35 Tex. 323 | Tex. | 1872
The appellants brought suit in the district court to obtain title and possession of thirty acres of land lying near the city of Houston.
They aver in their petition that their father, William M. Settegast, purchased the land in controversy from John W. Schrimpf, in his lifetime. W. M. Settegast, the father of the plaintiffs, died in 1858. Their mother had previously died, and a second mother and two sisters died about the same time their father deceased. At the death of their father they were infants of a. tender age; that Schrimpf took them to his house, where they remained and grew up to manhood ;' that Schrimpf afterwards dying, the appellee administered
The defendant pleads generally and specially, and in bar of the action set up, that William M. Settegast, at the time of his death, was an alien, and could not transmit his property by inheritance to his children. The plaintiffs amended their petition, and aver that their father came from the kingdom of Prussia in the year 1851, and settled in Harris county, in the State of Texas; that he intended to make the United States his home; that he became domiciliated ; that he acquired the property in controversy by purchase ; and that, so soon as he was able, he made the proper declaration before a court of record, of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, but that he died before the full period of his naturalization had elapsed. They further aver that, on attaining their majority, they became and are citizens of the United States, and of the State of Texas, residing in the county of Harris.
The amended petition was demurred to, and the court sustained the demurrer; to which exceptions were taken, and the cause is brought to this court by writ of error.
The only question, then, for our decision is, whether or not the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. Ib the case of Yates v. Iams, 10 Texas, 168, we have a learned exposition of the rights of foreigners, or aliens, under the laws of Spain and the Indies. This case was decided in 1853, but the facts governing it arose prior to the adoption of the common law as a rule of decision in this State ; and it can only be regarded as authority
“This provision of the law shows, beyond all controversy, that the common law rule that an alien cannot cast the descent upon an alien, was wholly inapplicable to the Republic of Texas. Hence we can see that, the decision in 18 Howard’s Reports was announced under a total misapprehension of the state of the law in Texas at the time the rights of the plaintiffs accrued.” But it is difficult to bring the case at bar within the precise rule of any reported case we have been able to find. We think, however, that the statutes in force at the time of the death of Wm. M. Settegast settle this question.
But, before we proceed to consider the rights of the parties under the statute law of the State, it is important to consider the main question by another and a different light. Was Wm. M. Settegast an alien, in the true sense of the term, at the time of his death ? We think not. There was nothing in the laws of Texas which declared him such; but, on the other hand, he was permitted, under the the laws of the State, to exercise most of the rights of citizenship, and was, to all intents and purposes, responsible to the laws as other citizens. The Constitution of the United States reserves the right, and makes it the duty of Congress, to pass naturalization laws, and the States are inhibited the exercise of this power. A very noted case has arisen in the history of our government, in which the political power has declared what must be regarded as the condition of one similarly situated to Wm. M. Settegast at the time of his death. (See letter of Secretary Marcy, Executive Doc., first session, Thirty-third Congress.)
How strongly, then, does the history of this case imply the rights of one situated as Wm. M. Settegast at the time of his death. Under this authority of the United States, we are forced to the conclusion that he
But, without intending to place our decision solely upon this ground, we hold that, under the act of the twenty-eighth of January, 1840, and the substantial reenactment of the same on the eighth of March, 1848, all difficulty in the way of the title to land in William M. Settegast descending upon his death to his children had been removed. It is true the language of the act might be more plain. The act reads thus: “In making title to land by descent, it shall be no bar to a party that any ancestor through whom he derives his descent from the intestate is or has been an alien; and every alien, to whom any land may be devised or may descend, shall have nine years to become a citizen of the Republic and take possession of said land; or shall have nine years to sell the same before it shall be declared to be forfeited, or before it shall escheat to - the government.” This, as Mr. Justice Lindsay has said, indubitably shows that the common law rule, that an alien cannot cast descent upon an alien, was totally inapplicable to the State of Texas.
It sufficiently appears in the pleadings of this case that the plaintifiis are within the nine years limitation, and we are unable to see that there is any legal bar to their recovering in this case. The judgment in the district court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reverseb and rewanded.