169 S.E. 543 | S.C. | 1933
June 1, 1933. The opinion of the Court was delivered by The appellant brought this action to recover of respondent damages for injuries which he alleges he received while coupling cars in the yard of the respondent at Sumter, S.C. His complaint alleges that the respondent is a corporation engaged in business as a common carrier of freight and passengers; that appellant was in its employ, his duties being, in part, to couple and uncouple freight cars in respondent's yard in the City of Sumter, S.C.; that while so engaged on the 27th day of December, 1929, he was injured under these circumstances: In order to couple or uncouple cars, a lever or rod is used; that in attempting to work this lever it resisted his efforts to raise it, necessitating the use of unusual force; the lever then came up suddenly, throwing appellant to the ground with such violence that a rupture was caused, which gave him great pain; that it was the duty of respondent *17 to furnish appellant a safe place to work and safe appliances with which to work; that it negligently and willfully failed to discharge this duty in not furnishing a suitable lever and not keeping it in proper working order and condition, and such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
For answer the defendant admitted the formal allegations of the complaint and denied all others. For further answer it set up the plea of assumption of risk.
The case went to the jury, which failed to agree after several hours deliberation. Thereupon the presiding Judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that "there is no evidence to show that defendant did not exercise reasonable care to furnish safe appliances for the use of the plaintiff."
This appeal followed. The single exception is that there was evidence to show that the appliance was defective, and such defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that it was the duty of respondent to know that such was the case, and its duty to keep such appliance in good order, which it negligently failed to do.
Both parties to the action agree that at the time of the occurrence complained of they were engaged in interstate commerce.
If the Safety Appliance Act of Congress (
The pertinent provision of that Act is as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." (Section 2, 45 U.S.C.A. § 2.) *18
In the case of Lorick v. Railway,
In the case of Steele v. Railroad Company,
In the case of Link v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.,
The opinion quoted with approval the following from the case of Armitage v. Chicago, M. St. P. Ry. Co., *19
It is patent that the order of the trial Judge, upon which is founded the judgment appealed from, is in contravention of the principles announced in these conclusive authorities.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case remanded for trial.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BLEASE and MESSRS. JUSTICES STABLER and CARTER concur.