*1 Aug. No. 29820. In Bank. [L.A. 1971.] al., JR., SERRANO, et Plaintiffs and Appellants,
JOHN al., PRIEST, Treasurer, etc., et BAKER State IVY Defendants Respondents.
Counsel Binder, David A. Michael Rintala, H. William T. Harold Shapiro, W. Horowitz and M. for Plaintiffs and Sidney Wolinsky Appellants. Hecht, Sandmann,
Kenneth Sears, Peter B. Kathrine Anne Louis Unverzagt, Garcia, Obledo, Mario Exelrod, Mendelson, Michael Joe Ortega, Alan. Coons, D. Stephen John E. Yudof, David L. Mark G. Sugarman, Kirp, Dimond, Paul R. Kenneth F. Wirin, Marc I. A. L. Fred Phillips, Hayutin, Okrand, Laurence Halvonik, Marson, R. Paul Sperber, Charles C. N. Moscone, Marks, R. G. Milton Breyer, George Ephraim Irving Margolin, Burton, Brown, Jr., Foran and T. McCarthy John John Francis Leo Willie on Plaintiffs as Amici Curiae behalf of Appellants. and General, Sanford N. Lynch, Attorneys and Thomas C.
Evelle J. Younger General, John D. Goodman, Attorneys' Assistant and Ernest P. Gruskin Counsel, Counsel, County W. Assistant Briggs, James Maharg, County Clinton, and W. Grillo, DeWitt Deputy M. Donovan M. Main Elaine Counsel, and Respondents. for Defendants County
Opinion whether the California SULLIVAN, J. We are to determine called upon on local school with substantial dependence its financing system, public revenue, violates the taxes and wide in school resultant disparities property have deter- of the Fourteenth Amendment. We clause equal protection mined discriminates poor that this scheme invidiously against funding of the wealth because it makes the of a child’s a function education quality his as we must that the parents Recognizing right neighbors. our an education in schools is fundamental interest which cannot public wealth, state necessi- conditioned we discern no can purpose compelling concluded, therefore, method of have tating financing. We present such a be- cannot fall withstand constitutional must system challenge fore clause. equal protection and their children
Plaintiffs, school County are Los Angeles public who relief against injunctive this class action brought declaratory parents, administering officials certain state and county charged claim to children represent school Plaintiff California system. California, children “except of all class consisting pupils unknown, which district, of which is presently identity *6 all school of affords the educational school district greatest opportunity class a to represent California.” Plaintiff districts within parents purport real and who in the school pay all who have children system of parents the their residence. taxes in of county property Instruction, Treasurer, of the Public
Defendants are the Superintendent California, as well as the Tax Collector the the of Controller of State and Los of Treasurer, County the and and the Schools Superintendent and as capacities sued both in their local The are officials Angeles. county tax col- of the school superintendent, class composed representatives the counties in state. lector treasurer of each of the other and The first cause alleges sets three causes of action. The forth complaint and sec- elementary as follows: Plaintiff children attend public substance districts in Los Angeles County. school schools located in specified ondary a financ- California throughout school maintained This system public and taxes causes relies local or scheme which property ing heavily plan the districts in amount individual school substantial disparities among educational Con- for the districts’ programs. revenue available per pupil as are not able much districts smaller tax bases to spend with sequently, valuations. assessed larger child for education districts with money per sub- scheme . . . direct It that “As a result of alleged financing of educational of availability in the and extent stantial disparities quality districts the several exist and among are perpetuated school opportunities available to . . The made of the . educational State. opportunities [Par.] children, Districts, schools in the children attending including plaintiff availablé to are the educational made inferior substantially opportunities to. ...” schools districts of the State. children other many attending public fails pro- scheme thus to meet the equal financing requirements of the United States Con- clause of the Amendment tection Fourteenth several and the Constitution in respects.1 stitution California specified action, In the second cause of after plaintiff ref- parents, incorporating by erence all cause, first allegations allege as a direct result of scheme financing they required pay higher tax rate than tax- complaint alleges 1The “A. scheme: age Makes the quality California, of education for school children in including Children, Plaintiff of the function wealth of the parents neighbors, children’s and as measured the tax reside, base of school district in which said children and “B. quality age California, Makes the of education for including children in Children, geographical Plaintiff a function of the accident of the school district in reside, which said children and any “C. Fails to take account of the variety of educational of the needs several (and therein) California, school districts of the children of the State of and living “D. Provides students in some school districts of the with State material advantages over students other selecting pursuing districts in and their goals, educational provide Fails children of substantially age, motivation, aptitude, _“E. ability resources, substantially equal educational Perpetuates quality services, “F. marked differences in the of educational equip- among ment and other exist facilities school districts of the State inequitable apportionment as a years. result resources past State use of “G. The district’ ‘school as a unit for the differential allocation of legislative educational funds bears of no reasonable relation the California purpose providing equal opportunity educational for all school children within the State. *7 part financing of the permits “H. State scheme which each school district to expend retain and property within that district all of the tax collected within that any objective district bears no reasonable relation to educational or need. disproportionate children, “I. A number of school who children are black children surnames, Spanish belonging minority children to other reside groups in school relatively districts in which inferior opportunity educational provided.” children other school districts in order to obtain for their payers many the same or lesser educational afforded children in those opportunities other districts. action,
In the third cause of after reference all the incorporating by allega- causes, tions of the first two all that an actual has plaintiffs allege controversy now arisen and exists between the as to the and constitu- parties validity of the tionality scheme under the Fourteenth Amendment of the financing United States Constitution and under the California Constitution. (1)
Plaintiffs for: a declaration pray that the present financing system unconstitutional; (2) an order to reallocate directing defendants school funds in order to this remedy invalidity; that the trial court adjudication retain of the action so that jurisdiction may restructure if de- system fendants and the state fail to act Legislature within a reasonable time.
All defendants filed general to the demurrers foregoing assert complaint ing none of the three claims stated facts sufficient to-constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained demurrers with leave to1amend. Upon amend, failure plaintiffs’ defendants’ motion for dismissal was granted. Proc.,
(Code 581, Civ. subd. An § order of (Code dismissal was entered Proc., 58Id), Civ. § this followed. appeal we observe that in our examination of the instant
Preliminarily complaint, we are its guided by long-settled against rules determining sufficiency a demurrer. all material facts We treat demurrer as admitting contentions, but not fact or deductions or conclusions of pleaded, properly 724, (Daar law. Yellow Cab Co. Cal.2d Cal.Rptr.
433 P.2d We also consider noticed. matters judicially we shall refer to from time to time herein Accordingly, relevant has been to our attention either information which drawn research; or our we in each instance independent judicially parties notice this material since it is of state contained in officers publications (Board Education v. fn. 3 Watson 63 Cal.2d agencies. 481]; Code, (c).) P.2d see Evid. subd. Cal.Rptr. § I our task the California begin We by examining At the thresh-
system which is focal complaint’s allegations. point our old we find fundamental statistic—over 90 percent (a) derive on real funds from two basic sources: local district taxes property (b) aid from the Fund.2 State School year for the fiscal 1968-1969 came from the 2 California educational revenues aid, taxes, following percent; 35.5 property percent; sources: federal local 55.7 state *8 tax. real source of revenue is the local far the school major property By Constitution, IX, the Legisla the California to article section of Pursuant and county, the of each county, city has authorized body ture governing at a rate necessary on the within a school district taxes real levy property *3 Code, et (Ed. education seq.)* § the district’s annual budget. to meet thus de can raise in this manner which a district amount of revenue The base—i.e., valuation of real the assessed property on its tax largely pends state; 1969-1970, Tax bases within its borders. vary widely throughout of attendance average daily assessed unit for valuation per example," $103 children4 to a from a low of peak ranged elementary $952,156—a 10,000. Public School Analyst, 1 to nearly (Legislative ratio 7.)5 Finance, V, Finance Part Current Issues Educational p. other factor local school revenue determining is the rate of taxation
within district. Although has on Legislature placed ceilings permis- sible tax (§ district rates 20751 et these maxima seq.), statutory a “tax override” election if surpassed a of the majority district’s voters (§ a higher rate. et approve all districts have voted to seq.) Nearly override the limits. Thus raised statutory funds which locally constitute the largest of school revenue are a portion function of the value primarily of the district, within a realty particular coupled willingness of the district’s residents to tax themselves for education.
Most of remaining school revenue comes from the State School Fund “foundation which the pursuant program,” through state undertakes local taxes in order to supplement a “minimum provide amount guaran- funds, percent; sources, 6.1 (Legislative miscellaneous 2.7 percent. Analyst, Public Finance, I, Expenditures School Part for p. Education 5. Hereafter referred Legislative Analyst.). to as 3 Hereafter, indicated, unless otherwise all section references are to the Education Code. enrollment, 4 Most school aid determinations are based not total “average but on (ADA), daily figure attendance” by adding together computed the number of actually present day dividing students on each school total the number (§§ taught. 11252, 11301, days 11401.) school was practice, In approxi ADA percent (Legislative Analyst, Finance, mates 98 of total School enrollment. Public IV, Glossary of Part Most Terms Often Used in School Finance When figures “per basis, we refer pupil” “per herein to on a child” we mean unit ADA. period 5 Over the January legislative November 1970 to analyst provided 1971 the Legislature to the reports series of five system which “deal with the current kindergarten public school finance from through community college and are designed provide working'knowledge system (Legis of school finance.” I, supra, Analyst, I, lative Part The series is as Expenditures follows: Part Education; II, Distribution; III, Part The State School Fund: Its Derivation and Part Program; IV, The Foundation Finance; Glossary Part Most Terms Often Used in School V, Part Current Issues in Educational Finance. *9 minor (§ excep- all districts . . With certain teed to . support tions,6 receive that each school district will foundation ensures program funds, $355 state local for each elementary from annually, pupil (§ 17665.) (§§ 17660) $488 for each school student. high “Basic state The state contribution is in two forms. principal supplied $125 aid” a flat re- consists of to each district of year, grant per pupil per Const., IX, (Cal. of the relative of the district. art. wealth gardless § par.
4; Code, 17751, 17801.) inverse Ed. aid” is distributed in “Equalization §§ to the wealth the district. proportion entitled, is
To the amount of aid to which a compute equalization district much the State of Public first how Instruction determines Superintendent local tax revenue would be if the district were levy generated property $100 tax at valuation in ele- $1 a rate on each of assessed hypothetical $.80 $100 school districts and in districts.7 mentary per high (§ 17702.) $125 To that he aid If adds the basic figure, grant. per pupil of those sum two is less the foundation minimum amounts than program district, 17901, 17902.) for that (§§ the state contributes the difference.
Thus, funds to the districts a basic minimum equalization guarantee poorer revenue, while wealthier districts are for such assistance. ineligible
An additional state aid” is available sub program “supplemental tof sidize school districts which are to make an extra particularly poor willing $12,500 local tax An effort. district with an assessed valuation of elementary $125 or less obtain more for each child it sets if its per pupil up local tax rate above a certain A level. school district whose statutory high $24,500 assessed valuation does not exceed for a eligible per pupil sup $72 if (§ child its local tax is plement up 17920- per sufficiently high. § 17926.)8 “unnecessary $10 6 Districts which maintain small schools” pupil receive less (§ seq.)
in foundation funds. 17655.5 et eligible types Certain of school districts are for “bonus” foundation funds. Elemen- 3; tary through grades $30 districts receive an additional for each student in this (§ 17674.) grades. is intended to reduce class sum tricts size those Unified school dis- (§ get 17671-17673.) $20 per an extra child support. § in foundation rate, simply “computational” 7 This is tax used to measure the wealth of relative equalization purposes. actually for It bears no relation to the tax rate set district levying district property local real taxes. through special areawide foundation equalizing effect occurs further 8 Some disapproved at an reorganization plans which were districts included program in valuation of all the program, the assessed (§ seq.) et this Under election. $1 at a rate of tax is levied pooled, and an actual in an area districts individual per resulting high $.80 for school districts. elementary $100 districts of each according to the ratio among the individual districts is distributed revenue aid disparities aid and Although temper equalization supplemental valuation,, assessed which result from the vast variations real property districts available to individual wide differentials remain in the revenue *10 and, -For educational example, in level of expenditures.9 consequently, school, children attend the Baldwin in Los where County, Angeles plaintiff of its $577.49 Unified to educate each Park School District only expended 1968-1969; Unified the same the Pasadena School year in during pupils student; $840.19 Unified and the Hills School District on every Beverly spent $1,231.72 Ed., (Cal. Cal. Public District out child. paid per Dept, Schools, IV-11, 90-91.) (1970) Table Selected Statistics 1968-1969 pp. in Park the assessed The source these unmistakable: Baldwin disparities $3,706; Pasadena, assessed valuation valuation child totaled in only per $50,885 $13,706; Hills, was figure was while Beverly corresponding Thus, (Id.) are —a ratio 1 to 4 to 13. grants inadequate state based on vary- offset inherent inequalities financing system widely local tax bases. ing
Furthermore, aid, basic which constitutes about half of the state educa- tional funds Public (Legislative Analyst, Finance, II, School Part The State Derivation, Fund: School Its Distribution and 9), Apportionment (1970) p. widens the actually between rich and gap (See poor districts. Cal. Senate Fact Committee on Revenue and Finding Taxation, State and Local Fiscal in Public Relationships (1965) Education 19.) California Such aid is Thus, district’s level foundation to the areawide poor effectively total. districts share higher in the neighbors. tax However, bases their wealthier any district is still free higher $.80; to tax itself at a entirely by $1 rate than such additional revenue is retained taxing district. compiled by legislative 9 Statistics analyst following range show the of assessed per pupil valuations for year: the 1969-1970 school Elementary High School Low 11,959 $103 ....................................... 19,600 41,300 Median ..................................... ................................ n ....... High 952,156 349,093 (Legislative V, Analyst, Part Per pupil expenditures during year also varied widely: Elementary High School Unified
Low $407 ............................. $722 $612 Median ........................... High 2,586 1,767 ............................. . 2,414 atp. spending Similar disparities have throughout been noted country, particularly when suburban ghettos communities and urban compared. (See, e.g., Report of the National Advisory Commission (Bantam on Civil 1968) Disorders ed. pp. 434- 436; U.S. Commission Rights, on Civil Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 25-31; pp. Conant, Slums 2-3; Levi, Suburbs pp. University, The Professions, and the Law 258-259.) Cal.L.Rev. districts, of a to all irrespective basis on a uniform pupil distributed per $125 Park, Hills, Baldwin receives wealth. as well as from district’s Beverly students. the state each of its Under the Baldwin the basic is essentially meaningless.
For Park grant $355 between the difference the state must make up foundation program child $47.91, of revenue child amount per per elementary $1 $100 of assessed valua- Park could a tax Baldwin raise by levying law, that difference tion. under Although present composed partly exist, aid, did if the basic aid aid and grant basic partly equalization of state aid—all district would receive the same amount equaliz- still funds. ing *11 Hills, however,
For Beverly $125 flat has real financial grant signi ficance. Since $1 a tax rate of $100 $870 there would per produce per student, elementary Beverly Hills is far too rich to for aid. qualify equalizing Nevertheless, $125 it still state, receives child from the thus enlarging economic chasm between it and (See Coons, Park. Clune & Baldwin Sugar- man, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Test Constitutional State of Financial Structures 57 Cal.L.Rev.
II Having outlined the basic of framework California we school financing, take up plaintiffs’ claims. we their con legal Preliminarily, reject tention that the IX, violates 5 financing system article section of the Constitution, California states, which “The pertinent part: Legislature free_school shall system for a provide common schools by which shall be and kept up each district at least six supported months in every . . (Italics added.)10 . .” year Plaintiffs’ is that argument present financ method and ing produces separate distinct each an educa systems, offering tional which varies with program the relative wealth of the district’s resi- dents.
We have held IX, as used in article section “system,” word as “unity well as an and implies the direc- purpose entirety operation, to the tion to legislature ‘a’ provide common means one system schools which be system all common within the applicable schools shall (Kennedy state.” v. Miller (1893) However, 432 558].) Cal. P. [32 10 Plaintiffs’ complaint IX, does specifically to article refer section 5. Rather it alleges financing system that the requirements “fails to meet minimum . . . California,” law citing fundamental and Constitution of the State other several provisions IX, specific state first Constitution. Plaintiffs’ reference article section is made appeal. in their brief on plaintiffs’ We treat this section claim under though complaint. as it had been explicitly raised in their require constitutional provision
we have never interpreted be must system the educational we have ruled only school spending; educational pro course of study terms of the prescribed uniform in Dist. Big Pine School (Piper from grade grade. gression 926].) 664, 669, P. Cal. 673 IX, article think hold otherwise. While be erroneous to it would
We 6 of that same section school financing, reference to 5 makes no section system of the fiscal authorizes the element very article specifically shall states, pro- “The Legislature in part: Section complain. plaintiffs county, board of each governing vide for the levying annually taxes, will rates ... produce such school district county, city district as the governing revenue each such in each fiscal year . .” . . shall determine required board thereof that where constitu dictate of construction
Elementary principles
conflict,
such
to avoid
be construed
can reasonably
tional provisions
Airlines,
Inc.
v. Western
(People
should
adopted.
interpretation
723],
(1954)
should be construed ap not ply irreconcilable, 6 section found the two were 6. If with section provisions recently. more and was adopted because it is more would specific prevail 182, 189 50 Cal.2d etc. Co. (Id.; County Placer v. Aetna Cas. that argument 753].) we must reject P.2d plaintiffs’ Consequently, [323 uniform schools” of common requires section 5 for a “system provision educational expenditures.
III matters, of these we take the chief con Having disposed prehminary up tention that the California plaintiffs’ complaint, namely underlying violates scheme clause of the Four equal protection 11 teenth Amendment the United States Constitution.* to I, complaint alleges financing system 11 The also that violates article sections 21, provides: general 11 and 11 the California Constitution. Section “All laws of a operation.” privileges nature shall have uniform special Section states: “No or altered, revoked, granted immunities shall ever be repealed which not be or citizen, Legislature; citizens, any granted nor shall privileges or class of or which, terms, granted upon immunities the same shall not be to all have citizens.” We provisions “substantially equivalent” equal protection construed these as (Dept. clause of the Fourteenth Amendment tó the federal Constitution. Mental Hygiene 586, 329, 321].) v. Kirchner Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d 400 P.2d [43 Consequently, analysis plaintiffs’ our federal is also protection contention applicable provisions. their claim under these state constitutional out, As recent decisions the United of this court have pointed States Court has a two-level test for Supreme employed legisla measuring tive classifications “In the area of clause. against equal protection restraint, economic court has exercised regulation, legis high investing lation with a presumption merely constitutionality requiring distinctions drawn aby statute bear some rational challenged relationship a conceivable state legitimate purpose. [Citations.] hand, in cases classifications’
“On the other involving ‘suspect interests,’ the court has on ‘fundamental adopted touching [fns. omitted] an attitude of active and critical classification analysis, subjecting cases, Under the strict standard in such scrutiny. applied strict [Citations.] compelling it has a bears the burden of only the state establishing drawn the law the law but that the distinctions interest which justifies (Westbrook Mihaly (1970) Cal.3d further its necessary purpose.” 839, 487], P.2d vacated on other Cal.Rptr. grounds 784-785 [87 2224]; In re S.Ct. U.S. (1971) 403 Antazo 999]; see Purdy 100,110-111 3 Cal.3d 473 P.2d Cal.Rptr. Cal. Fitzpatrick & Cal.2d 578-579 (1969) 71 State of California 456 P.2d Rptr.
A Suspect Wealth Classification demonstrated Court has the United States
In recent years, discriminate on toward classifications legislative marked antipathy which has One factor characteristics. basis of certain “suspect” personal “Lines court is wealth. of the high come under the close scrutiny repeatedly [citation], are *13 race like those of of wealth or property, drawn on basis v. (1966) 383 Virginia Bd. Elections (Harper disfavored.” traditionally of 1079].) 173, 663, 169, Invalidating L.Ed.2d 86 S.Ct. U.S. 668 [16 wealth or the court stated: “To introduce Harper, pay tax in Virginia poll introduce a fee a voter’s is to capri of a as a measure of qualifications ment on our (Id.) careful examination factor.” part cious or irrelevant “[A] of wealth . . . lines are drawn on the basis warranted where especially render a classification suspect factor which would highly independently [a] (Mc scrutiny. demand more exacting judicial thereby |[Citations.]” v. Board 739, 802, L.Ed.2d (1969) Elections 807 394 U.S. [22 Donald also Tate v. Short 744, 395 L.Ed. (1971) 401 U.S. 89 S.Ct. See [28 1404]. 130, 668]; (1970) v. Illinois U.S. 235 L.Ed. 399 [26
2d
S.Ct.
Williams
91
Roberts v. La Vallee
L.Ed.
586,
2018];
(1967)
U.S. 40
389
[19
90 S.Ct.
2d
Anders L.Ed.
194];
(1967)
Plaintiffs contend As we have already irrefutable. of wealth. find this basis We proposition levying locally by is raised discussed, educational revenue half of all over foundation Above the districts. in the individual real taxes on property $488 high student per ($355 elementary per program minimum valua district, its assessed measured by student), of a school the wealth Although expenditures. tion, determinant educational major at which the rate function of is also a locally raised money amount themselves, matter as a to tax practical residents of a district willing districts, rate sufficient taxes at a cannot levy bases with small tax simply minimal districts reap affluent that more the revenue produce text.) For example, 15, infra, and (See accompanying tax efforts. fn. assessed $100 of $5.48 citizens, tax of per who a school Park paid Baldwin half as much than 1968-1969, able to less were spend valuation in $100. $2.38 residents, taxed only who were Hills as Beverly education III-16, 43). Ed., (Cal. op. cit. Table Dept.
Defendants that the scheme vigorously dispute proposition basis of wealth. Their first is essentially discriminates on the. argument aid, basic the state distributes school to all this: funds equally through aid, equalization it distributes funds in a bene- through manner pupils; However, ficial funds constitute to the districts. state one only part poor of the entire school fiscal The foundation system.12 program partially revenue, in local sources of but the system alleviates great disparities aas school revenue in to the. wealth of the generates whole proportion individual district.13 is, revenue; major course, portion locally 12 The other raised is clear that such *14 out, supra, part system.
revenue is a of overall educational As we pointed the IX, specifically article section 6 of the state Constitution authorizes local districts to levy seq. of the school taxes. 20701 et Education Code details the mechanics Section process. of this 1969) Briggs Kerrigan (D.Mass. F.Supp. ask us to follow 13 Defendants (1st City affd. the of did Cir. F.2d which held that Boston not 1970) equal protection failing federally the subsidized provide violate clause in to lunches only at all of its schools. The court found that such lunches were offered at schools nor pupil that neither assessed valuation per Defendants also argue of its of district or a index the a is reliable of wealth expenditure pupil per assert, a because residents. The is untrustworthy, they former figure but of a minuscule number district a low total assessed valuation will a and thus “wealthy.” students have tax base high per appear pupil a is the total that the index of district’s wealth Defendants imply proper misses assessed valuation We think defendants’ contention its property. of in the the measure of a district’s wealth only point. meaningful present is the absolute of but of its context value its the ratio property, resources to which how because it is the latter determines figure pupils, much the district can devote to each of its students.14 educating defendants, accurately child does not
But, the per say expenditure determined because that is partly district’s wealth expenditure reflect a Thus, assessed valuation a district with á total high rate. the district’s tax tax, the same amount end spending per a low school levy might up taxes. This argu whose residents to higher a pay as poorer opt pupil district is the district favored when also meritless. richer Obviously, ment is for children with tax the educational its less can same quality provide Furthermore, matter, are financi statistical districts poorer effort. as a to match educational high unable to raise their taxes enough ally result, cooking the inexpensive had kitchen and facilities. As a in some cases which children, needy available to but not to ones. meals were well-to-do Here, plaintiffs spe- to present do not find this action. We decision relevant allege cifically systematically provides greater that of funds allocation By opportunities to the poor. to affluent children than are afforded educational contrast, Briggs the found court no wealth-oriented discrimination: “There is no pattern programs predominate such that schools with lunch of relative wealth areas of program deprivation.” without areas economic schools Furthermore, right very the nature of the involved in two cases different. education, right we The instant to an action concerns which have determined (See infra.) Availability inexpensive hardly be fundamental. school lunch can significance. be considered of such constitutional Elementary Angeles County, example, 14Gorman District in Los a total has $6,063,965, students, only pupil yielding assessed valuation but a tax base $147,902. significant $1,378 per find it spent We Gorman student edu- 1968-1969, (Cal. Ed., op. Beverly Dept, cation in even more than cit. Hills. IV-ll,p. table course, realize, high expenditure district portion per-pupil a in a We costs, salary, do principal’s certain like a which may like be attributable Gorman achieve expenses, schools cannot vary On such larger small not the economies of scale available with the size of school. extent, high per-pupil To this a district. statistic, may unrepresentative paper which spending small district hand, other eco- On the certain significant opportunties. in educational differences ratio, “inefficiencies,” a positive have pupil-teacher as a low such nomic educational represents high spending in such districts impact. The extent course, (See is, fn. proof. advantages matter educational actual infra. 401, 437, nom. (D.C. 1967) affd. sub F.Supp; generally v. Hansen Hobson See App.D.C. F.2d 175 [132 Smuck v. Hobson *15 V, supra, offerings of wealthier districts. (Legislative Part Analyst, pp. 8-9.) Thus, affluent districts can have cake and it can their eat too: they a high education their children while lower provide quality paying districts, contrast, taxes.15 Poor have no at all. cake defendants wealth of a Finally, suggest school does not district the wealth who reflect families live there. necessarily The simple answer to this is that have a argument plaintiffs there is alleged expenditure 15 “Insome cases districts with low correspondingly levels have low tax cases, however, many true; In more quite rates. low the opposite is unusually districts with expenditures unusually owing have tax rates to high their limited tax base.” V, (Legislative Analyst, supra, 8.) following Part p. The table demonstrates this relationship: Comparison Expenditure of Selected Rates and Tax Levels in Counties Selected 1968-1969 Expendi- Assessed per per Value Tax ture County ADA ADA Rate ADA Alameda $100,187 $2,223 Emery $2.57 Unified......... 8,638 6,048 Newark ... 5.65 Unified........ Fresno 2,640 33,244 Coalinga $ ... ... $2.17 $ Unified....... 8,144 6,480 Clovis Unified ......... 4.28 Kern $136,271 $1,545 Elementary $1.05 Rio Lamont ... Bravo 5,971 1,847 Elementary..... ... 3.06 Angeles Los 50,885 5,542 $1,232 Beverly $ Unified ... ... $2.38 Hills .... 13,108 3,706 5.48 Baldwin Park Unified.... p.at reports This governmental fact has received comment several California provide units. school districts are high-expenditure able to a school program “[S]ome low, at rates relatively of tax which are while other districts must tax themselves heavily significant low-expenditure to finance a . program. . . [Par.] One criterion activity provide equals. is that seeks to treatment of present system respect tax burden.” criterion, of public education ... in California fails meet this both with provision respect of services and the geographic distribution (Cal. Finding Taxation, Senate Fact Committee on Revenue and op. cit. present system support largely sharing “California’s is based between system sharing, expenses the state and the school district districts of the education. In this Therefore, has but one source of revenue—the tax. property its ability depends upon share its assessed pupil valuation and its tax effort. The existing (assessed (tax ability per pupil) variations local and tax valuation effort rate) present problems deny equal opportunity educational tax local' (Cal. Ed., equity.” Dept, State on Public Support Recommendations School 69.) (Quoted Equal Neitring, Aspects Inequalities & Horowitz Protection Programs Public Education and Public Assistance Place to Place Within State from 787, 806.) 15 U.C.L.A. L.Rev.
601 the valuation assessed per pupil between a district’s correlation the admitted by facts material treat these we its residents and of wealth demurrers. that thesis underlying defendants’ however, we reject basically, More of is that wealth as the so long constitutional wealth is classification basis on the discrimination that We think district, the individual. not industrial prop commercial invalid. is wealth equally of district through unevenly distributed is tax base district’s a augments
erty one children to the dollars educational more To allot out the state. of the fortuitous presence because another merely to those of than district education dependent a child’s to make quality is of such property **************16 establishments.16 and industrial commercial the location private upon basis factors as the most irrelevant on this is to rely Surely, financing. educational
Defendants, for the sake of that the financing system assuming argument wealth, nevertheless claim that no constitutional infirmity does classify by contains no involved because the allegation purposeful complaint Lightfoot Gomillion (Cf. 364 intentional discrimination. v. U.S. Thus, contend, L.Ed.2d 81 S.Ct. defendants un 339 [5 any facto, not treatment de de Since the United States only jure. 16 expenditure defendants contend that different levels of do educational not affect However, alleges quality complaint plaintiffs’ specifically education. the con trary, testing complaint against general purposes sufficiency and for of a a demurrer, allegations its to be true. we must take Although recognize controversy among we there is considerable educators spending of educational impact over the relative school achievement environmental influences on al., Equality Opportunity et of Educational (compare Coleman Kleindorfer, Stout, (U.S. 1966) Guthrie, Office of Ed. with Levin & Schools and (1971); Coons, Sugarman, supra, generally Inequality see Clune & Cal.L.Rev. 305, 310-311, 16), fn. we note that the several courts which have considered conten- uniformly rejected tions similar to defendants’ have them. Shapiro (N.D.Ill. 1968) F.Supp. McInnis v. sub nom. In affd. mem. Ogilvie 1197], heavily 394 three-judge McInnis relied U.S. L.Ed.2d S.Ct defendants, “Presumably, federal court stated: students on $1,000 receiving $600 acquiring education are better educated that those [sic] (Fn. omitted.) (Id. (M.D.Fla. 331.) Hargrave 1970). schooling.” at v. Kirk p. In Hargrave (1971) grounds F.Supp. vacated other sub nom. on Askew 856], “Turning the court declared: now to 401 U.S. asserted, may be ‘the available that in the abstract difference in dollars defenses necessarily produce quality does not abstract statement must a difference in the education.’ But this (Id. give proof way contrary to the in this case.” at Spending “spec $130 up differentials of within a district were characterized as Hansen, supra, Responding to F.Supp. in Hobson v. 401. defendants’ tacular” benefits, the varying expenditures reflect actual educational claim court did not great . verifies that replied: “To a extent . . defendants’ own evidence high- advantages figures in the- comparative pupil do refer to actual educational schools, teaching especially respect staff.” cost to the caliber has held Court de facto basis segregation *17 unconstitutional, to of race be so the de facto argument classifications goes, on basis the of wealth are valid. presumptively
We think whole of fall for want that the structure this must argument First, of a solid foundation in law and none of the wealth classifica- logic. tions invalidated States Court this the United or previously by Supreme Instead, has court been the discrimination. these product purposeful decisions have involved prior “unintentional” classifications whose impact fell more on the simply heavily poof.
For example, several cases have held that where important rights stake, at the state has an affirmative to relieve obligation an indigent the burden of his own without certain charge poverty supplying goods Illinois, services which others must In v. supra, U.S. pay. 351 Griffin 12, the court high ruled that Illinois was to a required provide pooi eal.17 defendant with free California, a Douglas supra, transcript app 372 353 U.S. held that an indigent has a right person court-appointed counsel on appeal. the factor of wealth held that a state may cases with have
Other
dealing
which,
certain
neutral on
on an indigent
payments
although
impose
face,
Virginia
In
Bd.
Harper
a discriminatory
their
Elections,
have
effect.
$1.50
a
supra, 383 U.S.
court struck down
high
poll
tax,
but
purpose
not because its
was to deter
from
because
indigents
voting,
172].)
be
might
its result
such.
fn.
L.Ed.2d at
We
p.
p.
Antazo,
In
a
supra,
held in
re
Cal.3d 100 that
defendant was denied
poor
if was
law he
because he could
imprisoned simply
equal protection
Short,
395;
(Accord,
supra,
not afford to
a
Tate v.
fine.
U.S.
pay
Illinois,
235;18
Williams v.
Connecticut
399 U.S.
see Boddie v.
case,
(Justice Harlan, dissenting
Griffin,
in
declared: “Nor
is this a
where the
prevented
appealing.
State’s own
has
a defendant
All that
action
from
[Citations.]
consequences
Illinois has done
to fail
alleviate the
of differences in economic
wholly apart
any
exist
The
circumstances
holds
imposes
that
from
state action.
Court
thus
[Par.]
that,
appeals,
Equal
at least
in this
of criminal
Clause
area
Protection
flowing
duty
on the
lift
handicaps
States an affirmative
from differences
(351
circumstances.”
economic
U.S. at
L.Ed. at
involving
rejected
18 Numerous cases
racial classifications have
the contention that
purposeful
prerequisite
establishing
equal
a
discrimination is
violation
Hansen, supra,
protection
Judge
Wright
Skelly
clause. In Hobson v.
269 F.Supp.
single
“Orthodox
protection
encapsulated
stated:
doctrine can be
rule:
government
imposes
justification
unequal
action which without
burdens or awards
unequal
complaint
analytically
benefits is
no violation of
unconstitutional.
that
equal protection
inequalities
deliberately discriminatory
vests
unless
stem from
once,
plan
simply
maturing
false.
Whatever
the law was
is a testament
to our
that,
decade,
concept
equality
the help
Court decisions in the last
recognize
thoughtlessness
we
firmly
arbitrary quality
now
can be
S.Ct.780],
fn.
discussed
(1971)
We Indeed, find we at most de We disagree. involves facto discrimination. is the cause action
the case the extent to governmental unusual scheme is mandated wealth classifications. The school funding private detail Constitution and statutes. Although California every (cid:127) for the residential commercial patterns may partly responsible *18 state, are distribution of assessed such valuation patterns throughout land- and hardened ordinances and other governmental zoning shaped by Uni- (Cf. San Francisco use controls economic promote exclusivity. 937, Dist. v. (1971) Johnson 3 956 School Cal.3d Cal.Rptr.
fied 309, P.2d district 669].) Governmental drew the school action lines, thus how wealth district would much local each boundary determining IX, 14; Code, (Cal. Const., contain. Worth- art. Ed. 1601 et seq.; § § ington 437]; S. Dist. (1916) v. Eureka Dist. P. S. 173 Cal. 156 [159 Hughes Ewing 1067]; v. Mountain 93 Cal. P. View 417 [28 v. City Sch. Dist. Council P.2d Cal.App.2d Douglas, Compared and official has example, activity Griffin a played significant establishing role in the economic chal- classifications lenged in this action.19 are that defendants correct their arguendo even assuming
Finally, discrimination based on wealth is de that instant merely contention facto, discrimination cannot justified analogy and not de such jure,20 rights and private perversity unfair to interest as the disastrous therefore, Theoretically, purely inequalities irrational even [Par.] willful scheme. homogenous, culturally uniformly white raise schools in suburb would two between (Fns. omitted.) (See question.” Hawkins also a real constitutional Shaw, 1286; Mississippi (5th 1971) Cir. F.2d CORE v. v. Norwalk Town of (2d 920, 931.) Redevelopment Agency 1968) Cir. F.2d No reason Norwalk stringent requirement wealth discrimination is appears impose a where more charged. financing inequalities state involvement in school 19 Onecommentator has described education, collec states] have determined that there will be follows: “[The taxes; general they have that the
tively out of determined collective financed base, largely mainly on statewide tax will be decentralized not rest but will boundaries, determining districts; thereby wealth they the district composed have districts; doing, only among they not sorted education- have distribution so wealth, widely average they have consuming varying but groups households into among non-school-using others—quite unequally taxpayers—households sorted districts; that they compulsory.” “[s]tate have education His conclusion is made supra, (Michelman, 83 Harv.L.Rev. responsibility indisputable.” involvement and 7, 50, 48.) segregation as either racial difficulty categorizing recently pointed out 20 We Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d School Dist. (San jure. Francisco de or de facto Unified Court United racial States Although to de facto segregation. de ruled facto racial segregation, has not on constitutionality yet invalid, and declared such ago this court held eight segregation years boards, im- racial that affirmative alleviate should take steps balance, City (Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist. however created. 878]; Francisco Uni-
59 Cal.2d 382 P.2d Cal.Rptr. San Johnson, dis- Dist. any School Cal.3d Consequently, fied to de based wealth reference crimination can be vindicated hardly sum, we facto which we condemned. In racial have segregation, already view basis are of the discriminates on the financing system wealth a district and its residents.
B Education as a Fundamental Interest But attack fiscal has an addi- protection on the plaintiffs’ system tional dimension. assert They draws lines on system only basis of wealth but that it'“touches indeed has a direct and upon,” significant *19 interest,” impact a “fundamental upon, education. It is namely urged combination, these two in grounds, establish demonstrable particularly denial of equal of the laws. To this we protection of the phase argument now turn our attention.
Until the time wealth present classifications have been invalidated only in conjunction with a limited number of fundamental interests—rights Williams; Tate; (Griffin; Douglas; Antazo) defendants in criminal cases (Harper; and rights Cipriano v. voting City Houma U.S. 395 647, 1897]; L.Ed.2d [23 S.Ct. Kramer v. Union School District 583, U.S. 1886]; L.Ed.2d cf. v. McDonald Elections, Board 802).21 U.S. Plaintiffs’ contention—that education is fundamental interest which not be on may conditioned wealth—is not direct supported by authority.22 any
937, 956-957.)
reasoning
We think
same
applies
based on
classifications
wealth.
Consequently, we decline to
oversimplified'
attach
configura-
an
label
complex
to the
public
private
tion of
and
decisions which has resulted
present
in the
allocation of
educational funds.
Connecticut, supra,
21 But in Boddie v.
401 U.S.
the Supreme Court held that
poverty cannot constitutionally
seeking
bar
a divorce
from access to the
individual
Using
civil
process,
rationale,
courts.
due
equal protection,
than an
the court
rather
indigent
ruled that an
required
could not
pay
court fees
costs
for service
process
precondition
commencing
as a
a divorce action.
Shapiro
Thompson (1969)
22 In
1322],
contexts the United States Court and this court. These by by legally decisions—while not exact issue before us—are controlling in their factual accurate of learn- persuasive description significance ing.23 integrity has a valid interest preserving programs. may legitimately the fiscal of its It attempt any distinctions assistance, education, expenditures, State to limit its whether for program. other But a accomplish such a purpose invidious not, example, between classes of its citizens. It could for reduce expendi- barring indigent tures for education children its from schools.” p. 614].) Although high L.Ed.2d at court referred to actual exclusion from school, education, rather expenditures than discrimination in we think the consti- (See principle text.)
tutional is the fn. accompanying same. Appeals A federal Court of has also held arguably that education is a fundamental Hargrave McKinney (5th 1969) interest. In Cir. 413 F.2d the Fifth Circuit *20 three-judge ruled that a district court must be to convened consider the constitution ality a Florida statue which limited the local property tax rate a county which levy raising could in school revenue. Plaintiffs contended that statute the violated the equal protection clause because high it with a per-pupil counties assessed allowed to valuation raise much more local revenue than counties with smaller tax bases. argument The equal protection court stated: “The by plaintiffs advanced suspect is the crux Noting of the case. that lines drawn on wealth are we [fn. omitted] dealing are here fundamental, interests which well be deemed omitted] [fn. say we cannot arguable there is no reasonably theory equal protection which would support a (Id. 324.) decision in plaintiffs. favor of the at p. [Citations.]" remand, three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional because there was On discriminatory Having poor for the effect which had in counties. no rational basis invalidated the statute under to consider test, equal protection the traditional the court declined interest, plaintiffs’ requiring that education was a fundamental contention Kirk, (Hargrave protection scrutiny” equal standard. application of the “strict 944.) supra, Court vacated the district court’s F.Supp. appeal, On grounds, the lower court should on other but indicated that on remand decision Hargrave (Askew (1971) 401 thoroughly explore equal protection issue. U.S. 856].) 91 S.Ct. they value because precedential these cases are not of 23Defendants contend that discrimination, merely but in the do context of racial the context of wealth not consider education in recognize this distinc- segregation We or total exclusion from school. Brown, Edu- v. Board classic of this came in
The
expression
position
38 A.L.R.2d
cation
When children living remote areas an action to brought local compel school authorities to furnish them bus class, we transportation stated: “We in no indulge to assert that hyperbole has a society interest compelling affording children to attend opportunity school. This was evidenced than more three centuries when ago, Massachusetts the first provided *21 in public system 1-647. And an éducation today [Citation.] has be- come qua the sine non of useful existence. ... In of the light public interest in the conserving minds, resource of we young must unsympathetic- examine ally action any of a public body has the effect of depriving children of the to obtain opportunity an (Fn. omitted.) education.” tion, agree but cannot with defendants’ quotation conclusion. Our of these cases is not suggest intended to that they legal control the here, result which we reach but simply they that eloquently express the importance crucial of education. 805, v. (Manjares Newton Cal.2d 375-376 Cal.Rptr. P.2d cases, Big Pine School Piper
And before these last mentioned long Dist., state supra, 193 Cal. to attend where an Indian girl sought schools, open we common schools are doorways declared: public “[T]he art, as science, into well chambers of and the learned as ing professions, commercial securing into fields of industrial and activities. Opportunities which a are often more or the employment rating less dependent upon a youth, institutions, our has received his pupil 673; work. These are that be rights cannot denied.” privileges see Ward Flood (1874) Manjares also 48 Cal. 36.) Although Piper schools, actual exclusion the involved from surely right to an (See education means than today more access to a classroom.24 Neitring, & 15 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. Horowitz to an education right
It illuminating importance is compare and the vote—two with the of defendants in criminal cases right rights already “fundamental interests” which Court has protected an interest discrimination based on wealth. individual’s against Although education in his freedom is we think that from a unique, larger perspective, court- have far social a or a than free transcript greater significance a affects lawyer. only vastly greater appointed directly “[E]ducation law, than it in ways number of the criminal but affects them persons which—to the an and much more varied signific state—have enormous (the ance. Aside from the crime rate inverse relation is strong), reducing education also each and of a democratic other value supports every but communication, and to name social mobility, society—participation, a (Fn. omitted.) (Coons, few.” & Sugarman, supra, Clune 57 Cal.L.Rev.
305, 362-363.) between analogy education and much more direct: both voting in, of, crucial Voting participation democracy. functioning 527-528, Reynolds 562-563 377 U.S. v. Sims 24 Cf. 1362], right impaired to vote that the Supreme Court asserted where the voting, impact from but also when the is barred qualified individual only when not of his gainsaid hardly be “It could by unequal apportionment: electoral is diminished ballot allegation certain that asserted claim had been that constitutional voting for members of entirely prohibited from had been qualified voters otherwise one And, of citizens in votes legislature. provide should if a State their state times, weight times, times or ten or five given be two part the State should State, hardly contended that the could part another of citizens in votes been,effectively diluted. residing areas had not right disfavored to vote those give course, legislative districting the same schemes which effect of state ... Of . One . . is identical. unequal numbers constituents representatives number simple as well as ‘sophisticated Constitution forbids ever aware must be (Fn. omitted.) modes of [Citation.]” minded discrimination.’ *22 608 of it because right “preservative a fundamental as regarded
has been Sims, 377 supra, v. (Reynolds ... civil and rights. other basic political Hopkins (1886) 506, 527]; Yick Wo 533, see 562 L.Ed.2d U.S. [12 of 220, 226, 1064].) The drafters 356, 6 S.Ct. 118 U.S. 370 L.Ed. [30 rationale—indeed, almost ident this same Constitution used the California IX, Article of education. the importance ical language—in expressing and intelligence of knowledge “A diffusion section 1 general provides: and liberties of the to- of rights people, essential being preservation of intel all suitable means the shall promotion the Legislature encourage by Piper scientific, moral, (See lectual, also improvement.” agricultural Dist., 664, minimum, edu 668.) At a Cal. Big Pine School 193 aof More significantly, cation more ballot. meaningful casting makes in, of, issues interest public it is the understanding likely provide in other civic activities. political which are to involvement spur The need for an educated assumes populace greater importance of our problems diverse become The United society increasingly complex. States Court has Supreme educa- repeatedly the role public recognized tion as a social unifying force and the basic tool for democratic shaping values. The has been termed “the most agency powerful cohesion promoting at democratic ... among heterogeneous people once of our symbol and the most means democracy pervasive for pro- our moting common (McCollum destiny.” (1948) v. Board Education 203, 333 216, 649, U.S. 661, 669, 461, 231 L.Ed. 68 [92 2 A.L.R.2d S.Ct. (Frankfurter, J., 1338] Abington In School Dist. v. concurring).) Schempp (1963) 374 U.S. 844, 203 1560], L.Ed.2d [10 83 S.Ct. was said that “Americans regard as a schools most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system government.” (Id. at 230 p. [10 L.Ed.2d at (Brennan, J., p. concurring).)25 863]
areWe convinced that the distinctive and function edu- priceless 25 The sensitive interplay between education and the cherished First Amendment right speech recognition of free has received also the United States Court. (1960) In Shelton v. Tucker 231, 247], 364 479 [5 L.Ed.2d 81 S.Ct. U.S. the court vigilant declared: “The protection of constitutional is nowhere vital more freedoms than community (Id. in the p. 236].) American schools.” at p. L.Ed.2d at [5 Similarly, Keyishian Regents the court observed v. Board U.S. 675], L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. “The peculiarly classroom is the ‘market place [17 ideas.’ depends The Nation’s future upon through leaders trained exposure wide exchange [a] robust . 640].) ideas. . (See L.Ed.2d at also Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. 393 U.S. L.Ed.2d 733]; Epperson v. Arkansas U.S. S.Ct. *23 as a it our warrants, treating indeed compels, society cation in our interest.”26 “fundamental commentators what several is in
First, maintaining essential education an individ- is, democracy”—that preserving “free have termed enterprise marketplace, the economic successfully compete ual’s opportunity of this schools background. Accordingly, public a disadvantaged despite into the and of the poor oppressed state are the bright hope entry of American society.27 mainstream finds it “Not
Second, every relevant. universally education person in an entire or even the police the fire to call department necessary upon however, benefits few are on welfare. lifetime. Every person, Relatively supra, & omitted.) (Coons, Clune (Fn. Sugarman, . .” . . from education 388.) 57 Cal.L.Rev. at p.
Third, of fife—be- education continues over a lengthy period public sustained, services have such tween Few other years. government contact with intensive the recipient.
Fourth,
to which it molds the
education is unmatched in the extent
uniqueness
recently
Supreme
26 The
of education was
stressed
United States
1940],
Thompson (1971)
Palmer v.
Court in
Finally, important assign- of attendance but also only the pulsory—not requirement and a child of ment to a district school. Although wealthy particular school, has this freedom is to attend a parents opportunity private context, available to the In this it has been seldom indigent. suggested “a child to an inferior state school takes assigned willy-nilly poor of of a sentence of minimum complexion complete with prisoner, on. (Coons, & Clune 57 Cal.L.Rev. 12years.” Sugarman,
C Accomplish Financing System Necessary The Is Not Compelling State Interest We now reach the the “strict final in the step application scrutiny” equal protection standard—the determination whether structured, California school system, presently necessary to achieve a state interest. compelling
The interest which defendants advance in current support state fiscal scheme is California’s “to local policy strengthen encourage (Ed. Code, for control of responsibility We public-education.” § first, treat the two separately of this possible granting aspects goal: to local districts of effective over the administration decision-making power schools; second, their of local fiscal control over the promotion amount of to be money spent education. best decide individual district well be may position hire, how to schedule educational and a host of
whom to its offerings, Which local or of such a other matters are either significánt impact as- as to decentralized determination. even detailed nature require But control be a local administrative suming arguendo may compelling interest, state financial cannot considered necessary present system its to further interest. No matter how the state decides to finance this education, this it can still leave system public decision-making power in the hands of local districts. a local district is that of allowing
The other asserted interest policy children. on the education its choose how much it wishes to spend than “[Qf a lesser pupil one district raises amount argue: Defendants the individual district, this is a matter of choice preference another than an district, taxes rather and reflects the individual desire lower interest within reflect a educational greater expanded program, local that district in such other services that are supported by property *25 as, or services.” taxes fire protection hospital example, police We need not decide whether such decentralized financial decision-making interest, a state since under the compelling present financing system, such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion for districts. We poor cannot Park care about agree Baldwin residents less education than in $600 those Hills because Baldwin Park less than Beverly solely spends $1,200. child while Hills over As them- defendants per Beverly spends selves the most accurate reflection a recognize, of perhaps community’s to commitment education is the rate at which its citizens are to willing tax standard, themselves to their schools. Yet Baldwin support by Hills, Park should be deemed far more devoted to Beverly learning than for Baldwin Park citizens levied a $5 $100 school tax of well over valuation, assessed while residents of Hills more Beverly paid only slightly $2. than
In so summary, as the assessed valuation a bound- long within district’s aries is a schools, major determinant of how much it can for its spend a district with only tax base will be to how large able decide much truly cares really about education. The district cannot choose to poor freely tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot Far from provide. to
being necessary choice, local fiscal promote system present financing actually less deprives districts of wealthy that option.
It is convenient at this point two final advanced dispose arguments assert, first, defendants. They that territorial uniformity respect the present financing system is not constitutionally required; secondly, that if under equal protection mandate relative wealth not deter- mine the quality education, the same be rule must to all applied tax-supported public services.
In
support
first argument, defendants
Salsburg Maryland
their
cite
(1954) 346 U.S.
L.Ed.
74 S.Ct.
and Board
Educa-
280]
Watson,
tion. v.
supra,
The first consists group closing precedents which the schools one Court has invalidated efforts shut In of a state while schools in other areas continued part operate. School Board 377 U.S. Griffin course, state, the court stated: “A has a wide discretion deciding 1226] whether laws shall statewide in certain only or shall operate operate counties, needs of each.’ legislature mind the and desires ‘having Salsburg U.S., v. Maryland, supra, record in 552. . . . But the case could present clearer that Prince Edward’s schools reason, were closed ... *26 for one and one reason to ensure . . . only: not, white colored children in Prince Edward would under any County circumstances, to the same school. Whatever go might nonracial grounds schools, a support State’s a to abandon allowing object county public must be a constitutional one . . . (Id. at L.Ed.2d at p. p. [12 1961) (E.D.La. v. Helena Parish School Board Hall St.
Similarly,
L.Ed.2d
affd. mem.
be admitted decided, Salsburg Four the Fourth and was when in the state. But elsewhere dence prohibit the admission interpreted to yet been had Amendments teenth (Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. in state trials. unlawfully procured evidence 933].) Consequently, 1081, 81 84 A.L.R.2d S.Ct. establishing a rule of evi simply Salsburg Maryland statute as treated the Court dence, (346 p. L.Ed. at at procedural U.S. in nature. purely was J., dissenting).) (Douglas, 287]; L.Ed. pp. 290] 554-555 see special required a statute which rejected attack on a constitutional Watson we In million, four excess of population in counties with the tax assessor duties of by the affected Angeles County would be recognized only Los though we even equal protection cases, applied the traditional simply both the courts legislation. In geographic basis for the finding some rational provision sustained the after test classification. “The Salsburg holding stating: The Hall distinguished court specifically differently, to treat the state v. State Maryland permitting Salsburg obtained localities, illegally against admissibility for different the rule .... Ohio, U.S. in view of evidence no obtains longer Mapp no- that there is decision for the reliance on that proposition Accordingly, the area of civil discrimination inhibition to constitutional geographic that the Salsburg] . . Court emphasized . rights misplaced. [T]he [in classifi- Here, the substantive was and ‘local.’ matter ‘procedural’ purely 658-659, fn. .” cation is . . . discriminatory pp. cases,
In the second
group
dealing
apportionment,
high
court has held that accidents of
lines
geography
arbitrary boundary
of local government can afford no
for
ground
discrimination among
(Kurland,
state’s
Equal
citizens.
Educational Opportunity: The Limits of
Jurisprudence
Constitutional
(1968) 35 U.Chi.L.Rev.
Undefined
585;
Wise,
Schools,
see also
Rich
Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal
Educational
66-92.)
Opportunity
at
pp.
rejecting
Specifically
tempts
justify
on the basis of various
unequal districting
geographic
factors,
the court declared:
of votes because of
“Diluting
weight
place of residence
basic
impairs
constitutional
under the Fourteenth
rights
Amendment
as much
just
as invidious discriminations based
factors
upon
Illinois,
such as race
status,
or economic
[citation]
351 U.S.
Griffin
California,
Douglas v.
Defendants’ second argument boils down to
if
this:
the equal
protection clause commands that the relative wealth of school districts
29 Defendants also
that permitting
claim
school districts to
locally
retain their
property
raised
tax revenue
equal
does not violate
protection, because
power
“[t]he
legislature
of a
respect
to the allocation and
public
distribution of
funds is not
by any
limited
requirement of uniformity
equal protection
or of
of the laws.” As an
law,
proposition
abstract
clearly
this statement
overbroad.
example,
For
a state
Legislature
grants
cannot make tuition
segregated
from state
private
funds to
schools
integration.
(Brown
in order to avoid
v. South Carolina State Board
Education
(D.S.C. 1968)
199,
F.Supp.
(1968)
296
affd. mem.
391,
222
U.S.
L.Ed.2d
[21
449];
89 S.Ct.
Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial
(E.D.La.
Assistance Commission
1967)
833,
F.Supp.
affd.
780,
mem.
389 U.S. 571
[19
88 S.Ct.
The cases cited
inapplicable
defendants are
present
in the
context. Neither
Mullaney (9th
1954)
635,
Hess v.
Cir.
F.2d
Dewey
cert.
sub nom.
den.
Hess v.
50],
U.S. 836
L.Ed.
Corp.
S.Ct.
nor Gen. Amer. Tank Car
Day (1926)
direct same governmental services;30 would and such spell tax-supported principle public this argument. We reject destruction of local government. unhesitatingly conse- of such dire defendants’ unreasoned We cannot share apprehensions intimate no views other from our we holding today. Although quences that, services,31 its we satisfied as we have are explained, governmental education activities demonstrates among public clearly uniqueness clause. to the command respond must protection We, therefore, California arrive at these conclusions. The as to us complaint sup financing system, by plaintiffs’ presented noticed, matters since deals plemented by intimately judicially education, the reasons touches a fundamental interest. For obviously upon detail, we have this conditions the full entitlement explained system wealth, such interest on classifies its on the basis of col recipients their lective affluence and makes the of a child’s education upon quality depend the resources of his school district and upon ultimately pocketbook his findWe that such constituted is parents. system presently not to the attainment of state interest. necessary Since it any compelling does withstand not “strict it denies to the requisite scrutiny,” plaintiffs contention, support following 30 In quotation this defendants cite the from 288], Co. v. MacMillan Clarke 184 Cal. P. 17 A.L.R. upheld constitutionality in which we high individual providing of a statute free textbooks to pupils: system free school ... a service to the primarily “[T]he pupfis, community, just but to the police protection, public as fire and libraries, playgrounds, hospitals, and the other numerous service utilities taxation, needs, are provided by and minister to individual benefit of general public.” services, Whatever the case as to the other we think that in this era high geographic mobility, “general public” merely the* benefited education is not located, community particular where the schools are but the entire state. recently Circuit has note, however, for the Fifth Appeals that the Court 31 We *28 racially the to discriminate in forbids town equal clause protection held the that Shaw, Mississippi, Hawkins v. Town In municipal of services. provision Shaw, had affirmative Mississippi the town of court held that the 437 F.2d sewers, lighting, sanitary surface and paving equalize services as street duty to such applied the “strict hydrants. The decision drainage, and fire water mains water of the district court the decision and reversed scrutiny” equal protection standard infirmity. test, constitutional found no which, had relying traditional on the decision, intimated the court the basis of the Although was discrimination racial might also be invalid: city services provision the in wealth discrimination that based on municipal services discriminatory alleged provision the also “Appellants however, note, interesting that the to dropped appeal. on It is was wealth. This claim highly a classification race renders as well as that wealth Court has stated Supreme (Id. at scrutiny. exacting judicial [Citation.]” demanding of a more suspect thus and p. fn. If the laws.32 the the protection situated similarly and others equal - must fall sustained, system the financial allegations complaint be found unconstitutional. it must the statutes comprising and (cid:127)/
IV
of the equal
that
Defendants’ final contention is
the applicability
been
adversely
to
has
resolved
clause
school
already
financing
protection
in
affirmances
summary
claims
Court’s
plaintiffs’
McInnis
sub nom.
mem.
Shapiro, supra,
McInnis v.
affd.
293 F.Supp.
1197],
and
Ogilvie (1969)
Burruss v. Wilkerson in The trial court U.S. 44 S.Ct. 812]. instant cited defendants’ demurrers. action Mclnnis sustaining financing system,
The Mclnnis the Illinois school challenged plaintiffs California’s, which is and similar a violation of the equal protection wide due clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because process variations con- They districts among expenditures pupil. “only
tended funds ac- that which system financing apportions Fourteenth educational needs satisfies the cording students (Fn. (293 omitted.) Amendment.” at F.Supp. stated concluded that complaint federal district court
A three-judge Amend- reasons: the Fourteenth cause action “for two no principal be on made only does not that require expenditures ment needs, lack of man- the basis of educational judicially pupils’ omitted.) (Fn. standards makes this controversy nonjusticiable.” ageable added.) (293 329.) (Italics rejected at The court additionally F.Supp. of the strict standard
the applicability scrutiny equal protection it was ruled that the Illinois scheme was rational because their to allow localities to determine own tax burden individual “designed “|l]t Rights may well 32 The stated that be United States Commission Civil has tangible inequalities .present at exist between substantial fiscal and city equal . 14th and suburban school districts . . contravene the amendment’s Education, guarantee.” v. Board protection supra, Relying quotation on the Brown from “— education, all on provides provided ‘where State must ” — passage appear concluded this “would to render terms’ commission readily disparities which are identifiable—such as disparities least those substantial average average support, per pupil expenditure, pupil-teacher fiscal ratios— reapportionment cited the decisions and unconstitutional.” commission also *29 Illinois, supra, concluding, “Here, Griffin, v. as in the State be under no Griffin it, service, having obligation provide the but the State must provide undertaken substantially equal by is the rich' in poor insure that the benefit received as well as the 261, 282.) op. supra, (U.S. p. cit. Rights, on Civil fn. measure.” Commission 616 schools.” to the
according they place upon importance curiam 333.) affirmed at The United States Court Supreme p. and the judgment
the
order: “The motion to affirm granted
following
cases
S.Ct.
No
(394
89
U.S. 322
affirmed.”
order;
no oral
court’s
there
argument.33
cited in the
was
high
were
our
affirmance forecloses
that the
court’s
argue
summary
Defendants
high
We disagree.
examination of the issues involved.
independent
the
from
by
Since Mclnnis
Court
way
appeal
reached
Supreme
court,
discretionary.
was not
high
federal
the
court’s
three-judge
jurisdiction
circumstances,
cor-
(28
defendants are
(1964).)
U.S.C.
In these
§
the
rect
a decision on
affirmance is
stating
formally
summary
However,
merits.
the
is often
significance
such summary dispositions
Mclnnis,
unclear,
where, as in
no cases as author-
the court cites
especially
stated,
“It has
One commentator has
often been observed
ity
guidance.
merits,
that the
an
on
dismissal of
the
appeal,
adjudication
technically
inis
the substantial
of a denial of
often
certiorari.”34
practice
equivalent
(D. Currie,
Three-Judge
Litigation
The
District Court
Constitutional
1, 74,
had
(1964)
and Landis
32 U.Chi.L.Rev.
fn.
Frankfurter
earlier that the
docket and
of the court’s
differences
suggested
pressure
opinion
“to
among
operate
judges
subject
obligatory jurisdiction
of the court to
not unlike those
considerations
discretionary
governing
Landis,
certiorari.”
at
(Frankfurter
Supreme
&
Court
Business of
Term,
October
(1930)
14.) Between
44 Harv.L.Rev.
60 and
in recent
percent
have been
handled
appeals
years
summarily
(Stern
Gressman,
Supreme
op.
Court
at
without
&
cit.
opinion.
194.)35
constitutionality
Virginia
33 The plaintiffs
Burruss attacked
court,
scheme. The decision of the district
which dismissed their complaint
claim,
for
cursory,
legal
failure
containing
reasoning
relying
to state a
was
little
Shapiro
on McInnis v.
precedent. Consequently,
parties
instant action
Mclnnis,
have centered their
on
suit.
discussion
and we follow
34Although the Supreme Court
decision,
affirmed the Mclnnis
rather than dismiss
ing the appeal,
probably
Currie’s statement is
entirely applicable anyway.
upholding
In
decisions of
appeal,
lower
courts
the Supreme Court “will
appeal
affirm an
from
court,
a federal
but will dismiss an appeal from a state court ‘for want of a substantial
question.’
federal
Only history would
justify
(Stern
seem to
this distinction.
...”
&
Gressman, Supreme
(4th
Court
1969)
Practice
ed.
35 Summary disposition of a
case
Supreme
Court need not prevent
the court
holding
hearing
from later
a fuff
on the same
constitutionality
issue. The
of compul
sory
flag
salutes is a case
point.
For three
years—in
successive
Leoles
Landers
364];
U.S.
L.Ed.
Hering
58 S.Ct.
v. State Board
Education
Assuming,
light
as we must
of the
action,
and
material
of the first stated cause of
allegations
considering
noticed,
therewith
matters
we have judicially
the various
conjunction
1493],
thereby
tailor the to fit needs of these students (310 F.Supp. atp. State.” comprehensive financing, equal protection 37 Ina com article on and school three meaning Shapiro ambiguous; mentators have stated: “The is but Mclnnis setback, hardly Plessy Ferguson. Probably case a temporary seems another but predictable consequence was the court precipitous effort to force the upon parties decisive complex action novel and issue for which neither it nor the ready. intelligible theory . . left plaintiffs’ were . virtual absence of [T]he pace litigation, district court character of the confusion bewildered. Given inevitable, parties may foreordaining summary disposition court and have been eager of of appeal. The could not an issue Court have been consider formally magnitude on Concededly this such a record. its curiam affirmance merits, permanent on the withdrawal decision but it need not the Court’s imply significant protagonists It probably the field. admonition from most as an (Coons, Sugar to clarify options again invoking & before the Court’s aid.” Clune man, supra, 308-309.) at pp. Cal.L.Rev. hearing by court a federal district willingness to order a full Supreme Court’s Hargrave, (see Hargrave 401 U.S. Askew v. v. Kirk the issues raised equal protection
476), applicability consider the to us that it does not indicates Mclnnis Burruss. decisions in its clause educational foreclosed *31 we are satisfied that children have facts that the alleged showing plaintiff school denies public system, them laws financing protection because it substantial districts produces disparities among of revenue available amount for education.
The second stated of action incor by cause plaintiff parents has, course, the first cause of porating set forth the constitution sufficiently ally defective financing scheme. Additionally, allege they that parents are citizens and residents of Los that owners of Angeles are County; they real assessed that are some defendants property county; county officials; and that result of the as direct financing system they required taxes at pay rate than other districts in order higher many taxpayers to secure for their children the or same lesser educational opportunities. Plaintiff parents in the join plaintiff children prayer complaint that the be declared system unconstitutional that defendants be required to restructure the financial as to eliminate its unconsti present system'so tutional Such for relief and seeks to aspects. prayed strictly injunctive officers of a prevent from under an void law. county acting allegedly Plaintiff then have stated a cause of since parents clearly action “[i]f . . unconstitutional, . law is then officials from county may enjoined their time spending (Blair out its . . . .” Pitchess carrying provisions ante, (1971) 258, 42, 1242]; 486 P.2d Code Civ. [96 Cal.Rptr. Proc., 526a.)38 §
Bécause the third cause action reference incorporates by allegations of the first and second causes and seeks relief, simply declaratory it sets obviously forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. sum,
In we find the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint sufficient legally and we return the cause to the trial court for further We proceedings. emphasize, our decision is not a final on the judgment merits. We deem it appropriate to out point for the benefit of the trial court on (see remand Proc., Code'Civ. §43) if, after further proceedings, that court should enter final judgment that the determining existing system unconstitutional and said invalidating system in whole or in part, may for the properly provide enforcement of the in such a judgment as to way permit transition from an orderly uncon stitutional to a constitutional system school-financing. As in the cases of school (see Brown desegregation v. Board Education 349 U.S. L.Ed. 753]) [99 and legislative reapportion- 38 Although plaintiff parents bring state, against this action county well as officials, it has been held that state officers too be sued under section 526a. (Blair Pitchess, ante, 267; at p. Employees’ State Assn. v. Williams California (1970)-7 Cal.App.3d 305]; Ahlgren Cal.Rptr. v. Carr Cal.App.2d 252-254 Cal.Rptr. 270, 63 Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. v. Brown (see Silver merit that an 132]), plan governmental a determination existing P.2d invalidation does not necessarily require denies equal protection operation an immediate implementa to that undertaken plan acts pursuant past *32 Obviously, any judgment substitute. valid tion of a constitutionally make should of system invalidating existing until an remain is to system operable appropriate that the existing clear laws, can of is not violative equal protection new system, effect. into put of educa- further the cherished idea American our we holding today
By shall available free schools make a democratic society tion that in This the credo of was gifts learning. all children the abundant equally Mann, this of which has been the and heritage inspiration Horace of believe,” wrote, “in the immortal great, “I he existence country. — law, ethics, or natural ante- immutable natural principle principle institutions, any to all human and abrogated by cedent being incapable right . . absolute education ordinance of man . which proves course, world, which, human comes into the being that every correlative to see the means of every government proves duty italics.) (Old for all. . . South (Original that education .” provided V, (Tenth No. 109 Annual to Mass. Leaflets 177-180 Report pp. Ed.), (1963
State Bd. of in American Education Lucio quoted Readings ed.) to the reversed and the'cause remanded trial court judgment to overrule a reasonable the demurrers to allow defendants
directions time within which to answer. J., Burke, J., Peters, J., Tobriher, Mosk, J., J., C. concurred.
Wright, McCOMB, J. would affirm ex- I dissent. the reasons I. judgment Mr. Justice Dunn in him for the Court pressed by opinion prepared in Serrano v. Priest 345. (Cal. App.) Cal.Rptr. Appeal denied for a was October rehearing Respondents’ petition J., McComb, was above. was and the modified to read opinion printed that the should be the opinion petition granted.