Aftеr a bench trial, Frank Sewell was convicted of driving while his license was suspended, a class A misdemeanor, for which he received a 182 day sentence and a $500 fine. On appeal, Sеwell raises two issues: 1
(1) Whether it was necessary for the State to prove that Sewell knew thаt he was driving while his license was suspended; and
(2) Whether the arresting officer, who observed Sewell operating a motor vehicle and knew that Sewell's license *1020 had been previously susрended, had sufficient cause to stop Sewell.
Affirmed.
The facts most favorable to the State show that on July 80, 1982, Officer Johnson of the Fort Wayne Police Department observed Sewell driving a motor vehicle on a public road in Fort Wayne. Knowing that Sewell's license had been рreviously suspended, Johnson stopped Sewell and asked if he had a driver's license, to whiсh Sewell replied, "No". Bureau of Motor Vehicle records showed that Sewell's license was suspended at that time.
Sewell first contends that this evidence is insufficient to support the сonviction because the State failed to introduce evidence that Sewell was аware that his driving privileges were, at that time, suspended. We disagree.
The crime of driving while one's license is suspended is one which is malum prohibitum; it is an offense only because it is prohibited by statute. "That which is merely malum prohibitum ... does not require intent and knowledge, unless specified by the prohibiting statute. . .." Gregory v. State (1973),
Sewell next complains that Johnson stopped him without reason, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Sewell argues that the traffic stop was unwarranted because Johnson did not believe Sewell had committed or was committing a moving violation; therefore, the admission into evi-
dence of Sewell's statement that- he had no license was error.
The standard by which Johnson's action must be measured is set forth in Delaware v. Prouse (1979),
"[Ejxcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobilе is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment...."
Officer Johnson explained his reason for stopping Sewell as follows:
"Wеll, the reason I stopped him is because he was involved in some of our previous investigаtions, and each time we get him for driving while suspended."
This reason is insufficient. Johnson stopped Sewell only because Sewell's license had been previously suspended. Johnson articulated no facts which would lead one to suspect that Sewell's license was suspended аt the time of the stop. Thus, Sewell's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was viоlated.
While we agree with Sewell's contention that his Fourth Amendment right was violated, the illegality оf a stop
"is of consequence only as it affects the admission of evidence obtained through a search incident to the arrest... It has no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused ...."
Scott v. State (1980), Ind.App.,
Johnson testified that he observed Sewell driving, and Bureau of Motor Vehi *1021 cle records were admitted into evidence showing that Sewell's license was suspended аt that time. This evidence alone is sufficient to convict Sewell of driving while his license was suspended. Sewell was not harmed by the admission of the conversation between himself and Johnson; therefore, its admission into evidence does not constitute reversible error.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Sewell also contends that a copy of his driving record was improperly admitted into evidence. Hоwever, Sewell cites no authority in support of this contention; therefore, it is waived. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7); Baker v. State (1982), Ind.,
. Ind.Code 1976, 9-1-4-52 reads, in pertinent part:
"Driving while license or permit suspended оr revoked unlawful.-(a) A person shall not operate a motor vehicle upon the рublic highways while his license or permit is suspended or revoked. A person who violates this subsection commits a class A misdemeanor."
(Burns Code Ed., 1982 Supp.).
. This Court's holding in Roberts is that criminal intent need not be provеd to obtain a conviction under IC 9-1-4-52. The discussion in that case of Roberts's role in frustrating the attempts of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to notify him of his license suspension is dictum.