{¶ 2} On June 14, 2001, Setzekorn entered into an employment contract with *2 appellant to work as a commissioned salesman.1 The term of the contract was one year with an automatic extension for an additional year unless either party to the contract provided written notice of its intent to not renew the contract. Appellant reserved the right to cancel the contract for any reason provided written notice was given to Setzekorn. There was also a clause which allowed amendments to the contract as needed. In addition, the contract contained a compensation clause which detailed Setzekorn's salary and commission plan. Various covenants, including a noncompete agreement, were also included in the contract.
{¶ 3} In July of 2001, Setzekorn attended a four-day, company-sponsored sales conference where he viewed a PowerPoint presentation concerning compensation which outlined a new compensation plan. The following January, Setzekorn discovered that he was not being paid commission according to the terms of his contract. Setzekorn voiced his concerns to the company and asked appellant to provide him with a written contract incorporating the new compensation terms. In May of 2002, Setzekorn's supervisor, Floyd Mays, (Mays) gave Setzekorn a written "Sales and Marketing Salary Plan" with an effective date of January 1, 2002 which summarized a new method of calculating commissions. On June 14, 2002 neither party gave any notice of intent not to renew the 2001 employment contract. Setzekorn continued to object to his commissions, and in November of 2002 he resigned.
{¶ 4} Setzekorn filed a breach of contract claim against appellant on January 7, 2005 asking for $34,289.95 in unpaid commissions and pre and post-judgment interest. In response, appellant argued that it cancelled Setzekorn's contract effective January 1, 2002 when the company "notified" its salesmen of the new compensation plan via the PowerPoint *3 presentation.
{¶ 5} A bench trial was conducted before the magistrate, who entered judgment in favor of Setzekorn. The magistrate found that appellant never cancelled the contract as it failed to provide Setzekorn with written notice. The magistrate also determined that appellant never entered into a new contract with Setzekorn and only attempted an amendment of the old contract. Appellant filed objections to the magistrate's decision arguing Setzekorn had both actual and written notice of contract cancellation.2 The trial court overruled both objections and adopted the magistrate's decision in its entirety. Appellant filed this appeal raising two assignments of error.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADOPTED THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION BY IGNORING MR. SETZEKORN'S ACTUAL NOTICE AND BY DETERMINING THAT THE POWER POINT PRESENTATION WAS NOT AN EFFECTIVE WRITING UNDER THE LAW."
{¶ 8} "Civ. R. 53(E)(3)(b) contemplates a de novo review of any issue of fact or law that a magistrate has determined when an appropriate objection is timely filed." Knauer v. Keener (2001),
{¶ 9} "In light of this discretion, a trial court's ruling on objections to a magistrate's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Id. "This standard requires more than a determination by the reviewing court that there was an error of judgment, but rather that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably." Id.
{¶ 10} In its first assignment of error, appellant argues that actual notice of contract cancellation satisfied the written notice requirement mandated by the contract. Alternatively, appellant argues that the PowerPoint presentation constituted written notice of the contract's cancellation. We find that there is no merit to either argument.
{¶ 11} A court's interpretation of a contract is solely to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties. Graham v. Drydock CoalCo.,
{¶ 12} While actual notice may be sufficient to cancel some contracts, it was inadequate to cancel the contract at issue in this case. The employment contract clearly stated that appellant had to provide Setzekorn with "written" notice of the cancellation of his *5 contract. This language is both plain and unambiguous and it expressly required appellant to present a writing to Setzekorn informing him of the contract's cancellation. Therefore, anything less than a written notification is insufficient notice.
{¶ 13} Appellant argues that the PowerPoint presentation complied with the written notice requirement to inform Setzekorn of the cancellation of his employment contract.3 While the contract did not specify exactly what words were needed to effect a cancellation, a reasonable expectation would be to provide some certainty or definiteness that a contract is being cancelled. See, e.g., Schwer v. Benefit Assn. of Ry.Employees, Inc. (1950),
{¶ 14} We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it adopted the magistrate's decision as the trial court determined that the magistrate's decision was "correctly reasoned" and "supported by the record." Appellant's first assignment of error is hereby overruled.
{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 16} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST *6 WITHOUT FIRST SETTING A DATE CERTAIN FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING."
{¶ 17} Appellant argues, in its second assignment of error, that the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 18} "Ordinarily, errors which arise during the course of a trial, which are not brought to the attention of the court by objection or otherwise, are waived and may not be raised upon appeal." Stores RealtyCo. v. City of Cleveland, Bd. of Bldg. Standards and Bldg. Appeals
(1975),
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's second assignment of error is hereby overruled.
{¶ 20} Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG and POWELL, JJ., concur.