Serrano v. Priest

No. 30398. Dec. [L.A. 1976.] SERRANO, al., JR.,

JOHN et Plaintiffs and v. Respondents, PRIEST,* Treasurer, etc., al., IVY BAKER as State et Defendants and Appellants; TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF Intervener and Respondent; al.,

BEVERLY HILLS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et Interveners and Appellants. * deceased) (now the former nor the holder of neither state Treasurer Although present is a to this we continue to the title Serrano v. Priest for

that office use party appeal, and convenience. consistency purposes Counsel Larson, Counsel,

John H. James W. and Donovan M. County Briggs Main, Counsel, for Defendants and Deputy County Appellants for Interveners and Appellants. Zumbrun,

Ronald A. John H. Cannon, H. J. Findley, LeRoy Roger Nichols, Leonard and Nichols & Rose as Amici Curiae on behalf Siegel of Defendants and and Interveners and Appellants Appellants. Luevano, M. Daniel M. M. John Sidney Wolinsky, Rosalyn Chapman, McDermott, Burdick, Ochi, Edelman, E. S. Rose Joel David A. Mary Binder, Horowitz, Harold W. H. Michael Jerome Levine and Shapiro, Robert Knox for Plaintiffs F. and Respondents. Griffin, Mnookin,

Thomas M. H. D. Robert John E. Stephen Sugarman, Coons, Hall, Jr., L. Ernest John R. W. Brent N. Aubry, Phillips, Carlyle Rushforth, Sutherland, Fredric P. A. Thomas Hunt and B. Timothy as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs Flynn Respondents. & R. Koszdin Woods and Fenton for Intervener and Levy, Henry Respondent.

Kronick, Moskovitz, Girard, & J. Tiedemann and Tiedemann Edward Mark Paul as Amici Curiae.

735 Opinion a constitutional

SULLIVAN, J. instant which involves proceeding, to the California school is before us system, challenge public financing 1971, of time. In we reversed a dismissal for second judgment demurrers and remanded the entered orders general upon sustaining v. Priest (1971) with directions that it to trial. (Serrano cause proceed 601, hereafter cited as Serrano 487 P.2d 1241], Cal.3d 584 Cal.Rptr. [96 were we held that the facts In so I.) alleged plaintiffs’ complaint doing forth, there and that causes of action set to constitute the three sufficient trial, school at the state were sustained if such public allegations and in violation of state be declared invalid as must system financing of the federal constitutional guaranteeing equal protection provisions laws.1 were filed all remand answers to complaint existing

Upon of defendants2 and certain school districts of the Los County Angeles defendants, were allowed to intervene as as their own adopting The California answers filed the other defendants.3 county previously AFL-CIO, Teachers, to intervene as a Federation of was permitted on condition that its the essential of plaintiff allegations complaint adopt The trial court declined to defendants’ original complaint. accept sum, “In we find the 1The kernel of our was set forth follows: allegations holding we the trial sufficient and return cause to court plaintiffs’ complaint legally further We decision is not a final on the our proceedings. emphasize, judgment merits. We deem it out for the benefit of the trial court on remand appropriate point Proc., if, 43) (see Code Civ. after further that court should enter final § proceedings, that the is unconstitu judgment determining existing system public financing tional and said in whole or in for the invalidating may system part, properly provide enforcement of the such a an as to transition from an judgment way orderly permit unconstitutional to a constitutional of school As in the cases of school financing. (see (1955) Brown v. Board Education 349 U.S. 294 L.Ed. desegregation [99 270,281 753]) (see S.Ct. Silver v. Brown Cal.2d legislative reapportionment 132]), 405 P.2d a determination that an Cal.Rptr. existing plan governmental [46 denies does not invalidation of acts operation equal protection necessarily require past undertaken to that or an immediate of a pursuant plan implementation constitutionally valid Obviously, any existing judgment invalidating substitute. an should make clear that the is to remain until existing system operable laws, new which is not violative of can put appropriate system, equal protection I, 618-619.) (Serrano into effect.” at pp. 2The of the state offices of defendants at the time of the first were occupants appeal Controller, Treasurer, Instruction, the Los of Public Angeles Superintendent collector, treasurer, offices tax of schools. County superintendent Unified, Unified, 3The El Beverly school districts were Burbank intervening Segundo Unified, Unified, Unified, Unified, and South Hills Beach San Marino Glendale Long Union School. Bay High and the be Governor as suggestion Legislature joined indispen- sable parties. 26,

Trial commenced on December 1972. After more than 60 of days trial the court issued its “Memorandum Re proceedings Opinion 10, 1974, Intended on Decision” and on 30 of the same August April year filed its of law, fact and conclusions of there 299 of the findings being 3, former and 128 of the latter. was entered on Judgment September 1974, and defendants’ motion for a new trial was denied on October 1974. This followed.4 appeal

I I, Our decision Serrano which due to the then of the legal posture directed itself to the of proceeding only of the sufficiency allegations to state a cause of action and complaint full trial contemplated for the of such proceedings proof nevertheless attracted the allegations, immediate attention of the California aAs result Legislature. lawmakers two Bill bills—Senate No. (S.B. passed 90) and Assembly Bill No. 1267 (A.B. 1267)—which, law upon becoming during of trial about certain pendency proceedings, brought significant changes in the then under public financing judicial scrutiny. this, all to the action entered into Recognizing parties thereupon that for of trial the California for the stipulation purposes of schools should deemed to include all law at the time of trial. This was later applicable agreement incorporated follows the trial court’s conclusions of law: “For of this among purposes the California schools, includes not litigation, system financing public all Constitution, statutes, the California only pertinent provisions court, 4Two notices of were filed in the trial one appeal by defendants and county ante) (see defendant-in-intervention school districts fn. and one then state Treasurer, Baker Priest. The state defendants have The Ivy appealed. remaining of the state Treasurer and defendants-in-intervention South Union Bay appeals High District Glendale Unified District were abandoned. School School subsequently are Thus defendants and the five county parties appellant remaining districts. intervening court, With briefs amicus curiae have been filed defendant permission California; Riles, Public the Pacific Wilson Instruction of State Superintendent District; Foundation; San Francisco Unified School The Association of Concerned Legal Institute, (ACT); (Earl Teachers The Childhood and Warren Legal Government Project Hall, Cal., Boalt & The Education Finance Governance Reform University Berkeley); Institute, (Research Alto); East Palo Nairobi California Project College, Taxpayers’ Association; (Graduate and the California School Finance Task Force School of Public Treasurer, Cal., Unruh, has also Policy, Berkeley). Jesse University present filed a brief.

737 and federal statutes of codes, and all administrative pertinent provisions amendments, modifications, and additions all includes but regulations, the from administrative codes resulting the California statutes S.B. 90 and known as enactment of those bills California Legislature’s 1406; 1973, 1972, Stats. ch. Stats. ch. A.B. 1267.” (See at this we think it In view of these point, developments appropriate of the trial court’s before particulars undertaking description of the detail the nature to review in some changes specific judgment, which were wrought by Legislature following of these our decision.5 Because our changes depends understanding as it existed at time an of the on understanding large part I, of that based Serrano we system, by reiterating description begin noticed, and certain matters of the on the judicially allegations complaint dictates our earlier we set forth in Clarity exposition opinion. be extensive.6 that the following excerpt B.

A. The Prior to S.B. 90 and A. 1267 System I, as follows: In Serrano we described financing system prior “We our the California task public begin by examining which is focal allegations. financing system point complaint’s our At the threshold we find a fundamental statistic—over percent local district taxes (a) school funds derive from two basic sources: the State School Fund.7 on real aid from (b) property real of school revenue is the local far source property “By major Constitution, the IX, section 6 of the California tax. Pursuant to article of each has authorized the county, city governing body Legislature enacted and the Governor signed oral in this case Legislature 5Following argument $272 these million to the state for budget law a finance bill some adding into bill, 1976.) This (Sen. the Governor on July Bill No. signed by purposes. course, court, trial and we do not consider it today. was not before the the footnotes in the following of convenience we have renumbered 6For purposes of the instant Serrano I in order to conform with the sequence opinion. from excerpt Hereafter, indicated, all those in excerpts unless otherwise section references (including I) from Serrano are to-the Education Code. fiscal 1968-1969 came from following 7California educational revenues for the year funds, aid, taxes, 6.1 35.5 federal 55.7 percent; sources: local percent; property Finance, sources, Public School 2.7 (Legislative Analyst, miscellaneous percent. percent; I, referred to as Legislative 5. Hereafter Education Part Expenditures Analyst.) taxes on real within a school district at a county, levy property Code, rate to meet the district’s annual education (Ed. necessary budget. et amount revenue which a district can raise in this § seq.) base—i.e., manner thus on its tax the assessed valuation depends largely of real within its borders. Tax bases the property vary widely throughout state; 1969-1970, for the assessed valuation unit of example, per attendance of school children8 from a average daily elementary ranged $952,156—a $103 low 10,000. to a ratio of 1 to peak nearly Finance, V, Public School Part Current Issues (Legislative Analyst, Educational Finance (1971) 7.)9 p. the

“The other factor local school revenue is rate of determining taxation within the district. has Although Legislature placed ceilings on district tax rates 20751 et these (§ maxima permissible seq.), statutory in a ‘tax override’ election if a of the district’s may surpassed majority voters a rate. 20803 et all (§ districts have approve higher seq.) Nearly voted override the limits. Thus raised funds which statutory locally constitute the of school revenue are a function largest portion primarily of the value of district, within a school with realty particular coupled of the district’s residents to tax themselves for education. willingness

“Most of the school revenue comes from the State School remaining Fund to the ‘foundation which the state pursuant program,’ through undertakes to local ‘minimum taxes in order to a supplement provide amount of to all districts With certain ....’(§ 17300.) guaranteed support minor the foundation ensures that each school exceptions,10 program enrollment, 8Most school aid determinations are based total not on but on ‘average (ADA), attendance’ a daily figure computed by number of students adding together on each school actually present that total day number of school dividing days 11252, 11301, (§§ 11401.) was In taught. ADA of total practice, approximates percent Finance, IV, enrollment. (Legislative Public School Part Analyst, of Terms Glossary Most Often Used 2.) in School Finance we When refer herein to on a figures basis, or child’ we mean unit of ADA. ‘per pupil’ ‘per 9Over November 1970 to 1971 the period January legislative analyst provided five series of which ‘deal with the current Legislature reports system public school finance from and are through kindergarten community college designed of the of school finance.’ Part provide working knowledge (Legislative Analyst, I, I, Education; II, 1.) The series is as follows: Part Part for supra, p. Expenditures Distribution; III, State School Fund: Its Derivation and Part The Foundation Program; IV, Finance; V, Part of Terms Most Often Used in School Part Current Issues Glossary in Educational Finance. $10 10Districts which maintain small receive schools’ less in ‘unnecessary per pupil (§ foundation funds. et 17655.5 seq.) Certain of school districts are for ‘bonus’ foundation funds. types eligible Elementary 3; $30 districts receive an additional for each student this sum is grades through funds, $355 each from state or local will receive district annually, 17656, $488 for each 17660) (§§ high elementary pupil 17665.) student. (§ forms. ‘Basic state in two is

“The state contribution principal supplied $125 each of a consists flat year, aid’ per pupil per grant IX, Const., of the art. § wealth district. (Cal. relative regardless Code, aid’ is distributed 4; Ed. §§ ‘Equalization par. wealth of to the district. inverse proportion aid to which a district

“To the amount compute equalization entitled, State first determines Public Instruction Superintendent local tax revenue would be if the district how much generated property $100 $1 a on each of assessed to a tax at rate of were levy hypothetical $100 $.80 in school districts and valuation per high elementary $125 aid he adds the basic districts.11 To (§ 17702.) figure, per pupil than the foundation If the of those two amounts is less sum grant. district, contributes the difference. minimum for that the state program Thus, funds to (§§ poorer guarantee equalization revenue, districts a basic while wealthier are districts minimum ineligible for such assistance. aid’ is available

“An additional state program ‘supplemental an which are to make subsidize school districts willing particularly poor assessed extra local tax An district with an valuation effort. elementary $12,500 for child if it $125 or less obtain more each per may pupil up A sets its local tax a certain level. school district rate above high statutory $24,500 for whose assessed does not exceed is valuation per pupil eligible a $72 child tax is if its local supplement sufficiently high. up per (§§ 17920-17926.)12 (§ 17674.)

intended to reduce an class size in those Unified school districts grades. get $20 extra child in (§§ 17671-17673.) foundation per support. 11This a tax rate used to measure the relative wealth of the simply ‘computational’ district for It bears no tax rate relation to the set equalization actually purposes. district in local taxes. real levying property 12Some further effect occurs areawide foundation equalizing through special in districts which were at an included in reorganization disapproved program plans (§ 17680 et valuation of all the individual election. Under this the assessed seq.) program, $1 $100 area is an actual levied at a rate for districts in an tax is per pooled, $.80 revenue is distributed districts school districts. The resulting elementary high level to the ratio of each district’s foundation the individual districts according among Thus, their in the tax bases of higher total. districts share the areawide effectively poor $ However, than itself at rate district is still free to tax higher wealthier neighbors. any $.80; district. the taxing such is retained entirely by or additional revenue aid and aid temper dispari

“Although supplemental equalization which result from the vast variations real assessed ties property valuation, wide differentials remain ill the revenue available to individ and, ual districts in the level of educational consequently, expendit ures.13 For in Los where childrenx example, Angeles County, plaintiff school, attend the Baldwin Park Unified School District only expended 1968-1969; $577.49 to educate each of its the same pupils during year student; $840.19 the Pasadena Unified School District on every spent $1,231.72 Hills Unified School District out Beverly paid per Ed., Schools, child. Cal. Public (Cal. Selected Statistics Dept. IV-11, 1968-1969 Table The source of these 90-91.) pp. disparities is unmistakable: in Baldwin Park the assessed valuation child totaled $3,706; Pasadena, $13,706; assessed valuation was while in Hills, $50,885—a was ratio of 1 to 4 to Beverly corresponding figure Thus, 13. the state are (Id.) to offset grants inadequate inequalities inherent in a based on local tax bases. financing system widely varying

“Furthermore, aid, basic which constitutes about half of the state II, Finance, educational funds Public School Part Analyst, (Legislative Derivation, The State School Fund: Its Distribution arid Apportionment widens the between rich and districts. 9), (See (1970) p. actually gap poor Taxation, Cal. Senate Fact Committee on Revenue and State Finding and Local Fiscal Public Education California (1965) Relationships districts, Such aid is distributed on a uniform basis to all 19.) per pupil the show 13Statistics assessed compiled by legislative analyst following range valuations for the-1969-1970 school per pupil year:

Elementary High School $ 11,959 $ Low 103 19,600 41,300 Median 952,156 High 349,093 V, 7.) Part (Legislative Analyst, supra, p. “Per that also varied pupil expenditures during year widely: Elementary High School Unified $ $ 407 $ Low 722 612 Median '672' 766 2,586 1,767 2,414 High {Id., at p. “Similar have been noted spending disparities throughout country, particularly (See, when suburban communities and urban are of the ghettos e.g., compared. Report 434-436; (Bantam 1968) Civil National Commission on Disorders ed. U.S. Advisory pp. 25-31; (1967) Civil Racial Isolation in Commission on Conant, Schools Rights, the.Public pp. 2-3; Levi, (1961) Slums and Suburbs The The and the University, Professions, pp. 251, 258-259.) (1968) 56 Cal.L.Rev. Law Park, Hills, as Baldwin as well of a district’s wealth. Beverly irrespective its students. the state for each of $125 from receives Under Park the basic “For Baldwin essentially meaningless. grant between make the difference the state must foundation up program child of revenue the amount $47.91, child $355 per elementary per $1 $100 a tax of raise Baldwin Park could per by levying law, difference is under valuation. assessed Although present if the basic aid, aid and of basic equalization partly partly composed the same amount exist, would still receive the district did not aid grant funds. aid—all equalizing financial however, has real Hills, $125 flat grant “For Beverly $870 $100 would $1 there a tax per Since rate produce per significance. student, is far too rich Hills qualify equalizing Beverly elementary state, thus $125 child from Nevertheless, receives it still aid. Coons, Baldwin Park. (See it and chasm between the economic enlarging Constitutional A Workable & Educational Clune Opportunity: Sugarman, 305, 315.)” Cal.L.Rev. Structures State Financial Test of I, at 591-595.) (Serrano pp. then, us in which concerned

It was the above-described system, were If, held, trial I. we Serrano complaint upon allegations true, the one that the described was found to be thus establishing California, be invalid as in would actually existing violation of state and federal Legisla- protection provisions. equal ture, likelihood decided not of such a finding, apparently recognizing to await outcome of such but to address itself immedi- proceedings an comment on economics (For ately problem. early practical I see Post & to Serrano in its confronting Legislature response Priest, 4 Brandsma, v. L.J. The to Serrano Pacific Legislature’s Response that we efforts from these It is to the 28.) legislative changes resulting comments. now to direct our proceed The New

B. System 1267, and A.B. of S.B. 90 about by changes brought passage the basic did not to alter while concept underlying significant, purport which we That the California concept, system. to undertakes the “foundation refer to as general may approach,” of each child the education dollar amount for insure a certain guaranteed district for district, the individual school in each and to defer to additional it whatever funds deems to the provision necessary furtherance of its educational As in the indicated particular goals. the mechanisms which this was foregoing excerpt, concept imple- mented to the of S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 were prior adoption basically aid, aid, aid, four: basic (1) (2) tax (4) equalization supplemental rate these, limitations and overrides. The new law retained three of 12, element of aid text (see fn. ante) supplemental accompanying being same, i.e., discontinued. The basic aid $125 remained the component per ADA. Thus was and alterations in fundamentally through adjustments two aid and tax rate limitations and remaining areas—equalization overrides—that into constitu- Legislature sought bring tional conformity.14 the most dramatic of the law new was a substantial

Perhaps aspect increase in the foundation level. For the fiscal 1973-1974 this year figure, which constitutes minimum amount to each per guaranteed pupil state, was in raised for school districts general elementary $355 from the ADA, $765 level of ADA the sum of previous per per and for $488 $950 school districts from 17656, ADA. (§§ high 17665.) increases were for small fn. (see schools Corresponding provided 10, ante), 12, areawide foundation were (fn. ante) retained. programs was factor,” also made to offset the so-called Provision “slippage has been the result of increases in the assessed valuation of real yearly within the districts to an increase in the amount of property (leading local contribution of the tax rate” through application “computational Thus, and a (fn. ante) decrease contribution). corresponding increase in the foundation level of for the yearly approximately percent first three thereafter was (§ former years percent prescribed. time, however, subd. see At the same (e); § present $1 $2.23 tax rate” was raised from to at the “computational elementary $0.80 $1.64 level and from at the school level. (§ 17702.) high The second of the new involved the creation of major aspect program limits,” “revenue or limitations on maximum per pupil expenditures text confines itself to a 14Although of the basic following description operational features of the new law from the standpoint foundational on ongoing approach based, which it is it is to note at this that S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 also appropriate point introduced certain modifications of a nature. The most of these categorical important (§ was establishment of the Youth 6499.230 Educationally Disadvantaged Programs (§ et and of the Childhood Education 6445 et The former seq.) Early Programs seq.). assistance, $82 authorized million in state to be awarded on a to program basis project with districts a incidence of heavy family poverty, bilingualism, pupil transiency, $25 $40 while the latter authorized million for 1973-1974 and million for 1974-1975 also basis, aon to restructure education in K project 3. primary grades through federal state and categorical support exclusive district each school 20902 et taxes. (§ override seq.) revenue by permissive generated without a voted a allowed district These speaking, generally provisions, its would increase than rate no taxes at a higher override levy a revenues 1972-1973 base over by permitted per pupil expenditures which tax rate a school A district factor.15 inflation having yearly inflation would receive levels of foundation in excess revenues produced revenues rose above as those decreased magnitude adjustments hand, base revenues a district On the other having levels. foundation allowance, did not reach inflation which, to the full when added revenues level, increase its could percent foundation up ADA. limit revenue per year’s preceding rate limitation structure

The combination foregoing a would, it was levels foundation contemplated, produce ever-advancing districts could While known poorer “convergence.” phenomenon levels, foundation toward move with rising rapidity comparative districts, to the diminished inflation richer due adjustment permitted rate.16 This at a much slower them, increase their revenue bases would however, district revenue the fact that was complicated, prognosis the maximum to revenue limits general generated by applied only in the of voter tax rate available to a district absence approval. purpose fn. as before text (see Such limitations be exceeded following might 20906). voted an override (§ if a of the voters in district ante) majority without voter which can be overrides overrides Permissive (i.e., imposed 1973-1974, 15For several alternatives were year determining provided allowable increase expenditures: $70 a flat inflation (a) A district add to the 1972-1973 revenue base may per pupil allowance, thereof, a foundation may or a or district below the program percentage at a maximum of 116 or instead move toward the foundation program percent; rate the revenue the unused of a voted override tax (b) A district add may portion rates, $65 aor and use a inflation allowance per pupil, limit tax computational thereof, instead move toward the foundation may or a district below program percentage or at a maximum of 115 the foundation percent; program used to the unrestricted balances (c) add to the 1972-1973 revenue base A district may 1972-1973, the total to exceed 3 but not percent balance income to expenditures fund for the state’s general classifications of in certain expenditures expenditures thereof, 1972-1973, a $65 or inflation allowance or pupil, percentage and use the toward the foundation instead move below the foundation program may at a maximum of percent. program overrides, districts tax rate of the richer many (barring 16The result of this process rate: To the extent below) in the tax will be a reduction general purpose be discussed in such districts increases the amount of in assessed valuation that annual growth tax rate in excess of the year’s under the to sum existing prior to be obtained revenue rate will have to be lowered. inflation adjustment, revenue limit plus permitted were also authorized to raise revenue for certain approval) special such as purposes, capital outlay.'

II With this in mind we turn to a consideration of the trial background court’s findings judgment. above,

As indicated the trial court issued voluminous and comprehen- sive of its While we do not here findings undertake support judgment. of those present as complete summary findings, especially they above, what has been out it is for duplicate pointed important present to indicate their substance as relate to the effect and purposes they of the it now as stands validity alterations following legislative enacted after our decision Serrano I.

A. Fact Findings of

The court found in substance as follows:

The California financing system following adoption S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 continues to be based of. foundation upon there have been substantial increases in foundation concept. Although levels, increases, alone, those considered do not eliminate any unconstitutional features which existed at the time of Serrano I. The retention of the basic-aid element in the foundation for program, continues have an effect example, anti-equalizing by benefitting only those Moreover, districts not aid. basic-aid eligible equalization districts continue to be favored over districts insofar as equalization-aid reach the foundation level with a they tax rate less may than the rate or computational rate raise revenue in by using comptational excess of the foundation level.

The revenue limit feature of the new law has serious defects. similarly 1972-1973 revenues as its base By taking figure, perpetuates inequities from tax base differentials. More it will resulting property importantly, allow total between revenue limits and high-spending “convergence” foundation levels after as rising many, perhaps many no voted overrides. After five years—even assuming years functioning occur, that no voted overrides —again assuming many high-wealth, districts will still be to three two times more high-spending spending than are low-wealth districts able to Even when the pupil many spend. be a course, there will continue to substantial run its has “convergence” districts, assum- basic-aid and between again equalization-aid inequality will be overrides, due that the former districts voted to the fact no ing the tax which is less than level at a rate to achieve the foundation able Thus, that tax rates can to the extent rate. produce equal computational levels, can be levels or equal expenditure differing expenditure rates, tax the will continue to generate by differing produced wealth of the individual district.17 revenue in to the proportion of the continued is exacerbated availability This by disparity potential of such overrides 20906. The to section voted overrides passage pursuant to districts would nullify contemplated operate by high-wealth aid increased to be achieved effect by equalization sought “convergence” feature, of the latter limits. The of revenue operation imposition inflation, for make it with will in combination impossible continuing of districts to maintain the present quality high-wealth, high-spending a to therefore districts will have incentive their such great programs, rate a increase in such districts tax overrides because even rate vote slight In the a low will raise substantial revenues. districts having relatively hand, the other the incentive to vote assessed valuation on pupil, per less, overrides be a increase the tax rate such will for substantial result, will be sufficient to revenues. substantial additional As produce of the extent local control “the to above the (i.e., opportunity go foundation level of a will higher program pursuit quality program”) to be of the new continue a function district wealth under law._ illustrate, $1,000 $3 and a for a ADA foundation level 17To assume district given per $100 district assessed tax rate. Assume further that one has an computational per that, $50,000 while valuation of valuation of ADA another has an assessed one-third per $16,667. tax In rate will or $1,500 first district produce application computational ADA, $500 ADA. district in the second will The first while per produce only per $125 ADA basic would not entitled to aid but would still receive per equalization aid in of be entitled to the amount aid second district would equalization payment. ADA—i.e., $375 under the which the sum the amount available by per figure ADA) is ($500 ADA) ($125 rate and .the basic aid computational per payment per spend ADA), at the level but in order ($1,000 excéeded foundation per level If it wished exceed the foundation it would have to tax at the rate. computational level, limit) allowable in excess foundation it would be to tax at a rate to the required (up that rate. district, hand, level The richer the other would be able to maintain foundation on $50,000 (i.e., $1.75 when at a mere rate by taxing percent expenditure $1,000 ADA). revenue limits If applicable added to basic aid allowance yields per (i.e., at which it to tax full rate that rate poorer allowed at the computational level) it would have tax in order to achieve the foundation merely would be required $1,625 $125 ($1,500 aid per ADA ADA the basic plus payment the sum of ADA)—or l Vs per district—at its available to the disposal. the amount poorer court, is of the trial contained the findings example, although explicitly [This based upon them.]

The effect of in district wealth also continues be felt in disparities the area of Permissive override taxes for this outlay. capital purpose, authorized the new law bonded indebtedness- repayment loans, and aid more revenue in at a tax rate districts generate given with a assessed valuation than districts with lower high pupil per Moreover, districts, assessed valuation wealthier per pupil. being gener- to able sufficient funds for within ally generate capital outlay purposes their are often not to bonding capacities, required levy permissive loans, taxes for override of state aid which is the repayment only source of assistance for districts whose is insufficient to bonding capacity finance needed capital improvements. overburden, tax tax which “refers to rates for

Municipal high property education,” other services than is a governmental phenomenon low-wealth, as well districts as low-spending high-wealth, high-spending districts. The with associated this problems phenomenon—such vandalism, old and bilingualism, buildings, disadvantaged youth, poverty districts, such —are in all but the wealthier districts from the present of view of assessed valuation are better able point per pupil respond such than the districts. problems poorer districts, of small

Similarly, presence require greater scale,” because “diseconomies of is not confined to expenditures districts, wealthier and differences such districts create among wealth substantial in both tax rates and disparities expenditures.

While federal revenue school districts in which federal grants facilities are located must be considered in wide tax-exempt evaluating in assessed wealth of such revenue disparities pupil, availability per curtailed, Public Law under 81-874 has been accounts for substantially California, amount of total educational revenue in only negligible affects number small of districts. Even such districts wide among variations assessed wealth tax create rates and inequity spending levels.

In view all of the isit clear that substantial foregoing disparities from differences in local taxable wealth expenditures pupil resulting will continue to exist under S.B. 90 A.B. 1267. The reason for this is revenue, local wealth is the determinant of essentially principal wealth do districts not need to make the same tax effort as low' high reach, exceed, wealth districts in let order to alone the level of the anti- basic aid becomes that in this setting, foundation program achievement.18 of doubtful and “convergence” equalizing methods exist several alternative There potential would not wealth- school of this state which produce methods, which are These alternative related disparities. spending feasible,” with “workable, include: full state “(1) funding, practical tax; consolidation of the a statewide (2) imposition property districts, five with 1,067 districts into about hundred present valuations of real assessed boundary realignments equalize property districts; retention of all school present among commercial from of and industrial but the removal boundaries property the such at and taxation of taxation for school local property purposes its which has as level; school district (4) equalizing[,] power to districts could choose the that school essential concept ingredient tax level chosen the for each of at different levels but expenditure spend such level for each school district be the same effort would choosing vouchers; district; (6) a and a or low-wealth whether it be high-wealth two more the above.” or of some combination school districts in Substantial among pupil expenditures per disparities in and extent of the cause and substantial quality disparities perpetuate For this reason of educational opportunities. availability of treatment to before the court fails financing system provide equality an level in the state. all expenditure per pupil Although equal pupils because of sound or desirable educationally every heeds, of educational educational equality opportunity requires differing from district 18The court found that: “Substantial expenditures per pupil disparities to exist in local taxable wealth will continue district that are the result of differences S.B. and 1267 in that: under A.B. tax the same effort reach “(a) districts do not make basic-aid High-wealth, low-wealth, districts. doas equalization-aid foundation program determinant of wealth is the local “(b) primary Above foundation program, a tax rate. given of revenue for generated amount determined by taxes is solely The from override “(c) permissive amount of revenue to a school district. amount of wealth available determined by taxes is solely revenue from voted override “(d) The amount of school district. of wealth within particular amount to exceed the foundation denied an “(e) equal opportunity Low-wealth districts are under Section 20906. overrides utilizing voted program by indebtedness depends local bonded “(f) local taxes repay Revenue from permissive wealth. local upon and low-wealth between aid is actually widening gap Basic “(g) anti-equalizing, districts. high-wealth and occurs slowly, revenue limits with the foundation “(h) Convergence program never voted override provision.” occur a result may that all districts an in terms of revenue to possess equal ability students with provide substantially equal opportunities learning. before court fails in this for it respect, gives high-wealth staff, districts a substantial advantage obtaining higher quality beneficial ratios and class program variety, expansion teacher-pupil sizes, materials, modem equipment high-quality buildings.

There is a distinct between cost and the relationship quality educational afforded. cannot defined opportunities Quality wholly terms of on statewide achievement tests because such tests performance all the do not measure benefits detriments child that a receive may However, from his educational even as a experience. pupil using output measure of a district’s educational differences in quality program, dollars do differences in achievement. produce pupil B. Conclusions Law and Judgment we consider to set out

Although unnecessary comprehensive law, review of the trial court’s 128 conclusions of the most fundamental of those conclusions were into the which we now incorporated judgment, describe.

The court held trial that the California school public financing system for and schools as it stood the elementary secondary following adoption 1267, of S.B. 90 and A.B. not in while violation of the equal protection Constitution,19 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the federal was I, 21, invalid violation as in of former article 11 and sections of the IV, I, 7 California Constitution art. and art. see (now § 16 respectively; & I, Serrano at our state fn. 11), compare supra, equal 19This was conclusion based on the decision the United States Court Supreme in San Antonio School District v. 1 1278], U.S. L.Ed.2d 93 S.Ct. Rodriguez [36 wherein the court—in a decision to Serrano I—held that the high subsequent Texas which like the financing system, California is based on the system was foundational not in of the concept, violation federal In provision. equal protection so held majority court inter alia that education was not a concluding, high interest” entitled “fundamental to strict under the federal because the scrutiny provision was to education or the terms of the right by explicitly implicitly guaranteed 33-34, 43, 44, (Id. 58-60].) at L.Ed.2d Constitution. 60-62 at pp. Proceeding pp. [36 examine the Texas under the less standard to cases not system stringent applicable strict went on to conclude demanding scrutiny, system majority question or control furthered state interest in local of education. rationally (Id. legitimate purpose 49-56, 59, 44-55, 60].) at L.Ed.2d at pp. pp. [36 which the system Indicating respects provisions.20 protection standard,21 court set constitutional our state violative of it was before a reasonable date of from the judgment22 entry of six years period it further constitutional into compliance; for time bringing continue to should operate that the held, ordered existing system The achieved. been specifically had judgment such until compliance standard for court, majority’s the Rodriguez analogy using by 20The trial was classification question affected interest whether the determination the interest of review), concluded that strict scrutiny (thus requiring “fundamental” the terms guaranteed protected was implicitly in education explicitly children test, it concluded that the strict scrutiny Constitution. Applying of the California to the any compelling necessary accomplishment was not California system therefore invalid. and was interest the State of California school financing further held The court “[t]he even under Constitution of the California violates the equal-protection provisions standard of rational relationship.” lesser constitutional of the judgment provided: 21Theindicated portions System, California Public School Financing features of said “3. That the following thereto, of said are violative AB 1267 the SB 90 and legislation pertaining including of the California Constitution: provisions equal-protection-of-the-laws $125.00 districts. The basic aid “(a) per pupil high-wealth payments tax overrides and raise each school district to vote of voters of “(b) right discretion. revenues at their unlimited between school districts in per-pupil expenditures, Wealth-related “(c) disparities to, and will needs that are not designed aids programs, from categorical special apart differences, less than which mean amounts considerably not reduce to insignificant the date of of this of six from years entry $100.00 within a maximum period per pupil, Judgment. districts that are not tax rates between school Wealth-related variations “(d) within the same maximum to, variations reduce to nonsubstantial and will not designed (c) above for the per-pupil equalization forth in set subparagraph six-year period levels. expenditure v districts wealth-related, between school disparities expenditure “4. That per-pupil the California provisions of said are violative equal-protection-of-the-laws to, include, not limited following: but are Constitution reach tax effort to do not make same districts basic-aid school “(a) High-wealth, low-wealth, districts. do levels as equalization-aid the foundation-program levels, wealth is the primary local property Above foundation-program “(b) tax rate. for a revenue generated given of the amount of determinant ' solely taxes is determined by derived from override of revenue “(c) The amount district. within a wealth particular amount of taxable property to exceed denied an districts are “(d) equal opportunity Low-wealth school of the under Section 20906 voted overrides levels utilizing foundation-program Education Code. is determined override taxes derived from amount of revenue “(e) permissive school district. wealth within a particular the amount of taxable property solely by makimum school district are used to determine tax overrides “(f) Unused voted AB 1267legislation.” limits under the SB 90 and revenue that “Present in expenditures per pupil as a fact disparities 22Thetrial court had found wealth can be district taxable of differences in local districts that are the result among within six eliminated years.” and effectively efficiently that it was not to be construed to provided require adoption any finance, of school but that the particular system require plan with the of state adopted comport requirements equal protection the trial court retained of the Finally, action and provisions. jurisdiction over the “so that of such for parties any parties may apply appropriate relief in the event that relevant circumstances such a as failure develop, and executive branches of the state legislative to take government law, enact into into necessary steps design, place operation, within a reasonable time from the date of of this entry Judgment, California Public School Financing System public elementary schools that will secondary with the said fully comply equal- of the California protection-of-the-law Constitution.” provisions

Ill Defendants advance three substantive contentions on appeal.

First, it is that the trial court urged employed inappropriate criteria insofar as it focussed on the notion of so-called “fiscal neutrality” to the exclusion of other factors If relevant its determination. the trial criteria, court had it is employed suggested, appropriate S.B. 90 and A.B. 1267 would have been seen to be free from improved by constitutional on objection equal protection grounds.

Second, defendants that an standard of urge improper legal equal standard, review was contended, utilized. The it is protection proper even under our state constitutional is that no more provisions, requiring than a rational between the relationship, critically analyzed, financing method chosen and some legitimate purpose.

Third, and that the before the court assuming is to some extent with inconsistent state constitutional guaran provisions laws, it is that those teeing equal protection urged provisions are to that extent in conflict with other of the state Constitution provisions and, in accordance with the in constitutional principle consistency should be made to tanto in order to avoid such interpretation, yield pro conflict.

IV contentions, Before we first of a taking up foregoing dispose matter. Defendants trial court was preliminary urge procedural

751 two matter because in this to allegedly without proceed jurisdiction not the Governor—were and Legislature parties—the indispensable out that “the Proc., It is Civ. Code operative § (See pointed joined. addressed to “are solely judgment directory provisions” in the action Governor,” defendant and that the parties Legislative and awarded relief about the all by lack sought plaintiffs bring power court—i.e., of the state the trial public restructuring by with of our which will in manner provisions comply financing system of the laws. Reference is state Constitution guaranteeing equal protection cases, v. Silver to certain made notably legislative reapportionment 308, 405 P.2d and to the 132], 63 Cal.2d 270 Brown (1965) Cal.Rptr. [46 there and the members of the were fact that the Governor Legislature case, it “would To do otherwise this made urged, deny [the] parties. their elective who created this system through represen- people tatives of their in Court....” day

This contention is based on several and inaccurate misconceptions First, statements of the record. it the trial court— is clear that of the well-established rooted in the doctrine wholly cognizant principle, Ill, Const., that the art. courts (Cal. 3),§ may separation powers enact,23 not to order the or its members to enact or or Legislature or not no means Governor sign sign,24 specific legislation—by of its addressed directory judgment provisions” “operative declared On the Governor. contrary simply Legislature it, before which was administered that the school financing system violation, defendant, of state constitutional was in parties the laws. The trial court also guaranteeing equal protection provisions over the matter so that indicated that it would retain any jurisdiction in the event relief’25 might apply “appropriate party time, within a reasonable set lawmakers and the Governor had failed 604, 1031]; (1905) 23See French v. Senate 146 Cal. 606-607 P. v. Myers English [80 341, 349; (1858) (1973) v. State 32 9 Cal. State Assn. Employees’ California of California 103, 60]; (1970) v. Baldwin Park 9 108-109 cf. Igna City Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. [108 Cablevision, 909, (1966) Inc. v. Council 581]; Monarch City 915 Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d [88 (1960) 550]; Council v. Court 179 City Superior 239 Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [48 389, 394-395 Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [3 790]. 6]; P.2d v. (1956) Haight 46 Cal.2d Harpending 24SeeJenkins v. Knight [293 189, 208; Employees’ California, supra, v. State Assn. 39 Cal. State California 103, 109. Cal.App.3d relief indicate that law the court clearly primary 25The conclusions of issued by time,” is an of a “reasonable after the passage to be invoked only contemplated, an unconstitutional officials from the dendant state operating injunction prohibiting school financing system. 752 the

the at six “to take enact years, necessary design, judgment steps law, into and into which would with place operation” comply However, it and those refrained from provisions. explicitly properly executive, directives to the lawmakers and the chief in its issuing státing “. . . is not intended to and is not to judgment: judgment require, [T]his be construed as or any requiring, adoption particular plan and schools of the elementary secondary state ....” indicate, it is cases themselves

Secondly, reapportionment rule that in actions for declaratory general long-established statutes, of state state relief challenging constitutionality injunctive with under the officers statewide administrative functions challenged are the defendant. v. Anderson 60 (1963) statute (See parties Yorty proper 312, 97, cited; 317-318 Cal.2d 384 P.2d and cases there 417], Cal.Rptr. [33 cf. D’Amico v. Board Medical 11 1 Examiners Cal.3d (1974) [112 786, 520 P.2d v. 2 10]; (1970) Cal.Rptr. City Carmel-by-the-Sea Young 1, 225, Cal.3d 259 466 P.2d 37 A.L.R.3d The fact 1313].) Cal.Rptr. [85 that in the context the and its members reapportionment Legislature may also be considered stems from the direct institutional proper parties interest of those in the determination. and cf.26 Silver v. (See parties 576, 579, Jordan Cal. 241 affirmed 381 U.S. (S.D. 1964) (1965) F.Supp. 689, Senate v. Beens L.Ed.2d 85 S.Ct. Minnesota State 1572]; [14 187, 8, In the 406 U.S. L.Ed.2d 92 S.Ct. 1477].) (1972) [32 case, hand, the other as in the of cases instant on brought great majority administrative of a officers to constitutionality challenge against them, or statutes administered statute Legislature do have—that of The interest Governor lack similar interest. they any enacted them—is with the of statutes concerned lawmakers validity status; thus it and directness not of may requisite party immediacy administrative represented by appropriate fully adequately officers of the state.

Moreover, even should the and the Governor be consid Legislature ered to this (i.e., subject proper parties litigation parties permissive clear that could in no or is case intervention), they joinder capable or without whom the action be considered indispensable parties parties, as we said Bank could parties, fairly proceed. Indispensable Court 16 Cal.2d at v. page Superior [106 of California Proc., (Code 387) our California statute intervention Civ. § 26Although governing Proc., 24), (Fed. rule not in all identical to the federal Rules Civ. rule respects parallel interest is to both. common significant requirement interests, will P.2d are “whose or duties be 879], rights, parties inevitably which be rendered in the action. are affected decree can by any Typical have a number of undetermined interests in the situations where persons fund, seeks, them in a trust and one of the same or particular property, action, share, whole, fix his or to recover an to recover the portion are claimed The other with similar interests him. by persons indispens for is favor of one claimant able The reason that a judgment parties. the amount or or fund would determine necessarily property part Hence, in the which the others. extent remains available to any judgment their action would affect rights.” Manifestly, inevitably which Governor no interest in this and the have proceeding Legislature to that this is remotely contemplated language. comparable case, in Moreover, Bank said in the dealing as we also of California . . . “we should with doctrine necessary parties indispensable be careful procedure avoid ^[27] into converting an arbitrary discretionary and burdensome power or a rule requirement fairness which 521; at see also Cal.2d (16 rather than thwart justice.” may accomplish 62 Cal.2d v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. [42 Muggill is clear that no 107, 398 P.2d In the instant case it 147].) quite Cal.Rptr. able and advocates in interest has lacked for willing governmental as This case been absence of the and Governor has parties. Legislature have at its no well-known to those entities since they inception, yet point interest so. Even more intervention or indicated sought any doing resolution, been a matter whose has this is anxiously significantly, and the at more than seven awaited large years. parties that to In of these considerations we are convinced invoke light trial thus the renewal of doctrine require indispensability, than indeed to “thwart rather on this would ground, proceedings justice." accomplish

V above, contention, as indicated first Defendants’ substantive in its examination óf the trial court concerns criteria employed by court, is finance before it. The trial by confining urged, the several its the matter of wealth-related among disparities inquiry districts, certain other factors—for example, improperly ignored Procedure, conform to the 27Section 389 of Civil enacted in 1971 to ours of the Code “in an equity good federal describes one party practice, indispensable (See action. Fed. Rules determination of the conscience” court deems essential to the Proc., rule Civ. of educational thus “adequacy” “equality” programs28—and view, claimed, before it. This it is oversimplified problem point reflected in the terms of the itself. 4 of the (See judgment par. judgment criteria, set forth ante in fn. The defendants application proper would the trial court to look not to the argue, require merely operation “mechanisms” utilized but to the overall results particular by system balance, statewide, achieved in terms of “a fair between education equal al and local otherwise, To do it is opportunities supplementation.” urged, which, is to a in its zeal one adopt nearsighted approach perfect “mechanism” in the a standard of all system, imposes “neutrality” upon overburden,” its other elements. with its attendant “Municipal problems, also covered trial court is cited a defendants as findings, by particular of an -area but efforts example requiring “neutrality” special to the circumstances.2 according

Defendants offer two formulations of what consider to be they criteria for the assessment of the school adequate public In their brief a test which is less system. opening they suggest tripartite an alternative “fiscal of the trial court than neutrality” approach what turns out to be defendants’ of the at issue from system description of its overall effect.30 the unwieldiness standpoint Perhaps realizing out for attack the single 28Defendants from trial court’s following passage memorandum “What the Serrano court as a opinion: California constitutional imposed is that there must of treatment between the requirement uniformity children of the various school districts in the State because all the children of State in schools are circumscribed. The persons similarly equal-protection-of-the-laws provisions California Constitution- mandate less than that all such shall be treated nothing persons alike. If such of treatment were to result in all uniformity children a being provided educational or even a low-quality program, clearly educational inadequate program, California Constitution would be satisfied. This court does not read the Serrano opinion as that there is constitutional mandate for the requiring any State to funds provide each child in the State at some level to either an magic produce adequate-quality educational or a educational It is program in high-quality program. disparity treatment between which runs afoul of the California constitutional mandate equals of the laws.” equal protection 29Several of the briefs amicus curiae filed herein also evince serious concern for the overburden.” problem “municipal 30The three criteria are these: “I. The must suggested assure that system every access, taxation, the State has without excessive local to sufficient fund general revenues to finance needs of school districts as commonly-shared perceived by State, and to such aids as the State and Federal to be categorical governments perceive to meet uncommon needs of districts. some II. The must required special, system permit revenues derived from local taxation to be used to 1 revenues supplement Type described above. III. The as a whole must fund generate public general revenues so as to result 2 revenues not more than a court- Type constituting determined of the State total of all school district fund revenues.” percentage general formulation, in their brief to state the

of this reply apparent they proceed the three terms: of of their more kernel types straightforward position funds, available to school districts—foundation of revenues categorical asserted, aids, third, and local it is is “unequal- supplements—only ized,” or taxable and the or district wealth dependent capacity upon additional school taxes. of the voters to percentage willingness pay these of total state school district revenues “unequalized” represented revenues, assert, an measure of the defendants objective “provides educational relative weights given by given year equal and local in school fiscal affairs.” So long opportunities participation this low—defendants as an figure sufficiently suggest percent relevant are interests figure—the appropriate competing adequately This, then, accommodated. is the balance” criterion which “optimum defendants would that we utilize in to the “fiscal suggest preference so, asserted, of the trial court. If we were to do it is neutrality” approach we would find that the as the subject system, improved by provisions 1267, S.B. 90 and A.B. is in with the approximate compliance suggested standards.31

The fundamental defect in this it is that flies in the face of argument our in I Serrano and also of court, the trial holding findings were on that In Serrano I carefully we held that if grounded holding. of the were sustained—which allegations dealt not complaint allegations with district in but also disparities revenue-producing capability with the effect of such on the of education in the disparities quality I, various districts (see Serrano at fn. 16)—then “the supra, p. financial must fall and the statutes system must be found comprising I, unconstitutional” as in violation of at (Serrano equal protection. supra, We 615.) described the (i.e., p. system question system alleged exist in the as one which “conditions full entitlement complaint) wealth, interest in on classifies its on the basis recipients [the education] of their collective affluence[,] makes the of a child’s quality education the resources of his school district. . . .” at (Id. depend upon therefore, follows, It in which the two basic any system 31Defendants that had this concede standard been to the applied financing system I, time at the of Serrano it would have been concluded that the then necessarily time, asserted, was not in At that it is “the system relative values compliance. placed educational’ and local fiscal control reflected upon equal statewide ratio of opportunities [as were 76.4% ‘equalized’ ‘unequalized’ approximately revenues] hand, 23.6%, On the other it is of the standard to the respectively.” urged, application (i.e. 1973-1974 itas stood the enactment of S.B. system A.B. following 1267) would reveal a ratio of 89.6 revenues to 10.4 percent “equalized” percent revenues. “unequalized”

elements of this are of the (1) description present—i.e., conditioning wealth, revenues with resultant availability upon revenue, in school disparities dependency quality education the level of district be declared upon expenditure—must invalid unless it finds sufficient to justification satisfy applicable test.32 equal protection court,

The trial to the law set forth in our scrupulously adhering concluded in essence that the new school previous opinion, over that which system, was before us in although considerably improved I, Serrano nevertheless retained the of the former foregoing ingredients This determination was recorded in no less than 299 system. findings fact, none of which is defendants as in substantial challenged by lacking In these circumstances defendants cannot now be heard to support. maintain that different “criteria” should have been the trial employed by court. The “criteria” utilized the trial court assessing effect of the before it were those discriminatory enjoined upon the court our in Serrano I. there was no error in this opinion Clearly respect.

Moreover, if even defendants’ balance” were not “optimum argument foreclosed our decision in if Serrano I—and it be further assumed by that the recomménded 90/10 ratio be sufficient to constitu- might satisfy tional demands33—it is that the factual on which such apparent premises is based are to serious argument open question.

In the first which defendants base their place, figures upon assertion of with the standard fn. (see present compliance suggested ante, data, are drawn from 1973-1974 fiscal that text) accompanying is, data I the immediate of enact- reflecting impact post-Serrano course, case, 32It is contended in this of that the standard utilized equal protection by us in I Serrano is no the U.S. Court’s decision—the longer—after Supreme Rodriguez test. We due consider this matter in course. For the we assert appropriate present test, this limited Whatever the of proposition: applicable equal protection findings the trial court establish that discrimination of the character condemned in Serrano I has been to exist in shown the school before us. financing system presently 33It was stated defendants at oral that the current by argument statewide is in budget sum, million, $5 $500 of billion. To 10 allow of this or neighborhood to be percent distributed to a access a function of taxable wealth pursuant system rendering would be matter, far from an when it is considered that it is insignificant especially those funds over and above the level which are critical assertedly “equalized” to school district’s to raise its level and with ability program beyond marginal respond creativity freedom of action to needs and desires. peculiar however, clear, that in 1973-1974 the various ments. It is pressures—no- inflation and declining enrollment34—tending aug- increasing tably to other revenues had not district ratio local ment the supplements which, Under the themselves. manifested system according present fully school districts makes the to the trial court’s ability findings, particular taxable wealth of with such to the vary according pressures cope will an district, it can that future see be years expected particular In in the ratio of local other revenues. increase statewide supplements circumstances, the of an such extent individual district’s participation ask, the statewide increase will its taxable wealth. To geared do, we our defendants defer notice of such future probable to the time of their actual occurrence is to ask that we disparities ignore in the are inherent defects which we called to examine. upon however, More we out that the basic fundamentally, factual point which defendants the above premise upon posit argument—namely under the total statewide subject percent expendi- or, tures are words, in other are not “equalized” “dependent upon taxable wealth in a school district and the capacity willingness voters to additional school taxes”—is contradicted pay flatly fully the factual determinations of the trial court. The lion’s share those revenues asserted to be in category “equalized” composed revenue the foundation represented by program (approximately of all revenue), trial court found that the tax percent yet explicitly effort of a school district to attain the foundation level35 required varied td the Thus, taxable wealth of that district. according these revenues can no means be considered under defendants’ own defini- “equalized” tion of that If term. we include foundation funds those program among funds which are the ratio becomes 90 to “unequalized,” percent in favor of revenues but percent “equalized” approximately percent to 16 in favor of revenues. percent “unequalized” we offer some comments

Finally, upon complex problems overburden,” associated with defendants some “municipal enrollments, course, 34The immediate effect of is a ADA a declining lowered in reduction corresponding foundation the affected state-provided program money district. The cost of education due to enrollment does not decline in the same declining us, situation, Under the system here before for proportion. this only remedy barring district, dramatic increases in the amount taxable wealth in a is an increased tax rate. 35As we out that later in this the fact in district wealth result point disparities opinion, in in effort to reach foundation levels is not itself tax disparities required determinative of the issue before us. It is insofar as such have the effect disparities us. in here concern producing educational disparities opportunity they District, curiae, the San Unified School see

the amici Francisco notably under of school It as a critical any system financing. problem is a at the overburden” outset “municipal important recognize the term banner armies march. under which many Strictly speaking, areas, of in concentrated urban relates to the prevalent phenomenon, other for services than education. tax rates governmental high property be when Such it is taken into account must phenomenon, suggested, districts; in a lower school tax rate school tax rates various comparing area, an with urban it is cannot higher urged, realistically compared tax or rural areas in tax effort” because rates suburban terms “equal districts in the latter areas bear a lighter taxpayers residing may found, overall tax in terms of a total As the trial court burden rate.36 however, the limited in its occurrence to is not phenomenon question districts such as San Francisco where a assessed valuation relatively high to a (due concentration business and with a combined industry) ADA low small school tax On rate. comparatively permits relatively the residents of districts in Los San contrary, Angeles, Diego, Jose, San a much lower assessed valuation example—with per ADA37—suffer from same urban typically problems require us, nonschool tax them. meet before rates similarly high a district’s to its educational needs and desires by tying ability respond ADA, to its taxable wealth discriminates per clearly among equally urban districts from the of view of their beleaguered point respective 36The counties, statistics San with following comparing Francisco derived neighboring Abstract, from the 1974 Statistical California are provided by defendants in illustration of this point: Average Average Average School Other Total Tax Rate Rate Rate Purpose $6.86 Contra Costa $5.85 $12.71 Marin 6.64 4.63 11.27 San Francisco 4.47 7.30 11.77 San Mateo 6.31 3.55 9.86 $5.91 State $5.24 Average $11.15 37Statistics published by California State of Education Department contain relative to following figures assessed comparative (1973-1974) valuation ADA in the indicated areas. “Modified Assessed Valuation Per Unit Of District a.d.a., Second Period 1973-1974”_ Elementary_High School 46,182 $22,857 Los Unified Angeles 52,109 21,376 San Unified Diego 21,533 47,722 San Jose Unified 116,328 57,658 San Francisco Unified - Schools, Statistics, (1973-1974 California Public Table IV Selected students within to educational benefits to the resident capacities bring their borders.38

The term used overburden” is also sometimes to “municipal designate certain related not tax rates but to nonschool to additional problems high burdens of school urban districts facts expenditure imposed upon of urban life. When there is widespread poverty, disadvantaged youth, district, in a it is do educational bilingualism, argued, only purely costs rise due to the for to increased effort overcome motiva- necessity tional and but costs related matters like vandalism problems, adaptive however, rise as well. the incidence of these is not Again, problems 38Defendants also advance several to what term in their arguments relating they brief “the search tax to the fact arguments, These relate equity.” generally speaking, ADA that level of assessed valuation in a school district tells us little per particular Thus, the income about level of families within that district. in cases a residing many ADA will a relatively assessed valuation low median high per accompany relatively income; would occur family business and/or industrial this as a result of of substantial normally presence within a district residents relative whose suffer from properties from the of view of income. At the other extreme are poverty point average family districts in which assessed valuation ADA is low in a relatively of per spite relatively income; median high this combination would in a family present community typically no having business or where is significant industry on emphasis single-family (from a of dwellings—i.e., inhabitants) “affluent” relatively standard standpoint living fear, A suburb. neutral” in “fiscally system, defendants result might taking (which from the in of a lower a “poor” city median income level has spite higher ADA) assessed valuation in to give (which order to the “rich” suburb a spite This, median higher ADA). income level has a lower assessed it is valuation per urged, fact, would be an intolerable (see in view of adverted above anomaly—especially 36, ante, fn. text), that in cases under the accompanying many present rate, property-rich city, its lower school tax will spite a total tax rate impose to or in excess of the comparable total tax rate in an income-rich suburb. answer to the above that is dispositive arguments is this court not now simply engaged in—nor is it about to undertake—the “search for tax which defendants equity” which, As defendants themselves it is virtue prefigure. recognize, Legislature institutional (see as well as constitutional function Haman v. competency County of 922, 617, (1973) Humboldt Cal.3d 993], 925-926 506 P.2d and cases there Cal.Rptr. [106 cited; cf. v. 15 Cal.3d Abrams 828-832 Community Agency Redevelopment 905]), 543 P.2d Our is difficult task is Cal.Rptr. assigned perilous quest. [126 much more defined: it is to determine the trial court committed narrowly whether whether the at issue error state school prejudicial legal determining financing system before it was violative of our state constitutional guaranteeing equal provisions of the laws insofar as it denies educational protection school students of this state. If we determine that no such the equal opportunity occurred, error must affirm we trial to the court’s the matter of constitutional system judgment, leaving achieving Broad of “tax considerations body equity,” designed function. equipped perform will concern Legislature while be a of immediate to the they certainly matter task, out such a are to our determination insofar as carrying pertinent present us, that the before its of burdens and bestowal of through shown imposition benefits, results in in the level educational impermissible opportunity disparity available to the students of the various school districts of this state. ADA. of wealth From level

limited to districts of per any particular education, which are able to those districts of view point providing valuation assessed because of the above meet relatively high problems lack that over districts which favored advantage. ADA are clearly per of a more reveals but one discussion aspect immediately foregoing As defendants state matter fundamental and problem. pervasive weak between brief: “The their expenditures per pupil relationship reply factors wealth and taxable part by affecting explained per pupil... in different cost of substantially programs equivalent offering school districts have old some school districts. For buildings example, maintenance; have a some which disproportionate expensive require salaries; must some older teachers entitled number of higher spend of vandalized for for excessive amounts repair security, in remote of the State have a few Some schools parts high buildings. than classes for less students. and must maintain students ten costly out noise from must insulate rooms Some schools keep distracting are located in State where or Some freeways. parts airports or climatic conditions unusually high heating require expenditures examine, however, we here Under air system conditioning.” those to it district to meet of a school problems peculiar depends ability A wealth of that district ADA. the taxable fiscally large part upon in a would if tailored way, neutral responsive responsible system, Rather, raise. it would which defendants resemble no specter way its own to meet district’s the individual particular problems make ability factors educational with upon opportunity depend connected providing district, the discrimination and thus the wealth dissipate than other us. before characterizes system defendants’ in its For all of the reasons we entirety reject foregoing neutrali- with the criterion of “fiscal constellation contentions dealing concluded, We the trial court. have upon ty” complete adopted evidence, discrimination in and the that the review of the findings ' to exist has been shown schooTffhancirig complain whichplaintifFs issue, court, in so* at and that the trial here under finding, to address the question proceed proper~critená7Wenow' employed" in violation of as shown to exist is invalid as whether constitutional guarantees.

VI not the whether or court, determination of I this in its In Serrano action, faced at the was stated a cause of of the complaint allegations

761 outset with the task standard to choosing proper equal protection Court,” out, United States we “has applied. Supreme pointed “[T]he a two-level test for classifications employed measuring legislative against clause. ‘In the area economic equal protection regulation, high restraint, court a has exercised with investing legislation presumption drawn that distinctions a by constitutionality merely requiring statute to a conceivable bear some rational challenged relationship legitimate purpose. ... ^[1] On the other hand, in cases involving interests,” . . the . classifications” or on “fundamental touching “suspect court has an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting adopted the classification to strict . . . Under the strict standard scrutiny. applied cases, that it such the state bears the burden of establishing only a interest the law but that the distinctions has compelling justifies ” drawn the law I at (Serrano are to further its by necessary purpose.’ 765, from Westbrook v. 2 Cal.3d 784-785 (1970) p. quoting Mihaly [87 839, 471 P.2d vacated on 487], other U.S. Cal.Rptr. grounds L.Ed.2d 91 S.Ct. 2224].) [29 on the basis of the the case before us Concluding complaint involved both a classification” (because discrimination in “suspect was made on the basis of wealth) and affected a “fundamental question interest” we (education), the latter standard. Ad proceeded apply ourselves to the state interest advanced defendants—local dressing and fiscal control—we concluded that it was not decision-making power incumbent us to decide whether that asserted interest was upon or whether the financial was “compelling” existing system “necessary” its furtherance because under the facts as the notion of local alleged control was a “cruel illusion for the school districts” due to poor limitations them itself. “In we placed upon system summary,” held, a “so as the assessed valuation within district’s boundaries is long schools, determinant of how much it can for its major spend with a tax will be able decide how much it base large truly choose to cares about education. The district cannot freely really poor tax an excellence which its tax rolls cannot Far from itself into provide. choice, local fiscal being necessary promote present of that less districts actually wealthy option.” deprives I at (Serrano below, of trial United

During progress proceedings rendered its in San Antonio School States Court decision Supreme There, District v. 411 U.S. 1. itself to an Rodriguez, supra, addressing attack on the Texas equal protection financing system— which like the here in is based on the “foundation question court held that that did not result in (1) approach”—the high system wealth, classification based did not aifect (2) suspect upon any interest, fundamental education less than fundamental for these being because it was not or or purposes explicitly implicitly guaranteed 33-34, terms of the federal Constitution. at (Id., protected by pp. 42-43, held, 61-62 L.Ed.2d at 59-60].) pp. [36 Accordingly, court so-called “strict test” for review of state laws scrutiny equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was Reinforced in this conclusion fact that the case inappropriate. taxation, before it involved local of fiscal peculiarly questions planning, and educational -thus raised serious considerations of policy—and federalism and deference to local decision at 40-44 L.Ed.2d (id., pp. [36 at court 47-50])—the examine Texas pp. high system proceeded test, under the less “rational that .such stringent relationship” concluding to the state of local control was shown.39 at (Id., relationship purpose 48-55 L.Ed.2d 51-56].) pp. at pp. [36 with the trial court and the it is clear that

We—along parties—think undercuts our decision I in Serrano extent that we held Rodriguez the California to be as (if proved alleged) to be invalid as in violation of the clause of equal protection Fourteenth However, Amendment to the United States Constitution. 11, we made clear in footnote our decision in I Serrano was based not on the of the federal Constitution but on the provisions provisions our own state Constitution as well. Our footnote 11 read as “The follows: also that the complaint alleges I, violates article sections 11 and 21 in substance financing system [now IV, I, article section 16 and article section of the 7(b)] California Constitution. Section 11 ‘All laws of a nature shall provides: general have a uniform Section 21 states: ‘No or operation.’ special privileges dissenters, the four Justice White 39Among his specifically grounded disagreement with to this latter on the basis which we refused respect point very upon had to consider I—i.e., control” as a “local interest” in Serrano “compelling that the notion of local (Id., control for less districts was chimerical. at wealthy 63-70 L.Ed.2d at pp. [36 Marshall, J., 60-65]; see also dis. 127-130 pp. difference, opn. by 97-100].) L.Ed.2d at pp. pp. [36 course, was that we had looked to this consideration in our application test,” the so-called “strict whereas Justice with scrutiny White—apparently agreeing that that test was for federal in the majority circumstances there inappropriate purposes it in order to conclude that the state had failed to demonstrate present—utilized rational any between its and the asserted interest. relationship altered, revoked, be or ever shall be immunities may granted citizen, citizens, class be or nor shall any Legislature; repealed which, terms, the same shall not or immunities upon granted privileges [40]as to all We have these citizens.’ construed provisions granted clause ‘substantially equivalent’ equal protection federal Mental Amendment to the Constitution. Fourteenth (Dept, of 400 P.2d v. Kirchner 62 Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. Hygiene [43 federal our 321].) plaintiffs’ protection Consequently, analysis equal their claim these state constitution is also under contention applicable us is I at The first here al (Serrano facing question provisions.” of two in that of the sentences light foregoing proper interpretation Rodriguez. this have been of

Three suggested interpretations language possible hereto, all embraced us. All on by parties properly premise proceed forecloses our second Kirchner that the footnote’s citation of any opinion federal that a classification satisfies protection equal argument our constitutional the same token satisfies own standards provisions.41 by I this, however, our reliance in Serrano defendants argue Granting cases with on United States Court dealing proper applica- Supreme in tion of review must be reexamined of the strict standard light scrutiny in the of and that such reexamination must result conclusion Rodriguez, a interest” is neither classification” nor a “fundamental “suspect involved, here of a strict standard for of use scrutiny purposes precluding hand, Plaintiffs, the state constitutional on the other resolving question. that removal of Serrano leaves our urge ground by Rodriguez federal I rationale intact state that if on wholly grounds. Alternatively argue they to be in is utilized our state constitutional analogy Rodriguez by applying that, for state “fundamental interest” provisions—so example, if would be held to exist only purposes right question explicitly of at the 1974 40The 7 General Election Proposition added passage following I, 7, (a): to our Constitution as article section subdivision “A not provision person may life, law be or without due denied deprived liberty, or property process equal of the laws.” protection court, 41In the indicated Kirchner this to mandate of the United opinion responding States Court our decision in Mental whether essentially inquiring Dept. Supreme 488, 720, (1964) P.2d v. Kirchner 60 Cal.2d 20 A.L.R.3d Hygiene Cal.Rptr. [36 reached, held that in our had an the conclusion although independent ground, 353] view Amendment, clause of the Fourteenth was equal any required by protection event our state “We so conclude independently required by equal provisions. protection law,” said, this court our construction and California by “regardless application (62 whether there is or is not same end Constitution.” compulsion federal 588; Karst, Cal.2d (See at italics v. Priest: A Court’s added. Serrano State The Federal Law Constitutional Responsibilities Opportunities Development of 743-748.) 60 Cal. L.Rev. state Constitution—the interest dt guaranteed by implicitly This, recalled, it will be was the to meet this test.42 education will seen ante, fn. court (see the trial accompanying theory adopted by text). is the correct on this point adopted plaintiffs position primary second reference to our its I makes clear As Serrano

one. through our state hereto are as all equal Kirchner (and agreed), parties opinion of’ the while guaran “substantially equivalent provisions, protection United States to the Amendment in the Fourteenth tees contained which, in a Constitution, anof given are vitality independent possessed obtain if that which would case, different from demand an analysis may in a We have stated were the federal standard recently applicable. civil liberties—which the area of fundamental context: related “[I]n Declaration of of the California ... all includes Rights—we protections that, our resort, to the of last sit as a court subject only qualification accorded the national restrict may guarantees interpretations In constitutional the federal charter. such under adjudication, citizenry and the full referent is California law our first panoply rights of as their due. decisions Californians have come to Accordingly, expect Court fundamental are United States rights defining Supreme consideration, but are to be afforded respectful persuasive authority no less courts when be followed California they provide by v. California law.” than is individual by (People guaranteed protection 297, 943, 951, 4 538 P.2d fn. 14 Cal.3d (1975) Cal.Rptr. [123 Longwill 101, 114-115 16 Cal.3d Disbrow (1976) also v. see 753]; [127 People 929, 939 14 Cal.3d 360, v. Norman (1975) 545 P.2d 272]; People Cal.Rptr. 13 Cal.3d 109, (1975) v. Brisendine 538 P.2d 237]; People Cal.Rptr. [123 are cited in of this of our state Constitution support 42Three sections explicitly are: proposition. They IX, of and (1) intelligence being section 1: “A diffusion general knowledge Article and liberties of the shall of the rights people, Legislature essential to preservation moral, intellectual, scientific, of all suitable means encourage by promotion agricultural improvement.” IX, of common (2) 5: “The shall for Legislature provide Article section in each district at least six shall be schools which a free school kept up supported in which a school has been established.” after the first year months every year, XIII, XVI, 15): “From all state revenues there § art. (3) Article section 8 (formerly the state monies to be for-support public first set applied shall apart education.” of institutions higher school system public in the instant Project, joins and Government Amicus curiae Childhood Whereas, its contention, imagery describing position. from does not shrink passionate as-a told, had to be in Rodriguez fundamentality argued claim-of we “the federal are law California the Bill of Rights[,] of from the language [u]nder remote inference general words thunders the conclusion [C]onstitution itself.[\\” from

765 Burrows 315, v. 531 P.2d 528, 1099]; Superior 548-552 Cal.Rptr. [119 166, 238, 590]; 245-246 529 P.2d Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. [118 596, Mandel v. 244]; 54 615-617 (1976) Cal.Rptr. Hodges Cal.App.3d [127 Bakery. P.2d State Kaluna (1974) 58-59]; 55 Hawaii 361 City v. [520 401-402;43 Note, see Fairbanks (Alaska 1970) 471 P.2d generally Toward An Activist Role State Bills (1973) Project Rights Report: Foreword: The State 271; Falk, Harv. Civ. Lib.L.Rev. Rights—Civ. Constitution: A More Than Ground (1973) “Adequate” Nonfederal Declaration 273; Note, Cal. L. Rev. Rediscovering Rights California L.J. (1974) Hastings Thus, the fact that a of the United States majority Supreme contract the area of active and critical Court have now chosen to analysis federal constitutional can under the strict test for scrutiny purposes44 afforded have no effect construction application upon existing fact—if be a our own constitutional Nor can the additional provisions. certain of the court’s decisions have (which fact—that former high may us in Serrano I) been relied not be to thrive upon by may expected cause us to withdraw from the we there shadow Rodriguez principles announced on state as well as federal grounds. then, determinations,

For these reasons we now adhere to our made in I, Serrano that for the reasons there stated and for of assessing purposes our state of our state constitution- financing system light al laws discrimination provisions guaranteeing equal protection 43Wefind the of the Alaska Court to be in this language Supreme particularly apposite “While we the minimum constitutional us must enforce standards imposed upon respect: Amendment, we the United States Court’s of the Fourteenth interpretation by are Supreme free, and we are under a additional constitutional and duty, develop rights if we find such fundamental and under our... Constitution privileges rights privileges and to be necessary be within the intention and of our local constitutional language spirit civilized life ordered which is at the core of our constitutional for the kind of and liberty for constitutional direction We need not stand and idly waiting heritage. by passively, we concurrently develop court of the land. Instead should moving from highest (471 embedded in our constitutional law.” P.2d at expound principles 401-402, omitted.) fns. pp. that the had considerable 44We do not think to doubt Rodriguez majority open decisions, in who in its new to certain of its especially difficulty accommodating prior approach Marshall, Indeed, we share the of Justice the area of fundamental rights. curiosity where the right his dissent states that he “would like to know the Constitution guarantees 535, Williamson], (1942) 541 Skinner v. Oklahoma rel. 316 U.S. to procreate, [86 [ex 1655, 1660, elections, v. 1110], 62 S.Ct. or the to vote in Reynolds L.Ed. right e.g., Sims, (1964) 1362], U.S. 533 L.Ed.2d 84 S.Ct. to an from 377 or the right appeal [12 conviction, Illinois, (1956) v. 351 U.S. 12 L.Ed. 76 S.Ct. criminal 585, e.g., [100 Griffin 82].) 55 A.L.R.2d at L.Ed.2d at 100 (Rodriguez, supra, p. p. 1055].” [36 in on the educational basis of district wealth involves a opportunity classification, education is a fundamental interest. suspect Because the school here in been shown has financing system question substantial and evidence at trial to involve a convincing produced one, classification as this like the former draws (insofar system, suspect on the basis of district and because that classifica- wealth), distinctions of the students of this state in tion affects the fundamental interest education, in as we concluded in we have no difficulty concluding today, I, the school before us must be examined Serrano that financing system with strict and under our state constitutional that provisions searching to such a case.45 scrutiny appropriate

We are fortified in this conclusion in reaching by language appearing court, decision itself. The Rodriguez high passing upon validity clause, of the Texas under the federal equal protection repeatedly its lack of with local emphasized “expertise” familiarity problems and educational which lack policy, against “counselled] interference with informed made at the state and premature judgments local levels.” at L.Ed.2d at These 48].) (Rodriguez, supra, p. p. [36 considerations, with concerns from conjunction abiding standpoint federalism,46 that court’s view conclusion high “buttressed] [its] school finance is an candidate for Texas’ system public inappropriate (Id., court, L.Ed.2d at This on strict at 49].) judicial scrutiny.” p. [36 hand, the other the instant case addressing occupies position quite different that of the court in constraints of from high Rodriguez. 45In we need not address the raised in pointed view of this conclusion problem, curiae, lucid of the amici whether in our state equal-protection fashion one applying review of all classifications we should insist strict scrutiny governmental provisions upon wealth, thus such classifications to a level of based on “suspectedness” elevating race. The classification here in which is based on to those based on question, equivalent district wealth, fundamental interest of the children of the state in affects the clearly here, education, (see 614-615), I and we hold as we held in Serrano especially pp. strict under our state this combination of factors warrants judicial scrutiny equal- protection provisions. as follows: “It 46The court its on the federalism misgivings question high explained remembered, also, under the Protection Clause must be has claim arising Equal every and state under our federal for the between national power implications relationship in the Questions of federalism are inherent always determining system. process the traditional of whether a State’s laws are to be accorded presumption constitutionali While maintenance scrutiny. or are instead to rigorous judicial to be ty, subjected ‘[t]he of the federalism is a foremost consideration interpreting any of the of principles action,’ examines state constitutional under which this Court pertinent would be provisions on our federal difficult to a case a greater potential impact imagine having us, now in which we are to of urged abrogate systems State.” than the one before 44; (Id., at education in existence virtually every p. financing public fn. omitted presently 49].) at L.Ed.2d p. [36

767 federalism, of our so to necessary functioning unique system proper court in determina- of national are not to this its government, applicable tion of whether our own state’s runs afoul public financing system Moreover, of state constitutional while we cannot claim that provisions. have we achieved the on the of school perspective “expertise” subjects and educational our deliberations in this matter have policy, had the benefit of a trial record thoughtfully developed (comprising 4,000 almost of testimonial with the transcript, pages replete opinions of various and and a clerk’s experts accomplishments persuasions, of almost if size), not exhaustive transcript equal comprehensive findings on the of an able trial and voluminous part judge, briefing by parties curiae, and than no less nine amici which are included the state among of Public Instruction. We believe that this Superintendent background us to undertake the of our amply equips judicial searching scrutiny state’s which is of us under our financing system required state constitutional of the laws. provisions guaranteeing equal protection however,

We out in that our of the strict point closing, application test in case this should in no to an scrutiny way interpreted imply the trial court and advanced as an acceptance theory, adopted by alternative rationale amici, and some of their by plaintiffs supporting by which the “fundamentalness” in affect- Rodriguez approach assessing ed 20, ante, in the state fn. rights (See applied by analogy sphere. Suffice it to that we text.) are constrained no more

accompanying say inclination than by authority gauge importance rights interests affected classifications determin- by legislative wholly through the extent to which are or ing they “explicitly implicitly guaranteed” 33 at L.Ed.2d at the terms of our 43]) (Rodriguez, supra, p. p. [36 mutable state Constitu- compendious, comprehensive, distinctly In tion.47 our state constitutional applying provisions guaranteeing equal laws we shall continue to strict and protection apply searching which, because of their classifications judicial scrutiny legislative on those individual and liberties which lie at the core of impact rights 47In the 1970 California Constitution Revision Commission report (proposed (introduction) 7) revision it is stated: “Between part 1964 our 16,000 Constitution amended was over 300 times. Its increased from to more than length 75,000 words, and it was 10 times than the United States longer Constitution.” Largely commission, a result of the work of the amendments made to 1964 have subsequent somewhat, reduced the sheer size of the document but it remains as it was today, aptly termed over two “A decades Prolix And Charter . .. ago, Formidable hardly adapted be a convenient code (Palmer or for the & rallying symbol ideologies democracy.” Selvin, Cal., Const., of Law in Development feature in Ann. West’s Ann. Cal. spec, IV, (1954 ed.) 26-27.) Codes at pt. pp.

our free and form of are consid- representative government,48 properly ered “fundamental.”

VII stated, For the reasons above we have concluded that the state review, here under because it financing system establishes I a classification based district wealth which affects upon perpetuates I education, fundamental interest of must be to strict subjected judicial whether with our state scrutiny determining complies equal Under this standard the provisions. presumption \protection to state classifications falls normally legislative constitutionality attaching and the state must shoulder the burden of that the away, establishing classification in to achieve a question necessary compelling 597; interest. I at Weber (Serrano see also v. Council City Cal.3d 958-959 513 P.2d 601].) Cal.Rptr. Basing [109 our determination factual trial upon amply supported findings court, above, which we have summarized in II we conclude without part ¡i hesitation that the trial court determined that the state failed to properly | bear this burden.

Our reasons for this conclusion are those stated us on essentially by this in Serrano I. The has been found point system question court, trial evidence, on the basis of substantial and to suffer convincing from the same basic which was shortcomings alleged system wit, exist in the it allows the original complaint—to availability educational aas function of the assessed valuation opportunity vary ADA of taxable within a district. The state interest per property given advanced in of this discrimination continues to be that of justification However, local control of fiscal and educational matters. trial court has found that asserted interest to be chimerical from the standpoint those which are favored in districts less taxable wealth pupil, terms,of record, ourselves, and we after a are in examination of thorough wholehearted with this assessment. agreement

The admitted to the which were improvements wrought by I Serrano have not and will not in the been Legislature following foreseeable future be sufficient to features of the those negate course, 48We do not the treatment suggest, afforded particular rights interests of our state Constitution is to be accorded provisions significant consideration in determinations of this kind. We do that this factor is not to be suggest conclusive given weight. this Foremost among these—espe- which inequity. operate perpetuate revenue limits—is and restrictive inflation in a of rising cially period which, overrides voted tax while providing continued availability what with a means they districts more affluent ready meeting will be educational conceive as objectives, legitimate proper such districts, unable support passage recognized poorer as but a new and desired in order to meet overrides objectives, equally illusion” which we found to of that “cruel more invidious aspect short, we I at In what (Serrano inherent in the former system. true here. in this is former said our long respect equally “[S]o opinion a a district’s boundaries within as the assessed valuation major schools, a district with for its of how much can determinant spend how much it will be able to decide a tax base really truly large [per ADA] choose to tax itself district cannot education. The cares about freely poor Far from tax rolls cannot excellence which its being into an provide. choice, the local fiscal financing system present necessary promote (Id.) of that the less districts wealthy option.” actually deprives school the California clear financing It is public accordingly the educational review, because it renders here under opportunity system of the taxable wealth this state a function to the students of per available live, shown the state which has been ADA of the districts in they Defen state interest.49 to be to achieve necessary compelling dants, however, to their bow: one have one more they, joined by string curiae, even in the event of this the amici contend that such holding by held to be in violation of court the before us cannot be financing system state because other our equal protection provisions, provisions authorize such a It is to this Constitution just system. specifically contention that we now turn.

VIII authorization Defendants’ claim state constitutional specific for the before us is based upon primarily that, 19, ante, has been indicated in footnote the trial court found in addition to 49As test, invalid for the State of under the strict being scrutiny financing system “[t]he California Constitution even California violates the equal-protection provisions While it is the lesser constitutional standard of rational relationship.” unnecessary under matter, rational we do observe that we no perceive for us to direct ourselves to this and a end of local initiative between the asserted governmental maximizing relationship to exercise such initiative only proportion which realistic provides options 1, v. 411 U.S. (Cf. Antonio District Rodriguez, supra, district wealth ADA. San School White, J.).) (dis. 63-70 L.Ed.2d opn. 60-65] [36 XIII, article section “Within terms of such limits provides: 20 as under Section of this Article the may provided [allowing local maximum tax rates and Legislature provide property bonding limits], the shall for an annual Legislature provide levy by county bodies taxes district sufficient to annual governing produce revenues for each the that district’s board determines are for its schools and district functions.” The required argument, generally stated, is a that harmonious of this section with other interpretation along of the laws must provisions insulate requiring equal protection operate distinctions based on district wealth from disparities equal protec- tion First, on two distinct levels. requirements. argument proceeds is held we in I that the Serrano there before us urged, was system XIII, “authorized” the “mandated” to article section by predecessor IX, 21 (former art. 6); § defendants and their par. holding, assert, amicus the law case, is now of the and to the extent supporting that the here in in shares of the former system question shortcomings related to district wealth it too is so “authorized” and system disparities, Second, out, “mandated.” it is even if not we are pointed compelled case, this conclusion doctrine of law of the terms of by section "the We indicated result. take these contentions in compel up order. I, in

At 595 and 596 of our Serrano opinion rejecting pages there exist was violative contention that the system alleged plaintiffs’ IX, of the of article “a common section system (requiring provisions IX, observed that article section schools”), we former paragraph XIII, issue, hére at 21), art. authorizes (now § provision “specifically of which (Id., element fiscal very system plaintiffs complain.” at At a later in the contention of 596.) p. opinion, point rejecting involved, defendants that de facto discrimination was here we had only occasion is to observe that scheme mandated in funding “[t]he detail California Constitution and statutes.” at (Id., every by references, It is these two taken represent urged together, holding that the there before was the terms of us system required by present XIII, section 21. article Insofar as now under examination system shares in features of the former we found system objectionable I, it is that section Serrano defendants equally argue, required of the law the case. under the doctrine Indeed, devoid merit.

We contentions as such being utterly reject clear, seizure of our we shall defendants’ such make upon fragments in an results I as a basis of in Serrano argument opinion but more distortion of such unfortunately unreasoned displays language I the law of the Serrano (now the rationale of to circumvent an attempt It of context. isolated words out beyond case) by emphasizing IX, that former article cavil—that beyond stating question—and of the fiscal element section 6 authorizes very “specifically that “element” of the we had reference to which plaintiffs complain,” ADA the several variations among permitting expenditures of the statement and the districts. This is made clear the context article IX it. Former section “common (the language following held, not, schools” should we to school provision) interpreted apply “uniform educational because such financing require expenditures” an would render inconsistent with former section 6 (the interpretation here at which allows variation in school district issue) provision however, This was former section expenditures. say, “authorized” or a in which variation such was system “approved” in district wealth. such conclusion would product disparities Any clearly have been at odds with ultimate in Serrano I that our conclusion there to exist was violative of state as well as system alleged equal federal VI, Cal.3d at fn. Part (5 11.) (See protection provisions. generally ante.) of an later on in our in entirely

Similarly, by saying opinion, disposing contention, scheme was “mandated different that the school funding (id., 603; at the California Constitution and statutes” detail p. every by that the constitutional italics we in no added), provision way implied The constitution- there to exist. “mandated” alleged question below, out more “mandated” al as we shall fully provision, point local decision as to the level of school that there be a for system allowing and that the mechanism to be utilized providing expenditures revenues to such be a levy permit expenditures county of that which taxes. It was the statutes enacted under the aegis provision decision wealth. tied of local to district efficacy We conclude for the reasons50 that the doctrine of the law of foregoing It case is not to defendants on this remains for us to helpful point. 50Two additional in this raised our esteemed in dissent are colleague points respect devoid of merit. The of section 20701 et of the Education equally Code, requirements seq. I which in the words of Serrano “authorized the ... taxes body levy governing on the real within a school district at a rate to meet the district’s property necessary 592) (5 course than annual education Cal.3d at are of rather budget” statutory Moreover, below, we constitutional in stature. out such would requirement point us, no mandate a such as that before in which the creation of way system, through

Ill IX, XIII, an of article section 21 art. (former undertake interpretation in order to whether that determine 6) § requires provision par. which, us, that before makes local decisions like their for effectiveness educational upon affecting opportunity depend ADA in the district. We conclude without hesitation taxable wealth that it does not. above, XIII, have noted article section of the state

As we within limits Constitution that the certain set by provides Legislature, limits, an established maximum tax rates and “shall bonding provide annual bodies of school district taxes sufficient levy by county governing annual revenues for each district that the district’s board produce determines are for its and district functions.” In so required schools both authorizes to establish a doing provision Legislature are mechanism revenues for each district to be “required” mechanism—i.e., the character of that “an describes produced, bodies of school district taxes.” The annual levy by county governing not, however, of the tax base does address itself to the question provision in terms of assessed is to be nor does to which levy applied, speak not authorize in in it does valuation disparities any Manifestly respect. wealth ADA of a based relative school district per upon expenditures have been here insofar as school district. Such they disparities, particular action, constitutional exist, to are the result of shown legislative mandate. that it IX, 14 Constitution establishes

Article section clearly for which bears the ultimate is the establishing responsibility Legislature its exercise of this districts and their boundaries.51 school By XIII, the concurrent exercise of its under article powers power, a mechanism based section 21 to for school financing upon provide taxes, a levies of school district it has created system whereby county ADA the various in assessed valuation among disparities per to districts result in in educational available disparities opportunity I, Thus, districts. in the students within such we said Serrano in districts of wealth ADA the would foster Legislature of varying degrees disparities IX, educational our statement I that former article Serrano opportunity. Similarly XIII, 21), (now to school taxes” § section 6 art. authorizes local districts “specifically levy (5 12) Cal.3d at fn. in no that that section authorizes a p. way implies system violation of the requirements equal protection. relevant: have 51The section in as here “The shall Legislature question provides law, to for the of school power, by general provide incorporation organization districts, districts, class, districts, kind and and community college every high such districts.” may classify lines, thus district drew the school action boundary “[gJovcnuncntRl contain each district would local wealth how much [cita- determining action, we is the reiterate It is that Cal.3d at (5 tions].” determinations,52 we hold to be today legislative product of our state protection violation guaranteeing equal provisions laws.53 however, XIII, article that because

It seems to be argued, of school of schools 21 authorizes section county levy this taxes, to structure a based is free upon Legislature notion, to Such a we hasten that it chooses. mechanism point any way A constitutional out, absurd. creating provision manifestly remains in a area subject always particular legislate duty power unless the all constitutional governing legislation requirements general it from such the Constitution intent of requirements plainly exempt appears. 1001], P.2d

In In re Jacobson (1936) [60 Cal.App.2d to its to create power acting pursuant Legislature, example, VI, did so in a manner which art. 11a), of inferior courts (former § than to courts in townships jurisdiction city populous granted greater of the class of courts of less the same townships—regardless populous held, This, it in violation of the was was city. particular population laws of a nature fundamental constitutional general requirement have a uniform “The derives its to create application. legislature power Constitution,” stated, courts the the court “but it do so in may from conclusion, of a clear non is guilty the 52The in dissenting reaching opinion, opposite in which that section “requires from the Starting proposition sequitur. (when sufficient tax in an amount a school annually each county may levy each district the revenues deemed aid) necessary by to by it then provide supplemented XIII, the section of make reference to article to that county,” proceeds assessed in on to local be all taxed by government which that property Constitution requires it these goes which it is situated. From premises and district in the county, city which a school financing system ... “necessarily contemplates conclude that section district....” taxable wealth of that are satisfied from the each individual district’s needs however, so, means that the it no follows this to be by without conceding Assuming system it, is, which the “the majority the dissent present so as puts contemplated shown, of we have is product as system, find unconstitutional.” The present command. not constitutional legislative judgment, and irrefutably: contention pointedly 53Thelearned trial disposed present judge IX 21 of § that section 6 of Article this court is “The rationale which [now impresses with the various school districts did not create of the California Constitution Article XIII] wealth. Section differences in and with their property their boundaries geographical IX, have whatever school districts written to to [i.e., 21 of Article apply § Article XIII] been created the California Legislature.” by with the the Constitution. It doubtless has the conformity provisions of to cities to made such right classify according population, having classification to different for each of the prescribe powers regulations must, however, classes. The be uniform for each powers regulations 500; of the classes.” at (16 italics added.) Cal.App.2d in Mordecai v. Board 183 Cal. 434 Similarly, Supervisors [192 P. to its constitutional to Legislature, acting pursuant 40] power XI, create and the affairs of districts art. (former 13), § regulate irrigation enacted a from its comprehensive irrigation plan exempted those districts located in counties which had a charter provisions adopted This, concluded, to a date. we it could not do. “It is prior specific argued, effect, XI, this art. § provision empowers [former 13] to it what laws sees fit in to districts pass legislature regard irrigation untrammeled that laws of a nature by general requirement general shall have a uniform We cannot with this. There is operation. agree to indicate that this nothing granted power legislature by was not to be exercised to the provision subject general require- ments of the constitution the manner in which the governing power when conferred or shall be exercised. The legislation possessed legisla- ture has the the constitution power provision just conferred districts, but that quoted legislate concerning irrigation affairs of like the other on power, must power legislature legislate subjects, exercised the manner in which the constitution that the provides power when it exists must be exercised. legislation any grant power of legislate Before on a can be held to be particular subject general free of all the intent the constitution to that requirement governing legislation, must be No such intent in the instance.” (183 plain. appears present effect 441-442; Cal. at italics added.) pp. token, the same we are here confronted with a situation in which By has been for the Legislature granted power provide of schools the mechanism of levies of school district through county taxes. in the constitutional Nothing provision establishing power, however, indicates its exercise is to be freed from constitu- general tional limitations to all the legislation. applicable Accordingly Legisla- ture, in its exercise of the with other subject power conjunction powers it, was act in a manner consistent with such possessed by obliged limitations. This it has not done. Instead it has undertaken to create a which, school of educational system financing by making quality available ato student the wealth of the opportunity dependent upon lives, district in which he inconsistent with fundamental manifestly of the laws to constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection ' all citizens of this state. That we hold can no today, system, longer endure.

We also without merit the contention that the wholly reject before made or school us is somehow financing system necessary IX, of article section of the state by permitted provisions That section “A diffusion of Constitution. provides: general knowledge to the of the and essential being rights intelligence preservation all liberties of the shall suitable encourage people, Legislature moral, intellectual, scientific, means promotion agricultural at this We declare ourselves a loss to understand how improvement.” mandate authorize the creation of a can be said to or system provision conditions educational on the taxable wealth of opportunity district in which the student attends school.

For the reasons we cannot defendants’ argu foregoing accept that there conflict ment exists some irreconcilable between require ments of our state and other state constitu equal protection provisions XIII, tional article section provisions equal stature—namely IX, them, article section 1. The latter as we neither provisions, interpret us, mandate nor such as that before and therefore the approve conflict which here is that between of our only appears requirements and the realities equal protection provisions proven present, created California school conflict legislatively public financing system—a court, which the invalid, trial to be by holding properly resolved.54

IX To we conclude that the trial court recapitulate, properly ordered and decreed that the California public financing system 54We decline defendants’ invitation to address ourselves to the constitutional merits of the various alternatives and combinations thereof which have been developed in the literature on this Our concern is with the scholarly subject. today system presently We before us. are confident that the aided what we have said Legislature, today will which has about this be able to devise a body grown subject, scholarship up which achieves constitutional from the conformity financing system an of educational structure taxation. through standpoint opportunity equitable decision, observes, “the ultimate As the from quoting Rodriguez dissenting opinion the democratic of those must come the lawmakers and from pressures solutions from with our brethren as to we we differ who elect them.” In this most heartily agree; which that task must be undertaken. framework in constitutional

for schools, those "public elementary secondary including provisions of the S.B. 90.and A.B. 1267 this while legislation system, pertaining in violation the the clause of Fourteenth equal protection the Constitution, Amendment United States is invalid as in being I, violation of IV, former article sections and 21 art. 16 and (now § aft. I, 7, of the Constitution, § California known as respectively) commonly of the laws of our state equal Constitution. This protection provisions and the determination other related of the we find provisions judgment to be evidence; indeed, and the fully no attack supported by findings has been made on the as For the findings lacking evidentiary support. detailed, reasons we have we discern no defect in the jurisdictional below based on the us as devoid of proceedings claim—rejected by merit—that the Governor and the should have been Legislature joined We conclude that the of the trial court indispensable parties. holding is on our earlier decision in I Serrano grounded solidly soundly wherein we determined other that the California things among to withstand “strict denied financing system, failing scrutiny,” laws under the relevant plaintiifs equal protection provisions of our state Constitution. We therefore confirm that our decision Serrano I was based not on the equal protection provisions federal Constitution, Constitution but also on such of our state provisions arid we insofar as latter are emphasize provisions applicable here, I Serrano constitutes law of the case.

We observe that the trial court deemed it and so adhered to properly law set forth our earlier constitutional opinion assessing the same as revised S.B. 90 and A.B. purposes system financing 1267. Since such before the court shown on was substan tial involve evidence to classification on district (based wealth) suspect education, to touch interest of fundamental trial court upon Serrano I followed it to the “strict test properly subjecting scrutiny” under which the state has the burden of that the classi establishing fication in to achieve a state interest. necessary question compelling test, this the court determined on

Applying properly findings substantial evidence the state failed to had bear its supported by burden and that before it was invalid as denying of the laws as the California Constitu guaranteed by equal protection claim, that, tion. we hold to defendants’ there is Finally contrary no conflict of our state between requirements equal protection

777 of the California Constitution so as and other provisions provisions determinative case. as the law of this the former yield compel of for We reserve is affirmed. The purpose jurisdiction judgment an award motion upon respondent’s passing considering filed 1977. fees on attorneys’ appeal, January J., Mosk, J., J., Tobriner, concurred. C. Wright, RICHARDSON, J. I with the dissent. respectfully My disagreement on VIII of their wherein focuses majority part opinion they principally article XIII consider the California Constitution application is financing program, concluding present as of the of that Constitu invalid violative equal protection provisions below, I more I serious reservations As have about tion. fully develop as it affects article XIII. constitutional analysis indulged majority with the is that the same thesis majority’s My principal problem essential elements Constitution authorizes challenged expressly system. review of asserted

The learned and majority’s comprehensive another, their of the scheme and faults holding failings present it, devised well be consistent more one must be may equitable, replace Doubtless, with it a well-intended effort sound policy. represents to assure for California’s school children. educational equal opportunity Nonetheless, it is our function to formulate Under our not public policy. time-honored, founded constitutionally system separation govern- mental we are entrusted difficult tasks as with such powers, devising That or between alternative educational financing policies. choosing alone, vested in the within the Legislature, acting responsibility confines Constitution. So as the our state long Legislature expressed work manner with has its in a consistent overriding performed constitu: of our we its efforts tional must regardless uphold personal principles, results. Accord- as or wisdom of those views to the fairness legislative those constitutional vital with becomes to analyze precision great ingly, as invalidate a on action before we limits system important legislative California school as the financing plan. accepted existing do not clause now protection majority rely upon equal in Serrano v. Priest (1971) to our Constitution. Contrary holding federal it is (Serrano I), Cal.3d 487 P.2d now 1241] Cal.Rptr. [96 established that school highest authority systems do not federal (San such ours offend protection principles. equal Antonio School District v. 16, 411 U.S. 1 L.Ed.2d (1973) 93 Rodríguez [36 Indeed, S.Ct. 1278].) herein admit that majority candidly decision “undercuts” Serrano Fs reliance Rodriguez clearly upon national charter. (Ante, 762.) other court in p. Among things, high held that the “strict standard of review Rodriguez was scrutiny” since no “fundamental interest” or classification” inapplicable, “suspect involved; was traditional method local district present unfair some financing, nevertheless though perhaps respects, operates fashion, a rational discrimination; without invidious and that courts should defer to the state in these matters of legislatures policy, since these bodies alone have the with necessary expertise familiarity differ, do, local One as I with the court’s conclusion may problems. high Yet, that education is not a fundamental interest. whether question here at issue violates financing plan equal protection federal has been laid to rest in Rodriguez. herein, The with of the majority disagreeing analysis Rodriguez’ equal issue, I, to the footnote, fact that Serrano in a stated that protection point its federal contention “is analysis also plaintiffs’ equal protection to their claim . . under . state applicable (5 constitutional provisions.” 596, Cal.3d at hold, fn. The noted, then 11.) as we have p. majority California’s school is invalid under the financing system only remaining constitutional Const., refuge—the (Cal. equal provisions. protection I, 7, IV, art. art. § § broad,

In the Constitution both general language guarantees equal of the laws and laws, uniform of the and forbids protection operation Since, irrevocable or immunities. we have special privileges previously observed, these are provisions “substantially equivalent” I, federal 596, clause 5 Cal.3d (Serrano at fn. equal 11), protection so, not to do we defer to the although required might Rodriguez equal rather than create our own different protection analysis interpretation identical constitutional (See v. Disbrow substantially language. People 101, 119, 16 Cal.3d (1976) dis. 545 P.2d 272].) opn. Cal.Rptr. [127 Indeed, a number state courts have done cases post-Rodriguez just declined to invalidate that—namely, comparable in reliance state constitutional Northshore (See systems upon provisions. 178,. District No. 417 v. P.2d School Kinnear 84 Wn.2d 685 (1974) [530 590]; v. Hollins Ariz. 88 P.2d 200-202]; (1973) [515 Shofstall v. Hootch v. 635]; 96 Idaho P.2d cf. Engelking Thompson [537 804; Alaska School 536 P.2d (Alaska 1975) System State-Operated 273].) 62 N.J. 473 A.2d v. Cahill (1973) see Robinson present but [303 I but do are, for reasons accept, fully respect majority cited and the cases. the lead of to follow Rodriguez foregoing unwilling however, dissent, does not foregoing principle rely upon My serious, contains deference, for in view analysis my majority’s fatal, Constitution which flaw: the same California indeed generally essential ele- authorizes the also extends specifically equal protection As matter of California’s of school ments financing. present which the Constitution authority specifically interpretive principle, hand cannot be withdrawn with other. extends with one generally The are that our schools financed majority thoroughly explain sources, two and from the state school fund local district taxes. As major IX, 6, aid to the state to education is authorized article section former, by Constitution, of the state which directs the to a state Legislature provide $180 fund for each in an amount not less than year apportionment attendance; in that the fund shall be apportioned pupil average daily districts; as the the school annually may through Legislature provide, $120 that at least in the and must Legislature apportion per pupil $2,400 each district the next fiscal at least to during preceding year, school district each fiscal year. latter, taxation, the local

As to the assistance to schools from district XIII, herein, authorized article is subject challenge by plaintiffs’ 21, section the Constitution “Within such which limits provides: be under Section 20 of this Article may [allowing provided to maximum local tax rates bonding Legislature provide property shall an limits], for annual by county Legislature provide levy bodies of school district taxes sufficient annual governing provide revenues each that are district the district’s board determines for its schools and district functions.” required section 21 a school

Paraphrased, adopt requires Legislature in which each a school financing system county may annually levy district tax in an the revenues deemed amount sufficient provide each district board. Since under our Constitution necessary property in, must assessed and taxed only by, county, city 14; XIII, it Co. see San Francisco etc. v. Scott (art. situated § Ry. 222, P. Inc. v. 142 Cal. 229 Smith-Rice (1904) 575]; Heavy Lifts, [75 190, 256 841]; Los (1967) County Cal.Rptr. Angeles Cal.App.2d [63 Flavin, 162, Ehrman & Cal. 145-146), § Taxing Property pp. at. Constitution, XIII of the 21 in follows article section necessarily with section a school conjunction contemplates which each individual district’s needs are satisfied from the taxable district, of that wealth which the namely, present system majority find The unconstitutional. describe the as a majority foregoing reasoning If, however, “non section sequitur.” empowers Legislature revenues, for district tax levies to assure and if provide adequate under section 14 the to tax the district to subject property generate district, those revenues must within the wherein lies the “non repose Do not sections 14 combination, authorize, sequitur”? of taxes on local within constitutionally, system wheréby levy property district, aid, shall constitute the source of supplemented by school financing? assert the constitutional at issue was majority provision different,

intended to authorize a more not based equitable, system upon in district wealth. concede that the state Constitution disparities They (ante, “allows variation in 770, school district italics expenditures” p. One would added). that are more related to presume expenditures closely of education than in the value of quality generalized equality However, to district school taxes. we subject properties emphasized I Serrano that the state Constitution did not an require equality between various school districts. Our words were “. . . we have spending never the constitutional interpreted provision require equal Nonetheless, . . .” Cal.3d at (5 insist that spending; p. majority since the Constitution does not district wealth authorize expressly revenues, as to the source of district cannot disparities present system view, deemed its shield. In the “Such protected by majority’s action, . . . are the result of not constitutional disparities legislative 772, connection, mandate.” italics this I do not (Ante, (In original.) p. contend, course, that the California Constitution mandates the present of school but that it or authorizes that financing, permits system.) that

The central theme of the is has somehow majority Legislature abused its constitutional school district authority by drawing boundary manner in a variations in district wealth. As the lines majority permitting it, district which “It is that action we lines], boundary put [drawing determinations, reiterate is the that we hold today product legislative be in violation of our state guaranteeing provisions equal protection

781 Yet, manifest that 772, it is italics in the laws.” (Ante, again original.) school districts to create and derives its classify power Legislature Furthermore, we ourselves IX, 14). (art. the same Constitution § from is school districts over that “The held have legislature power long at districts divide, or abolish such It change, may plenary. [Citations.] S. Dist. (1916) v. Eureka S. Dist. .... (Worthington [Citation.]” pleasure added; v. see P. italics 437], Cal. 156 Ewing 173 Hughes [159 if the It seems to me self-evident P. 1067].) Cal. [28 substantial restric had intended to of our Constitution framers impose district over school tions Legislature plenary power upon I did not do so. boundaries, have so would They they expressly provided. and dramatic it is that such a drastic unlikely highly suggest on as the now would have restriction power majority impose plenary deference, I to occur With due been intended wholly by implication. that, we that those who must contrary, presume adopted suggest its were aware of the fact that (and sections) section predecessor fully there existed for in district wealth and that the effect of years disparities the continued exercise of such would result in plenaiy legislative power continued wealthier districts to allocate disparities, permitted more funds for educational existence (Undoubtedly, purposes. the state such was factor school fund motivating creating disparities IX, local revenues. result of 6.)) (Art. § inequitable supplement wealth is demonstrated forcefully eloquently disparities Nevertheless, once we determine that the action in majority. question or, authorized, indeed constitutionally sociologically unsatisfactory are correction. matters legislative unacceptable, consequences viewed in We have often that a constitutional enactment be insisted context and the conditions to its of its historical existing prior “light 529, 64 Cal.2d 534 enactment.” v. Reitman (1966) Cal.Rptr. (Mulkey [50 XIII, 881,. Section 21 of article was 413 P.2d and cases 825], cited.) We that was to as as 1974. have been told its recently purpose adopted IX, restate “without of former article change meaning” provisions Com., 6, section in 1946. Cal. Const. Revision (See adopted Proposed 6, Revision of the Cal. Constitution Section 6 (1971) 36.) pt. p. provided: “The shall for the annually by governing Legislature provide levying taxes,____ of each and of such school county, body county, city for each school district will in each fiscal such revenue as year produce in such fiscal as board thereof shall determine is governing required for the of all schools and functions said district year support authorized or law.” required by

Thus, 1946, as the California Constitution autho- early expressly Indeed, rized a of local school district financing. original Constitution local school district which to provided any neglected its school lose its of the interest “keep support” might proportion IX, from the school fund. Local school district (Art. 3.)§ public forms, in various but all of them based individual district systems upon wealth, have been in from this state’s operation inception surviving amendments to the numerous constitutional local provisions authorizing Sweet, schools. of the Public School (See support History 60-62, in Cal. at System pp. A

The review of constitutional is not new. close history foregoing examination of our own of the demonstrates analysis previous problem that the same conclusions I have reached were also necessarily implicit our in Serrano I. I find opinion Respectfully, unconvincing majority’s our definitive in Serrano I of the attempt explain away disposition state constitutional issue whether district wealth can survive disparities equal protection analysis.

First, I Serrano describing present financing system, variations in district are a acknowledged wealth-produced spending of the the state Constitution. authorized necessary by-product IX, XIII, We said: “Pursuant to article section 6 to art. predecessor [the Constitution, California has authorized the § Legislature 21] of each taxes on the governing body county, city county, levy real within a school district at a rate meet property necessary Code, district’s annual education 20701 et (Ed. The § budget. seq.) amount of revenue which a district can raise in this manner thus depends base—i.e., on its tax the assessed valuation real within largely property its borders.” Cal.3d at italics (5 added.) p. foregoing, contrary view constitutional fn. is founded (ante, 50), majority upon IX, XIII, to art. (art. (the 21)), § § legislative, authority. predecessor Second, I, in Serrano had that the was plaintiffs argued present system IX, 5, invalid under Constitution, article section of the state which section the for a of common requires Legislature provide system schools. In the that, IX, we said “While article section rejecting argument 5 makes no reference to school section 6 that same article financing, XIII, to art. authorizes the element § predecessor [the specifically very 21] the which 596, Cal.3d at italics system (5 plaintiffs complain.” p. fiscal the fiscal of which What was the “element of added.) system plaintiffs in that this related “variations The insist majority phrase complain”? however, ADA.” I that this “element” think it arguable, per expenditures included not had broader in implications expenditure question For, as on district wealth well. the but disparities page inequalities to the above we had described preliminary plaintiffs’ previous quotation, the as “Plaintiffs’ that contention follows: argument present financing educa and distinct each an method systems, offering separate produces wealth which varies with relative district’s tional program 595, I it is element think that this added.) at italics (Id., residents.” p. authorizes, IX and not existence section 6 of article merely ADA” (as “variations in suggested by majority expenditures herein). I, “it is clear that such

Third, in we stated that Serrano [locally raised] weAs a of the overall educational revenue iá financing system. part 6, out, IX, article section of the state Constitution supra, pointed taxes.” at (Id., local districts school authorizes levy p. specifically article Once must be If under IX local fn. 12.) again question put: if, under taxes are authorized for school support, specifically XIII, Constitution, that same such taxes must be article necessarily wealth, local then how is the rendered assessed unconstitu system upon tional under article I? I Serrano defendants had that

Finally, argued any discriminatory effects were from “de facto” arising present origin in nature. We and in not invidious flatly, my accordingly opinion wisely, “Indeed, we find case unusual noting rejected argument, action is cause of the extent which orig.] governmental [italics The scheme is mandated in the wealth classifications. every funding and statutes.” at italics (Id., detail Constitution California insist that the constitutional mandates added.) provision majority as to the level of a for local decision there be “only system allowing fail, however, I to see how such 771-772). (ante, expenditures,’’ pp. local available wealth local decision based making, necessarily upon aid, from state differs in material any respect supplemented by under herein. scrutiny of the In we must reconcile two separate provisions summary, Constitution, first, our citizens “equal guaranteeing general expression laws,” second, constitutional specific provision protection 784 a school Legislature

authorizing adopt financing whereby each district finances its own educational needs. The majority, purport to follow the well established rule that conflicts between constitution ing al or avoided, XIII, should be construe article statutory provisions 21, section I in a manner which contradicts its respectfully suggest, plain section, the “historical of context” and conflicts meaning, ignores with our own recent construction of that section in Serrano I. The conflict irreconcilable from the of the arising majority’s rejection leads result to a which is not Rodriguez analysis necessarily palatable I, in accordance with Serrano can conflict be resolved them—namely, one manner: the more the Constitution must specific provision of Cal.3d at I am unable to (5 prevail. accept majority’s state, that the conclusion of this school whose present financing essential elements are authorized of the expressly by specific provisions Constitution, is at the same time in violation of the general equal clause of the same Constitution. protection

Few constitutional are more established firmly principles accepted than the that all rule intendments favor of presumptions validity The case for of statutes must reach mere legislation. invalidity beyond “ ‘ doubt to the level at which we can “. . . their fairly say [j/c] unconstitutionality clearly, positively, unmistakeably ap ’ ” 513, re (In H. 2 (1970) 76, Cal.3d 519 pears.” Ricky Cal.Rptr. [86 P.2d it is well settled that 204].) there exists a Similarly, equally strong in favor of the aof presumption Legislature’s interpretation provision the Constitution. (Methodist Sacramento v. Hosp. Saylor 1, Cal.3d Thus, 488 P.2d we 161].) must Cal.Rptr. [97 presume that the construed the of its under Legislature properly scope authority XIII, Constitution, article section and we must further presume is constitutional. The resulting financing legislation must be accorded foregoing principles great weight determining constitutional scheme. validity present

I am toward the efforts achieve a wholly sympathetic majority’s I more fair and result in this case. also equitable fully acknowledge vital our role education must modern and the society, play for all absolute an education of our necessity assuring adequate Yet, could more I with the citizens. There be no this say worthy goal. deference, roam utmost as I conceive our role we are not free to in search answers, but work within the must administratively acceptable limitations, confines of constitutional to the leaving Legislature selection those which are most to a appropriate particular responses Const., III, So has need. art. (Cal. Legislature § long developing interven constitutional we should withhold under its authority operated believe, tion. It I is this wise prompted pertinent principle, admonition of United States Court in the sentences closing Supreme of its merit the attention decision: “These matters continued Rodriguez of the scholars who have contributed much their already challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come lawmakers from from democratic those who elect them.” School Antonio (San pressures of District v. 411 U.S. at at 58-59 L.Ed.2d 58], Rodriguez, supra, pp. [36 italics added.)

I would reverse the judgment.

CLARK, J. I dissent.

Our students, schools $5 serve 5 million over billion. nearly spending Stats., Cal. (1973-1974, 84-85, B, Public Schs. Selected tables IV-1 pp. IV-2 The B.)1 well, educational works its system amazingly considering size, the of its and the of huge complexity support, great diversity and commerce within our state. geography, population level of uniform educational provides high relatively opportunity. $5 half our schools’ from billion comes local Approximately budget real tax. this resource would be to our unfair property Eliminating youth, of their It education. is whether jeopardizing quality questionable $2 an additional Vi billion other taxes raising through politically feasible. The answer lies with the branches executive legislative state While neither abolition of tax local government. urging property XIII, nor article section of our Constitution for invalidating providing local level, taxes and local control of the property spending for absolute in the majority’s requirement equality opportunity school finances2 will have this effect.

Our of school has three or abilities present (a) goals: resources;3 in access to level to maintain provide (b) high equality 1The Selected is an Statistics official and all and table references are publication page to it unless otherwise indicated. The 1973-1974 school is the first under year analyzed Senate Bill No. 90 and Bill No. 1267. Assembly 2The in a we majority variety ways availability not allow may educational as a function of the assessed vary (E.g., valuation opportunity pupil. ante, 755-756, 768.) pp. However, educational is an 3Equal opportunity goal government. important Rather, do not majority concern themselves with educational directly equal opportunity. a level of local control over and amount of nature high expenditure; to a substantial level of fiscal In a (c) require responsibility. where one branch of finances in whole or in another government part branch which is control over the the three are given expenditure, goals in conflict. The of absolute majority’s frequently goal equitable oppor- for school means either local control or fiscal tunity sacrificing branches, Our and executive no doubt based on responsibility. legislative their with numerous federal-state have experience financing programs, established a in which the level of cannot be equal opportunity increased without sacrifice of local fiscal or adminis- significantly major trative control.

The of school finance assures that school district present system every shall have access to certain funds student at a fair local tax rate of district wealth. The combination of the amount regardless guaranteed aid not in this action is categorical challenged equal roughly of the school in California—the percent budget equalized portion—leav- about 10 which is affected our current source of ing percent by concern—district wealth. The in tax potential percent disparity districts is small when viewed in total support among light commitment, educational and is the traditional fully justified by govern- mental interest local with local fiscal preserving decision-making to abolish this small responsibility. majority’s attempt disparity, are concerned with they whether there is for school a test at equal opportunity funding, least one removed from the basic step goal. state, Because there are such variations in our there is little to believe great reason will opportunity educational equal funding produce For equal opportunity. instance, there is variation in costs between great our Sierra schools and our San heating Likewise, schools. air Diego is no doubt a conditioning major expense Valley Imperial but will be minor in coastside areas. School site relatively costs in center of San Francisco will be times than the cost of an many greater amount of land in Paso equal And, course, state, Robles. the cost of varies living greatly throughout indicating need for differentials. There is no reason to assume salary numerous cost differentials faced school districts offset each other and that somehow equal funding will result in educational equal opportunity. More is there the additional whether related importantly, directly question funding educational or whether more direct exists between opportunity relationship matters such as and interests classmates/ Even other of one’s opportunity ability will with there of funds because voters raising equal opportunity funding, disparate have ideas facilities and concerning priorities. different vastly the rich At trial revealed there is no substantial correlation between expert testimony hand, and the level of student district assessed valuation on one district-poor on a scale from one in statewide achievement tests on the other. Measured performance to ten, varied between two and one. the correlation positive negative assumed, Nevertheless, thesis is that the of this the majority’s purposes opinion, enforce is of rather than of educational which the courts should funding equality opportunity. substitute, no will create frustrate local offering greater inequality, or eliminate local fiscal decision-making, responsibility.

This has travelled our courts for many years, having litigation through before this court more than five v. Priest (Serrano been years ago. If the

5 Cal.3d 584 487 P.2d 41 A.L.R.3d 1187].) Cal.Rptr. [96 ante, fn. can be absolute demanded (see, 2) majority equality without local fiscal or local control and achieved sacrificing responsibility XIII, have a taxation article section to by duty required majority tell us how. have not because cannot. They they to districts and “rich”

Secondly, by repeatedly referring “poor” within the 10 districts there must be percent disparity, by holding districts, absolute assume among equalization majority popular Hood, role of Robin take from the rich to to the appearing give poor. However, the whether a assets should be question governmental entity’s Hood, is not the of Robin of our state or federal adjusted province Constitutions, Rather, or of this court. we must look beyond to the that is to serve. governmental entity citizemy government designed so, When we do Robin Hood loses his and we find the Sheriff of disguise, from the more those fortunate. Such Nottingham, taking poor give reverse welfare is clause of hardly compelled by equal protection any constitution. Responsibility

Equality, Control, Local and Fiscal A. The in Goals Conflict

The conflict in can best be illustrated at the outlines goals by looking of various methods of school and their effect on the three financing goals. The method would

(1) be total state simplest appear financing the district with the district full control of the level of given expenditure. Absolute of financial resources is assured because each district equality need ask for funds state will Local control comply. However, assured definition. fiscal fails and the result is responsibility district, A local able to all transfer but bankruptcy. being insignificant state, costs to the will be in unrestricted for the benefit of its spending citizens on school-related school district any activity. Conceivably, every will have a arts center Los performing rivaling Angeles’, resulting insolvency. avoid estab- Of course total state

(2) might bankruptcy by limits, the entire school on expenditure by apportioning lishing spending basis, of the two. While such or a combination system per pupil and fiscal resources meet of equality funding goals might control of levels.4 it eliminates local spending responsibility, would be local At end of the the other financing. (3) purely spectrum of fiscal This satisfies responsibility—requiring requirement system the full amount. to tax itself for money community spends However, would be less than reviewed the system equitable I.5 Serrano While the do not should majority specify to be their choice because it

adopted, “power equalizing” appears to be the one the measure against existing system appears majority “ ‘has ás its essential order to arrive at invalidity. ingredient could choose to at different levels the that school districts spend concept the tax effort would be the same but for each level of chosen expenditure level it be a for each school district such or whether choosing high-wealth ” a low-wealth district.’ (Ante, p. If the is illustrated latter using hypothetical figures. system easily income the same amount of $2 is it must tax rate per pupil produce $800. rate in district state, If the tax district in the let us assume any every the amount let us assume $3, must receive same is the district per pupil, of the wealth of the $1,200. must be received These amounts regardless districts, those with low assessed district. Obviously, poor revenue, will not sufficient and the valuation the tax produce per pupil, districts, In the tax state will have to the difference. rich given provide revenue, the the rates will excessive with state excess. obtaining produce districts, on the let us look at the To illustrate the system impact districts, assessed valuation one three kinds of effect on having producing court, reasons, trial first of school the suggested by 4For the above support Moreover, 747), would (ante, should total state rejected. funding full state funding p. XIII, article local control imposed by violate the partial requirements section 21 of our Constitution. 5 the district lines to have all three by redrawing we could achieve goals Theoretically, However, district. because assessed value student every substantial equality lines would valuations each the boundary and assessed change year, number of students A wildcat oil well might require or two. successful single, have to be every year redrawn Each and teachers. with the of students reassignment a redistricting consequent statewide would also redistricting. Obviously, new subdivision would require large 747) (ante, must the trial court the second system suggested by waste and involve huge be rejected. above, the half that amount of set forth second the exact money having and the third double district), valuation (a assessed having poor rich In first district fiscal district). assessed valuation (a responsibility members, will because school board is assured considering expenditures, or all In the second tax their have to poor constituency expenditures. there, For is introduced. an element of fiscal district irresponsibility half decide to board members dollar spend, every state the other be raised from dollar need constituency, paying state to raise its tax to obtain is half. The rate encouraged poor at the educational for the opportunity community, purchasing funding rate, the tax the more sale. Because the money higher half-price tax district is high encouraged adopt bargain, poor greater This, of district would not undertake. rate, the first funding programs course, federal the basic incentive involved partial support spending for state programs. district, hand,

The third or rich on other will be for any penalized For dollar it seeks to for its students it must expenditure. every spend tax, $2 raise one to their Sacramento. Faced with sending punishing for each the school board members will constituency expenditure, restrain the first and second expenditure by eliminating programs would districts undertake.

Viewed from the district, of dollar cost to the rather than standpoint rate, tax illustration number a mirror of illustration presents image number not but an inverse between equalizing presenting relationship district wealth and to fund schools. The rich district will opportunity become its disincentive to and the will become rich by poor spend, poor rate, its substantial incentive to The fact that at tax spend. any given eliminate be in each district either the does may expenditure equal troublesome disincentive or the incentive. Both render the opportunity for school The varies with the assessed funding unequal. opportunity valuation student within it is true—but per districts—inversely wealth, with district violates the basic varying necessarily majority’s ante, that no 747.) such variation be (See, requirement permitted.6 e.g., that commercial and industrial be removed 6The trial court also suggests property 755-756, rolls, (Ante, level. at the state pp. tax such property from local school taxing cause that the the trial court’s finding principal is on suggestion Apparently, based in some districts of is due to the in the assessed valuation student presence of inequality However, due to this still leave inequalities would and commercial industrial property. in the ratio of values and differences in residential property the great the resulting a district. There is no indication students to total population are basic The illustrated above four school support systems tax. other systems, given financing depends upon Although property ante, either fns. involve (see, 6), have been they systems suggested will waste of resources or lack assurance result they significantly great However, at than the before existing looking system. greater equality two the first a few are warranted. observations Only existing system, can statewide (total require- produce majority’s systems financing) seen, first, The as we have involves financial ment of absolute equality. second avoids risk, The if not a substantial insolvency. certainty, levels. local control but eliminates expenditure totally bankruptcy involve a relation- (local third and fourth necessarily financing) systems for wealth and the educational between district opportunity ship inverse, rule in violation direct or majority’s prohibiting funding, such wealth any relationship.

Further, used the third and fourth are to the extent systems significant- educational some wealth funding ly, relationship opportunity board occur. This results because local school will members—properly look the local effect with their concerned constituency—will always In a we can no less. their action. democracy Considering expect teachers, issue of whether to hire more on fundamental expenditures size, size, teachers, or class local to hire fewer class reducing increasing what and tax rates must ask burdens dollars school board members words, In other unless on district residents. are being placed costs, the all covers going substantially marginal expenditure funding local considerations. Local to be based on systems funding seen, involve wealth relation- four, have three we necessarily used, are extent that or inverse—and any they ships—direct will based on wealth relationships. funding the three The rational conflicting goals equality, approach fiscal control, the and local rejecting majority’s requires responsibility demandfor to each. combined accommodate a system absolute equality accepting be must allowed the ideal absolute Minor equality departure of from The two other to accommodate the existing order interests. compelling does no more. system Baldwin Park and Beverly less under the system. would be than present inequalities Hills, I are both to illustrate great two school districts used Serrano inequality, the residential districts.

primarily to (id.) but is related system was also suggested closely A of vouchers system wealth. family I have our school finance it because delayed evaluating existing system must in the of be viewed alternate The is light systems. present system the and executive to this court’s first Serrano decision legislative response within the confines of our Constitution’s of mixed system requirements 6; 20, of IX, XII, state local and control. (Art. art. 21.) § §§ financing The starts with number the system power equalizing, giving rate, $2.23 school districts an incentive to tax at the poorer computational level, at level, the the $765 to receive foundation elementary per $28,700 student. An assessed valuation of at a rate student tax of per $2.23 $640 $125 will student which when added to the produce per $765 to be for all students7 will A paid required produce figure. $28,700 district an assessed valuation below will not receive having $765 allowance, $125 student from its local taxes and the and the per state will make the balance. More than 85 of the students in up percent $28,700 are this state in districts an assessed valuation of less than having III-8, student. These are called the districts (Table 28.) per p. equaliza- tion aid districts.

The criticism level this of financial against principal part program $765, is the limitation to which means that for above that level come into shouldn’t inequities play. Why program state aid extend on $765? above levels The answer should indefinitely now. The factor inverse wealth apparent by equalization produces because the districts are relationships poor encouraged spend bring Thus, to the some limitation must be money on community. placed this $765 and as will level is type financing, appear, eminently reasonable. is not carried forward to those districts power equalizing approach $28,700 assessed valuation more than student.

having per (Nearly of the students are in those districts.) The determined percent Legislature not to factor discussed above. This that a means apply penalizing $28,700 double the student assessed having, example, per $765 valuation could student at a rate tax of little over half provide per $2.23. rate of About 2Vi computational percent elementary are students in school districts double assessed valuation or more. having III-8, (Table However, $125 $120 7The student is per strictly speaking power equalizing.

$125 IX, allotted on student basis is section of our article required by Constitution, the same Constitution involved imposing equal protection requirements $120 here. To the this extent an produces inequality equal exception 744) (ante, It was trial its protection the court to requirement. improper posit p. determination of on this invalidity factor. 792 factor of the is this criticism levelled system

The against principal rates while still low tax a rich have few districts relatively providing may the the rise to some $765 factor student. inequality, gives Although per of its funds district local the rich alternative part by giving penalizing new in the for school the state will to impose inequities opportunity ones.8 much effect than existing greater practical funding—inequities the in abstract The real is how is legal great inequality—not question as it works. Our concern should terms—but under really system $1 million assessed valuation that there exist a district be may possessing this student, To use the but 38 students. only example possessing unfair, it to statewide is and few more like invalidate the a system to Rather, must we if not to measure attempt folly. existing the total inequality against system. weigh 1267 Bill No. No. trial, Senate Bill 90. to the Assembly

At prior available, was made inequali- quantify results attempt becoming total fund revenues law in terms of the new ties under arising would 76 the revenues was be prediction percent produced. revenues, 15 the foundation arise under percent program, equalized funds assumed to would be of the revenues equalized categorical records 9 this Subsequently, only percent unequalized. proceeding, districts, of the 28 Los unified school of the percent comprising Angeles students, 10 of the constituted showed that state’s budget only percent addition, statewide an funds. In basic showing figure unequalized $985.48 student of (table current per elementary average expenditure IV-1A, $765 with the aid when 84) figure, equalization compared the correctness of indicates testimony.9 roughly number, aid at such resulting figure high By equalization setting students, the insures of our in aid to more than present percent on is distributed funding degree equality. Ninety percent high Further, distributed an basis with inequitably. percent equitable do obtain districts as to the 10 may even part poor percent, $2.23. their tax rate above merely raising addition, the rich district. The limitations on 8In system places spending existing are illusory. at whether the limitations real or court and the discuss majority length

trial I believe factor if and because limitation is a further anything, The spending equalizing discuss the unnecessary spending basic factors do not deny equal protection, limitations and their exceptions. from the average aid is eliminated 9When of.categorical approximately percent $985.48, $837.67 with which should be compared becomes the average payment $765 aid measure the inequality opportunity. figure roughly equalization

793 seen, all As we have to eliminate inequality—the majority’s attempting control, result in loss of local or insolvency, perfection requirement—will 10 in new and Substantial reduction in the percent greater inequity. revenue risks involve substantial similarly inequality appears control, loss of local or new insolvency, inequity. First,

The attack the 90-10 three ratio on levels. majority they say does not meet of absolute (Ante, 755.) requirement equality. However, above, out should not be pointed requirement imposed. Second, ratio, state that the 90-10 based on the 1973-1974 majority does not into take account inflation and future enroll- year, declining ment. However, (Ante, 755-756.) has pp. Legislature provided increases in foundational based on increases assessed programs part valuation, Code, an indicator of inflation. The (Ed. 17669.) § declining enrollment is that aid will decrease under the foundation argument because will be fewer but that there students costs will decrease program at a slower rate. But at an historical cost by looking relationship, test, from their own a new one. majority depart equality introducing Third, state that the of 90 ratio majority percent equalized false, is foundation are funds percent unequalized urging unequa- lized. But the basic aid has (Ante, p. purpose equalization been to offset in the foundation. inequities Although punishment omitted, factor has been it would less than districts having apply students, of all our and would to a much percent significantly apply smaller For this reason percentage. adjustment any quantifying would be minimal. inequalities

Rich and Poor The decision will impact today’s require transferring funding resources from the rich districts to the districts—there little poor being effect on the districts which are neither rich nor In our many poor. urban-suburban live, where most students a rich district does complexes not mean a residents, district of rich but is one of people ordinarily poor while a district of more one fortunate poor ordinarily people. to be a transfer of resources from

impact today’s appears opinion poor to those more fortunate. people

The determination whether a is rich or its poor upon depends Thus, assessed valuation student. tracts of presence large children local schools tends to attending occupied property a rich. Absence of such tends to make district

make property mind, rich this in we can in so-called poor. Bearing general identify and districts. poor

Rich will include extensive commercial or industrial districts property both, will little either or while the ones of such property, poorer possess it out or not attracted it. Rich districts will zoned having having possess ones a low ratio of school students to total population—poor ratio. high considerations,

With these we can further the rich and identify poor exist,10 districts. rich districts the older Although exceptions comprise commercial-industrial areas. Because of the transition of relatively families, affluent families to the suburbs to raise in rich parents districts tend to be than the districts on the poorer average.11 poor other hand are those substantial new subdivisions but having housing commercial-industrial bases. have a ratio of students lacking They high to total Parents who can afford to new homes to population. purchase raise their families are affluent than in the more those ordinarily residing older commercial-industrial areas. and rich districts is confirmed

This numerous analysis poor studies Educational Suburban (see Zelinsky, Equalization Sprawl: The Suburbs School Finance Subsidizing Through Reform 161, 162, 182-184, Nw.U.L.Rev. and authorities collected) by my rich 1973-1974 school (Table districts study poor year. IV-11, Further, the trial record 93-123.) discloses a number of pp. illustrations where the mature industrial-commercial has a community much assessed valuation than the new suburban higher per pupil nearby more than But the area some cases latter has a much (in double). higher income than the former sometimes a two-to-one per capita (again relationship). districts,

The rich districts and the being primarily poor people poor I ones more fortunate cannot believe economically, composed people mature, residential Hills and 10The are the areas very wealthy Beverly exceptions vacation areas Lake Tahoe and Palm and the second home Springs. Hillsborough, Unified School District is one of the richest in the state. Besides its 11San Francisco industrial the ratio of school children to amount of commercial property, large statewide and the of students is smaller than the average, percentage general population Per income is lower schools is than statewide higher average. capita attending private than the statewide and the counties. average surrounding us to take from the to the give equal protection requires poor more fortunate.

Conclusion I that we cannot have absolute conclude opportunity equality other not in sector of funding—and governmental perhaps any The absolute demanded is activity. equality today’s majority opinion unobtainable if fiscal control—both local particularly responsibility interests—shall be While Califomiá’s compelling preserved. present for school than be less financing may perfect although from total the minor and the departs equality, departure justified Furthermore, should be invalidation takes from the upheld. poor to those more gives fortunate—hardly goal protection. equal I would reverse the judgment.

McComb, J., concurred. for a was denied 1977. Appellants’ petition January rehearing J., Clark, Richardson, J., were of the that the should opinion petition 1, 1977, On was modified to read as granted. February judgment above. printed

Case Details

Case Name: Serrano v. Priest

Court Name: California Supreme Court

Date Published: Dec 30, 1976

Citation: 557 P.2d 929

Docket Number: L.A. 30398

Court Abbreviation: Cal.