings. “metallization,” crystal- “one and the same (“this 7,11. conducting strip being 3-5 con- wafer,” part,” fixed and “two line “flat thin a metallized one of the faces nected to we conclude blades.” Because parallel blade”); patent, col. the flexible err in its court did not the district (“[T]he of the mobile edges 11. 20-22 “metallization,” the term construction of covered metallizations teeth are summary judgment and therefore conducting layer right an- extend the grant- infringement properly literal no gles.”). Sex- Analog, we need not address ed to respect with latter arguments tant’s of the Marcillat prosecution history three limitations. applicant in which the distin- patent, structure over the guished his “metallized” argu construction Sextant’s claim Rudolf, “doped silicon” structure ironic contention: hinge ments on an our conclusion that term strengthens to its own the evidence intrinsic only mate- “metallization” denotes metallic construe the and insufficient ambiguous .to rials, The ex- doped silicon materials. claims, resort to extrinsic requiring thus can- proffered by trinsic evidence testimony. We expert such as evidence *9 by the not alter the construction indicated in evidence is that the intrinsic disagree evidence, injecting an am- thereby intrinsic “metalliza the term to construe sufficient See Bell & biguity where none exists. lan with the claim first tion.” We start Document Prods. Co. 1582, Management Howell Vitronics, F.3d at 39 90 guage. 'See 706, 701, 45 Sys., Altek “metalliza v. 132 F.3d term The USPQ2d at 1576. (hold- 1033, (Fed.Cir.1997) USPQ2d use of a metal- certainly tion” connotes ing that may extrinsic evidence not be [w]hen determining whether upon relied during claim construction history estoppel applies to limit the doc when the intrinsic evidence is sufficient to trine of equivalents, a court must exam claim). construe the Accordingly, dis- ine the reason why applicant amend trict court not did err in its construction ed claim. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 the term “metallization,” and 17, it therefore U.S. 117 S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d did not err in granting summary judgment 41 USPQ2d at 1872. If such exami that Analog’s device, which doped uses nation indicates that a patent applicant polysilicon, did literally not infringe any of has made a substantive change to his the claims of the Marcillat or Boura pat- claim that clearly responds to an exam ents. rejection iner’s of that claim as unpat- entable prior art, over prosecution histo C. Prosecution History ry 'Estoppel estoppel applies claim; only the question of the scope of the estoppel As we recently banc, restated en remains. No presumption needs be An accused device that does literally applied in such a case because rea infringe a claim may still infringe under son for the amendment is clear. the doctrine of equivalents if each limita Bai v. L & Wings, Inc., L 160 F.3d tion of the claim is met in the accused 1355, 48 USPQ2d 1674, (Fed.Cir. device either literally or equivalently. 1998). case, In this original claim 7 of Prosecution history estoppel provides a Marcillat was drawn broadly to capacitor legal limitation on the application of the plates. This claim was rejected over Ru doctrine of equivalents by excluding dolf, to which Marcillat responded by from the range of equivalents subject amending his claim to include the “metalli- matter surrendered during prosecution zation” limitation and by distinguishing of the application for the patent. The Rudolf on the basis that it disclosed the estoppel may arise from matter surren use of doped silicon. Marcillat’s amend dered as a result of amendments ment was thus clearly responsive to the overcome patentability rejections, or as examiner’s prior art rejection. Under a result argument to secure allowance such circumstances, prosecution history es- of a claim. Prosecution estoppel toppel plainly applies. is a legal question subject to de novo review on appeal. As scope of estoppel, Sex tant contends Cybor, Analog’s accused 1459-60, F.3d at de 46 USPQ2d vices differ too (citations substantially omitted). from the 1177-78 de vice disclosed Rudolf history estoppel to preclude 1. The conclusion Marcillat Patent that Analog infringes the Marcillat Sextant makes several arguments under the doctrine equivalents. Our concerning the district court’s alleged case law recognizes that scope pros “misapplication” of the law of prosecution ecution history estoppel “may have a limit history estoppel following the Supreme ing effect within a spectrum ranging from Court’s decision in Warner-Jenkinson Co. great to small to zero. The effect may or v. Hilton Co., Davis Chemical 520 U.S. may not be application fatal to aof range 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 of equivalents broad enough to encompass USPQ2d (1997). have We considered particular product.” accused Hughes these arguments, but find them unpersua States, Co. United 717 F.2d Aircraft sive. Again, we focus exclusively on the 1351, 1363, USPQ 473, (Fed.Cir. “metallization” limitation because it is dis- 1983). scope ie., of estoppel, what positive. subject matter been surrendered dur We recently stated ing prosecution by the patentee, is to

827 prior that the art of a reason Case law has established point vantage from viewed provide history estoppel see patentee, prosecution of competitor able Co., oriented” limitations independent “policy 8 F.3d Steel Jessop Int'l v. Haynes (Fed. See 1652, of Loctite equivalents. 1656 on the doctrine 1573, 1578, USPQ2d 28 Ltd., 861, 870, 781 F.2d 1076, Corp. 29 Cir.1993), rehearing, 15 F.3d Ultraseal on (Fed.Cir.1985), 90, overruled (Fed.Cir.1994), USPQ and is deter USPQ2d 1958 AB v. grounds by Nobelpharma art and on other prior reference to the mined with Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d Implant made arguments any amendments and/or (en banc); (Fed.Cir.1998) art, USPQ2d 1097 see 46 distinguish to such attempt in an Int'l, Jessop Inc. v. Steel Kogyo Haynes see also Kinzoku Corp. Festo v. Shoketsu 1573, 1579, Co., USPQ2d Co., 857, 864, 8 F.3d 72 F.3d Kabushiki (Fed.Cir.1993), (Fed.Cir.1995), rehearing, 15 vacat 1656-57 USPQ2d (Fed.Cir. USPQ2d 117 F.3d grounds, 520 U.S. ed on other 1994). (1997). Therefore, the fact that Sextant is 1240, 137L.Ed.2d 323 S.Ct. art is not fatal to practicing prior not Here, estopped clear that Sextant is it is history prosecution of es- application Analog’s that successfully asserting toppel. equiv- silicon are employing doped devices claims. “metallization” of the alent to the Patent 2. The Boura above, Marcillat’s “metallization” As noted that the district court Sextant contends response in limitation was added histo- to hold that had no basis Rudolf, which of dis- examiner’s citation range to limit the ry applies estoppel In addi- doped use of silicon. closed the affordable to the otherwise equivalents amendment, argued Marcillat tion to the in the claims term “metallization” Ru- distinguishable over that its claim was Boura, arguments two in and it makes “com- capacitor plate Rudolfs dolf because contention. Sextant first support of that heavily monocrystalline silicon prise[d] 1 to that Boura amended claim argues ... without metalliza- doped with boron re- the examiner’s indefiniteness overcome effect App. Joint at A2224. The tions.” ¶ 112, 2, § jection under 35 U.S.C. argument of Marcillat’s amendment and re- “principle as the Sextant characterizes clearly silicon materials was to surrender time. Sextant jection” pending by doping. Analog’s made conductive opinion in Supreme Court’s War- cites within devices thus fall doped-polysilicon support its contention to ner-Jenkinson therefore do estoppel scope response made in amendments under the infringe patent the Marcillat not give prose- not rise to rejections § 112 do Accordingly, the equivalents. doctrine next ar- history estoppel. Sextant cution granting judg- not err in court did district “incorporat- the court erred gues that law on as a matter of Analog ment history of Marcillat into the file ing” Analog infringed the claim that Sextant’s Boura, thereby raising history of file the doctrine Marcillat under present that was estoppel equivalents. ac- that such contends Marcillat. Sextant ap- that the court’s argues Sextant next applica- the two because improper tion was history estoppel plication related, and there- formally not tions were as to “demonstratively erroneous desiring competitor a reasonable fore Analog scope apparent because it is not Boura would scope the claim assess art.” prior the surrendered practicing history of Marcillat. file investigate the at 39. We dis- Brief Opening Sextant’s Court in War Supreme agree. practicing If Analog were prosecu whether held art, defense complete it ner-Jenkinson would have had applied to limit the estoppel charge, infringement Sextant’s depended on the equivalents be irrelevant. doctrine prosecution history would *11 828 reason in the prosecution disclosed 1051, history 137 146, L.Ed.2d USPQ2d 41 at

for the amendment to the claims. See 1873.4 Warner-Jenkinson, 30, 520 U.S. at 117 The Court did not resolve the issue 1049, 137 at 146, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d USPQ2d 41 whether an amendment made response at 1871 (“petitioner reaches too far in ar § to a rejection 112 is an amendment made guing that the reason for an amendment for “reasons of patentability” that gives during patent prosecution is irrelevant to rise history estoppel. See any subsequent estoppel.”). If the claims Bai, 1355, 160 F.3d at USPQ2d 48 at 1678 were for amended a reason “related to (noting that the “meaning of the word patentability,” prosecution history estoppel ‘patentability’ was not made [by clear applies. See 520 29-35, U.S. at 117 S.Ct. Supreme Court in Wamer-Jenkinson], 1049-51, at 146, 137 USPQ2d L.Ed.2d 41 but the context of the court’s discussion Bai, 1871-73; 160 1355, F.3d at 48 was patentability art.”); over the prior USPQ2d at 1677. hand, On the other Litton, if 140 1457, F.3d at USPQ2d 46 “ the claims were amended for a reason that 1327 (noting that ‘related to patentability’ was not “related patentability,” prosecu encompassed amendments ‘made to avoid tion history estoppel does not ”). apply prior absent art.’ a “clear and unmistakable surrender” of On hand, the one it is clear patent subject certain matter. See Warner-Jen applicant must comply §with 112 in order kinson, 31-33, 520 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. at to obtain a patent; failure to meet the 1050, 146, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 USPQ2d at requirements of that section results 1872; Sys., Litton Inc., Inc. v. Honeywell, patent, denial of a and a basis for denial of 1449, 140 1458, 46 USPQ2d 1321, a patent is a form of “patentability” re- (Fed.Cir.1998).3 1327 Finally, if patent quirement. hand, On the other prosecution record does not disclose the statute uses the title “Conditions pat- for amendment, for an a court must entability” as the heading for the novelty presume that the amendment was made and nonobviousness provisions, see 35 for purposes of patentability pros and that 102, §§ 103, U.S.C. § whereas 112 only ecution history estoppel applies, and pro refers to the requirements of specifica- vide the patentee with an opportunity to tion. See also and compare 35 U.S.C. ch. rebut that presumption. See 10, Warner-Jen §§ (1994) (entitled 101-105 “Patentabil- kinson, 520 33-35, U.S. at Inventions”) 117 S.Ct. at ity of with 11, id. ch. §§ 111— addition, earlier, 3.In as we Litton, have stated 1458, USPQ2d 140 F.3d at 46 at 1327. arguments [E]ven during made 4.The claim at issue in Wamer-Jenkinson was without amendments to language claim —if rejected over prior art that disclosed an ul- sufficient to evince a clear and unmistak process trafiltration operating at pHa above able subject surrender of may es- matter — 9.0. response, the applicant amended his top an applicant recapturing that sur encompass processes claim operating “at a rendered matter under the doctrine of pH from approximately Thus, 6.0 to 9.0.’’ equivalents. Hoganas See AB v. Dresser In while the 9.0 limitation clearly was added to dus., Inc., 948, 952, USPQ2d 9 F.3d 28 art, distinguish prior "reason add (Fed.Cir. 1993). 1939 Estoppel by ing the lower limit of 6.0[was] unclear.” clear and unmistakable surrender without Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 117 S.Ct. at may amendments arise even when USPQ2d 137 L.Ed.2d at 1872. arguments were examiner not The Court thus concluded that prosecu while necessary to distinguish prior art. Texas estoppel did necessarily apply not Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade to the 6.0 limitation because it "was not relat Comm’n, 1165, 1174-75, 988 F.2d art,” avoiding ed to the court creat USPQ2d 1018, (Fed.Cir. 1993). This ed a rebuttable presumption that the 6.0 limi principle presupposes that the applicant tation had been added for a reason "related has made the surrender unmistakable patentability.” 31-35, See 520 U.S. at enough that public may reasonably rely 1050-51, S.Ct. at 137 L.Ed.2d on it. USPQ2d at 1872-73. limitation Patent”); kinson, of this addition (entitled for a “Application *12 rejec- (3) the art 282(2) necessary to overcome (drawing a distinction § & id. that was at “any pending on Deval ground on based invalidity based tion between the Limiting of this of the time amendment. part [§§ 100-212] in II the specified ” capacitor plates and to com- of Boura patentability a claims title as condition for of have any requirement “metallizations” could not with comply to prising “failure title.”) (empha- because Deval distinguished or 251 of this over Deval sections 112 added). Thus, on arguments are “It arrangement: there exact is this sis disclosed on capacitor of the issue. form electrodes necessary both sides to pendulum of 11 and confronting faces the event, need not resolve any In we (if All insulating). the latter is stator 10 to necessary it is not issue because this as a thin may be formed metal electrodes the Although neither this case. resolve by be obtained layer may The layer. emphasized nor the district parties deposition and under vacuum evaporation was § in Boura rejection that the 2, ’474 col. 11. example.” patent, Deval rejection § over the with a combined added). Furthermore, (emphasis 41-45 fact, reference, and that the was Deval not Boura did at- surprisingly, not that Boura amended contention Sextant’s that the claims were dis- tempt argue to rejection, § 112 “overcome a his to claims the basis from Deval on of tinguishable Reply Sextant’s rejection,” § 103 not a “metallization” in inclusion of the term the the by prosecution belied Brief at is argued his the claims. Boura instead First, the “metalli- of history. the addition distinguishable amended was claim as responsive was not limitation zation” the location on the basis of of from Deval ¶ cannot rejection § examiner’s metallization, i.e., Deval because dis- the for purposes added be said to have been formed on the capacity electrodes closed language. clarity precision or structure, the claim while as sides by accompanied rejection § 112 edge-wise configura- claimed an amended the examiner: following remarks from the (“In A2310 con- Joint App. tion. See improve be an appear to 1 would “Claim sensor, [De- the Applicant’s with [ ] trast claim, what it is not clear but type ment body the test electrodes of capacity val’s] is. See 37 C.F.R. improvement layer of metal which formed a thin are 1.75(e). terminology should § Consistent body of this test the two sides covers line 2 recites example, be For used. metallizations consist [sic] not in does structure,’ lines 7-8 re whereas ‘pendular of this portions test edge formed line ‘re element.’ ‘pendular cite Thus, his- prosecution while the body.”). App. Joint —return—.” call’ should for the addition tory discloses reason Second, accom remarks Boura’s A2301. limitation, it does not dis- “edge” were directed his amendment panying the term “metalliza- the reason that close Deval, albeit over the claims distinguishing Boura. the claims of added to tion” was to the “metalliza relevant respects not must, we under Wamer-Jen- Accordingly, Thus, present not limitation. we tion” kinson, that this limi- rebuttably presume an applicant the situation which ed with “related a reason was added for tation purpose his claims for has amended prosecution and that patentability” ¶ Cf. rejection. §a overcoming range to limit applies estoppel USPQ2d at Litton, 140 F.3d at be af- otherwise might equivalents 1329-30. limitation. “metallization” fordable the situation Instead, this case involves presump- has not rebutted history of Boura noted, it is Sex- already As we have for the addi tion. reason not disclose the does amended his contention limitation. tant’s “metallization” rejection, §a to overcome in Warner-Jen- pH Like 6.0 limitation opines prosecution. which Sextant is not “relat- ent The court then would However, we patentability.” ed to have decide whether that reason sufficient already dismissed this as un- contention history estoppel to overcome prosecution supported by and even contrary to a bar to application the doctrine history. Because Sextant has equivalents element added that Boura established did not amend amendment. no explanation Where his patent- claims for reasons unrelated to established, however, the court should *13 ability, we conclude that the presumption presume that the PTO had a substantial prosecution has not been rebutted and that patentability related to for in- history applies to estoppel the “metalliza- cluding limiting the element added tion” limitation.5 circumstances, amendment. In those prosecution history estoppel would bar Having concluded application the the doctrine equiva- history of estoppel applies operation under of lents to presump- that element. The the Wamer-Jenkinson we presumption, described, subject tion we have one to question scope left with the of the of if appropriate rebuttal an reason for a Bai, that estoppel. See 160 at F.3d required established, is amendment (after USPQ2d 48 at a 1677 court finds gives proper deference to the role of history that prosecution estoppel applies, defining pro- claims in an invention and “only the question scope notice, remains.”). viding public to primacy the estoppel Because none of our of the PTO ensuring cases that the prior to the instant claims applied case has only subject the allowed cover presumption matter that Wamer-Jenkinson or ad any patentable of scope estoppel properly proffered dressed the arising pat- a therefrom, we Supreme application. fashion, consult the Court’s ent Applied in this discussion of presumption guid for prosecution history estoppel places rea- ance: sonable limits the doctrine of equiva- lents, however,

We and further problem, are left with the insulates the doctrine of any what to do a from feared case like the one at conflict with the Patent bar, where the record seems not to re- Act.

veal the reason for including the lower Warner-Jenkinson, 33-34, 520 U.S. at 117 pH view, limit of holding 6.0. In our 1051, 137 S.Ct. at USPQ2d L.Ed.2d 41 that certain reasons for a claim amend- added). at (emphasis 1873 ment may the application prose- avoid of Our cution cases have history addressed estoppel meaning is not tanta- to mount to to holding that the a attributed absence of Court’s statement history reason for an may similarly amendment estoppel “bars” any avoid equivalency such an with estoppel. respect to the limita- Mindful claims do tion. generally indeed serve both a See Sys., Litton Inc. v. defini- Inc., Honeywell, tional and a function, notice we think 145 F.3d 47 (denial the better place USPQ2d (Fed.Cir.1998) rule is to the burden on 1106 the patent-holder banc) to establish suggestion the reason for rehearing en (Plager, an required during amendment pat- Clevenger, JJ., Gajarsa, dissenting); for 5: concerning Our inability decision Sextant's patentee allow a opportunity to rebut the to operation rebut the operation of the Wamer-Jenkin- presumption. Remand is fully son presumption upon rests a developed especially necessary when this court deter- consistently record in which Sextant has mines for the presumption first time that the maintained that applicable its amendments were made patentee and the had a for purpose traversing rejec- § develop 112 concerning to chance the record argument tion—an we have found un- reason for amendment at issue. Because persuasive. However, recognize that it fully respect we Sextant has been heard with to may be necessary argument, circumstances for § in other its we see no reason for this court to to the district court remand remand here. application bar the States, estoppel would v. United Hughes Co. Aircraft to that element.” equivalents as (Fed.Cir.1998) doctrine 1384, USPQ2d 1542 F.3d Warner-Jenkinson, 33, 117 520 U.S. at en rehearing (denial for of suggestion 1051, 137 USPQ2d JJ., at L.Ed.2d S.Ct. banc) dissent Gajarsa, (Clevenger and added). language This (emphasis at 1873 not with Litton, dealing case ing). foregoing the Court in its not used but was presumption the Wamer-Jenkinson n with effect of amendments rea discussion clearly made an amendment pat- for reasons “related clearly made rejected we patentability, sons related ie., of distin purpose for the entability,” “any argument infringer’s the accused See art. over the guishing during prosecu language amended 1456-58, USPQ2d at Litton, 140 F.3d patentability related to reasons tion for prosecu (rejecting the notion that Litton, 140 1326-27 range equivalents.” has no an amendment arising (empha 1456, USPQ2d at 1326 related patentability for reasons added). Su made reasoned that sis We *14 of doctrine of the application the “bars” “to endeavored Court had preme limitation). as amended equivalents the rules of substantially the so change the Instead, to was confined language that estoppel, of scope the concerning game” presump the (brackets operation of of the discussion 1457, USPQ2d at at 46 1326 id. tion, only operative it is that suggesting omitted), Supreme and that quotations and that circumstance. Wamer-Jenkin- predating case Court law in the scope concept of the son embraced is of Wamer-Jenkinson reading This pri- avoid made to of context amendments poli the of by consideration strengthened 1457, at 1326 art, USPQ2d 46 or see id. in that to desired foster that the Court cies Northwest Driller Co. v. Keystone (citing rationale for the Court’s to case. Central 42, 47-48, S.Ct. 55 Corp., U.S. Eng’g 294 that idea the creating presumption the (1935) Smith 262, 747 and 79 L.Ed. a definitional ... serve both “claims 784, Club, U.S. 282 Magic City Kennel public the and that notice public function” (1931)). 788-790, 707 75 L.Ed. 51 S.Ct. scope of the literal to assess be able should made Thus, amendments we concluded for of claim extension and effective patentability to related for reasons equivalents of under the doctrine scope Supreme of the reading careful “[a] certainty. See Warner with reasonable that War in context shows opinion Court’s 33-35, S.Ct. at -Jenkinson, 117 520 U.S. change in a did not effect ner-Jenkinson USPQ2d at 41 1051, 137 L.Ed.2d by precluded matter subject of scope the is notice” “public policy This 1873.6 in the only circumstances estoppel, an but in the circumstance heavily implicated Id., 140 estoppel.” an may trigger be operative is presumption the which 1449, USPQ2d at 1327. 46 definition, to one cause, it is unclear why par a history prosecution reading the reading However, similarly careful a According was made. ticular amendment announced Supreme Court shows the Court, through operation ly, the applied scope different rule the burden presumption, placed The Court’s arises. a presumption when pat- clarify his reasons. patentee “In circum- unequivocal: those language thereby clarify and failure to so [i.e., entee’s the Warner-Jenkinson when stances not work should presumption rebut history applies], presumption own, Warner-Jenkinson, of its unbounded a life U.S. at 28- 6. See also denying that the 1048-49, 29, USPQ2d can be no There 137 L.Ed.2d claims. S.Ct. at broadly, (“We applied equivalents, ... share the concern when at 1871 doctrine equivalents, public-no- as it ... that the doctrine with the definitional conflicts Mfg. Graver Tank claiming require- [& since applied come to be statutory function tice Co., U.S. ment.”). v. Linde Products Co. Air (1950)] has taken on S.Ct. 94 L.Ed. the detriment of public by allowing an amendment is unclear from an analysis of range uncertain of equivalency to remain the prosecution history record, and unre- as to the limitation at issue. butted by the patentee, the prosecution history estoppel arising Moreover, therefrom is and as a practical total mat ter, completely anyone “bars” the desiring to application assess possible scope of doctrine of equivalents estoppel arising oper ation of amended limitation. Wamer-Jenkinson The district presump thus faces correctly difficult task. As we rendered judgment noted previously in Analog our was not discussion of liable to the Marcil- Sextant under the lat patent, the doctrine scope of equivalents because Sextant estoppel has traditionally could not been show determined equivalency to the “metalli- with reference to the prior zation” art and any limitation.7 Because this estoppel amendments arguments and/or made bars in an infringement under the doctrine of attempt to distinguish such art. See page equivalents, it is unnecessary for us to 15, supra. However, in the circumstance address the scope any other possible presumption is operative, be estoppels applicable to Boura. cause the record is unclear concerning the We have considered the parties’ remain- for an amendment, it unlikely ing arguments, but find them that the either with- art or patentee’s argu out merit or ments, unnecessary to if resolve any, given will be of assistance in an *15 our disposition of the estoppel case. analysis. The lack of relevant information concerning the scope of sur

rendered subject matter is further exacer CONCLUSION bated if the patentee does provide not clarification during rebuttal. Indeed, The district this court did not err in its is case an example of the futility of a scope construction of the “metallization” limita- analysis in the tion, circumstance which the which appears in the claims of both presumption is operative. Unguided by the Marcillat and Boura patents. The the prosecution history, the prior art, ap court did not err in granting summary plicant’s argument during prosecution, and judgment that Analog’s devices do not lit- sufficient evidence in rebuttal to the pre erally infringe the claims of either of these sumption, we have no way to set reason patents. Moreover, the court did not err able limits on how far beyond the literal in concluding that prosecution history es- scope of the term “metallization” the es- toppel precluded Sextant from asserting toppel will allow the doctrine equiva that Analog’s use of doped silicon is equiv- lents to reach. We can expect reasonable alent to the “metallization” limitation of competitors assessing the file history of the Marcillat claims. Finally, the court’s Boura to be equally puzzled as to the scope judgment that Analog does not infringe of any potential estoppel. Thus, it is logi under the doctrine of equivalents is af- cal and fair that prosecution history estop- firmed because the unrebutted operation pel arising from the operation of the War of the Wamer-Jenkinson presumption ner-Jenkinson presumption allows the concerning the “metallization” limitation doctrine of equivalents no room to operate. bars the operation of the doctrine of equiv- Finding the Supreme Court’s language alents as to that element. The judgment clear, we hold that circumstances in of the district court is therefore which the Wamer-Jenkinson presumption is applicable, ie., where the reason for an AFFIRMED.

7. Because we affirm the district court on a "incorporating” the Marcillat file history into rationale, different we need not reach Sex- the Boura file history. tant's argument the that district court erred in Boura limitation. ing “metallization” the Judge, SMITH, Circuit Senior invention newly claimed the distinguished part. dissenting as fol- reference Deval of the that from analysis majority’s the with agree I Applicant’s the [ ] with “In contrast lows: and I construction court’s the district capacity the sensor, patent, cited in this properly district the that agree aby body are formed test electrodes Analog’s that summary judgment granted the two covers metal which layer of thin literally infringe the not did device not consist does body and of this test sides I patents. Boura or the Marcillat of either edge portions on formed in metallizations Sextant majority that the with agree also different quite is ... This body. estopped these in which sensor Applicant’s from asserting that from patent the Marcillat edge on formed electrodes capacity of that the claims infringes Analog’s device (emphasis part” flat fixed portions of equivalents. the doctrine under patent added). however, majority’s dissent, from I clear that it makes passage quoted The pre- Wamer-Jenkinson holding limitation the “metallization” added Boura relying on estops sumption with, and invention his to contrast in order respect with equivalents the doctrine by De- from, disclosed it distinguish patent. se per val, by requiring metallizations not metallizations that the by requiring but Opinion Majority The on not body test edge court’s the district affirms majority Therefore, shows record side.1 the Boura summary judgment was added limitation “metallization” the doctrine infringed under not to patentability reasons related for following reason- on the based equivalents should presumption Wamer-Jenkinson (1) disclose the not Boura did ing. apply. limitation “metallization” adding the that Boura acknowledges Wamer-Jenkinson, *16 majority therefore, under “metallization-on-the-edge” limi- the was added that the limitation presume must we De- rejection over to a response tation patentability. to related for reasons added parts: two into val, the limitation splits but presump- (2) not rebutted Since “on-the-edge.” “metallization” Therefore, (3) the Wamer-Jenkin- tion. from formed capacitors discloses Deval applica- and the applies presumption son reasons, that metallizations, majority the is equivalents the doctrine tion of have been could limitation part “metalliza- barred, equivalents so no the invention distinguish to in order added patent’s Boura by the are covered tions” does record the art. Since prior the from claims. adding any other not disclose the Wamer-Jenkinson disagree I limitation, majority “metallization” The Boura here. applies presumption presump- the Wamer-Jenkinson applies the rea- clearly shows unrebutted, applica- and bars tion, it finds was add- limitation “metallization” son equivalents. of the doctrine from invention his distinguished ed: the Wamer-Jenkin- applying cases Our by requiring art prior the Deval such support do not presumption son edge, not on the metallizations that the For limitations. of claim parsing delicate the first response his In the side. v. & of Bai L case recent in the example, re- original, replaced action, Boura (cid:127)Office (Fed.Cir. Inc., F.3d 1350 Wings, L contain- claim 10 with new claim 1 jected parallel while "side” ter wafer precisely clear it make record does-not 1. The clear record Regardless, the body plane. test a "side” distinguishes what to distin- order added per- the limitation "edge” is an Perhaps "edge.” from guish reference. the Deval accelerome- flat plane pendicular to the 1998),we held that the Wamer-Jenkinson ing prosecution in support of patentabili- presumption did not Bai, apply. ty, whether or not actually required to applicant claimed a target game including allowance, secure may create an estop- a fabric-covered, dish-shaped glove. Origi- pel.”). nal claims 1-3 rejected were over a combi- The majority case, in this by contrast, nation prior of four patents, art including reasons that because the “metallization” (Hartel) one that disclosed a dish-shaped limitation was disclosed in the art, prior it structure. In response, Bai amended could not have been necessary to distin claim 1 to include all the limitations of guish Boura’s invention and therefore was original 1-3, along with two addi- not added for a reason related to patenta- tional limitations: that glove be “hemi- bility. The Bai court rejected the very spherical” and that it include a “strap logic on by relied the majority in this case. mounted on the rear side.” Id. at 1352 Panel decisions are binding on future and n. 1. The amended claim was allowed. cases, unless overturned the court en The district court concluded that Bai banc. See UMC Elees. Co. v. United had added the “hemispherical” limitation States, 816 (Fed.Cir. 652 n. 6 in response to the obviousness rejection, 1987) (“A panel of this court is bound by despite Bai’s argument that the prior limitation precedential decisions unless and un was added merely to clarify the claimed til banc.”). overturned en The majority’s structure and not to distinguish over approach today is foreclosed Bai.2 prior art. Id. at 1354. On appeal, As a colleague so eloquently stated, agreed we that the amendment “was clear- require “[w]e practitioners who appear be ly an attempt by Bai to differentiate his fore this court to apply rigorous logic and invention over the patent.” Hartel Id. at consistency in their advocacy; we should 1355. require no less of ourselves whenever we We reached this conclusion despite providing directions to the bar.” Lit fact that Bai had added the ton Systems, “strap” limi- Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 tation at the same time F.3d 1472, as the “hemi- 1478 (Fed.Cir.1998) (Gajarsa, spherical” J., limitation. The dissenting Bai denial of rehearing en never banc). considered whether The inconsistency “hemi- engendered by spherical” limitation the majority’s was necessary approach in this case does a distinguish disservice art view of the development juris our simultaneous prudence. “strap” limitation, and in *17 fact rejected Bai’s argument that “the In addition, I am uneasy with applica- amendment could not have been made to tion of the Wamer-Jenkinson presump- overcome prior art because it was not tion for the first time on appeal, because I necessary to overcome the prior art re- do not believe that Sextant has had an jection.” Id. at 1356. The Bai court adequate opportunity to rebut the pre- held that Bai was estopped from raising sumption. This court should not lightly the issue of the necessity of the “hemi- conclude that the record presents no rea- spherical” limitation. “Whether or not son for a claim amendment, long after the the ‘hemispherical’ limitation was super- parties have exhausted their opportunities fluous, the prosecution record clearly re- to present evidence and arguments. This veals that Bai made this amendment to is especially so when that conclusion re- overcome prior Id., art.” citing Ameri- quires the court to limit patent to claims can Permahedge Barcana, v. 105 F.3d their literal Here, terms. the district (“[C]lear assertions made dur- court concluded that the record did in fact 2. The majority's approach is also Hughes inconsistent States, Co. v. United Aircraft F.3d Techs., with Inc. v. Cat (Fed.Cir. Insituform Contract- 1998). Inc., ing, 161 F.3d 688 (Fed.Cir.1998) and Boura to the applied history prosecution amendment for the the establish the Marcillat claims, though even patent’s allow- quick secure patent the Boura —“to not related were applications Boura and to avoid and application Boura the of ance no shared and or division continuation Marcillat’s during raised objections the Boura inventors, the because common Thus, the patent.” of his prosecution to correspond the to amended were claims the Wamer-Jenkin- applied never court the after the claims of Marcillat language, patent’s Boura the to presumption son allowable. indicated claims were Marcillat with Sextant presented never and claims timing of the the found that court The the apply To it.3 to rebut opportunity an claim similarity of the and the amendment court, the with this first in presumption the Boura added that indicated language doctrine the barring completely effect of the allowance quick “to secure terms adds litigants to is unfair equivalents, objec- the to avoid application Boura litigation. of unpredictability to the prosecution Marcillat’s during raised tions have to on, will litigants this point From concluded court The patent.” of his pre- the Wamer-Jenkinson worry about prosecution patent’s Marcillat the time the first for applied being sumption respect with estoppel an created being limited their appeal, on claims. patent’s Boura dis- terms, court because literal their “[a]s recently confirmed haveWe reason a on court the trial with agrees deter for standard proposition, basic development This amended. was claim been has subject matter mining whether anyone. be welcomed cannot ordinary one is whether relinquished applying propriety Regardless conclude objectively the art would skill presumption the Wamer-Jenkinson appli history that prosecution presumption appeal, the on time the first Inc. Systems, Litton it.” surrendered cant case, since in this apply not even should 1449, 1462 Inc., 140 F.3d Honeywell, v. history shows Corp. Mktg. I (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Mark (on not the edge, “metallization Co., 66 F.3d Donnelley Sons& v. R.R. distinguish side)” added was limitation Desper (Fed.Cir.1995)). also See Deval from the accelerometer claimed Inc., Labs, Products, QSound v. Inc. does presumption Since (“In reference. (Fed.Cir.1998) deter 1325, 1338 F.3d no burden apply, there subject what, any, if scope mining application no it and bar surrendered, rebut the standard been has matter equivalents. reason would a doctrine what one: objective is an reading the competitor able Opinion Court’s District surrendered.”); been history conclude Elecs. Labs., Mitsubishi Inc. court’s Wang district disagree with also I (Fed. 1571, 1578 Inc., America, The dis- patent. the Boura treatment the statements Cir.1997) (“We examine patent’s the Marcillat held that trict the reasons remand, consider pel, it must although that a majority states 3. The added, Warner-Jen see cases, were limitations called for here is not necessary some *18 and kinson, S.Ct. explain U.S. at a chance had Sextant has because opportunity limitation. give parties "metallization” the the for must therefore the us to However, explaining for sufficient arguments this record and if evidence to submit Thus, for presumption the Wamer-Jenkinson limitations. the claim apply reasons the to envision hard it is appeal, time on applies first the court the which this every case in be In sufficient. not it would a case which patentee presumption, Warner-Jenkinson the doctrine to consider for this order opportunity the same had least have will history estoppel, prosecution and equivalents "rebut” case in this Sextant had issues. See those decide court must trial litigants should Future presumption. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. Wulff, U.S. Singleton v. implication majority’s by the fooled (1976). order for 49 L.Ed.2d differently than treated they bewill of doctrine issues to decide trial court today. history estop- and equivalents and actions of patentee before the PTO during prosecution ask what a compet- SEAL-FLEX, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

itor reasonably may conclude patentee surrendered to gain issuance of pat- (citation omitted)). ent.” ATHLETIC TRACK AND COURT We have a found basis for prosecution CONSTRUCTION, Defendant- history estoppel in statements made by Appellant, patent applicants in variety of contexts during prosecution. See, e.g., Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessop Co., Steel (Fed.Cir.1993) Owen E. Perry, and cases cited there- Sanctioned in. But we have never Party-Appellant. based finding of prosecution history estoppel on a state- 97-1432, Nos. 97-1504 and 98-1045. ment made applicant during different prosecution of an unrelated application, United States Court of Appeals, nor have we ever hinted that competitors Federal Circuit. should examine the file histories of applica- tions other than the one suit in order to April 1999. determine the scope of equivalents that may be accorded the patentee. The dis-

trict court’s importation of the Marcillat

patent’s prosecution history into the Boura

patent was erroneous and should be re-

versed.

Conclusion The district court’s holding that

prosecution history of the Marcillat patent

estops Sextant from asserting the doctrine

of equivalents in the Boura patent is con-

trary to precedent our and should be re-

versed. In addition, the majority’s holding part “metallization” of Boura’s “metallization-on-the-edge” limitation is subject to the Wamer-Jenkinson pre- sumption is contrary our precedent

to the facts of this case. I would reverse

the district holding court’s with respect to

the Boura patent and remand for further

proceedings to determine whether Ana-

log’s device infringes the claims of the

Boura patent under the doctrine of equiva-

lents, as equivalents those limited the Boura pat- ent and our controlling precedents. I

therefore dissent from that part of the

panel’s disposition of this case.

Case Details

Case Name: Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., Defendant-Cross-Appellant
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: Feb 26, 1999
Citation: 172 F.3d 817
Docket Number: 98-1063, 98-1077
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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