Case Information
*2 Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and GARZA and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises out of an allision between the M/V CATHY M. SETTOON (the “CATHY”), a vessel owned by Settoon Towing, L.L.C. (“Settoon”), and an oil well. Settoon appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of New York Marine and General Insurance Company (“NYMAGIC”), Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”), and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) (together, the “umbrella insurers”), concluding the umbrella insurers are not liable to Settoon for damages resulting from the allision. State National Insurance Company (“SNIC”) cross-appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Settoon, finding SNIC liable to Settoon for damages and prejudgment interest resulting from the allision. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in all respects except for the calculation of prejudgment interest. We REVERSE and REMAND for calculation of рrejudgment interest in a manner consistent with this opinion.
I
On January, 20, 2007, the CATHY struck an oil well in Bayou Perot, Louisiana, causing damage to the wellhead and uncontrolled discharge of oil into the water. The captain of the CATHY did not report the allision to the United States Coast Guard or to Settoon. The next day, the captain of the M/V CHERYL SETTOON, another vessel owned by Settoon, saw the oil spill as it passed by the allision site and reported the spill to the Coast Guard and Settoon’s management. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation, and the captain of the CATHY initially denied involvement. When the Coast Guard confronted him with a reconstruction of the allision from the CATHY’s tracking system on February 23, 2007, thirty-four days after the allision, the captain of the CATHY admitted involvement. Settoon notified its insurers of the event on February 26, 2007, thirty-seven days after the allision.
Three insurance policies belonging to Settoon are at issue in this litigation, all of which provide excess insurance coverage over Settoon’s underlying primary policies. SNIC insures the first layer bumbershoot policy (“Bumbershoot 1”), which provides the first $4,000,000 of excess coverage. SNIC sent Settoon a binder for this policy on November 8, 2006, listing the underlying insurance policies and indicating the policy included a “Pollution Liability” endorsement. The binder included a “Conditions” section that stated, “Warranted copies of all underlying policies scheduled in item 5, received within 60 days of attachment.” We interpret this as a requirement that Settoon send SNIC the full texts of its underlying policies. The “Conditions” section also stated, “All coverages scheduled to remain in force for the entire term . . . .” The binder stated the insurance policy was effective from November 2, 2006 to November 2, 2007.
On December 13, 2006, SNIC contacted Settoon stating several items were needed to issue the policy, including copies of the underlying policies and the premium payment. On December 28, 2006, SNIC contacted Settoon stating SNIC received the premium payment but still required the underlying policies, among other items. On January 10, 2007, SNIC contacted Settoon again stating it required the underlying policies to issue the insurance policy. On January 23, 2007, three days after the allision, SNIC contacted Settoon again stating it needed the underlying policies to issue the insurance policy. On February 7, 2007, SNIC contacted Settoon again stating it needed the underlying policies to issue the policy. SNIC received all the underlying policies by March 1, 2007, and sent Settoon the Bumbershoot 1 policy on Mаrch 2, 2007.
Bumbershoot 1 begins by defining the general scope of the agreement in Section I-A, titled “Coverage.” In relevant part, the Coverage section reads:
The Policy shall indemnify the Insured . . . for the following . . . : 1) All Protection and Indemnity risks covered by the underlying Protection and Indemnity Insurance . . . .
2) . . . marine collision liabilities . . . .
3) All other sums which the Insured shall become legally liable to pay as damages on account of . . . b. property damage . . . .
Section III of Bumbershoot 1 is titled “Exclusions.” In relevant part, the Exclusions section reads: “This insurance does not apply to . . . xi. Any liability for, or any loss, damage, injury or expense caused by, resulting from or incurred by reason of: . . . f. pollution liability.” One of the endorsements attached to the policy is titled “Pollution Liability,” which reads:
This endorsement forms a part of the policy to which it is attached. . . .
Exclusion xi.f. “Pollution Liability” of this pоlicy shall not apply, however, provided that the Insured establishes that all of the following conditions have been met:
. . .
C) The discharge, dispersal, release or escape became known to the Insured within 72 hours after its commencement.
D) The discharge, dispersal, release or escape was reported in writing to these underwriters within 21 days after having become known to the Insured.
. . .
Coverage, if any, provided by the endorsement will: A) Apply only if such coverage is also provided in the underlying insurance(s) . . . .
. . .
Such coverage, however, shall only apply excess of valid and collectible underlying insurance.
All other terms and conditions remaining unaltered.
NYMAGIC insures the second bumbershoot policy (“Bumbershoot 2”), which provides $5,000,000 over Bumbershoot 1. The first section under the heading “Insuring Agreement” in Bumbershoot 2 is titled “Coverage” and reads in pertinent part:
This Policy is to indemnify thе “Assured” in respect of the following . . .
(a) All Protection and Indemnity risks. . . .
(b) . . . Collision . . . Liabilit[y] . . . .
(c) All other sums which the “Assured” shall become legally liable to pay . . . in respect of claims made against the “Assured” for damages . . . on account of . . . “Property Damage” . . . .
Under the heading “Exclusions” Bumbershoot 2 states:
This Policy Shall Not Apply: –
1. To any claim directly or indirectly in consequence of the actual or potential discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, petroleum products or derivatives, liquids or gases, waste materials, sewerage or other toxic chemicals, irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water.
Under the heading “Conditions” Bumbershoot 2 lists, among other conditions, the following:
9. NOTICE OF OCCURRENCE: Whenever the “Assured” has information from which the “Assured” may reasonably conclude that an “occurrence” covered hereunder involved injuries or damages which, in the event that the “Assured” should be held liable, is likely to involve this policy, notice shall be sent as soon as practicable to the Company, provided, however, that failure to notify the Company of any “occurrence” which at the time of its happening did not appear to involve this Policy, but which, at a later date, would appear to give rise to claims hereunder, shall not prejudice such claims.
Endorsement #8, attached to Bumbershoot 2 and titled “Follow-Form Pollution Endorsement (Sudden & Accidental Limitation),” further explains the pollution exclusion and provides a buyback. The endorsement states in relevant part:
I. ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
(A) In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby agreed that this policy shall not apply to any liability for . . . “property damage” . . . arising out of the . . . “release” of “pollutants” into . . . any watercourse, water supply, reservoir or body of water.
It is further agreed that the intent and effect of this exclusion is to delete from any and all coverage’s afforded by this policy any “occurrence”, claim, suit, cause of action, liability, settlement, judgement, defense costs or expenses in any way arising out of such “release” . . . .
. . .
II. SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL BUYBACK
(A) It is hereby agreed that the above Absolute Exclusion shall not apply provided that the Named Assured establishes that all of the following conditions have been met:
. . .
(4) The occurrence became known to the assured within 72 hours after its commencement.
(5) The occurrence was reported in writing to those underwriters within 30 days after having become known to the assured.
. . .
ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAINING UNCHANGED.
NYMAGIC, Federal, and St. Paul insure the third bumbershoot policy (“Bumbershoot 3”), which provides $40,000,000 over Bumbershoot 2. The second section under the heading “Excess Bumbershoot Liability” in Bumbershoot 3 is titled “Coverage” and reads in pertinent part:
The company hereby agrees, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, to indemnify the Assured in respect of the following:
A. All Protection and Indemnity risks of whatsoever nature covered by the underlying Bumbershoot policies.
B. . . . Collision Liabilities . . . .
C. All other sums which the Assured shall become legally liable to pay . . . in respect of claims made against the Assured for damages of whatsoever nature, on account of:
. . .
2) Property Damage . . . . The fourth section under the “Excess Bumbershoot Liability” heading is titled “Conditions” and lists, among other conditions, the following “Notice of Occurrence” condition:
Whenever the Assured has information from which the Assured may reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered hereunder involved injuries or damages which, in the event that the Assured should be held liable, is likely to involve this policy, notice shall be sent to the Company as soon as practicable, provided, however, that failure to notify the Company of any occurrence which at the time of its happening did not appear to involve this Policy, but which, at a later date, would appear to give rise to claims hereunder, shall not prejudice such claims.
Endorsement #8 attached to Bumbershoot 3 is exactly the same as Endorsement #8 attached to Bumbershoot 2, containing the same “ABSOLUTE POLLUTION EXCLUSION” and “SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL BUYBACK” provisions as reproduced in relevant part above.
The insurers sought a declaratory judgment that they are not liable for the losses arising out of the allision because Settoon did not meet the requirements in the endorsements, which would have provided the pollution liability excluded by the pollution exclusions. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The district court made three holdings: 1) the umbrella insurers are not liable on the Bumbershoot 2 and Bumbershoot 3 policies because Settoon did not comply with the 72-hour knowledge and 30-day notice provisions in the buybacks; 2) SNIC is liable on the Bumbershoot 1 policy because it delayed delivery of the policy to Settoon; and 3) SNIC is liable for prejudgment interest beginning on the date Settoon made judicial demand.
II
We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court.
Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany
,
We review interpretations of insurance policies de novo.
Old Republic Ins.
Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assocs., Inc.
,
III
Settoon asserts the umbrella insurers are liable despite Settoon’s failure to provide them notice within 30 days. To provide the pollution liability excluded by the pollution exсlusion, Bumbershoot 2 and Bumbershoot 3 require the following condition be met in the pollution endorsement: “(5) The occurrence was reported in writing to those underwriters within 30 days after having become known to the assured.” Settoon asserts its non-compliance with the 30- day notice provision is not cause for barring liability for three reasons: 1) the insurers must, but cannot, show they were prejudiced by the delay; 2) when the 30-day notice provision is read alongside the general “Notice of Occurrence” provision in the Bumbershoot 3 policy, it is clear that delays beyond 30 days are permitted when the insured does not immediately realize the occurrence gives rise to a claim; and 3) Louisiana’s doctrine of impossibility excuses Settoon’s failure to provide notice within 30 days. Settoon is mistaken on all three counts; the umbrella insurers are not liable because Settoon failed to provide notice within 30 days.
A
First, Settoon asserts the insurers are required to, but cannot, show
prejudice from the delay. The parties rely on Texas law a great deal in debating
whether the insurers must show prejudice resulting from the late notice. This
case arises under Louisiana law, so Texas law is informative but not controlling.
In interpreting Texas law, we have drawn a distinction between “occurrence”
policies, where “any notice requirement is subsidiary to the event that triggers
coverage,” and “claims-made” policies, where “notice itself constitutes the event
that triggers coverage,” in deciding whether the insurer is required to show
prejudice as a result of late notice.
See Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul
Surplus Lines Ins. Co.
,
Only one Louisiana case has addressed the interpretation of notice
provisions in exceptions to exclusions under Louisiana law, but then only
tangentially.
Smith v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Il.
,
In Louisiana, an insurer is not liable where a claims-made policy requires
notice within the policy period but notice is not given until after the policy
period.
Hood v. Cotter
, 5 So. 3d 819, 824–25, 830 (La. 2008). The notice
provision in the main body of the policy “provides the scope of coverage
bargained for by defendant.” . at 829;
see also Vitto v. Davis
,
In an earlier case interpreting Louisiana law, this circuit held where
“immediate notice” is an express condition precedent to coverage in the main
body of the policy, “failure to comply with the provision precludes coverage” and
“prejudice need not enter the calculation.”
Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.
,
Whether a notice provision is a “condition precedent” to recovery depends
on the language of the policy; we have held that “the words ‘condition precedent’
mean exactly what they say, and failure to comply with this provision
рreclude[s] recovery, regardless of whether prejudice [is] shown.”
Gulf Island,
IV v. Blue Streak Marine, Inc.
,
The Lloyd’s policy requires notice only when the assured “may reasonably conclude” that a covered occurrence has taken place. This language falls short of the express condition precedent language that we held in MGIC and Auster Oil [ & Gas, Inc. v. Stream ,891 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1990)] was necessary to make giving notice a condition precedent to recovery.
Gulf Island, IV
,
Turning to the insurance contracts at issue, we hold the umbrella insurers
are not liable to Settoon regardless of prejudice to the umbrella insurers. First,
it is clear that the notice condition in the endоrsement is a “condition precedent”
despite not using the precise phrase “condition precedent.” The buyback clearly
indicates the notice provision is a condition precedent to recovery under the
endorsement. The absolute pollution exclusion states, “It is . . . agreed that the
intent and effect of this exclusion is to delete from any and all coverage’s . . . any
. . . claim . . . in any way arising out of [pollution].” The buyback states, “It is
hereby agreed that the above Absolute Exclusion shall not apply provided that
the Named Assured established that all of the following conditions have been
met . . . .” Settoon must “establish” that the “conditions” have been met in order
for the absolute pollution exclusion not to apply. Short of the exact phrase
“condition precedent,” there is almost no stronger language that could establish
a “condition precedent” to recovery. Further, Settoon is a sophisticated business,
not an ordinary consumer.
Cf. Joslyn Mfg.
,
The bargain here “delete[s] from any and all coverage[]” pollution liability
unless the insured gives notice within 30 days of the occurrence. Pollution
liability is not stripped away because of a violation of the notice provision;
rather, non-compliance prevents the exception to the exclusion from taking effect
in the first instance, meaning the pollution exclusion remains in effect. In
Louisiana a violation of a provision mandating notice within the policy period
allows the insurer to avoid liability,
Hood
,
B
Second, Settoon points out that although the 30-day notice provision is present as a condition in the pollution endorsement, the notice provision in the bodies of the main Bumbershoot 2 and Bumbershoot 3 policies requires notice “as soon as practicable” and provides that “failure to notify the Company of any occurrence which at the time of its happening did not appear to involve this Policy, but which, at a later date, would appear to give rise to claims hereunder, shall not prejudice such claims.” Settoon asserts this notice provision in the main body of the policy must be given effect because the endorsement includes a clause stating, “All other terms and conditions remaining unchanged” and does not include a ranking clause that would have given precedence to provisions of the endorsement over provisions of the main body of the policy. By reading the two provisions together, Settoon maintains delays of notice beyond 30 days are permitted because the ocсurrence “did not appear to involve this Policy” until the captain of the CATHY confessed his vessel’s involvement in the allision. The umbrella insurers respond that the “Notice of Occurrence” provision does not apply to claims under endorsements, but rather only to claims under the main body of the policy, because it speaks of occurrences “covered hereunder.”
Where an insurance policy is clear, we do not engage in further
interpretation beyond the plain meaning of the words.
See
L A . C IV . C ODE art.
2046 (“When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’
intent.”);
La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.
,
Additionally, we read each insurance policy as a whole. . at 517.
“[E]ndorsements affixed to a policy of insurance are to be construed in
connection with the printed provisions of the policy and the entire agreement
harmonized, if possible, but in the event of irreconcilable conflict, the
endorsement or rider prevails.”
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bouler
,
Here, under Louisiana law primacy is given to the endorsement over the
main body оf the policy.
See Zurich Ins. Co.
,
C
Third, Settoon asserts Louisiana’s doctrine of impossibility excuses its non-
compliance with the 30-day notice provision. It is true that under Louisiana law,
an insurer cannot impose a
penal reduction
in benefits for failure to comply with
a notice provision.
Mansour v. State ex rel. State Emps. Grp. Benefits Program
,
694 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding insurer liable despite
insured’s non-compliance with 72-hour notice provision where insurer could not
show prejudice and where insured could not comply with notice provision
because of condition insured against, which was a heart attack);
see also
Hayward v. Carolina Ins. Co.
,
D
The umbrella insurers are not liable to Settoon because Settoon failed to comply with the 30-day notice provision in the buyback. Therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether Settoon complied with the 72-hour knowledge provision. The district court did not err in holding the umbrella insurers are not liable to Settoon.
IV
The district court held SNIC cannot rely on the specific terms in the Bumbershoot 1 buyback because SNIC delayed delivery of the policy in violation of L OUISIANA R EVISED S TATUTES Annotated § 22:873(A) (2012), which, subject to payment of the premium, requires insurers to deliver policies within a rеasonable period of time after issuance. SNIC did not give Settoon the policy until months after Settoon’s premium payment. Therefore, the district court held SNIC liable to Settoon on the Bumbershoot 1 policy. On cross-appeal, SNIC asserts the terms of the policy are applicable for two reasons: 1) SNIC did not “issue” the policy when it sent the binder, so the delivery obligations of § 22:873(A) do not apply; and 2) delayed delivery in violation of § 22:873(A) does not free Settoon from the policy terms if Settoon was not prejudiced by a lack of knowledge of the terms, and Settoon was not prejudiced. Because delayed delivery in violation of § 22:873(A) prevents SNIC from relying on the exclusions in the policy and the conditions precedent of the exceptions to the exclusions, whether or not the delay caused prejudice to Settoon, we hold SNIC is liable to Settoon.
A
“We may affirm the district court’s judgment on any basis supported by the
record,”
United States v. Roussel
,
Admittedly, in one paragraph of its summary judgment motion SNIC contended the only reason the policy did not “issue” until March 2, 2007 was that Settoon delayed in delivering the underlying policies. It is clear from the context of the brief thаt SNIC did not mean to argue in this paragraph that § 22:873(A) did not apply because SNIC did not “issue” the policy for purposes of the statute’s delivery requirement; rather, SNIC used this paragraph to argue Settoon should not be advantaged by its own delay in sending the underlying policies. SNIC maintained throughout its summary judgment motion that it delivered the policy in compliance with § 22:873(A) by delivering the binder. Thus, the district court did not have an opportunity to decide whether § 22:873(A) was applicable on SNIC’s “issuance” theory because Settoon and SNIC disputed only whether SNIC’s delivery of the binder sufficed for compliance with the statute’s delivery requirement. See Celanese Corp. , 620 F.3d at 531. Accordingly, SNIC waived its assertion that § 22:873(A)’s delivery requirement is inapplicable because it did not “issue” the policy until after Settoon sent the underlying policies.
B
SNIC asserts the terms of Bumbershoot 1 are appliсable because the delayed delivery of the policy did not prejudice Settoon, as Settoon had knowledge of the terms regardless of the delivery timing. Settoon asserts prejudice is not a relevant factor under Louisiana law and, in any event, Settoon was in fact prejudiced because it could not have known of Bumbershoot 1’s specific terms. Louisiana statutory law provides:
Subject to the insurer’s requirements as to payment of premium, every policy shall be delivered to the insured or to the person entitled thereto within a reasonable period of time after its issuance.
L A . R EV . S TAT . Ann. § 22:873(A) (2012).
In
Louisiana Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
of London
,
A Louisiana appellate court relied on
Louisiana Maintenance Services
in
holding an insurer did not violate § 22:873(A) when it delivered the policy to the
association
it insured but not to each
individual
within the association.
Naquin
v. Fortson
,
We hold a finding of prejudice is not required to disallow reliance on the
policy terms and endorsement provisions.
Louisiana Maintenance Services
indicates delayed delivеry in violation of § 22:873(A) is enough to prevent SNIC
from relying on the pollution exclusion in the main body of the policy regardless
of prejudice to Settoon.
See La. Maint. Servs.
,
V
SNIC asserts that even if it is liable to Settoon, it is not liable for prejudgment interest because federal maritime law, not Louisiana law, controls. Further, SNIC asserts that if it is liable for prejudgment interest, the interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid for the allision, not from the date of judicial demand. SNIC is incorrect in its first assertion: SNIC is liable for prejudgment interest because Louisiana law controls. SNIC is correct, however, in its second assertion: prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid fоr the allision.
A
SNIC is liable for prejudgment interest because Louisiana law applies over
federal maritime law. This circuit created a three-part instructive test for
determining whether federal maritime or state law controls a disputed issue in
Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu
,
The first prong of the three-factor test asks whether federal law is entrenched. Id . “In the absence of preexisting entrenched federal maritime law . . . [t]he application of unfamiliar federal maritime rules engenders undesirable uncertainty аmong maritime actors.” Id . at 888. In order to determine whether federal law was entrenched, Anh Thi Kieu analyzed our circuit precedent and concluded that although the language in our precedent recognized the federal law at issue in that case, it did not have to apply the federal law, so the federal law was not entrenched. Id . at 888–89. The same conclusion is warranted here.
Where a primary and excess policy are drafted together in a “carefully
dovetailed, integrated program in which each [insurer] had significant interests
at stake,” this circuit has held under maritime law the excess insurer is liable
for prejudgment interest on the amount owed by the primary insurer that
exceeds the primary policy’s limit.
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co.
, 443
F.2d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1971).
Alcoa Steamship
specifically held, “But we do not
make this as a choice of law for general (or Louisiana) application.” . Rather,
Alcoa Steamship
limited the holding to the carefully crafted insurance plan,
where “[o]bviously what was in mind was what has occurred here—a Court
holding that despite the fixed ceiling of [a сertain amount], the law requires
payment of interest thereon.”
Id.
at 256. In the context where both the primary
and excess insurer were liable to the insured, the court required the excess
insurer to pay any prejudgment interest beyond the limits of the primary
insurance policy. . This circuit relied on
Alcoa Steamship
fifteen years later
to hold, “[A] marine insurer is not liable for interest in excess of its policy limits
unless language in the policy so provides.”
Ryan Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. James
Marine Servs., Inc.
,
Ryan Walsh
and
Alcoa Steamship
addressed situations where both
primary and excess insurers were liable, and held the excess insurers were liable
for prejudgment interest beyond the limits of the primary insurers.
Ryan Walsh
,
The second
Anh Thi Kieu
factor asks whether Louisiana has a substantial
interest exceeding the interest of maritime law.
Anh Thi Kieu
,
The third
Anh Thi Kieu
factor asks whether there is a material difference
between state and federal law.
Anh Thi Kieu
,
B
SNIC is correct to assert the interest should be calculated from the date Settoon paid out its obligations rather than the date Settoon made judicial demand. As the above analysis indicates, Louisiana law is applicable to liability for prejudgment interest. See Part V.A. supra . Under Louisiana law, interest is calculated from the date of judicial demand only for “ ex delicto ” damages. L A . R EV . S TAT . Ann. § 13:4203. Louisiana law distinguishes between “ ex delicto ” and “ ex contractu ” damages:
The Louisiana Court of Appeals explained that “the classical distinction between ‘damages ex contractu ’ and ‘damages ex delicto ’ is that the former flow from the breach of a special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flow from the violation of a general duty owed to all persons.”
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Tex. Meridian Res. Exploration Inc.
,
Here, the insurance obligations are “
ex contractu
” because they “flow from
the breach of a special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor.”
Davis
,
149 So. 2d at 254. SNIC’s obligation is contractual, arising out оf SNIC’s
agreement to pay Settoon for Settoon’s liability for damage to third parties;
SNIC’s obligation does not arise out of a general duty SNIC owes all persons or
out of its agreement to pay Settoon for damage to Settoon (even though the
underlying incident with the third party was a tort). “The general rule in
Louisiana is that legal interest runs from the due date of the obligation in
question.”
Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Elec. Indus., Inc.
,
VI
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in all respects except for the calculation of prejudgment interest. We REVERSE and REMAND for calculation of prejudgment interest in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Notes
[1] A Louisiana appellate court applying
Louisiana Maintenance Services
held an insurer
did not violate § 22:873(A) where it delivered the policy after the event giving rise to the claim
but within a reasonable time period (two months) and where the insured had knowledge of the
relevant exclusion.
MacLaff, Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co.
,
[2] One Eleventh Circuit case that dealt with only one insurance policy relied on
Alcoa
Steamship
and
Ryan Walsh
to disallow prejudgment interest beyond the policy’s limit.
Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp.
,