23 Ga. App. 765 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1919
Mrs. Sarah A. Sewell prosecuted the defendant, her son, for larceny after trust. The indictment contained nine counts. The defendant demurred to it on general and special grounds, the demurrer was overruled, and exceptions pendente lite were filed. Upon the trial a general verdict of guilty was returned. A motion for a new trial was made, to the overruling of which the defendant excepted.
The evidence shows that the prosecutrix was a widow, that she could not write her name or read writing, and that the defendant was a married man, a dentist by profession, and his mother’s favorite son. While in some respects the evidence is conflicting, we think the jury were authorized to find that Mrs. Sewell had, in the county of Franklin, at various times before the indictment was found, entrusted the defendant with the notes and the various amounts of money as charged in the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 8th, and 9th, counts of the indictment, for the purpose of collecting the notes and applying the proceeds and the various sums of money for her use and benefit. It is true that the evidence shows that most, if not all, of this money was collected by the defendant in 1912, and deposited to his mother’s credit in a bank at Lavonia, Georgia, in the same year, and that all of it was drawn out by
In our opinion the evidence sufficiently showed that the ofEenses
The special grounds of the motion for a new trial are merely amplifications of the general grounds, and, except that the allegations in the 5th, 6th, and 7th counts of the indictment were not supported by any evidence, the general verdict of guilty was aúthorized. Inasmuch, however, as the charges in those- counts were unsupported by any evidence, the general verdict of guilty was unauthorized and must be set aside. The indictment contained nine counts, and the 5th, 6th, and 7th counts charged that the defendant had been entrusted with certain specific sums of money which he unlawfully converted to his own use. These specific amounts of money were not mentioned in any of the other counts of the indictment, and these three counts charged separate and distinet offenses from those charged in the other counts. The general verdict of guilty, in law, meant guilty under each and every count of the indictment; and the court, therefore, erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. See, in this connection, Tooke v. State, 4 Ga. App. 495 (61 S. E. 917); Hall v. State, 8 Ga. App. 747, 750 (70 S. E. 211); Innes v. State, supra.
Judgment reversed.