This is an interlocutory appeal in a case in which the state seeks a death sentence. We address two issues: (1) the scope of permissible “victim impact” evidence, and (2) whether the defendant was entitled to a preliminary expert evaluation of hospital records to determine if the cause of one victim’s death might legitimately be disputed.
1. We first address the scope of permissible “victim impact” evidence. Victim impact evidence has been defined as “simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question.”
Payne v. Tennessee,
501
*287
U. S. __ (111 SC 2597, 2608, 115 LE2d 720) (1991). The type of evidence offered as victim impact evidence may vary, and has included evidence of the personal characteristics of the victim and of the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family,
Payne,
supra, 111 SC at 2604, as well as evidence of a victim’s “family members’ opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant,”
Booth v. Maryland,
In the instant case, the state seeks to introduce evidence not only of the personal characteristics of the two victims and of the emotional impact of the crimes on the victims’ families, but also of the emotional impact of the crimes on the community and of the psychological and physical impact of the crimes on the victims’ families and community. All of this evidence is properly characterized as victim impact evidence. Sermons moved to prohibit the introduction of such evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
The state relies upon
Payne v. Tennessee,
supra, 111 SC, in support of its contention that its victim impact evidence is admissible. In
Payne,
the United States Supreme Court overruled much of both
Booth v. Maryland,
supra, 482 U. S., and
South Carolina v. Gathers,
However, as the defendant argues, Payne does not require that victim impact evidence be admitted in death-penalty cases; it merely holds
that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence . . . the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. [Payne, supra, 111 SC at 2609.]
*288 The question to be answered, then, is the extent to which Georgia law permits the introduction of victim impact evidence.
In
Muckle v. State,
We emphasize, however, that Muckle does not preclude the state from introducing evidence that is admissible for purposes other than demonstrating victim impact if that evidence also incidentally conveys that the defendant’s crime has had victim impact consequences. 3 For instance, at the guilt phase of the trial, some facts about the victims, including, possibly, some of their personal characteristics, will inevitably be developed, not only because the jurors must be provided “those details of context that allow them to understand what is being described,” Payne, supra, 111 SC at 2617 (Souter, J., concurring), but also because evidence relating to the victims’ character and personality may be probative of critical aspects of the trial — for example, the defendant’s claim of self-defense or provocation. This type of evidence remains admissible at the guilt phase of the trial, and may be considered by the jury at the punishment phase.
2. After reviewing the medical evidence proffered by the defense, we conclude the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for preliminary expert review of hospital records to make a threshold determination of whether the cause of death as to one of the victims was likely to be a significant factor in his defense. See
Roseboro v. State,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
No evidence of this kind was introduced in Payne. The Payne Court therefore did not have to address Booth’s holding that the Eighth Amendment barred such evidence.
Although Muckle’s holding has been superseded in non-capital cases by the adoption of OCGA §§ 17-10-1.1 and 17-10-1.2, those statutes specifically exempt death-penalty cases from their scope. Accordingly, Muckle is still the law in death-penalty cases.
See generally
Brown v. State,