The plaintiff before bringing this bill in equity had recovered a judgment against the defendants Annie Welson and Joseph Welson, who are husband and wife, in an action at law in which an attachment of real estate belonging to Annie Welson had been made. At the time of the attachment the real estate was subject to a first and a second mortgage. The plaintiff was proceeding to advertise a sale of the property on its execution (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 236, §§ 26-30) when the defendant Milton Welson, a son of the other two defendants, claiming to be
The case was referred to a master. An interlocutory decree from which no appeal was taken confirmed the master’s report. The final decree declared that the mortgage was cancelled and discharged and no longer a lien on the premises against the plaintiff and persons claiming under it, that the assignment was void and that the defendant Milton Welson and persons claiming under him were enjoined from setting up any right under the mortgage. The defendant Milton Welson has appealed from the final decree.
Prior to the making of the attachment in the action in which the plaintiff obtained judgment, the defendants Annie Welson and Joseph Welson, as the result of negotiations with the holders of the second mortgage on the real estate here involved, paid to the holders an agreed sum for its discharge and the holders delivered to the attorney of Annie and Joseph Welson the mortgage note, the mortgage deed and a duly executed discharge of the mortgage. The money paid in discharge of the mortgage was not the money of the defendant Milton Welson. After the attachment of the real estate by the plaintiff in its action at law and because of the attachment, at the request of Annie and Joseph Welson acting through their attorney, the instrument discharging the mortgage was altered by one of the former holders to the form of an assignment of the mortgage to Milton Welson. The master found that this was done for the purpose of preventing the satisfaction of any execution issuing upon a judgment which might be obtained by the plaintiff in its action at law. Sub
The plaintiff’s bill was not brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 3 (9), to reach and have applied to its debt through a decree of court the purported interest under the second mortgage which the assignment pretended to convey. The objective of the bill was the elimination of the effect of the existence of the assignment and the mortgage on the plaintiff’s exercise of its rights under the attachment and execution. While attempting to make effective those rights through a sale on execution, the plaintiff found itself obstructed-by a purported assignment of a mortgage, which in reality secured no debt. The enforcement at law of the plaintiff’s rights under its execution was hindered and made inadequate since any purchaser at the execution sale must take a title subject on record to the encumbrance of the second mortgage and the price which could be obtained at such a sale would thereby necessarily be depreciated. Resort to equity when necessary for the purpose of enforcing the collection of an execution issued in a law action is a recognized branch of equity. Rioux v. Cronin,
The final decree declared the assignment void and the mortgage cancelled and discharged. A fraudulent conveyance, though voidable, is not a void conveyance. Pierce v. Le Monier,
Ordered accordingly.
